By Dr. Ann Griffiths, 21 June 2023
It’s hard not to get discouraged about Canadian military procurements. And it’s particularly discouraging when looking at the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project. For a very expensive major program, the lack of interest by government departments is palpable and puzzling. Thus the pages on the website of Public Services and Procurement Canada which discuss the National Shipbuilding Strategy haven’t been updated in almost a year. The most recent entry in the ‘Progress of the Project’ section for the CSC is dated 7 February 2019. The ‘News’ section for the CSC has nothing more recent than 8 February 2019. The RCN website includes one piece of news, dated 1 June 2023 -- the CSC Project adopted a new Operations Room/Command Information Centre (CIC) layout [Sailors shape future CSC Command Information Centre - Canada.ca]. What if anything can we learn from this painfully slow process? And should it be abandoned partially or completely? It is useful to look at Australia where there’s speculation that a high-level review of the RAN surface fleet may result in a reduction of the number of Hunter-class frigates (which, like the CSC, are also Type 26-based) to be built to free up resources for smaller and more numerous ships. The Australian Type 26 adventure sounds eerily familiar to what Canada has experienced with the CSC – delays, huge cost increases, increasing size/weight of the ships, design tweaks, etc. It even includes questions about how the design was selected in the first place, as the ship only existed on paper, whereas the two rival designs were already in service. This article by Andrew Tillett, “Shipbuilder defends $45 billion frigate project as axe hovers,” should be read by Canadians, and perhaps there should be a similar discussion in Canada: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/shipbuilder-defends-45-billion-frigate-project-as-axe-hovers-20230619-p5dhph.
44 thoughts on “Reconsidering the Type 26 Plan”
Far as I’m concerned which doesn’t mean anything, but build the first 4-6 ships here and build the rest in another country with Canadian specks the same time. How much would we save? Billions. Another option get South Korea or Japan to build a couple of their destroyer ships. The Halifax ships will rust out before we get 2-3 new ships in the water, just like our AOR’s.
I do not think it is possible to have another nation build the CSC’s for Canada, nor is it an especially wise decision. Foreign military shipyards around the world generally are absolutely packed between their own nation’s domestic orders and whatever foreign customers would be already ahead of Canada in the queue. These same foreign military shipyards usually are owned by companies which have their own warships designs they will be trying to sell, it would be against their best interests to build one of their competitors designs. BAE and Lockheed Martin would also likely be very unhappy about a foreign competitor getting a wide open look into their most advanced modern frigate design. These foreign yards would have to assemble their own supply chains for all of the bespoke equipment required for a foreign ship design they have no experience or involvement with as well, it simply isn’t really possible.
Taking over half of the CSC order out of Canada also is counter productive to the entire point of the program, to have long term Canadian employment and spend as much of the money on the program domestically. This program is expected to be building 15 ships until the late 2040’s, that is significant long term and high skill job generation domestically. It’s also a huge investment into Canadian shipbuilders to make them far more modern, competitive and effective for future contracts, civilian or military. You might initially save some money however, you would be losing cost efficiency in the long term as your domestic economy of scale is effectively gone by cutting the order in less than half alongside a legal battle with the various shipyards and companies.
South Korean and Japanese destroyers don’t fit the mission Canada wants, operating a group of one off foreign warships would likely be an expensive, time consuming logistical nightmare. The Halifax class are going to need to keep on trucking along until the CSC replaces them, even if that means more maintenance work and purposefully lowering operational tempo to be easier on the hulls.
Hello Jimmy. Sorry Ron….., Jimmy is absolutely correct on all fronts!
Given some of the technology on board the CSC will be ITAR and restricted I cannot see the UK allowing even the hull form built outside Canada, Australia & UK. I also can’t see the USA allowing its Aegis system to be fitted anywhere other than in Canada.
So foreign build CSC is just not an option, as for asking Japan and Korea to build a couple of DDGs for export that will likely be a huge no as well mainly as they are modified US designs (based around the Burke DDG). They also require huge crews the Maya for example has a crew of 300 roughly which is double that of the CSC.
The Halifax replacement should have been planned out a decade ago, but sadly like most things the whole plan was pushed and pushed to the point where it’s a mad scramble. Political indecision and procrastination lead to increased expense as does elongated project time lines.
Sadly though, the Halifax’s will have to carry on which will cost the Canadian tax payer even more than it actually ever should have, not to mention risk more break downs again costing the tax payer more than it should with increased maintenance, lower operational tempo which means less sea time which in turn reduces readiness, opportunities and training capabilities which lowers further the already low morale.
Now add in our overseas commitments that might also take a hit making Canada look like a bigger basket case than it already is which means on the international stage Canada will increasingly get sidelined.
Good morning Blair,
As an exercise in reality, it would be interesting to list those NATO countries which routinely deploy their forces far from their shores, such as into the Indo-Pacific region and to the other side of the Atlantic, for lengthy (multi-year) periods.
I suspect that very few countries do this and that some of the big (%) spenders do a lot of sitting around at home heroically staring at their hated (fellow NATO member) neighbour.
Each NATO member builds the defence force relevant to its geopolitical situation and its history. It is hard at times to compare them, except by using the very crude % GDP approach.
We should put what Canada does with its defence spending into perspective.
Ubique.
Les
Afternoon Les
Interesting comment with regards to overseas commitments but what I can tell you is the following (all open source information) and this doesn’t include Air force, Marine or Army deployments or fixed assets either – the list would be much longer and more countries would be involved so here is the Naval side of things.
UK
Currently has a force of mine warfare, bay class LPA, and type 23 FFG deployed to the Persian Gulf on 5 year rotation.
2 OPVs operating in the Pacific using Singapore as a main staging area this is a rolling tasking no end date.
HMS Procter spends 95% of her time as Falklands Guard Ship and also Antarctic supply & patrol ship indeed I cant recall the last time she was in home waters it was some time ago.
Caribbean patrol always has a ship in or around the region usually a RFA vessel.
This is without the permanent vessels stationed in the BIOT & Gibraltar.
The UK Royal navy is well over stretched we have 6 DDGs & 10 FFGs as the main bulk of the fleet now add in the carriers and LPDs when they go out on Tasking QE has just deployed only a few days ago.
France
Has a small forces deployed permanently in the following places: Guyana South America, Reunion & Mayotte Indian Ocean, French Polynesia, French West Indies, UAE, Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, Ivory Coast & Germany
Denmark
Deploys vessels for extended multi year periods to Greenland these are under the Danish Naval command, have also done extended periods using rotations from Djibouti as part of the CTF as multi year missions (ongoing)
Netherlands Navy
Permanently deploys vessels in Curacao, also part of the CTF group and has done similar rotations as Denmark
Greek (Hellenic) Navy Deploys multi year missions in the Persian gulf using Saudi Arabia as home base
Italy Rotates ships on multi year deployments to the Persian gulf using Djibouti port, they also have access to Bahrain & Kuwait ports.
USA, well, need we say more.
So in terms of Just NATO & Just Naval forces as you can see there’s quite a few of them that deploy multi year missions with their assets or indeed in the case of some nations permanently deploy them.
To my knowledge Canada has no overseas bases and no overseas vessels on permanent or extended multi year deployments.
When looking at operational tempo, the Royal Navy & the United States navy is well up there, the Dutch, Danes, French, Norwegian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Polish & Turkish Navies also have pretty high tempo of operations. Ok many of them operations are focused in or around their own EEZ but quite a few of them will deploy well beyond their EEZ and as noted in many cases some of these ships deploy overseas for multi year missions.
So I disagree that many of the “Heroic” big spenders sit around staring at the NATO neighbor under performing, considering that one of the chief reasons the RN, USN, even the French & Dutch who have recruitment issues at the moment, it’s not due to lack of sea time indeed to the contrary it’s too much that’s the chief complaint right now in the Royal Navy.
Each defense force spends what it can on defense in areas it thinks are important using a mix of history and current threats I agree on that.
One of the civil servants I worked with in the UK simply told me “we pitch for as much as what we think we can get away with then think about what to spend it on” < always stuck with me.
I think if we put what Canada does with its defense spending it might make for somber reading, most of the budget will go to pay & rations, followed by maintenance, food, and new procurement taskings.
As you know the older a platform gets the more it costs in maintenance expenditure and the more down time it has.
Hello Ron. Save Billions CAD? I think not! If you built the other CSC Type 26 Frigates in another country, your “savings” would be minimal (if any) at best and more than likely would even cost more than what Canada is willing to pay. Building 3 or 4 “Destroyers” in another country would mean a different class of ship totally and more cost in the long run. The Halifax class frigates are long in the tooth and starting to rust out already and may not be able to provide the “stop-gap” procedures before the CSC Frigates start to come on stream. I have argued before to build 3-4 CSC “Destroyers” by lengthening the CSC Frigate Midships by 10 meters (see below) and just build 12 CSC Type 26 Frigates:
CSC Type 26 “Destroyers” 4;2 East/2West–C2 & AAW (on-board TG Command Staff structure): Lengthened midships by 10m (161.4m-529.5 ft) to accommodate 4 x Electric Motors; 4 x more powerful Diesel Generators (DGs); CCMS 330 system; 1 x 127mm Leonardo Vulcano/2 x Marlin 30mm Stabilized Rapid Fire gun systems; SPY-7 (3) S Band LRDR & X Band Illumination AESA radars; S & X Band Nav Radars; CEC/BMD Cap; 32 x MK 41 Exl VLS cells for ESSM II/IIIC-SM 3/6/TLAM/Hypersonic Cruise Missiles midships/32 x Exl MK 41 VLS cells forward; with 4 x 4 NSMs & 12 x 4 Exl VLS Sea Septor CIAD midships; HMS-Active/Passive Towed Array Sonar; Towed Torpedo Countermeasures-Sea Sentor; VDS-TLFAS-Towed Low Frequency Active Sonar; High Energy Laser Defence System; 2 x CH 148 Helicopter cap.; 2 x 176 UAV drones; XLUUV Cap. 210 crew + TG Command Staff; 10-12,000 tonnes; 28-30+ kts. Cheers!
This is a good idea but is 10m going to get all that done?
Yes WAYNE. 10 meters is more than enough to insert two more Electric Motors and 4 x more powerful DGs to replace the existing DGs. It will also allow for a 32 cell ExL Mk 41 VLS along with another 24 cell VLS Sea Ceptor system and add another 2 x 4 NSM system all midships. If we have the “will” to do this!
Building stretched versions with more equipment is simply not going to happen. You just can take a design and add 10 meters and pack in more diesels and gear. Lots of unintentional design issues can crop up. All ships will be built the same and the government and RCN has been very clear on that.
Like I said to WAYNE, Ted, this could happen if we have the will to do it. Not “packing in more DGs” as you say Ted, just replacing the DGs that are there now with more powerful ones that will be required for future power increases (I.E.High Energy Laser System etc). Yes, two more Electric motors for higher cruising speeds along with the present Gas Turbine for sprint speeds of 30+ kts. The 32 cell ExL MK 41 VLS system midships could also be included along with the 32 cell MK 41 VLS system forward as was originally planned. I am confident the Engineers would be able to make this happen with no stability design problems. It could happen in the future — attitudes and Governments can change. Cheers!
Not about ‘will’ Dave, it’s about actual limitations. This ship as it is has weight issues, not the extent of the Hunter Class frigate but significant thus the change from the 32 VLS and other changes to the design to save weight. Even throwing in greater power generation capability by changing the type and power generation capacity is not going to work when everything such as wiring, transformers etc would have to redesigned and changed! I’ll let you in on a little secret, greater power generation was considered but ultimately shelved due to the space needed and changes to the design that would have delayed everything even more. Adding a 10 meter addition changes the hydrodynamics to the design, ultimately weight gain and adding more power doesn’t mean the ship will go faster. The only will we need is the will to see the project through and not the musings of an amateur naval architect!
Unfortunately that’s not possible under the NSS which is the whole point in building in Canada. The Halifax class will not rust out in its entirety due to more comprehensive refits and investment including structure replacement. You may see some ships paid off before the delivery of the first CSC however the Halifax Class will be around at least until 2040 according to the CRCN and the planning I’ve seen.
Hello Dr. Ann Griffith: I too have been disappointed with the lack of information and updates from the government on the state of the CSC Type 26 project since its inception and since Lockheed Martin has completed Phase 1 of the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) late last year. The “lack of interest by the government” as you say is one problem, however it’s also the un-called for secrecy by the government that is also puzzling to everyone. What is the ‘true’ state of the project as of today? No one is talking. The British Type 26 project however, seems to be progressing and at a much faster pace than Australia’s or Canada’s designs. Their 2nd Type 26, HMS Cardiff, is almost ready (front half towed out yesterday (21 June 2023) and will be welded together with the aft section next month). Canada has not even completed its Design Phase yet. Does Canada need to make changes? You bet! I don’t believe however we need to re-invent the wheel. The CSC Type 26 is indeed a great design and we should continue with the program but at a much faster pace. What is really required is a “wake-up call” for the government, like yesterday! Here are some suggestions for them:
1. Go from 15 CSC Frigates down to 12 maximum….now;
2. Complete all Design Phases by the Fall of 2023;
3. Sign contracts with Irving and start construction of the 12 frigates before the end of this year;
4. Extend the length The CSC Frigate design by 10 meters for 4 “CSC Type 26 Destroyers” as follows (to be built at both Davie and Seaspan Shipyards-2 each):
a. C2 & AAD with on-board TG Command Staff structure;
b. Lengthened midships by 10m (32.89ft) (161.4m-529.5 ft) to accommodate 4 x Electric Motors plus 4 x more powerful Diesel Generators (DGs)-Lengthening the CSC Frigate was discussed by the government before, but was never adopted;
c. A robust CCMS 330 system to coordinate all sensors and weapons systems;
d. 1 x 127mm Leonardo Vulcano/2 x Marlin 30mm Stabilized Rapid Fire gun systems; with a High Energy Laser Defence System;
e. SPY-7 (3) S Band LRDR & X Band Illumination AESA radars; S & X Band Nav Radars;
f. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability;
g. 32 x MK 41 Exl VLS cells for ESSM II/IIIC-SM 3/6/TLAM/Hypersonic Cruise Missiles midships with another 32 x Exl MK 41 VLS cells forward;
h. 4 x 4 NSMs & 12 x 4 Exl VLS Sea Septor CIAD midships as well;
i. HMS-Active/Passive Towed Array Sonar; Towed Torpedo Countermeasures-Sea Sentor; VDS-TLFAS-Towed Low Frequency Active Sonar;
j. 2 x CH 148 Helicopter capability; 2 x 176 UAV drones (to be housed inside the hanger area;
k. XLUUV Capability (to be housed in the Multi-Mission Bay (MMB) area;
l. 210 crew + accommodation for a full TG Command Staff;
m. Ship displacement-10-12,000 tonnes full load;
n. Max ships speed-28-30+ kts.
This plan hinges on getting CAF personnel strength back up past 16,000. It is feasible and would be a benefit to the Canadian Government, the National Ship-building Strategy (NSS) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).
David, it is too bad you weren’t working for the government, they need someone like you in there.
I don’t think so Ron. They would probably “sack” me within a week for saying the truth! I worked for the government ( a very proud RCN vet) for 41 1/2 yrs (& 1 day). I just want the Navy to survive!
Again not going to happen and a very simplistic view and understanding on the design and procurement process. So how do you propose starting construction before the end of this year as the assembly building will have to be raised and lengthened along with other modifications not to mention obvious issues such as the current build already underway. You just can close the build down and pivot to another vastly complex design. The CSC will be built as designed after the current order books are fulfilled and yard modifications are finished.
Ted, These CSC “Destroyers” will not be built at Irving Shipyard, but at both Davie and Seaspan Shipyards respectively from scratch (2+2 destroyers). Irving would still build the 12 CSC Frigates as is. Yes, this is a “wake-up call” for both the government & Irving. If Irving is not prepared to start building these ships by year’s end, then give the contracts to other yards! The process has been far too long. So, let this happen and get on with the build….now!
The CSC “Fantasy” destroyers you propose are not going to be built at Sea Span or Davie. The combat package as stipulated by the NSS contract is by Irving with non combatants being built by Sea Span and the CG being built by Davie. The reality is that Seaspan has its order books full and doesn’t have the capacity. Davie is several years away from upgrading its yard and getting a start on the CG builds so it doesn’t have the capacity either. I assume that you know that this idea was dismissed by the RCN early on in the CSC planning as too expensive and thus the “all ships have the same capability” build plan.
Lots of interesting ideas here, David. You are proposing the 32 additional Mark 41 VLS immediately forward of the mission bay, I presume. Would the mission bay remain the same size? I read in Navy Lookout “A guide to the Type 26 Frigate”, November 28, 2022, that the deckhead above the mission bay, serves a critical structural function, providing longitudinal rigidity to the ship, thereby reducing metal fatigue lower in the hull. I suspect having the top of the VLS flush with the top of the mission bay would make the ship too top-heavy. Perhaps a beam on either side would provide sufficient rigidity to allow the VLS to be seated lower in the hull. I’m no expert, but I’ve read that altering an existing hull design can lead to all sorts of complications, delays, and cost overruns. Perhaps a different hull design is in order for a destroyer. Does anyone know if the existing type 26 design can take 48 mark 41 cells forward? I think it would be a far better ship that way.
Hello Andrew. Your thoughts on the “critical structual function” of the beams to reduce metal fatigue at the MMB makes some sense and I guess the engineers when re-structuring this “CSC Destroyer” would have to take that into account to avoid the “top heavy” problem. I’m no engineering expert as well, but perhaps 2 more beams on either side of the MMB would help. Funny you should mention “perhaps another hull design is in order”. As you may know, the UK is looking to replace their Type 45 destroyers with the Type 83 Destroyer that looks very much like the Type 26 Frigate (only larger) if you take a look at the graphic on this future Destroyer that Canada could also “piggy-back” on to produce a “true” CSC Destroyer as we have with the Type 26 Frigate. The reason the “experts” said why Canada went down to 24 MK 41 VLS cells was to “save weight”. Putting another 16 cellls up forward above the 32 VLS cells along with 32 cell MK 41 VLS cells midships, may be a bit too much even for the CSC “Destroyer”. However it might be a viable option for the UK Type 83 Destroyer. It will be several years before the Type 83 Destroyer comes on stream, so there is time to advance that idea. Cheers!
It comes off to me as slightly alarmist to look for meaning where none likely exists regarding official government updates to the Canadian Surface Combatant project. There is effectively no news to report on considering that all of the work being undertaken currently is ongoing behind the scenes and even if it was released, the information is so niche that it would serve little purpose in a public facing information resource like those listed websites. We are currently in the process in procurement where there is effectively going to be minimal public news, even before you factor in Canadian political disinterest in procurement which happens for basically every project at one time or another throughout the process.
In my opinion, it would be a fools errand to abandon the CSC program right now. I cannot think of a worse option Canada could exercise. Canada has been involved in the CSC program in detail since 2012, we are over a decade into the program already as we speak. Alongside incurring hefty legal fees and lengthy lawsuits from BAE and Lockheed Martin if we pull out now, Canada would end up back at square one with regards to the process of picking another vessel. We would either need to restart the bidding process or try to sole source a design, both of those are likely to attract legal action alongside wasting substantial amounts of time, effort and money. Australia might have a valid concern about wanting to replace their Hunter class orders with more numerous but lesser vessels however, that is due to their proximity to China and related strategic situation. Canada does not share that danger and large/capable frigates like the CSC is what we need over less capable but more numerous ships. Modern anti-shipping weapons are becoming more and more dangerous, to the point where ships are having to become larger and more capable to be able to have any kind of endurance against prolonged engagements with remotely modern opponents. For the roles that Canada is going to be looking to undertake, the money we will be spending regardless and the amount of time that we will require these ships to be active for, we need a very capable large frigate to get the most bang for our time and effort. Type 26 is seemingly the premier anti-submarine warfare frigate design in the world at this point, all of that advanced quieting technology and techniques aren’t cheap. That same hull is large enough that we can (with apparently some difficulty) fit the radar suite, sensors and weaponry aboard that these ships will be incredibly capable assets when placed in our own taskforces or in our allied taskforces to detect, coordinate and intercept hostile attacks. Canada only gets a crack at procurements like this every few decades, we need to make sure to make it count and that we do not kneecap our naval performance for decades to come.
A numerous force of homogenous, high capability frigates like our modified Type 26 is exactly what Canada requires. As we effectively have two separate coasts, we need what amounts to two independent fleets able to have high readiness alongside high capability to meet a rapidly evolving naval ecosystem (With the Arctic going forward, it might be wise to consider three coasts instead of two). We save money on training, logistics and infrastructure pipelines by having one design of major combatant throughout the navy, alongside having better availability than a high-low split fleet. The multi-mission bay also provides a unique capability for the vessels to be future-proofed in a world moving towards integrated drone use alongside the ability to adapt to any now unseen future missions.
As for the Type 26 design itself, I have some questions myself but I think in the end, it was likely still the best option. BAE very likely oversold how mature the design was and how able it was to easily take modifications however, that doesn’t change the fact that it was the most capable anti-submarine warfare vessel submitted alongside being the most modern. The FREMM design was fine and capable but shot itself in the foot by submitting an unsolicited underbid outside of the procurement process, the Danes pulled the Iver Huitfeldt design alongside the Germans and their design due to perceived unfair happenings in the program, Navantia’s F-105 design and Alion’s De Zeven Provinciën designs were not as well suited towards anti-submarine work and were somewhat dated designs. Its also likely that Canada’s required modifications to any of the other designs if they were to be chosen could easily have ran into the same issues that Type 26 may be dealing with right now. Type 31 is unsuited to Canadian requirements unless it is effectively stripped down and rebuilt with major capability upgrades from the ground up, even then it isn’t going to be as effective as Type 26. Any other foreign designs chosen will likely be swamped in legal challenges alongside going through its own lengthy and costly tender/modification period to meet the high bar of Canadian capabilities.
I think Canada should stay the course with the CSC as it exists now. If future information becomes public about major issues and concerns with the design, we can go from there to decide the best course of action.
Hello Jimmy. I agree with a lot of what you have said. What do you think of my concept of just buildiing 12 CSC Frigates as is and giving my 4 “CSC Destroyer” concept to Davie and Seaspan. I believe the re-designing of the current CSC Frigate and lengthening them by 10 meters could happen if the CSC Frigate could be re-designed for C2/AAD capabilities. Would this put strain on the engineering aspects of the current design if this was done or would the engineers be able to figure this out? Cheers!
I think its valuable to not confuse secrecy with a lack of news to report. I am also very underwhelmed by the transparency and information sharing throughout the entire process of the CSC program (especially now) but it is something to keep in mind that there likely isn’t much able to be shared right now. The in-depth details of the various design reviews aren’t something that is released to the public, nor would they be especially interested. It is something to remember that we are enthusiasts and the outlier, the public doesn’t really care about this program. I would also imagine that if the program has ran into problems, the government is keeping it internal until they are addressed, to try and ward off hyperbolic criticism by certain very hostile members of the Canadian defense press who seem to get much joy in relentlessly bashing the CSC program.
As for Britain’s Type 26 program, its progress is as expected for a program which started far earlier than Canada or Australia, is the home nation for the base design and laid down its first ship in 2017. Britain has some major advantages over Canada or Australia here alongside a significant head start. Canada has significantly changed and Canadan-ized the design, I would rather us drag our feet in the design stage and be careful compared to rushing things.
With regard to your idea about an enlarged CSC, I think it is more than plausible as a design itself and could be a very capable warship however, I don’t think it is especially practical given Canada’s situation.
If we are looking to speed up the program, I think this proposed idea isn’t workable. Rushing all of the design phases isn’t a good idea nor is it practical. The preliminary design review is almost certainly done right now, with the critical design phase going from 2023-2024 and the final design review phase coming in 2025. It’s not really possible to speed these up given the lack of personnel available to work on these and the pace of work they need to keep, as I stated before, you don’t want to rush these design stages unless you are willing to accept the fact errors and problems are likely. If we wanted to enlarge the CSC, we would effectively need to split the design review boards off and redesign the larger vessel. This would further stretch staff and timelines significantly, we are not even done the current CSC design at this point.
Irving physically cannot begin construction of the CSC’s in 2023, likely not into 2024 either. HMCS William Hall needs to finish fitting out alongside, HMCS Frédérick Rolette has its modules finishing assembly and will go outside for final assembly hopefully by the end of Summer 2023. HMCS Robert Hampton Gray had steel cut in August 2022 but we are unaware if it had its keel laid down yet or not. Even after those ships are completed, there is two more unnamed Coast Guard variants which need to be either built or canceled. Even once that is done, Irving is planning major expansion work to properly accommodate the building of the CSC design. They are infilling 13 acres of Halifax harbor to provide them with additional indoor/outside work space, a new syncrolift and will likely have to rent/build a larger launching barge in order to deal with the CSC. Irving can likely start building a single CSC prior to having this work done but they will need this project completed before they can seriously get up to a good building pace.
Davie and Seaspan do not have any additional space to build even a small number of warships at the moment. Both are entirely booked between their repair/refit contracts with the RCN alongside their ongoing or planned Coast Guard projects. You would need to either cancel or further delay very important Coast Guard programs, which would be suboptimal. These yards would also have to retool for a very limited production run of these ships, making them very expensive as they will each only build two before moving on. It also defeats the primary purpose of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, concentrating specific work in each yard to allow long term work and expertise building. After building the first few ships, Irving will build considerable expertise with the CSC design and will become very efficient at building them due to a skilled workforce and well built supply chain. Seaspan and Davie are splitting various CCG contracts while Seaspan also is doing the JSS.
Having two different designs also defeats part of the purpose of CSC being a homogenous class of ships. While an enlarged CSC shares many similarities with the original, its still going to be enough of a difference to cause logistical headaches. Having 15 of the same ship made sure that you would always have some suitable ships ready for the mission at hand, look at the lackluster operational readiness of Britain’s Type 45 destroyers to see what we could be dealing with if we pick a small class of specialist vessels. You would also need additional training and logistics required to train crews for this modified variant as well, further straining the RCN. Unlike Britain or Australia and their small air warfare fleets, the RCN is split between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans meaning we effectively need two self sufficient fleets. Only two vessels per coast will likely have low readiness and will be down for repairs often.
I think we are better served overall by sticking to our current plan and not budging. We’ve already set the groundwork and have what looks to be a very capable design for our requirements. The Halifax class will have to be taken care of better with decreased operational tempos and more repair work done however with ships like the DeWolf class coming online, we can hand off some of the less intensive overseas duties to them. Any kind of departure from the plan now will result in many headaches, even more than we are currently dealing with. Hopefully more news will be forthcoming about CSC soon to break the drought we are currently dealing with.
Hello,
Do you have any sense of future shipbuilding after the warship series? Are there plans laid out for commercial building to use the developed expertise, or will we return to a slow period until the next round of warship procurement?
The commercial aspect is what I’ve found lacking from the Strategy. There is nothing to ensure critical mass of work between the warship cycles.
Regards
RE: Jimmy 26 June 2023:
Hi Jimmy:
1. Don’t mean to rain on you excellent rebuttal of my “Destroyer” proposal, but I do have some concerns. The lack of news (secrecy) from this government on the CSC Type 26 Frigate program is both stifling and unnecessary. The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Phase 1 has now been completed by Lockheed Martin (LM) and the government and should be available for all Canadians to debate on its outcomes. This government has stalled the release on this and other documents for much too long. Take David Johnson’s final report on the Election’s Interference by China. Again, not yet released by the government. It is fine not to be a fan of the media, however what does this say about the average Canadian? I differ with your comment that the average Canadian “doesn’t really care” about the CSC Frigate program. There are many more Canadians than you can count on both your fingers & toes, that really want to know where the CSC Frigate project stands. My point on this is that both the US Constellation class and both the UK and Australian Type 26 programs have been much more forthcoming in releasing constant up-dates on their programs. Especially with the US Constellation class updates. Their system requires them to release updates on their frigate build at least every quarter, so Americans know what they are getting. “Dragging Our Feet” as you recommend, with the PDR design release, is exactly what this government is purposely doing, by design for no need other than for political purposes.
2. As no contracts have yet been signed, dropping the number of CSC Frigates from 15 to 12 ships is not a hard thing to do by the government and can happen at any time. All it takes is the “will” to do it. We can then later start the re-design of the CSC “Destroyers” for a 4 or even 5 ship build at both Davie and Seaspan shipyards as the Irving yard comes on stream with its 12 CSC Frigate build. The re-design of the CSC Frigate to add another 10 (or even 15) meters midships, could easily be accomplished by both Davie & Seaspan Engineers. This is not rocket science. They could work to ensure there will be no stability or speed restriction concerns with this “Destroyer”. After all, it is still a Canadian Surface Combatant only lengthened with superior AAW capabilities. This would give the RCN a very capable AAW Fleet for the future.
3. I will give you that the CSC Frigate build will not be able to start by the end of 2023, so how about the end of 2024? Will the “new” Irving synchrolift be ready by the end of 2024? One can only hope. Irving should not just be “planning” major expansion work, but should be building on that work now! How does it defeat the primary purpose of the NSS if both Davie & Seaspan shipyards could “re-tool” their shipyards to build these “Destroyers” in consort with both the JSS and CCG Polar Class 2 icebreaker programs?
4. Finally, I agree with you to “press on” with the CSC Type 26 plan however only build 12 instead by Irving. Both Davie and Seaspan yards are both quite capable of building these AAW “Destroyers” to bring the RCN fleet to at least 16 major combatants. Another JSS AOR would not hurt as well. Of course this all hinges on more “trained” Naval personnel to man this fleet along with another Sqn of CH 148 Cyclone helicopter purchase as well (2 Helos per destroyer). More headaches as you say, but just what the doctor ordered for our sailors.
1.) I think you misunderstand my point and what these design reviews are. They are not public facing information, they are not something commonly shared for Canadian projects or even foreign projects except perhaps a blurb announcement saying “this stage has been completed”. These reviews are classified technical information that isn’t shared with members of the public. Canadians do not care about the military, they especially do not care about the Navy and doubly so about a specific navy project. The only time Canadians “care” about our procurement programs is when they see news about cost blowouts, delays or technical issues, where they give a sigh, mutter some unkind words about government wasting money and move on with their day. We are enthusiasts, we care far more about these programs (especially the minutia) than any normal citizen does. It is important to remember that.
I am not familiar with the Australian, UK and American systems however, I see little point trying to compare to other nations who have different procurement and reporting systems than we do. Until such changes are done, this is how our system works. Putting out too much information can be just as dangerous, if not more so, than not putting out any. Look at the problems with the Hunter class and how they have been published, the media ran with a leaked document which lacked context and smeared the entire design as a dangerous failure. They apparently fixed the design but not before its reputation had been stained. I am not a fan of the secrecy or lack of transparency either however, some things just aren’t reported/can’t be reported and some things shouldn’t be reported. It’s one thing to want our system to change but until then, it’s not incredibly relevant here. As far as I can see as well, none of the other Type 26 operators are putting out details design review information either.
2.) The government can always drop the frigate order however, it is a more complex and difficult issue than one might think. Irving is planning for 15 ships, they are planning their personnel, supply chains and working schedules for years on that fact. Forcing such an order down on Irving, Seaspan and Davie will significantly interrupt their current and planned shipbuilding schedules. As I stated previously, cutting the order will likely result in costs for the ships rising as you are losing the economy of scale. This is especially relevant as losing the last 3 ships is even worse, as you are cutting off the order when the production line is running at peak efficiency. Canada has a major shortage of experienced personnel within the procurement departments which can be used to modify these designs, that is one of the reasons why CSC’s design process is dragging on. One can say whatever they like however, modifying warships isn’t as easy as dropping a hull section in and washing your hands of everything. The ships are interconnected designs where every thing you add can affect other pieces, let alone major additions. You will have to split those already thinly stretched teams even more to deal with such a redesign, a very substantial redesign at that. This will make both processes even slower and will cause delays. If you think CSC is slow now, this is a way to make it worse.
You are overestimating the capability of Canadian yards. Davie is currently tooling up and preparing to take on vital Canadian Coast Guard contracts, they are not currently ready to build anything and are busy with upcoming contracts in the future. Seaspan is absolutely at capacity with their current and future programs. We cannot afford to delay these already delayed programs for the CCG any longer, neither yard has the extra manpower or space to accommodate something as difficult and large as a further enlarged CSC. None of Canada’s yards can deal with this program unless you further delay the current or upcoming programs for it, which I think is a very bad idea.
I won’t speak to the realism of your design as I do not see myself as especially qualified to do so.
3.) I can’t especially speak to this as much either, Irving will have to undergo construction to their yard while they are actively going to be using it. That will be a challenge in itself for them to overcome, many things “should” be happening now but reality is not the ideal situation. It defeats the purpose of NSS because NSS is built on the idea that yards will specialize in certain ship types and by doing that, will retain long term work within themselves. As far as I know, it is a specific stipulation as part of the signed NSS agreement that each yard will do specific work. This would break that and cause issues. Sharing work between them is entirely against this goal as you lose the efficiency in supply lines and production by retooling multiple times to deal with additional designs. Irving is building all of the CSC, Seaspan is doing JSS + CCG vessels and Davie is doing CCG icebreakers. Davie and Seaspan are sharing the PC2 heavy icebreaker orders as a second was awarded to Davie as a bone to Quebec during an election, it is the outlier. As I said above, Seaspan and Davie are either currently at capacity or are booked to capacity with very important NSS orders already. There is not the room for your proposed ships to be built, not without some very tough and suboptimal decisions being made.
In the end, I don’t think all of the increased cost, effort, headaches to shipyards and countless other issues are worth the gain to capability that a few enlarged CSC’s would bring. Homogenous design was one of the huge upsides of CSC as it helps with training, logistics, build cost/complexity, etc. This would fly directly in the face of that and cause a lot of issues that the RCN was specifically trying to avoid with CSC. The Canadian Government and RCN have their own amount of problems to deal with at the moment and going forward, we do not need the additional major problems that this destroyer variant proposal will likely cause.
RE: Jimmy-26 June 2023-12:54 PM:
Hello Jimmy. I am not suggesting the government divulge any Canadian or Allied “secrets” WRT the Preliminary Design Review (PDR Phase 1). Far from it. We must maintain that of course. But we can at least give Canadians a feel for what the final design will look like and perhaps a “sneak-peek” of what the CSC Frigates future up-dating will look like as well. For instance; will the CIAD Sea Septor VLS sylos be increased from 24 to 48 missiles now that the Satellite antennas have been moved forward from either side of the CIAD VLS to around the reconfigured main mast. There is certainly enough room there now. Will the NSM silos be increased from 2 to 4 systems as per the US Constellation class Frigates? Again, enough room for that. Where will the Gargoyle 176 drones be located? Inside the hanger or in 20 ft. containers inside the Reconfigureable Multi-Mission Bay? Is it still possible to go back to a 32 MK 41 VLS system forward to accommodate “future” Hypersonic missile systems along with SM3/6 weapons? I understand everyone is “preaching saving weight” to go to 24 cells, but why are both the UK Type 26 City and Australian Hunter class Type 26 Frigates staying with the 32 MK 41 VLS concept forward?
I will give you that my CSC “Destroyer” Design concept may have some holes that need to be filled and perhaps not possible to be started at this time, however I believe the concept is still valid. By the time the last CSC Frigate is in the water by 2040 (perhaps), both the Sea Span and Davie shipyards will have already had the JSS AORs and Polar class 2 Icebreakers “in the water” and would be ready to move on to other NSS government programs like the CSC Type 26 “Destroyer” concept. Before that happens, the CSC “Destroyer” Design phase, would have already been completed (one would hope). Another possibility would be to “piggy-back” on the UK Type 83 Dssign that the UK will build to replace their Type 45 Destroyers (which by the way looks very much like the Type 26 City class Frigate-only larger to accommodate advanced weapon systems) as Canada is doing with the CSC Type 26 Frigate with Lockheed Martin doing the Design Phase as well to build a “minimum of 4 or 5 CSC Destroyers (for continuity). Training and Logistics as you say, will not be that difficult as many of the Type 83 capabilities are very similar to the Type 26 City class Frigate design.
Another option (which I have talked about before on the CNR forum) would be to acquire the Arleigh Burke Block III Design from the US and build those, however that would require some serious discussions with the US as they would not likely want to just give us those plans and would probably want to build them in the US. That would also put some holes in your “homogenous” class of CSC Type 26 ships. The bottom line is, that we would still be able to construct only 12 frigates from Irving as no contracts have been signed as yet. We would always build them in “Batches” anyway (4 Batch 1; 4 Batch 2 & 4 Batch 3) Irving contracts. Yes, stick to the CSC Frigate Design as is, but only build 12. It is going to be harder over the next several years to keep the Halifax class in an “operational” tempo without at least some of them (perhaps 3 or even 4) frigates going to the scrap-yard until we can acquire at least enough CSC Type 26 Frigates to replace them. What say you?
Seaspan is at capacity so no they can’t build warships. Davie is some time away from finishing yard upgrades and is not selected for the combat package for building.
The Commander of the RCN recently said in a town hall that the Halifax Class will have to keep going to 2045. Much money is being invested in refits to improve the structure of the ships to keep some going that long, more than likely some ships will be paid off early and crews reallocated for fleet shortages before the first CSC takes to the water. After the last AOPV is constructed there will be significant reconstruction of the assembly hall lengthening and raising it to allow for multiple CSC to be built as once as a sort of frigate factory. The question is will the CSC be built and I believe too much has been invested to not to build at least 3 to replace the last 3 280’s. That being said I wouldn’t be adverse to a different class to supplement the CSC and the time it will take to build 3 CSC’s, there is plenty of time to plan a different class. If they did do that would it be that bad really? If the government or RCN sticks to their guns and we do build all 15 then more power to them, I’m happy either way. Let’s remember that the CSC project hasn’t had all the design challenges that the Hunter Class frigate has had and so while some similarities nothing all deviating from the 15 ship build other than the odd biased media article.
I wonder how much CSC production could be accelerated if the construction of the CCG AOPS was delayed/cancelled.
Ubique,
Les
Hello Les,
I don’t think Irving is going to be able to meaningfully start CSC production for a few more years. HMCS William Hall needs to finish fitting out alongside, HMCS Frédérick Rolette has its modules finishing assembly and will go outside for final assembly hopefully by the end of Summer 2023. HMCS Robert Hampton Gray had steel cut in August 2022 but we are unaware if it had its keel laid down yet or not. Then comes the two Coast Guard AOPS you have mentioned, those will either have to be built or canceled. It’s likely a good idea to build them considering they are at the end of the order, meaning they are going to be the fastest built ships and the most efficient given the experience and well defined supply sources that Irving has set up. The CCG as far as I have heard isn’t very enthusiastic about getting AOPS but its one of those situations where the government is likely pressuring them due to the convenience of the order, its better than nothing in the end. I don’t think you can delay them to start the CSC, as once you start CSC, Irving needs to retool and prepare for the new design. You will lose most of the advantages in efficiency and speed of construction if you try and juggle the frigates and AOPS together. Even once that is done, Irving is planning major expansion work to properly accommodate the building of the CSC design. They are infilling 13 acres of Halifax harbor to provide them with additional indoor/outside work space, a new syncrolift and will likely have to rent/build a larger launching barge in order to deal with the CSC. Irving can likely start building a single CSC prior to having this work done (minus the new launching platform) but they will need this project completed before they can seriously get up to a good building pace.
You might be able to save some time but you risk leaving the yards sitting around without work for some amount of time while they modernize/await CSC’s design to finalize to the point they can meaningfully start construction.
Because of government secrecy Les, we will never know! Probably no savings in time or money so I guess we will have to be resigned to the fact that the AOPS is here to stay. Even the CCG versions.
This was mentioned recently in a townhall with the CRCN and the answer was that it was looked at among other things to speed up the process however still a significant amount to the design process left as per the plan and the yard modifications required. In short changing plan at this juncture will not save time.
Good morning Jimmy, David, and Retired,
Thank you for your feedback and the valuable info/insights that you provided.
Unique,
Les
It’s difficult, given the stated lack of the federal government’s timely progress reports and transparency, for the average taxpayer to determine 1. whether the government intentionally wants to keep Canadians in the dark, like mushrooms, on the progress of the NSS/CSC program; or 2. the procurement process is just slow and cumbersome; or 3. the government at the cabinet level and the procurement process is just simply incompetent; or 4. all of the aforementioned.
Hello BC. I must agree with much of what you have said. Yes it is difficult (and also confusing) for the “average” taxpayer to determine what the “real” truth is WRT to CSC Type 26 program. The answers to your statements are:
1. YES, Keep most Canadians in the dark to deflect and delay!
2. YES, The procurement process definitely needs to be updated soonest!
3. YES! Most definitely! Put the right people in charge that at least have a clue as to what they are doing! Never a politician!
4. YES! YES! YES!…………All of the above
The RCN’s unofficial theme: “We Have Done So Much, With So Little, For So Long, That Now We Are Ready To Do Anything With Nothing Forever!!”
Reply to Blair Shaw of 17 Jul 23
Good morning Blair,
We seem to be discussing two different things. Your focus appears to be sea time. My focus was on distant missions for the benefit of NATO and the democracies in general. I would not include deployments that are primarily of national interest. Thus, most French, British, Dutch, and Danish deployments do not count for me, as they are in national waters (even if overseas), are the result of former imperial roles (e.g. Senegal) or are done to justify the permanent UNSC seats for France and the UK. To my mind, these deployments are equivalent to AOPS deploying to the Canadian Arctic. Similarly, national navies spending long times at sea “defending” national EEZs against hated neighbours do not count.
Thus, for me, when we exclude national interest sea time, Canada’s deployments to Latvia, the Indo-Pacific, western African waters, and the Baltic seem much more significant and meritorious.
Ubique,
Les
There is no reconsidering building the ships because that is exactly why we don’t have new ships now and the costs are so high. Initially they were supposed to be cheaper but that was a decade or more ago but delays and ‘reconsideration’ = No ships and higher costs. There solution is not enough of the right ships or ones that are sub par that will be destroyed in combat within days leaving us defenceless… Awesome solution. Just build the best ships, build what we really need to protect us and do it now.
Here’s a few layman thoughts & questions:
1) The destroyer being 10 m longer, why not just build both destroyer & frigate hulls to the same longer length?
The destroyer needs it, fine. For the frigate, would the extra 10 m not allow it to carry more fuel, more stores, bigger hangar or landing pad, etc. – I am sure they can find a use for an extra 10 m on that frigate, so long as it does not add anything with extra complexity. Whatever cost increase from an extra 10m of hull would probably be offset by having both frigate and destroyer be the same basic size. Or am I completely out to lunch?
2) I have a feeling they won’t be building 15 of these, regardless of the party in charge. The time frame for getting into service being so far down the road, who knows what kind of new naval developments there will be? Drone swarms, lasers, quantum radars, AI torpedoes that follow the mothership like friendly exploding dolphins. The point is: they may need a fresh new design before Canada even has all these ships in service.
3) Speaking of which: submarines will need to be replaced, and that decision is going to be a doozy. 4 is not enough for a 3 ocean country like Canada, considering how much sub proliferation there is, and the increasing number of perils that can kill surface ships. Could I suggest we might need 8? (2 per ocean, plus 2 in the shop.) I do not foresee these being second-hand. Maybe not needing nuclear-powered, but we do need something credibly threatening.
Nobody knows what the future will bring, but it sure does not look like the world will enjoy a peaceful 30 years ahead.
Hello Wyldhowl. Certainly is refreshing to hear from a new forum member. Your thoughts and questions are very much appreciated on this forum. Most of which have already been spoken to by other members as well.
1) Your thoughts on extending the design for all 15 CSC Frigates by 10 meters although commendable, will not be practical as the current CSC Design Phase is still on-going and does not allow for a 10 meter extension. What I and others have suggested is to either lengthen the first 3 or 4 CSC Frigates by 10 meters to incorporate a 32 MK 41 ExL VLS Cell midships forward of the Multi-Mission Bay This would also give room for another 2 x 24 ExL VLS silos as well forward along with another 2 x NSM missile sets as the Constellation class frigate already has. This 10 meter extension however will also have to be thoroughly and thoughtfully restructured by Naval Engineers in order to ensure both ship balance and speed are not compromised. Adding another 2 x Electric motors (4 in total) will also help. Reinstating the 32 MK 41 ExL forward from 24 will give this ‘CSC Type 26 Destroyer’ the missile ‘teeth’ it needs (well over 100 missiles of various types). What has also been considered is only building 12 CSC Type 26 Frigates (as is), and then pinning our coat-tails to the future British Type 83 Destroyers now being considered by the RN and build up to 4 of those for Canada. If you have seen the plans for this destroyer, it looks very much like the BAE Type 26 Frigate only larger. Building only 12 CSC Frigates and then 4 Type 83 Destroyers would bring Canada back up to strength to where we were 20 years ago with 12 Halifax class & 4 Iroquois class ships for a total of 16 surface combatants.
2) You may be proven correct on the number of CSC Frigates that will finally be built. The CSC Type 26 Frigates will already have the 176 Gargoyle UAV drones as part of the C4ISR requirements. Other autonomous vehicles both surface and sub-surface may be incorporated in the frigate as part of “future-proofing”. The BAE Type 26 UK design will have a laser system as well. A great place to put them would be Port Stb’d waists as it looks kind of empty there now.
3) Submarines, however, are another kettle of fish. Your suggestion of 8 new subs does not go far enough. More than 4 and perhaps as many as 12 next generation submarines have been asked for by the Senate Defence Committee for several years now. One thing is clear though. These boats will have to be designed and built outside of Canada as we do not have the expertise in this country to build them as yet. These AIP/LIB next generation subs may come from one of perhaps 4 countries. ROK; Japan; Germany or France. My bet would be the Japanese Taigei class LIB submarine or the German Type 212CD or 216 AIP submarine. If it came down to final design, I suspect Germany would win out hands down for 12 Type 212 CD or 12 HWS Type 216 Canadian subs. Germany makes the best steel for non-nuclear subs in the world. Another option would be to investigate the Hybrid submarine combining Small Modular Reactor with LIB/AIP technology. This strategy is only feasible however on a joint venture with other existing sub builders.
Your last statement wyldhowl, is very appropriate and perhaps true. Only time will tell. Cheers!
As a lay person with no naval engineering background, may I ask in all ignorance why the RCN could not function with additional converted joint support vessels (e.g. OBELIX and another added to ASTERIX); construction of the news frigates based instead of the Type 26 on the proven FREMM/ CONSTELLATION design; and savings found applied to 1-3 replacement diesel-electric submarines? The current plan threatens to bankrupt government interest and resources.
The RCN very well could hypothetically function with the fleet that you mentioned however, it is leaving out the details as to why these other options were not chosen and likely will not be in the future.
Asterix is an acceptable interim ship and could work fine if the RCN wanted to operate it long term however, the terms of the contract through the Federal Fleet Service seem predatory. The Parliamentary Budget Office released a report in 2020 going over the costs of operating Asterix alongside potentially purchasing her and a sister ship. Asterix was offered for purchase upon its delivery to the Government of Canada in 2018 at a base price of $658 million, or $724 million with applicable taxes. If purchased at the expiry of the contract agreement in 2022-23, PBO estimated it will cost the government $576 million, or $633 million with tax considering wear and tear. The PBO similarly guessed that buying Obelix would cost the Government roughly $800 million a few years ago.
For these costs, you can likely go overseas and get a purpose built supply ship. Asterix is about as good as one can expect a converted vessel to be but she is missing many of the military hardening features, self defense equipment, purpose built weaponry storage, command and control facilities to act as a fleet flagship, etc which the JSS program vessels will deliver.
FREMM is a perfectly suitable frigate design. However, they entered a bid for the CSC program and lost to the Type 26. The French/Italian firm was unhappy with Canadian intellectual property rights requirements and the overall procurement process, so it attempted to disingenuously lowball the Canadian Minister of Defence with an offer outside of the procurement process. Therefore, FREMM lost and will not be bought. Canada has put in the work to modify the Type 26 into exactly the ship we want and to Canadian standards, Constellation is an American modified FREMM and would thus not be the ship Canada wants. Ditching the Type 26 for another design at this point would cause Canada to enter into a major legal battle with BAE and Lockheed Martin, further wasting money and time for little benefit. The Constellation is using American systems that we are not planning to use, changing to it would either require breaking the contracts we have to produce a lot of Canadian systems and parts from Canadian companies or modifying the American design.
The PBO did another report about canceling the Type 26 for various other designs. They found that changing to FREMM would be a roughly four year delay in the program and would only save about $6 billion. Many of the costs of the CSC program involve infrastructure upgrades, design changes, development and reflect the expensive nature of domestic Canadian building. Changing the design will not make a meaningful difference in cost. If anything, it will raise them further.
Canadian program costing methods are very strange and not reflective of the “sticker prices” which many other countries release, being strictly the cost per piece of equipment multiplied by the amount of equipment bought. Canadian programs are far more comprehensively managed cost wise, which works to drive up their supposed cost. Thus without similar data to compare, it is fruitless to try and compare CSC’s program cost to say Constellation’s sticker cost.
Canada’s 15 SCS should be scrapped in favour of:
5 – Modified Ageis “VLS Canister” equiped
Izuma Carriers
5 – Dokdo ASW Aircraft Carrier / Assault
5 – French SSN
5 – French SSK
5 – SSKG
5 – Mogai ASW Frigates
5 – Mogai ASW / MCM Frigates
5 – Danish ASW Arctic Frigates