By Dan Middlemiss, 3 July 2025
There has been a flurry of interest of late in the prospect of the navy acquiring corvette-sized warships to augment the currently planned RCN fleet.
However, we should not forget that the RCN on several occasions has examined this option before. Here are a few brief highlights of DND’s consideration of corvettes in its force planning from the 1970s and later.
The Cases
In a 25 January 1974 ship design study, “CF Report on Surface Warship Study,” DGMEM/DMEM 5 (PD) October 1973-January 1974, one option reviewed was based on a 1,500 ton corvette design.
The federal Cabinet had directed DND to “take into account the possible advantages of smaller ships more suitable and economical for use as back up for fisheries enforcement.” However, further studies subsequently ruled out an armed patrol ship, despite Cabinet’s insistence that the option be examined. Why? Smaller ships for sovereignty purposes (‘sovereignty ships’) could not carry out the priority NATO roles and missions.
17 July 1980 Memorandum to the Minister DND from the CDS and the DM DND, “Future Ship Study – Follow-On Options to the Canadian Patrol Frigate,” with an attached “Future Ship Study - CPF Follow-On Options,” 6 June 1980. A synopsis was later publicly released in the House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, No. 31, Appendix ‘EAND-20,’ 19 March 1981. The study reaffirmed earlier findings that “ships require a minimum displacement of 3,000 tons, a sustained speed of 25 knots in Sea State 5 and an endurance of 4,500 nautical miles to meet the sea keeping, mobility and flexibility and capability requirements. Only the CPF will be capable of meeting these capability requirements.”
We should note that the Canadian Senate also considered the possibility of smaller vessels, although these were less capable than corvette-sized ships. In its May 1983 Senate Report on Canada’s Maritime Defence, the Senate recommended adding 12 missile-equipped, fast patrol boats to the RCN and provided the following rationale:
“(e) Patrol vessels and their systems.
Small high-speed patrol vessels, useful for Regular Force and Reserve training purposes, Naval-Officer-in-Charge (NOIC) duties, coastal patrol, sovereignty surveillance and control, and rounding up enemy fishing and merchant vessels in time of war, would require for those duties little more than a good radar, good communications systems and a small-calibre gun. Equipped, at more expense, with a more sophisticated radar and surface-to-surface missiles, they could provide significant opposition to surface intruders, since they are hard to detect. and the missile would give them significant punch at long-range." (p.49)
At the time, I recall an admiral telling me that the RCN wanted nothing to do with this concept because it would detract from its priority concern of acquiring a fleet of CPFs.
A September 1990 Defence Policy Statement indicated that Ottawa wanted up to 6 corvettes, with 4 to enter service within 15 years. (See Peter Haydon, “What’s Wrong with Corvettes?”, Canada’s Navy Annual, 1991). In general terms, this plan was confirmed in Canadian Defence 1992. The Canadian public became aware of this plan in Vice-Admiral Thomas’ Letter of Resignation, which states in part:
"I am also unable to accept a policy proposal which will minimize the capability and future development of the Maritime Forces by affirming that the centre of interest for these forces be in Canadian coastal waters (east and west). I would agree that the centre of day-to-day activity may be in Canadian coastal waters. That is why we must progress and build the MCDV vessels. However, inshore requirements alone cannot determine the kinds of ships and submarine required for the future. It is a fact that blue-water, mid-ocean, combat-capable warships, in combination with the MCDV, can do any work Canada needs done at sea.... Corvettes can’t. They have neither the reach nor the seakeeping. The Corvettes proposed are just a code for ‘spend less money.’ Unfortunately, they are the wrong ships and they won’t be cheap."
Concluding Note
I have not sought to provide my own analysis of the relative merits of corvettes as compared to larger surface combatants.
For most of these cases, less capable ships were perceived by senior navy officials as diverting scarce funds from the most capable and most flexible warship programs the RCN preferred.
Today, by way of contrast, there appears to be more emphasis on viewing corvettes as complementary assets adding to overall fleet capability, and focused on performing different roles.
Image: 221202-N-EB711-1006 ARABIAN GULF (Dec. 2, 2022) Guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) sails next to Turkish Navy corvette TCG Burgazada (F-513) in the Arabian Gulf, Dec. 2. The Sullivans is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to help ensure maritime security and stability in the Middle East region. (U.S. Navy photo by Sonar Technician (Surface) 1st Class Kevin Frus)
21 thoughts on “The RCN’s ‘Other’ Experiences with Corvettes: A Short Recap”
Outdated Threat Assessments and Strategic Assumptions
The historical objections to corvettes stem from Cold War-era thinking, where the focus was on blue-water, NATO-assigned anti-submarine warfare and task group operations in the North Atlantic. The 1974, 1980, and 1990 studies referenced were designed to support a binary fleet model: either large combatants or inshore patrol craft. This doctrinal rigidity no longer applies in a 21st-century multi-domain environment marked by distributed lethality, grey zone threats, and rapid technological change.
Shifting Geopolitical and Operational Realities
Today’s threat environment includes:
– Saturation drone attacks, swarming tactics, and hybrid threats close to home.
– Expanded domestic maritime responsibilities in the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic.
– Low-intensity maritime security operations, such as embargo enforcement, drug interdiction and fisheries protection.
Corvettes are ideally suited for these mission sets, filling the gap between expensive destroyers and lightly armed coastal patrol vessels.
Modern Corvettes Are Not Yesterday’s Boats
The corvette designs considered in the 1970s–90s were often simplistic, lightly armed, and with limited sensors. That is no longer the case. Today’s corvettes (e.g., MEKO A-100, Gowind, Ada-class, Sa’ar 6) offer:
– Modular payloads and multi-role flexibility
– Modern sensors and strike weapons (NSM, CAMM)
– Adequate endurance (3,000–5,000 nm), seakeeping, and C4ISR capabilities
– Much lower lifecycle and operating costs than major surface combatants
Importantly, modern corvettes can now be equipped with the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, enabling them to carry up to 24 VLS cells. This brings corvettes into the realm of layered air and missile defense, and allows them to integrate into Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) networks with destroyers, contributing to fleet-wide air defence and missile strike operations. These corvettes aren’t just patrol boats, they are credible, networked combatants.
Fleet Composition and Resource Allocation
The argument that corvettes “divert resources” from more capable warships ignores modern budget realities. Canada’s River-class Destroyer (RCD) will deliver only 15 ships over a multi-decade timeframe. With a looming capability gap and limited hull numbers, complementary vessels are essential to:
– Free up destroyers for high-end warfare
– Increase presence in low-threat environments
– Sustain operations during maintenance cycles or crises
Corvettes would augment — not replace — major combatants. They offer quantity with quality.
Past Attitudes Conflicted with Long-Term Needs
Vice-Admiral Thomas’ 1990s-era resignation letter reflected legitimate fears at the time about coastal-only force planning. But that argument misrepresents what modern corvettes can do. The view that corvettes “can’t” operate mid-ocean is no longer accurate. Many NATO states field corvette-sized ships for open ocean escort, surveillance and deterrence, including France, Italy, Germany, and Israel.
Furthermore, the concern that smaller vessels would dominate fleet planning is no longer valid in a force mix model, where each platform has a clearly defined role.
International Benchmarking Supports Corvette Acquisition
Many allied states are embracing corvette and light frigate classes as integral to fleet strategy. For example:
– US Navy: deploying Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and developing Constellation-class frigates
– UK Royal Navy: investing in Type 31 general-purpose frigates
– Germany and Israel: maintaining heavily armed corvettes for regional and expeditionary roles
Canada risks strategic irrelevance in presence operations and allied burden-sharing without a similar tiered fleet approach.
Conclusion
The historical dismissal of corvettes by the RCN was rooted in Cold War-era priorities and a constrained view of naval force structure. These assessments are now outdated. Corvettes are not a substitute for destroyers, they are enablers of a more persistent, agile and cost-effective maritime presence.
Modern corvettes equipped with MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems and 24 VLS cells bring real warfighting power to the fleet and can plug directly into the RCN’s high-end force architecture. They provide valuable magazine depth, increase the number of platforms in the battlespace, and allow River-class Destroyers to focus on the most demanding tasks.
A modern RCN must embrace a multi-tiered fleet that includes destroyers, Arctic patrol vessels, submarines, and a new class of missile-armed corvettes to secure Canada’s maritime interests across all domains, at home and abroad.
For a bit more on the modern corvette thinking in the RCN, see:
“Defending Canada At Home And Abroad”
Vice-Admiral Topshee on The Herle Burly podcast
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvFhCh9rQrQ
See also, this speculative commentary:
“Let’s talk about the Continental Defence Corvette”
Noah
True North Strategic Review
6 July 2025
https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-the-continental-defence
Big questions are, when and where will these corvettes be built? Insistence on “Canadian-designed, Canadian-equipped, and Canadian-made” – and we can be certain this will arise from our industry – will be the death-knell for this concept.
Appreciate the links, the Herle Burly interview with VAdm Topshee does offer valuable insights into evolving naval strategy, and Noah’s speculative take raises fair questions. That said, the idea that “Canadian-designed, Canadian-equipped, and Canadian-made” will be the death-knell of the Continental Defence Corvette (CDC) project deserves scrutiny.
We’ve heard this argument before — that domestic shipbuilding is inherently too costly or inefficient. Yet, we must remember that the intent behind building in Canada isn’t just about ships, it’s about sovereignty, industrial resilience and maintaining critical capabilities. The National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) exists for this very reason.
Yes, insisting on full domestic production may mean higher upfront costs, but it also means long-term economic return through jobs, tax revenue and industrial capability. More importantly, it guarantees we’re not reliant on foreign yards for warships that defend our territory and interests.
Furthermore, the CDC if smartly scoped could avoid the mistakes of past projects. Leverage proven hull designs. Integrate off-the-shelf subsystems. Use modularity and automation to drive down crew requirements and operating costs. And crucially, start small and iteratively, rather than designing for every possible mission on day one.
Lastly, the real death knell for any future fleet initiative won’t be domestic content it’ll be indecision, endless redefinition, and lack of political will. If we believe corvettes fill a real operational gap, especially as ‘wingmen’ to the River-class and to relieve high end assets from low end tasks, then we need to commit and make the NSS work for this class too.
Let’s stop assuming failure is inevitable and start demanding success is engineered.
Thank you Ted. Well said.
Ubique,
Les
Ted,
Believe it or not, I am a strong supporter of the idea that the RCN acquire a substantial number of Tier-2 warships in the 2,000-4,000 ton range. Canada needs these now, not in 20 years from now!
I suspect I will enrage many readers when I say that by the time the River-class is finally operational in the late 2030 period, the ships will be Tier-2 warships in terms of firepower. In saying this, I am discounting the inevitable rejoinder that future batches of the RCD will have significantly more firepower – all without compromising delivery schedules, which are currently projected to accelerate miraculously somehow in the 2039-2050 period when Canada plans to have a total of 12 RCD, with a ‘goal’ of 15 ships. And all this without significantly increasing the program costs. So my preferred outcome would be for ISI to complete the first, inordinately expensive batch of RCD, then follow-up with a sizable number of CDCs. I recognize that, politically, this will likely not happen, and even if it did, we would find a way to turn a relatively cheap CDC into a multi-billion dollar per ship program.
I note as well that you project 24 VLS for the CDC, which will be the same number as for the initial 3 RCD. Clearly, we are talking about a much larger corvette than the current 1,000 ton limit the NSS allots to Canadian shipbuilders, other than Irving, Seaspan, or Davie. So where will this new Canadian-designed corvette be built? The 3 current NSS shipbuilders have their order books completely filled for the next couple of decades. Therefore, Ottawa could, again, relax its own NSS rules and allow yet another Canadian shipbuilder to take on the corvettes. Team Vigilance, headquartered in Vancouver, springs to mind, and there has been much speculation about its prospective offering.
See,
“Let’s talk about Vigilance”
Noah
True North Strategic Review
30 January 2025
https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-vigilance
Of course, then would follow the inevitable requests for additional infrastructure funds to get ready for construction etc, and then Canada would be saddled with a fourth shipyard to continue to prop up for ‘sovereignty’ reasons, and to avoid the inevitable bust period that would follow the corvette program.
Given that the NSS has not delivered a single vessel on time and on budget to date (for reasons I concede that have more to do with Ottawa than our shipbuilders), I find it very difficult to be as optimistic as you are about the prospects for the CDC.
Respectfully, this argument presents a false dichotomy and makes several assumptions that don’t hold up to a realistic appraisal of Canada’s naval needs or industrial potential.
Yes, the River-class Destroyer (RCD) program is costly and complex, but this is by design. It is a top tier, globally deployable surface combatant intended to replace the Halifax-class with vastly superior anti-air, anti-submarine and command-and-control capabilities. Dismissing the RCDs as “Tier-2 in firepower” by the late 2030s is misleading. This class will field some of the most advanced systems in the Western world, including SPY-7 radar, integrated electronic warfare, and up to 24 Mk 41 VLS cells from the outset, with growth potential. Future-proofing is embedded in their design, and significant modularity is planned.
Calling them Tier 2 due to timelines or initial loadouts ignores the evolving nature of naval warfare, lifecycle upgrades, and the fact that no credible near peer warship deploys at full potential from hull #1.
Regarding the Continental Defence Corvette (CDC), yes, there is room and need for a complementary Tier 2 vessel but not as a substitute or fallback. These ships should augment, not replace, Canada’s high end combat capability. The problem isn’t that the CDC will become “multi-billion dollar ships.” It’s that we treat any program requiring upfront investment in design, production and people as inherently wasteful. This mindset is precisely why projects take too long, we wait until we need them, then panic.
The CDC should be developed in tandem with the RCD, not in its shadow. That requires deliberate strategic investment now, not delay disguised as cynicism.
As for where these corvettes will be built: Canada doesn’t lack industrial space, we lack political will. Saint John can be revitalized. Vancouver (Seaspan) can expand. Davie will soon be certified for combatants. Or yes, a fourth yard such as Team Vigilance or revitalized Thunder Bay could be introduced. These decisions should be driven by fleet need and national resilience, not a fear of supporting “too much shipbuilding.”
Canada already underbuilds relative to its maritime domain. More shipbuilding capacity is not a liability, it’s strategic infrastructure.
Finally, invoking the NSS as a failed program is disingenuous. It rebuilt a collapsed industry from near zero, created thousands of jobs, delivered five AOPS (with more ahead), and set the groundwork for RCD construction. Yes, timelines and costs are problematic but they are improving, and lessons from AOPS and JSS are directly informing the RCD approach.
In summary:
We need both the RCD and CDC programs. Not one at the expense of the other.
Firepower comparisons should account for upgrade potential and operational role, not snapshot VLS counts. Industrial expansion is an investment in national security, not a handout. NSS criticism ignores real successes and necessary learning curves. Defeatism is not strategy. Let’s stop thinking small, and start planning smart.
I can accepts that many readers are of the ‘glass half full’ persuasion, but I am also aware of the adage about the definition of insanity – doing the same thing over and over (always with a rosy outlook, nothing ever can go wrong) and expecting a different outcome. I am suggesting that the historical record of Canadian naval shipbuilding is far from one that would inspire unfettered confidence in the prospects for the current round of shipbuilding.
I am pleased to note that some are finally acknowledging that the premises of the NSS are badly flawed. The original NSS concept was for existential reduction in the then unsustainable number of naval shipyards whereby each would get a small piece of the construction pie. The initial NSS plan was for a single shipyard which could handle all the anticipated government fleet renewal projects. For political reasons, the number was increased to two shipyards where well-sequenced load-levelling schedules would be the order of the day. Now the number of yards is up to 3 and soon maybe that will become 4 or even more yards.
I agree that Canada’s extremely urgent sovereignty and defence requirements, as articulated by our topmost political and military leaders as well as by numerous other alliance leaders, absolutely justify an all-out acceleration of all of our shipbuilding projects, but especially of Ottawa’s naval warship programs. So let’s stop kowtowing to our shipbuilders and get them building NOW, not in 10 years or more when they, and many in the suffocating DND bureaucracy, deign it feasible. If this entrenched, risk-averse, coddled, and self-interested coterie cannot or will not deliver, then I agree that we should by-pass (or fire) them and find planners and builders who are prepared to do the job – wherever they may be found. We do not need a complacent cohort of people who are hooked on building a sovereign capacity for some distant future. That will be too late – and certainly the currently planned schedule of less than a handful of RCD by 2040 will be far too late.
Oh but wait, here is another hard reality, and not a mere defeatist assumption. The recent report of the Office of the Procurement Ombudsman observes:
“An area that survey respondents felt would benefit defence procurement is the
establishment of a VPM (Vendor Performance Management) framework, further
cementing its importance as one of the top foundational changes listed above.
One survey respondent stated that they believed “a major issue with defence
procurement is major suppliers know they won’t really get punished for failing
to meet requirements and that “Canada will always pay” is pretty much their
philosophy. Another survey respondent opined that “Canada’s unwillingness
to enforce contracts with Defense Contractors has clearly resulted in Canada
receiving inferior products at significantly higher cost (JSS [Joint Support Ship],
OOSV [Offshore oceanographic science vessel]). The contractors can deliver
what we want when we want at the cost we want they just know they do not
have to and take advantage of Canadian Taxpayers as a result. Simplifying and
streamlining procurement is also critical to improve end results as well”. [emphasis added, Time for Solutions: Top 5 Foundational Changes Needed in Federal Procurement, 8 July 2025]
If we are truly investing in national security, let’s demand that we have our defence planners and shipbuilders deliver as they keep saying they can. No more excuses about having to start from scratch with so many ‘challenges’ to overcome. We do need successes and we need them today, not decades from now. In the process Ottawa needs to re-evaluate what it really needs our navy to do. We are never going to able to challenge the major peer navies, so we should stop pretending that we will be able to.
Dan, with respect, your latest remarks come across as cynical defeatism wrapped in selective outrage and oversimplified hindsight.
You say you support acquiring a fleet of corvette sized warships and yet nearly every follow-up post you’ve made since has undermined that very goal by repeating long debunked arguments about shipbuilding futility and throwing shade at every aspect of the NSS. You can’t have it both ways.
On Your Dismissal of the NSS
You paint the NSS as fatally flawed, but that ignores real, measurable progress:
Five Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships delivered and in service or sea trials.
Joint Support Ships in construction and reaching completion.
Davie certified as the third yard, unlocking further capacity.
Shipbuilding jobs, apprenticeship pipelines, and IRB/ITB benefits active across the country.
Was the NSS slow out of the gate? Absolutely. It rebuilt an industry from cold ash. But calling it a failure while ignoring every structural milestone achieved is like criticizing a marathoner for being tired at the halfway point after running uphill for 20km. Let’s not pretend a single yard, in today’s world, could have built everything on time and on budget either. That’s a fantasy.
On the “VLS Count” and Firepower Dismissal
You assert that by the time the River-class destroyers arrive, they’ll be “Tier-2” ships because others may have more VLS cells? That ignores the modular and scalable design of the RCD. Initial batches will carry 24 Mk 41 cells, with space for growth. More importantly, they’ll field SPY-7 radar, state-of-the-art EW, and advanced ASW capabilities – a full spectrum, blue water combatant platform built for the next 40 years. It’s not about how many cells you have on Day 1; it’s what you can integrate over the lifecycle.
Let’s also remember: No navy launches their best-equipped hull first — not the US, not the UK, and certainly not Canada. Iterative capability builds are normal, and planned. You’re judging the fleet by a snapshot, not the trajectory.
On Domestic Industry and the “Fourth Yard”
You raise concerns about adding a fourth shipyard. But that’s a false dilemma. Expanding Canadian shipbuilding is not a burden, it’s a strategic investment.
Davie is expanding. Seaspan is diversifying. Team Vigilance, Thunder Bay, and revitalized Saint John are all viable candidates to produce smaller combatants, with modest infrastructure upgrades. The UK is building Type 31s in Rosyth without sinking the rest of its industrial base. Germany maintains multiple yards producing corvettes and frigates simultaneously.
If corvettes are built to smart, proven designs with off-the-shelf systems and Canadian integration, there is no reason they must balloon into $2B per unit ships unless Ottawa lets that happen.
And here’s the irony, you agree Canada needs these ships “now, not in 20 years.” But then you complain about building capacity to deliver them. You’re criticizing the only pathway that would actually allow your desired outcome.
The Real Problem Isn’t the NSS, It’s Procurement Culture
Here’s where we do agree: the system is overly bureaucratic, slow and risk averse. The Procurement Ombudsman report is damning but it’s also exactly why Canada needs to fix procurement culture, not abandon domestic capability.
Yes, contracts must be enforced. Yes, vendor accountability must improve. But gutting the NSS or abandoning sovereign capacity is not the answer. You don’t fix a clogged engine by tossing out the whole car.
You close by saying Canada “should stop pretending” it can compete with peer navies. That’s a false premise. Canada isn’t trying to match the US or China. It’s building a balanced, layered fleet that contributes to allied operations and defends one of the largest maritime zones on Earth.
Corvettes like the proposed CDC are not distractions – they’re essential enablers. And if you genuinely support their acquisition, as you claim, then perhaps it’s time to stop reinforcing narratives that guarantee their failure.
We don’t need pessimism masquerading as realism. We need leadership, investment and belief in our ability to succeed.
Ted,
This thread has gone far beyond the confines of corvettes, and I do acknowledge from long experience that rational thought and strongly held beliefs do not easily co-exist.
It is the NSS, not me, which proclaimed that two major shipyards was the most that Canada could support to avoid the familiar boom-and-bust syndrome that Canada has experienced since 1945. Now the thinking seems to be that the more yards the merrier, because they are investments in a sovereign future.
And a belief in a benign future when these investments eventually deliver is at odds with what most military (including RCN) leaders currently foresee in a fast diminishing strategic window.
However, if we were in Israel’s, Ukraine’s, or South Korea’s and Taiwan’s shoes, we would not be so sanguine about the time the world has before serious conflicts engulf it. In the 2008-2010 period when the NSS and the CSC/RCD was being conceived, the geopolitics looked far different. Hence the CSC ‘humanitarian’ mission bay etc. Now, I concede that most Western states, not just Canada, got the future wrong back then, but my argument is that many of these states are currently scrambling to rectify their earlier mistakes. Canada shows few signs of any sense of real urgency to alter course. Without saying so, you appear to believe that Canada has time on its side, and all will be well when things return to normal between 2040 and 2050. I do not share your belief. Conflict is coming, and we are not truly preparing. This is a reality I think you are not addressing.
My opinion, and yes it is nothing more than that, is that Canada needs to procure many more, cheaper, and less capable warships (corvette-plus?) – except for urgently needed submarines – to take care of our own backyard. If Canadian yards can help construct these, then fine. But we may have to consider foreign yards with proven track records, even if the end product is not ideal in terms of our optimal requirements. Quantity has a quality of its own, and quantity NOW trumps quality down the road. Three RCD in 2040 will not help very much.
I absolutely share your concern with the lack of real political leadership, but my focus is on the misapplication of Canada’s existing shipbuilding capacity. Our major shipbuilders have their initial contracts now, and they know they have the navy and Ottawa over a barrel. I could go on at length about why that is so, but the historical reality is that once contracts are signed, there is next to nothing in the way of enforcing penalty clauses and warranties, etc., that can induce them to produce on time and within budget. Your depiction of NSS accomplishments rings hollow, especially in terms of warships constructed. As matters stand, all the grand plans of the RCN and the optimistic schedules and spreadsheets of our major naval shipbuilders cannot mask the fact that at best, Canada will be reduced to about 3 RCD and 5 or so Halifax-class warships by 2039-2040. This is not defeatism or pessimism, it is a reality.
The true ‘defeatism’ alas may come because our hopes and beliefs for a happy, secure future are revealed to be nothing more than wishful thinking.
Reply to Ted Barnes 11 Jul 25 post @17:21
Good afternoon Ted,
Thank you for continuing to be one of the most authoritative, thoughtful, and relevant posters on this forum. Thank you also for this debunking of another “The sky is falling. Let’s slip our throats” commentary.
Ubique,
Les
Dan Middlemiss rightly points out that this thread has strayed beyond corvettes, and in doing so, he reiterates his familiar critiques of the NSS. But let’s clarify a few fundamental misconceptions particularly regarding why the NSS is structured the way it is, and why some of the criticism, though well meaning, lacks context or overlooks essential realities.
First, it’s important to understand why the NSS committed to two shipyards. This was not arbitrary. Canada has never had more than two full capacity naval shipyards operating simultaneously for sustained periods without plunging into unsustainable boom bust cycles. The choice of two yards — Irving for combatants, Seaspan for non-combatants — was informed by historical precedent, workforce limitations, industrial base realities, and the need for predictable output and program management. Expanding that capacity isn’t as simple as awarding more contracts. It requires long term workforce development, secure design data, consistent federal program oversight, and a stable demand signal, all of which take years to cultivate.
Middlemiss criticizes the NSS for delays and inefficiencies, but fails to acknowledge that the very purpose of the strategy was to end the cycle of foreign buys and haphazard emergency shipbuilding. Before NSS, Canada lacked any naval shipbuilding capacity. NSS has reversed that: not quickly, but methodically. For example, over a dozen large vessels have been launched or delivered since NSS began, including AOPVs, Coast Guard vessels, and support ships like MV Asterix. Warships take longer — always have, always will especially when built to high-end NATO interoperability standards and adapted from complex foreign designs like the Type 26.
The suggestion to build “many more, cheaper, less capable” warships at foreign yards may sound appealing, but it ignores critical facts. Foreign shipbuilding means foreign jobs, foreign sustainment chains, and foreign availability timelines and likely a loss of any semblance of sovereign control over our industrial base. It also fails to account for lifecycle costs and the difficulty of maintaining multiple foreign designs in a fleet with finite personnel and training bandwidth.
He argues that NSS contracts are too rigid and unenforceable. But this again ignores the practicalities of naval acquisition. Once designs are locked in and contracts signed, there are few Western countries, even the United States, that can easily shift course without immense cost and political fallout. Enforcement mechanisms exist, but cancelling or altering shipbuilding contracts midstream is often more disruptive than completion delays. It’s easy to say ‘do better,’ but the reality is that complex warship construction is rarely fast, cheap, or linear particularly when building for the first time in a generation.
Finally, Dan warns of future conflict and implies the RCN is sleepwalking toward irrelevance. The reality is that Canadian defence planners are acting, but within the limitations of personnel, industry and politics. You don’t fix a 30-year neglect cycle with a press release or a panic buy. You rebuild capability deliberately. You don’t throw out the NSS; you iterate it possibly with complementary foreign built stopgaps if needed, but without sacrificing the long-term goal: a self-sustaining, sovereign naval construction base.
The NSS is not perfect, no national program of its scale ever is. But it is delivering. And it is the only viable path to ensuring Canada has a capable and self-reliant fleet in the decades ahead. Defeatism masquerading as urgency doesn’t build ships. Persistence, strategic patience and investment in Canadian workers and shipyards does.
Ted,
As always you make many excellent points, and I would be prepared to concede that you are right about most of them were it not for one key point where we fundamentally differ. That concerns the imminence of conflict and what we are doing to be prepared for it, if such conflict comes when our political and military leaders are predicting it will – sooner than later. Yes, we can all scoff and say this is just alarmism, but can we afford to be wrong?
The NSS is geared to peacetime, and thus far we have seen little evidence that the naval programs it encompasses can be quickly surged to meet the greatly altered strategic situation that many argue now confronts us. Perhaps it can, and I would happily sacrifice boom-and-bust avoidance to accelerated construction schedules even if this requires many more Canadian shipyards all pulling together. You do not see Ukraine, which does not even have a real navy, arguing that it should wait and see how a domestic shipbuilding strategy works itself out over the next 10-15 years in order to support a sovereign shipbuilding capacity, nor does it make excuses for its slow progress based on coming late to the party. No, facing an existential threat it is on the highest level of war footing.
And, I ask again as I have in posts before, just how ‘sovereign’ and nationally controlled is our domestic shipbuilding industry when the vast majority of its naval systems are foreign supplied and foreign controlled (eg., via the US Foreign Military Sales)?
So there is my central concern and if that is defeatism, so be it. However, many far better minds than mine are suggesting that the real threat is right now. Canada needs to prepare its defences immediately, not build capacity for some distant future ‘decades ahead.’ So how do we get on with that job?
Good afternoon Dan,
This post has helped me understand much better the motivation behind many of your posts.
I would ask you, though, to confirm which future conflict(s) you see as appearing soon enough to justify massive changes to the NSS. The specific nature of these likely, future threats will significantly affect the required shape of the CAF and the RCN; distant conflicts on the far side of the Pacific will almost certainly require different ships (or combinations thereof) than ones that occur in our coastal waters.
Thank you.
Ubique,
Les
Les,
I am chiefly guided by the professional assessments of our current and previous CDS, previous MND, top NATO officials, and our current RCN Commander. In an August 2024 interview VAdm Topshee stated: “I think General Carignan’s 5-year timeline is as good as anything we’re going to get. I think we have to recognize the reality that our current procurement setup means that we are looking at 15 to 20 years before we deliver a full spectrum of capability in any project that we do…” Note that most of these Canadian assessments were made prior to the ongoing upheaval Canada now confronts with the Trump administration.
There has been a good deal of analysis of the PRC’s accelerating military production and what it portends for Taiwan, Oceania, the South China Sea and beyond. While I think the so-called ‘Davidson window’ of the PRC being prepared to blockade or invade Taiwan by 2027 is perhaps too extreme, it seems clear that both in its military exercises and its diplomacy, the PRC is probing for vulnerabilities in Western defences – and is finding plenty.
Then again, we have actual conflicts underway in the Red Sea and the Middle East, and several NATO countries fear Russia’s plans sparked by its Ukraine adventure. All these hot-spots have the potential to spread, and Canada would likely be drawn into some. Our previous CDS has stated that both Russia and China already consider themselves to be at war with Canada. Finally, the Arctic has seemingly gained in strategic importance in the past year or so.
So, I think 2030 is as good a milestone as any for Canada’s defence preparations. Note that the first of the RCD is not scheduled for operational use until “about 2035″ according to VAdm Topshee.
Of course, it would take a far longer and deeper analysis than this to examine the the various threats engulfing Canada, and I have touched briefly upon my concerns about the NSS warship schedules in the Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 20, issues 1 and 2 (2024).
Dan, your concerns about urgency are not without merit, but your solution risks doing more harm than good. Canada cannot afford to jettison strategic planning and industrial sovereignty for a kneejerk reaction rooted in panic. What you’re proposing abandoning the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) model for a short-term surge of distributed shipbuilding will not produce usable warships in time nor build lasting capability. It will replicate the very boom-and-bust chaos the NSS was designed to avoid, wasting money, scattering resources, and delivering little of enduring value.
Yes, Ukraine is at war. But Canada is not. And unlike Ukraine, Canada has the luxury and the obligation to invest in sustainable defence infrastructure. You invoke Ukraine as if its emergency measures are a model for long-term naval procurement. They are not. Ukraine has no navy left to speak of because for decades it failed to build one. Now it improvises with drones and missiles, not destroyers. That is not a template; it’s a cautionary tale.
Moreover, the notion that our sovereignty is compromised by using allied-sourced systems is misleading. Every NATO navy interoperates with allies and draws on FMS frameworks for key systems. Canada does so by choice not due to a lack of sovereignty, but to enhance interoperability, efficiency and access to proven systems. The US, UK, Germany and Australia all rely on each other’s technologies without sacrificing strategic autonomy.
What you call “alarmism” is, in fact, a demand for impulsive reindustrialization without a workforce, a design, or a yard to carry it out. That doesn’t build capacity, it burns it out.
If you want urgency, then press for acceleration within the NSS framework. Expand existing yard throughput. Push for design finalization and materials procurement today. Incentivize skilled labour development now. Accelerate without scattering.
The NSS isn’t peacetime idealism. It’s imperfect, yes, but it’s the only viable path to fielding credible, sovereign naval power in this decade and the next. Scrapping it midstream would do what our adversaries hope we’ll do, abandon strategy for political expedience and emerge with nothing.
If you believe conflict is imminent, then don’t advocate tearing down the structure we’ve finally begun to build. Strengthen it. Drive it harder. But don’t derail it. That is how you actually prepare for war.
Ted,
With respect, I have taken issue with the NSS as it stands because nobody, except yourself, me, and a very others are trying to make a case for either accelerating the RCD or else finding some other approach (not restricted to, but including seeking warships from foreign sources) to getting the warships we need. I have NOT ruled out the NSS, but as I have stated many times, I do not see any particular urgency or clearly laid out plan to accelerate the RCD in particular or to fit the CDC into a speeded up program. Contrary to your contention, I stated earlier above, “If Canadian yards can help construct these, then fine.” I also said, “…thus far we have seen little evidence that the naval programs it [NSS] encompasses can be quickly surged to meet the greatly altered strategic situation that many argue now confronts us. Perhaps it can, and I would happily sacrifice boom-and-bust avoidance to accelerated construction schedules even if this requires many more Canadian shipyards all pulling together.”
Moreover, it is not me, but VAdm Topshee and the CDS who have laid out clear markers for doing something more urgently within the next 5 years. Please see my reply to Les on this point.
If this authoritative timeline for preparation strikes you as something politically contrived, unconvincing, or “impulsive” then the blame lies elsewhere.
The case you are once again making is that we have plenty of time to get it right under the NSS and that we do not have any credible option to plodding on to acquire the Holy Grail of a distant future sovereign capability. But it is DND and the CAF’s job to have that capability when we need it, and it is our military and political leaders who are saying we need it long before 2050. We know that there is Navy future fleet-mix study in the works, and we also have hints that the Navy wants some interim solution to its missing capability. Clearly our own navy and several others are seeking short-term fixes wherever they can find them. You say have faith and get some political will to make changes within the NSS. But, in principle, this same political will could be seeking to find solutions to a capability gap outside the framework of the NSS.
I suspect that deep down, many in the navy, and many Canadians as well as their political and military leaders really believe that – notwithstanding Trump – the US will bail us out in a crunch. Some may find in this guilty secret evidence that, when it comes to defence, we have conceded that Canada really is the US’ 51st state.
It is past time that we all call a spade …. a spade with regard to the nay-sayers who cloak their true feelings disguised as acceptance of the next generation addition of the Tier 2 CDC Corvette/Frigates. Whatever the follow-on build will be, as a ‘true complement’ to the RCDs, it must have an ability to meld into the RCD Task Group concept ‘future-proofing’ capabilities. In my own opinion, the CDC must have, as a minimum, a SPY 7/CCS 330/CEC/Links 11/16/22 & Satellite Comms capability along with some sort of MK 41 VLS weapons system. I do not, however, see them having a BMD/C2BMC capability requirement as I believe the RCD will eventually have. There would be no need for the CDC Corvette/Frigate to have that capability if they are working in consort with the RCDs in the future. The CDC must also have an updated MCM capability along with modularized ASW capabilities and perhaps a laser defence system. It must also have a flight-deck & hanger & helicopter haul-down large enough to support some sort of ASW/Rescue Helo. A lot to put into any CDC or small Frigate of about 3-4000 tonnes, but with some input from the NSS, this could be easily accomplished. The RCN and government must have the political will to get this started, I believe, well before the first RCD (HMCS Fraser) is in the water. Cheers!
I’m still at a loss as to how we will crew the notional future fleet – 15 RCDs, 12 SSKs, 6 AOPS, 2-3 AORs, sundry combatant/non-combatant vessels.
Politically, it’s never been terribly easy to allocate funds for major projects. But convincing a sufficient number of Canadians to climb aboard and sail them? That’s the real challenge.
New kit can be a recruiting tool, sure, but life at sea isn’t for the faint-hearted. Even CRCN has noted the potential difficulties in raising and retaining a new generation of submariners who may quickly tire of another trip Baffin Bay.
Hello Barnacle Bill. You have finally hit the nail-on-the-head! Requiring the NSS by the government to build a “future RCN” fleet without increasing the RCN naval personnel to crew all of these new naval ship marvels we are either building now, or contemplating to build, would be sheer madness!! The RCN is down sailors by several thousand personnel as it stands today. Even with attrition, we cannot fully crew this future fleet. Sufficient RCN personnel to do this is the key to this new fleet….AI be damned! The RCN fleet runs on its sailors and not the other way around. Recruitment and retention will be the key to success!! Well said!!
‘We have done so much, with so little, for so long, that now we are ready to do anything, with nothing, forever….!”
Barnacle Bill, the concern around how we’ll crew the future fleet is valid but it’s also exaggerated and rooted in assumptions that don’t hold up under scrutiny. This isn’t a crisis of manpower; it’s a challenge of political will, policy coherence, and smart planning.
Let’s be clear: most of these ships don’t exist yet.
You mention 15 River-class Destroyers, 12 submarines, and a range of auxiliary ships but we are years away from many of these being real programs, let alone sea trials.
Submarines: The replacement for the Victoria-class is years from contract awarded. We don’t even know if it will be 12 boats or fewer and nothing’s funded yet.
Joint Support Ships (JSS): We’ll be lucky to have two, and once MV Asterix is returned to Federal Fleet, we’re likely back to two AORs not three.
Continental Defence Corvette (CDC): Still early in development. Will it be 6 or 8? Unknown. What we do know is that by the time they arrive, the entire Kingston class will be gone so this is replacement, not expansion.
So let’s stop pretending we’re staffing a 50-ship navy tomorrow. We’re talking about a slow, multi-decade renewal cycle.
Modern ships need fewer crew.
Unlike Cold War-era platforms, new ships are increasingly automated.
Halifax-class requires 225 sailors. River-class will likely need 175.
Modern SSKs are smaller and leaner than older diesel-electric boats.
AOPS already use mixed-crewing and rotational models to optimize personnel usage.
Fleet renewal does not mean a 1-to-1 increase in crew demand.
Retention is fixable if we want to fix it.
People don’t leave because they hate ships they leave because they’re overtasked, underpaid, and unsupported.
Increase base housing and local amenities.
Offer signing bonuses, pension portability, and fast-tracked trades training.
Leverage the Naval Reserve more aggressively in line with recent DND interest in expanding the force
These are policy decisions, not immutable facts.
Uncrewed and autonomous systems are part of the solution.
The RCN is already moving in the right direction. Just this month, HMCS Vancouver launched an explosive-laden Hammerhead USV proof of concept for future unmanned operations. These systems can handle surveillance, MCM, and even strike missions, reducing human burden.
Stop selling the Navy as a dead-end.
If all the public ever hears is that “life at sea is hard and no one wants to do it,” you’re not identifying a problem you’re creating it.
There are Canadians who want meaningful work, adventure, and structure. Give them modern ships, decent conditions, and a leadership team that believes in its own future and you’ll find them.
Bottom line: We don’t need to crew a ghost fleet of 50 ships overnight. We need to build a credible plan for a steady, manageable transition. With political will, improved personnel policies, and smart integration of new technologies, we can crew the fleet of the future because most of that fleet hasn’t even hit the drawing board yet and the RCN does go to places other than Baffin Bay.
Hello Ted. Once again you have given a rational perspective to ‘crew sizing’ of RCN ships that are not even built yet. However, are you familiar with RCN Ship ‘billet’ numbers? When a ship or submarine is decided upon for the RCN, billet numbers are assigned to each class of vessel sometimes months or even years before the class is built. These billets are assigned/designated to each ship/submarine based on the # of Officers & crew required for that class including all shipboard Sailor Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) Trades & Officer/Command positions. One billet for each sailor and officer on board (no more; no less) No billet number… no position. The River-class Destroyer for example has 210 billets total per ship; The Protecteur-class (JSS) has 239 billets per ship; the AOPS has 65 billets + 20 ‘others’ per ship; the new submarines-possibly the South Korean KSS III Batch II (if selected), will have 48 billets + 5 Trainees. I also believe the next submarine fleet will have 12 boats — 6 per coast (3 high readiness; 2 in Ramp up/Ramp Down & 1 in EX WK PD per coast). In my own opinion, I believe your crew size for the RCD of 175 billets would be for a reduced readiness ship and not fully crewed. I also think the CDC will be fleet sized at 12 ships & not 6 or 8 as you contend. If you take the Australian Tasman-class Corvette as a sample crew size and applied that to the CDC Corvette of say between 100-120 billets, they then seem to add up.
CLASS BILLETS EAST/WEST
RCD 3150 1680/1470
CDC 1440 720/720
JSS 478 239/239
MV ASTERIX 114 114 —-
AOPS 510 255/255
SUBS 636 318318
TOTAL 6328 3326/3002
As of late 2023 there were a total of 6226 sea-going billets on both coasts. “THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE SHORE, MED UNFIT OR RESERVE UNIT BILLETS.”