By Dan Middlemiss, 3 July 2025
There has been a flurry of interest of late in the prospect of the navy acquiring corvette-sized warships to augment the currently planned RCN fleet.
However, we should not forget that the RCN on several occasions has examined this option before. Here are a few brief highlights of DND’s consideration of corvettes in its force planning from the 1970s and later.
The Cases
In a 25 January 1974 ship design study, “CF Report on Surface Warship Study,” DGMEM/DMEM 5 (PD) October 1973-January 1974, one option reviewed was based on a 1,500 ton corvette design.
The federal Cabinet had directed DND to “take into account the possible advantages of smaller ships more suitable and economical for use as back up for fisheries enforcement.” However, further studies subsequently ruled out an armed patrol ship, despite Cabinet’s insistence that the option be examined. Why? Smaller ships for sovereignty purposes (‘sovereignty ships’) could not carry out the priority NATO roles and missions.
17 July 1980 Memorandum to the Minister DND from the CDS and the DM DND, “Future Ship Study – Follow-On Options to the Canadian Patrol Frigate,” with an attached “Future Ship Study - CPF Follow-On Options,” 6 June 1980. A synopsis was later publicly released in the House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, No. 31, Appendix ‘EAND-20,’ 19 March 1981. The study reaffirmed earlier findings that “ships require a minimum displacement of 3,000 tons, a sustained speed of 25 knots in Sea State 5 and an endurance of 4,500 nautical miles to meet the sea keeping, mobility and flexibility and capability requirements. Only the CPF will be capable of meeting these capability requirements.”
We should note that the Canadian Senate also considered the possibility of smaller vessels, although these were less capable than corvette-sized ships. In its May 1983 Senate Report on Canada’s Maritime Defence, the Senate recommended adding 12 missile-equipped, fast patrol boats to the RCN and provided the following rationale:
“(e) Patrol vessels and their systems.
Small high-speed patrol vessels, useful for Regular Force and Reserve training purposes, Naval-Officer-in-Charge (NOIC) duties, coastal patrol, sovereignty surveillance and control, and rounding up enemy fishing and merchant vessels in time of war, would require for those duties little more than a good radar, good communications systems and a small-calibre gun. Equipped, at more expense, with a more sophisticated radar and surface-to-surface missiles, they could provide significant opposition to surface intruders, since they are hard to detect. and the missile would give them significant punch at long-range." (p.49)
At the time, I recall an admiral telling me that the RCN wanted nothing to do with this concept because it would detract from its priority concern of acquiring a fleet of CPFs.
A September 1990 Defence Policy Statement indicated that Ottawa wanted up to 6 corvettes, with 4 to enter service within 15 years. (See Peter Haydon, “What’s Wrong with Corvettes?”, Canada’s Navy Annual, 1991). In general terms, this plan was confirmed in Canadian Defence 1992. The Canadian public became aware of this plan in Vice-Admiral Thomas’ Letter of Resignation, which states in part:
"I am also unable to accept a policy proposal which will minimize the capability and future development of the Maritime Forces by affirming that the centre of interest for these forces be in Canadian coastal waters (east and west). I would agree that the centre of day-to-day activity may be in Canadian coastal waters. That is why we must progress and build the MCDV vessels. However, inshore requirements alone cannot determine the kinds of ships and submarine required for the future. It is a fact that blue-water, mid-ocean, combat-capable warships, in combination with the MCDV, can do any work Canada needs done at sea.... Corvettes can’t. They have neither the reach nor the seakeeping. The Corvettes proposed are just a code for ‘spend less money.’ Unfortunately, they are the wrong ships and they won’t be cheap."
Concluding Note
I have not sought to provide my own analysis of the relative merits of corvettes as compared to larger surface combatants.
For most of these cases, less capable ships were perceived by senior navy officials as diverting scarce funds from the most capable and most flexible warship programs the RCN preferred.
Today, by way of contrast, there appears to be more emphasis on viewing corvettes as complementary assets adding to overall fleet capability, and focused on performing different roles.
Image: 221202-N-EB711-1006 ARABIAN GULF (Dec. 2, 2022) Guided-missile destroyer USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) sails next to Turkish Navy corvette TCG Burgazada (F-513) in the Arabian Gulf, Dec. 2. The Sullivans is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to help ensure maritime security and stability in the Middle East region. (U.S. Navy photo by Sonar Technician (Surface) 1st Class Kevin Frus)
10 thoughts on “The RCN’s ‘Other’ Experiences with Corvettes: A Short Recap”
Outdated Threat Assessments and Strategic Assumptions
The historical objections to corvettes stem from Cold War-era thinking, where the focus was on blue-water, NATO-assigned anti-submarine warfare and task group operations in the North Atlantic. The 1974, 1980, and 1990 studies referenced were designed to support a binary fleet model: either large combatants or inshore patrol craft. This doctrinal rigidity no longer applies in a 21st-century multi-domain environment marked by distributed lethality, grey zone threats, and rapid technological change.
Shifting Geopolitical and Operational Realities
Today’s threat environment includes:
– Saturation drone attacks, swarming tactics, and hybrid threats close to home.
– Expanded domestic maritime responsibilities in the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic.
– Low-intensity maritime security operations, such as embargo enforcement, drug interdiction and fisheries protection.
Corvettes are ideally suited for these mission sets, filling the gap between expensive destroyers and lightly armed coastal patrol vessels.
Modern Corvettes Are Not Yesterday’s Boats
The corvette designs considered in the 1970s–90s were often simplistic, lightly armed, and with limited sensors. That is no longer the case. Today’s corvettes (e.g., MEKO A-100, Gowind, Ada-class, Sa’ar 6) offer:
– Modular payloads and multi-role flexibility
– Modern sensors and strike weapons (NSM, CAMM)
– Adequate endurance (3,000–5,000 nm), seakeeping, and C4ISR capabilities
– Much lower lifecycle and operating costs than major surface combatants
Importantly, modern corvettes can now be equipped with the MK 41 Vertical Launching System, enabling them to carry up to 24 VLS cells. This brings corvettes into the realm of layered air and missile defense, and allows them to integrate into Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) networks with destroyers, contributing to fleet-wide air defence and missile strike operations. These corvettes aren’t just patrol boats, they are credible, networked combatants.
Fleet Composition and Resource Allocation
The argument that corvettes “divert resources” from more capable warships ignores modern budget realities. Canada’s River-class Destroyer (RCD) will deliver only 15 ships over a multi-decade timeframe. With a looming capability gap and limited hull numbers, complementary vessels are essential to:
– Free up destroyers for high-end warfare
– Increase presence in low-threat environments
– Sustain operations during maintenance cycles or crises
Corvettes would augment — not replace — major combatants. They offer quantity with quality.
Past Attitudes Conflicted with Long-Term Needs
Vice-Admiral Thomas’ 1990s-era resignation letter reflected legitimate fears at the time about coastal-only force planning. But that argument misrepresents what modern corvettes can do. The view that corvettes “can’t” operate mid-ocean is no longer accurate. Many NATO states field corvette-sized ships for open ocean escort, surveillance and deterrence, including France, Italy, Germany, and Israel.
Furthermore, the concern that smaller vessels would dominate fleet planning is no longer valid in a force mix model, where each platform has a clearly defined role.
International Benchmarking Supports Corvette Acquisition
Many allied states are embracing corvette and light frigate classes as integral to fleet strategy. For example:
– US Navy: deploying Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and developing Constellation-class frigates
– UK Royal Navy: investing in Type 31 general-purpose frigates
– Germany and Israel: maintaining heavily armed corvettes for regional and expeditionary roles
Canada risks strategic irrelevance in presence operations and allied burden-sharing without a similar tiered fleet approach.
Conclusion
The historical dismissal of corvettes by the RCN was rooted in Cold War-era priorities and a constrained view of naval force structure. These assessments are now outdated. Corvettes are not a substitute for destroyers, they are enablers of a more persistent, agile and cost-effective maritime presence.
Modern corvettes equipped with MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems and 24 VLS cells bring real warfighting power to the fleet and can plug directly into the RCN’s high-end force architecture. They provide valuable magazine depth, increase the number of platforms in the battlespace, and allow River-class Destroyers to focus on the most demanding tasks.
A modern RCN must embrace a multi-tiered fleet that includes destroyers, Arctic patrol vessels, submarines, and a new class of missile-armed corvettes to secure Canada’s maritime interests across all domains, at home and abroad.
For a bit more on the modern corvette thinking in the RCN, see:
“Defending Canada At Home And Abroad”
Vice-Admiral Topshee on The Herle Burly podcast
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvFhCh9rQrQ
See also, this speculative commentary:
“Let’s talk about the Continental Defence Corvette”
Noah
True North Strategic Review
6 July 2025
https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-the-continental-defence
Big questions are, when and where will these corvettes be built? Insistence on “Canadian-designed, Canadian-equipped, and Canadian-made” – and we can be certain this will arise from our industry – will be the death-knell for this concept.
Appreciate the links, the Herle Burly interview with VAdm Topshee does offer valuable insights into evolving naval strategy, and Noah’s speculative take raises fair questions. That said, the idea that “Canadian-designed, Canadian-equipped, and Canadian-made” will be the death-knell of the Continental Defence Corvette (CDC) project deserves scrutiny.
We’ve heard this argument before — that domestic shipbuilding is inherently too costly or inefficient. Yet, we must remember that the intent behind building in Canada isn’t just about ships, it’s about sovereignty, industrial resilience and maintaining critical capabilities. The National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) exists for this very reason.
Yes, insisting on full domestic production may mean higher upfront costs, but it also means long-term economic return through jobs, tax revenue and industrial capability. More importantly, it guarantees we’re not reliant on foreign yards for warships that defend our territory and interests.
Furthermore, the CDC if smartly scoped could avoid the mistakes of past projects. Leverage proven hull designs. Integrate off-the-shelf subsystems. Use modularity and automation to drive down crew requirements and operating costs. And crucially, start small and iteratively, rather than designing for every possible mission on day one.
Lastly, the real death knell for any future fleet initiative won’t be domestic content it’ll be indecision, endless redefinition, and lack of political will. If we believe corvettes fill a real operational gap, especially as ‘wingmen’ to the River-class and to relieve high end assets from low end tasks, then we need to commit and make the NSS work for this class too.
Let’s stop assuming failure is inevitable and start demanding success is engineered.
Thank you Ted. Well said.
Ubique,
Les
Ted,
Believe it or not, I am a strong supporter of the idea that the RCN acquire a substantial number of Tier-2 warships in the 2,000-4,000 ton range. Canada needs these now, not in 20 years from now!
I suspect I will enrage many readers when I say that by the time the River-class is finally operational in the late 2030 period, the ships will be Tier-2 warships in terms of firepower. In saying this, I am discounting the inevitable rejoinder that future batches of the RCD will have significantly more firepower – all without compromising delivery schedules, which are currently projected to accelerate miraculously somehow in the 2039-2050 period when Canada plans to have a total of 12 RCD, with a ‘goal’ of 15 ships. And all this without significantly increasing the program costs. So my preferred outcome would be for ISI to complete the first, inordinately expensive batch of RCD, then follow-up with a sizable number of CDCs. I recognize that, politically, this will likely not happen, and even if it did, we would find a way to turn a relatively cheap CDC into a multi-billion dollar per ship program.
I note as well that you project 24 VLS for the CDC, which will be the same number as for the initial 3 RCD. Clearly, we are talking about a much larger corvette than the current 1,000 ton limit the NSS allots to Canadian shipbuilders, other than Irving, Seaspan, or Davie. So where will this new Canadian-designed corvette be built? The 3 current NSS shipbuilders have their order books completely filled for the next couple of decades. Therefore, Ottawa could, again, relax its own NSS rules and allow yet another Canadian shipbuilder to take on the corvettes. Team Vigilance, headquartered in Vancouver, springs to mind, and there has been much speculation about its prospective offering.
See,
“Let’s talk about Vigilance”
Noah
True North Strategic Review
30 January 2025
https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-vigilance
Of course, then would follow the inevitable requests for additional infrastructure funds to get ready for construction etc, and then Canada would be saddled with a fourth shipyard to continue to prop up for ‘sovereignty’ reasons, and to avoid the inevitable bust period that would follow the corvette program.
Given that the NSS has not delivered a single vessel on time and on budget to date (for reasons I concede that have more to do with Ottawa than our shipbuilders), I find it very difficult to be as optimistic as you are about the prospects for the CDC.
Respectfully, this argument presents a false dichotomy and makes several assumptions that don’t hold up to a realistic appraisal of Canada’s naval needs or industrial potential.
Yes, the River-class Destroyer (RCD) program is costly and complex, but this is by design. It is a top tier, globally deployable surface combatant intended to replace the Halifax-class with vastly superior anti-air, anti-submarine and command-and-control capabilities. Dismissing the RCDs as “Tier-2 in firepower” by the late 2030s is misleading. This class will field some of the most advanced systems in the Western world, including SPY-7 radar, integrated electronic warfare, and up to 24 Mk 41 VLS cells from the outset, with growth potential. Future-proofing is embedded in their design, and significant modularity is planned.
Calling them Tier 2 due to timelines or initial loadouts ignores the evolving nature of naval warfare, lifecycle upgrades, and the fact that no credible near peer warship deploys at full potential from hull #1.
Regarding the Continental Defence Corvette (CDC), yes, there is room and need for a complementary Tier 2 vessel but not as a substitute or fallback. These ships should augment, not replace, Canada’s high end combat capability. The problem isn’t that the CDC will become “multi-billion dollar ships.” It’s that we treat any program requiring upfront investment in design, production and people as inherently wasteful. This mindset is precisely why projects take too long, we wait until we need them, then panic.
The CDC should be developed in tandem with the RCD, not in its shadow. That requires deliberate strategic investment now, not delay disguised as cynicism.
As for where these corvettes will be built: Canada doesn’t lack industrial space, we lack political will. Saint John can be revitalized. Vancouver (Seaspan) can expand. Davie will soon be certified for combatants. Or yes, a fourth yard such as Team Vigilance or revitalized Thunder Bay could be introduced. These decisions should be driven by fleet need and national resilience, not a fear of supporting “too much shipbuilding.”
Canada already underbuilds relative to its maritime domain. More shipbuilding capacity is not a liability, it’s strategic infrastructure.
Finally, invoking the NSS as a failed program is disingenuous. It rebuilt a collapsed industry from near zero, created thousands of jobs, delivered five AOPS (with more ahead), and set the groundwork for RCD construction. Yes, timelines and costs are problematic but they are improving, and lessons from AOPS and JSS are directly informing the RCD approach.
In summary:
We need both the RCD and CDC programs. Not one at the expense of the other.
Firepower comparisons should account for upgrade potential and operational role, not snapshot VLS counts. Industrial expansion is an investment in national security, not a handout. NSS criticism ignores real successes and necessary learning curves. Defeatism is not strategy. Let’s stop thinking small, and start planning smart.
I can accepts that many readers are of the ‘glass half full’ persuasion, but I am also aware of the adage about the definition of insanity – doing the same thing over and over (always with a rosy outlook, nothing ever can go wrong) and expecting a different outcome. I am suggesting that the historical record of Canadian naval shipbuilding is far from one that would inspire unfettered confidence in the prospects for the current round of shipbuilding.
I am pleased to note that some are finally acknowledging that the premises of the NSS are badly flawed. The original NSS concept was for existential reduction in the then unsustainable number of naval shipyards whereby each would get a small piece of the construction pie. The initial NSS plan was for a single shipyard which could handle all the anticipated government fleet renewal projects. For political reasons, the number was increased to two shipyards where well-sequenced load-levelling schedules would be the order of the day. Now the number of yards is up to 3 and soon maybe that will become 4 or even more yards.
I agree that Canada’s extremely urgent sovereignty and defence requirements, as articulated by our topmost political and military leaders as well as by numerous other alliance leaders, absolutely justify an all-out acceleration of all of our shipbuilding projects, but especially of Ottawa’s naval warship programs. So let’s stop kowtowing to our shipbuilders and get them building NOW, not in 10 years or more when they, and many in the suffocating DND bureaucracy, deign it feasible. If this entrenched, risk-averse, coddled, and self-interested coterie cannot or will not deliver, then I agree that we should by-pass (or fire) them and find planners and builders who are prepared to do the job – wherever they may be found. We do not need a complacent cohort of people who are hooked on building a sovereign capacity for some distant future. That will be too late – and certainly the currently planned schedule of less than a handful of RCD by 2040 will be far too late.
Oh but wait, here is another hard reality, and not a mere defeatist assumption. The recent report of the Office of the Procurement Ombudsman observes:
“An area that survey respondents felt would benefit defence procurement is the
establishment of a VPM (Vendor Performance Management) framework, further
cementing its importance as one of the top foundational changes listed above.
One survey respondent stated that they believed “a major issue with defence
procurement is major suppliers know they won’t really get punished for failing
to meet requirements and that “Canada will always pay” is pretty much their
philosophy. Another survey respondent opined that “Canada’s unwillingness
to enforce contracts with Defense Contractors has clearly resulted in Canada
receiving inferior products at significantly higher cost (JSS [Joint Support Ship],
OOSV [Offshore oceanographic science vessel]). The contractors can deliver
what we want when we want at the cost we want they just know they do not
have to and take advantage of Canadian Taxpayers as a result. Simplifying and
streamlining procurement is also critical to improve end results as well”. [emphasis added, Time for Solutions: Top 5 Foundational Changes Needed in Federal Procurement, 8 July 2025]
If we are truly investing in national security, let’s demand that we have our defence planners and shipbuilders deliver as they keep saying they can. No more excuses about having to start from scratch with so many ‘challenges’ to overcome. We do need successes and we need them today, not decades from now. In the process Ottawa needs to re-evaluate what it really needs our navy to do. We are never going to able to challenge the major peer navies, so we should stop pretending that we will be able to.
Dan, with respect, your latest remarks come across as cynical defeatism wrapped in selective outrage and oversimplified hindsight.
You say you support acquiring a fleet of corvette sized warships and yet nearly every follow-up post you’ve made since has undermined that very goal by repeating long debunked arguments about shipbuilding futility and throwing shade at every aspect of the NSS. You can’t have it both ways.
On Your Dismissal of the NSS
You paint the NSS as fatally flawed, but that ignores real, measurable progress:
Five Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships delivered and in service or sea trials.
Joint Support Ships in construction and reaching completion.
Davie certified as the third yard, unlocking further capacity.
Shipbuilding jobs, apprenticeship pipelines, and IRB/ITB benefits active across the country.
Was the NSS slow out of the gate? Absolutely. It rebuilt an industry from cold ash. But calling it a failure while ignoring every structural milestone achieved is like criticizing a marathoner for being tired at the halfway point after running uphill for 20km. Let’s not pretend a single yard, in today’s world, could have built everything on time and on budget either. That’s a fantasy.
On the “VLS Count” and Firepower Dismissal
You assert that by the time the River-class destroyers arrive, they’ll be “Tier-2” ships because others may have more VLS cells? That ignores the modular and scalable design of the RCD. Initial batches will carry 24 Mk 41 cells, with space for growth. More importantly, they’ll field SPY-7 radar, state-of-the-art EW, and advanced ASW capabilities – a full spectrum, blue water combatant platform built for the next 40 years. It’s not about how many cells you have on Day 1; it’s what you can integrate over the lifecycle.
Let’s also remember: No navy launches their best-equipped hull first — not the US, not the UK, and certainly not Canada. Iterative capability builds are normal, and planned. You’re judging the fleet by a snapshot, not the trajectory.
On Domestic Industry and the “Fourth Yard”
You raise concerns about adding a fourth shipyard. But that’s a false dilemma. Expanding Canadian shipbuilding is not a burden, it’s a strategic investment.
Davie is expanding. Seaspan is diversifying. Team Vigilance, Thunder Bay, and revitalized Saint John are all viable candidates to produce smaller combatants, with modest infrastructure upgrades. The UK is building Type 31s in Rosyth without sinking the rest of its industrial base. Germany maintains multiple yards producing corvettes and frigates simultaneously.
If corvettes are built to smart, proven designs with off-the-shelf systems and Canadian integration, there is no reason they must balloon into $2B per unit ships unless Ottawa lets that happen.
And here’s the irony, you agree Canada needs these ships “now, not in 20 years.” But then you complain about building capacity to deliver them. You’re criticizing the only pathway that would actually allow your desired outcome.
The Real Problem Isn’t the NSS, It’s Procurement Culture
Here’s where we do agree: the system is overly bureaucratic, slow and risk averse. The Procurement Ombudsman report is damning but it’s also exactly why Canada needs to fix procurement culture, not abandon domestic capability.
Yes, contracts must be enforced. Yes, vendor accountability must improve. But gutting the NSS or abandoning sovereign capacity is not the answer. You don’t fix a clogged engine by tossing out the whole car.
You close by saying Canada “should stop pretending” it can compete with peer navies. That’s a false premise. Canada isn’t trying to match the US or China. It’s building a balanced, layered fleet that contributes to allied operations and defends one of the largest maritime zones on Earth.
Corvettes like the proposed CDC are not distractions – they’re essential enablers. And if you genuinely support their acquisition, as you claim, then perhaps it’s time to stop reinforcing narratives that guarantee their failure.
We don’t need pessimism masquerading as realism. We need leadership, investment and belief in our ability to succeed.
Ted,
This thread has gone far beyond the confines of corvettes, and I do acknowledge from long experience that rational thought and strongly held beliefs do not easily co-exist.
It is the NSS, not me, which proclaimed that two major shipyards was the most that Canada could support to avoid the familiar boom-and-bust syndrome that Canada has experienced since 1945. Now the thinking seems to be that the more yards the merrier, because they are investments in a sovereign future.
And a belief in a benign future when these investments eventually deliver is at odds with what most military (including RCN) leaders currently foresee in a fast diminishing strategic window.
However, if we were in Israel’s, Ukraine’s, or South Korea’s and Taiwan’s shoes, we would not be so sanguine about the time the world has before serious conflicts engulf it. In the 2008-2010 period when the NSS and the CSC/RCD was being conceived, the geopolitics looked far different. Hence the CSC ‘humanitarian’ mission bay etc. Now, I concede that most Western states, not just Canada, got the future wrong back then, but my argument is that many of these states are currently scrambling to rectify their earlier mistakes. Canada shows few signs of any sense of real urgency to alter course. Without saying so, you appear to believe that Canada has time on its side, and all will be well when things return to normal between 2040 and 2050. I do not share your belief. Conflict is coming, and we are not truly preparing. This is a reality I think you are not addressing.
My opinion, and yes it is nothing more than that, is that Canada needs to procure many more, cheaper, and less capable warships (corvette-plus?) – except for urgently needed submarines – to take care of our own backyard. If Canadian yards can help construct these, then fine. But we may have to consider foreign yards with proven track records, even if the end product is not ideal in terms of our optimal requirements. Quantity has a quality of its own, and quantity NOW trumps quality down the road. Three RCD in 2040 will not help very much.
I absolutely share your concern with the lack of real political leadership, but my focus is on the misapplication of Canada’s existing shipbuilding capacity. Our major shipbuilders have their initial contracts now, and they know they have the navy and Ottawa over a barrel. I could go on at length about why that is so, but the historical reality is that once contracts are signed, there is next to nothing in the way of enforcing penalty clauses and warranties, etc., that can induce them to produce on time and within budget. Your depiction of NSS accomplishments rings hollow, especially in terms of warships constructed. As matters stand, all the grand plans of the RCN and the optimistic schedules and spreadsheets of our major naval shipbuilders cannot mask the fact that at best, Canada will be reduced to about 3 RCD and 5 or so Halifax-class warships by 2039-2040. This is not defeatism or pessimism, it is a reality.
The true ‘defeatism’ alas may come because our hopes and beliefs for a happy, secure future are revealed to be nothing more than wishful thinking.
Reply to Ted Barnes 11 Jul 25 post @17:21
Good afternoon Ted,
Thank you for continuing to be one of the most authoritative, thoughtful, and relevant posters on this forum. Thank you also for this debunking of another “The sky is falling. Let’s slip our throats” commentary.
Ubique,
Les