By Moderator, 13 June 2023
Some of you will have already seen the spring issue of CNR – the joint issue with Australian Naval Review. If you haven’t seen it, you should try to find a copy. It’s interesting to compare the two navies and the two countries’ maritime situations and see the similarities and differences. The joint issue has articles on four themes with authors from Canada and Australia for all of them -- two themes illustrate the differences and two themes illustrate the similarities. First the differences. The national security articles clearly show the different views of the purposes and roles of the navies. In Canada, the navy plays little role in national security, as defined by the government, whereas in Australia, the navy is a key player in how the government sees Australia’s security. In terms of submarines, the differences are stark. Australia is forging ahead on its ambitious submarine program, while Canada is at the initial stages of considering replacements for its submarines. In terms of the similarities, the articles on climate change and navies illustrate that both countries are facing challenges in a changing climate, and both are attempting to make their navies carbon neutral. And it is clear that recruitment and retention are huge problems for both the RAN and RCN – the only differences are in the programs that have been set up to address the problem. Comments on the joint issue or other similarities or differences would be very interesting to hear. Maybe we could think about a second joint issue!
24 thoughts on “Comparing the RAN and RCN: Comments on the Joint Issue”
We don’t compare to the RAN………
Hello Ron. Perhaps you are right but it depends on what you are trying to compare. “Apples to oranges”, or “Apples to Apples”. If it’s “Apples to Apples”, the RAN does not compare to the RCN in many aspects.
Hi David,
Very well said!!!
Ubique
Les
David, we are lacking LHD, replenishment ships, long range missiles, ships capable of firing long range missiles, attack helicopters, SUBMARINES, amphibious ships, I’m not asking much.
Hi Ron,
Couple of points.
Fully agree with the need for AORs. Four to my mind. Great pity the government missed the boat so badly in the early 2000s.
Agree with the need for Arctic-capable submarines. Eight to 12 I believe.
LHDs are nice-to-haves for Canada.
Which other amphibious ships do you feel that we need?
Which missiles do you feel that we need?
I believe that the CAF needs attack helicopters both as part of the army’s combined arms team and to escort the Chinooks. In what context do you envisage them being used?
Ubique
Les
Yes Ron you are correct on all fronts, however we have to stand up and walk before we can run. We will get there, but if only we surpass the 2% of GDP for defence ASAP!
Re: AUKUS and Australia’s submarine force, a bit of reality for those who consider all things Australian uncritically and see Canada, Canadians, and the CAF as so much less/unworthy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Igqs1qDbnK4
2% of GDP needs to happen and soon. They need to look what’s happening in the world, what NATO wants from us. What’s it going to take to take care of the country? All we need to do is look at Ukraine, the days of sitting on our butts are long over. As for the questions what missiles do we need? Tomahawks, hypersonic when they become available, defensive missiles such SM-6, SM-3, Patriots. We need LHP/Amphibious with supporting attack helicopter not Cyclones with a couple door gunners. Attack submarines such as South Korea’s capable of launching cruise missiles. A marine force would be nice but we can’t get regular soldiers and our leadership has no stomach for such. In a few years if not sooner than we think the Arctic ocean is going to become a very tested area and if Canada keeps on the track we’re on we will lose it. We should have a navy that’s twice as strong as Australia’s and quit thinking the USA is going to always come to our defense. It’s going take all 3 political parties to come up with a plan and not one 10 years down the road. Look at the fiasco of the F-35 purchase. We have become nothing more than an embarrassment to Canadians.
Good morning Ron,
Fully agree with need for Arctic-capable forces.
10 articles have been written, mainly in the CNR, by Brian Wentzell, Jose Canadas Mendez and myself over the last 4 years on the topic. I am curious how much the vision that they contain fits in with your view of what is needed.
Ubique
Les
Hello Ron. Cannot disagree with much of what you have said. Especially with our Army’s requirements of Parriots and Tactical Helicopters. The RCN’s requirements of SM3/6 and Hypersonic missiles for our CSC Frigates would be useful as well. Canada tried to establish a Marine Battallion years ago, but that somehow went nowhere fast. Attack submarines will come (hopefully sooner than later). However a “3 Party” plan for our defence Ron, will never happen as politicians cannot even agree on anything WRT Chinese political interference of our own elections!
Hello Les: It looks very much like the RAN is in a “world of hurt” with the Collins class and its “real” capabilities and future availabilities for the next 20-30 years down the road. I take it that they did not even start to modernize the Collins class until much later than even Canada did with our Victoria class and are very much “behind the eight-ball” until AUKUS is realized. Something for Canada to consider when thinking about the Victoria class replacements no doubt! It seems that the RAN is having the same personnel issues as Canada right now but hopefully will have the right number of people in the near future to augment their sub force now for that future when the AUKUS nuclear program is “supposed” to come “on-stream”. They must get the HEU nuclear waste problem solved very soon! It sounds like they are much farther behind than Canada is for nuclear waste storage. Their nuclear waste problems are just starting. One of the problems when you decide to go totally nuclear! An interesting film indeed!!
Hi David,
For the reasons that you raise and others, I believe that Australia will never buy the AUKUS submarines as planned.
Time will tell.
Ubique
Les
Hello Les: It would be helpful if you could expand on your reasons you believe that Australia will never buy the AUKUS SSN from the UK as planned? It seems if that will be the case, then Australia may have to “settle” with Virginia class SSNs, and not as many, for the foreseeable future. I was under the impression that the AUKUS SSN project was a “collaborative” program among all three countries, as both the US and UK would also be procuring the same sub (different variants) to replace their Virginia and Astute SSN classes as well. I.E. each country “sharing” the costs to make it more affordable for all?
Good morning David,
Thank you for your request.
There are three major reasons why I do not believe that Australia will buy the AUKUS submarine as planned.
Firstly, I do not think that Australia will be able to build the supporting nuclear industry as quickly as required. It will have to depend on a foreign (likely American) industry. This is analogous to its purchase of the battlecruiser HMAS Australia, which it could not build or even fully man, prior to WW I.
Secondly, putting an American propulsion system into a British hull seems fraught with scope for more than the usual delay and confusion found with multinational weapon projects. I believe that the Brits will be the weak point in this approach. Consequently, I believe that the USA will proceed with an “interim” solution, while AUKUS slowly spirals around the bowl in its death throes. This will leave Australia looking to the USA for its submarine way ahead.
Thirdly, given the above beliefs, I expect that the current eyewatering price tag will only grow. This will likely lead to hard questions about value for money and how many eggs to put into one basket.
For the above reasons, I expect Australia to pursue an American submarine solution, while perhaps saying nice words about AUKUS.
Ubique,
Les
Hi David,
In addition, I would like to add that Australia’s AUKUS plan reminds me of two comments made by instructors during an equipment project management course that I attended centuries ago in NDHQ.
“Capital projects start out slow and then peter away from there.”
“The five stages of a capital equipment project are:
1. Heady enthusiasm.
2. Creeping doubts.
3. Flight of the responsible.
4. Punishment of the innocent.
5. Reward of the non-participants.”
Ubique,
Les
Hello Les. you could be right on everything you have said. Yes, your NDHQ analysis course of “Capital projects start out slow and then peter away from there” seems to be very familiar for every CAF project the government has “attempted” to accomplish so far.
Further to my comment of 19 Jun 23, here is info on the 10 articles mentioned.
The strategic context for them is created by both the unrelenting effects of climate change, notably in the Arctic, and the increasingly aggressive actions of large authoritarian revisionist states such as Russia and China. These two factors mean that Canada cannot only pursue its long-standing ‘distant defence’ strategy but must also be able to conduct coastal defence of its shores, notably off its most demanding coast – the Arctic. See Canadian Naval Review (CNR) 17.3 pages 20 and 21 for an amplification of this idea. This requires the Royal Canadian Navy to have a balanced fleet able to undertake both missions, see the same article pages 21-24.
The general shape of a basic Canadian Arctic amphibious capability is described at CNR 15.2 pp 36 and 37. The similar description for an intermediate level of capability is found at CNR 16.1 pp 32-34.
Several aspects of the command and control of these amphibious forces are touched on briefly at:
Canadian Army Journal (CAJ) 19.2 pp 72-74 (Canadian Army Journal 19.2 (publications.gc.ca)).
CNR 17.2 pp 33 and 34.
The basic level of capability would use Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels and Joint Support Ships (when sea-ice permits) as the required amphibious ships. The intermediate level would require the development and construction of specialized amphibious vessels – the working designations for the two suggested notional ship designs are: Landing Platform Arctic (LPA) (an Arctic-capable Landing Platform Dock) and the Landing Ship Infantry (Arctic) (LSI(A)), which is less capable but also less expensive. These are discussed at:
CNR 16.1 pp 33 and 34.
CNR 17.1 pp 33-35.
CNR 18.1 pp 31-34.
CNR 18.2 pp 23-27 (Available in print, subscriber-only on-line access until about October 2023).
CNR 18.3 pp 30-32 (Available in print, subscriber-only on-line access until about February 2024).
The marine infantry required by this new capability would be found by re-roling one to three of the army’s existing infantry battalions (3 RCR, 3 PPCLI, and 3 R22eR). This approach is described at the following articles, the last of which also discusses the creation of a small coordinating brigade headquarters:
CNR 15.2 p 37.
CNR 16.1 p 33.
CAJ 19.2 pp 70-75 (Canadian Army Journal 19.2 (publications.gc.ca)).
The initial provision of the maritime tactical helicopters (using existing Cyclones) and hovercraft required to transport the marine infantry to and from their ships is discussed at:
Helicopters – CNR 17.2 pp 32-35.
Hovercraft (Landing Craft Air Cushion) – CNR 18.1 pp 34-36.
Hello,
Note that those “revisionist states” form the core of the Eurasian landmass, which represents about 50% of the world’s population and very much of its real economy and resources.
The days of the West (and current NATO incarnation) conducting gunboat diplomacy and imposing its will on that part of the world are over. Those states can militarily push us out and they no longer need us economically. They are increasingly self-sufficient in energy and resources, and their military technology matches and in some cases exceeds ours.
So NATO (American) requirements to deploy on the other side of the planet to impose its will, are becoming moot and almost impossible to fulfill. “Distant defense” has become impossible, as those states can sink any of our expeditionary forces in their immediate back-yard. It is a political constraint, not a technological/military one.
We should focus on rebuilding our society, industry, and economy. That will allow us to build a credible defensive force that is focused on protecting our borders locally, not on expeditionary missions.
Regards
Good morning Curious,
Distant defence missions do not have to involve landing on the Eurasian land mass. We could very easily be called upon to help deter aggression against South Korea, Japan, (India) and other neighbouring countries (see CNR 17.3 pp 20 and 21). This is hardly Western gunboat diplomacy. Instead, it would be a collective response by world democracies against authoritarian attempts to impose their will. Such a defensive effort is vital to Canada’s future security; failure would ultimately leave us kowtowing to whichever dictator the CCP chooses to impose on China (and its Russian client state).
This basic logic has underpinned the distant defence strategy for over 100 years.
At the same time, I fully agree with the need for capable coastal (Arctic) patrol and defence forces and the requirement to grow and protect our economy.
Finally, I would urge you to read Michael Beckley’s “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower” for a discussion of China’s many and growing internal problems. These may well cut off its push for hegemony at the knees. I do not necessarily agree with the author’s view of the USA’s future, but his summary of China’s limitations is well supported and cannot simply be brushed aside. Russia’s endless problems and decline fill our news screens daily.
Canada’s contribution to any such collective defence will certainly be naval in the first instance. Whatever ships we send as part of it will have to be very capable.
Ubique
Les
Hello Curious Civilian. You seem to have a simple view of the world and Canada in particular, and I suspect that your views on Canada’s military are equally so. The very same “gun boat diplomacy and imposing their will” as you say, could easily be said of many Eastern countries such as Russia and China as well as many other states. NATO is definitely much more than just one nation (USA). Many other members (including Canada) are trying to stabilize rogue states, including Russia, from trying to “impose their will” on others (Ukraine). Canada can no longer stand by and watch this happen without bringing the world to the very edge of destruction. If Canada builds its “credible forces” first, then re-establishing our society, industry and economy will happen naturally, however Canada’s economic position is still very strong and will do just fine, thank you very much. Protect our own sovereignty yes, but we must not diminish our expeditionary world-wide missions as well.
Hello and thank you both for your replies.
The validity or righteousness of our missions notwithstanding, it remains that those countries have the military-technological means to sink our forces close to their coast, should things come to that, particularly as their naval forces are fully integrated with their land and aerospace systems. Our forces can no longer prevail against the combined armed forces of those states, and we the west collectively no longer have the capability to produce and man giant armadas required to overwhelm their forces, then land and impose political concessions on their leadership.
As for superpowers and our screens, there is ample primary information out there from western sources alone, that disputes what we are told by CBC and CNN. It is indeed a simple view of the world, with very simple indicators like food prices, housing, healthcare, educational attainment, indigenous technology, tonnage of refined resources. I can be naive, but a country needs these basics well covered before designing and building space vehicles, nuclear submarines, aircraft, warships, and advanced weapon systems in industrial quantities.
Go straight to the primary data, the data is openly available on the internet from reputable sources. Compare these indicators across the board, then see what it is we can build. Western indicators are on a downward trajectory and have been for some time.
Canada’s economic potential is indeed enormous, but it is unmet, as we are increasingly unable to cover the basics. We have higher food prices, housing is perpetually in some crisis, we do not have sufficient doctors and nurses, ER times are worsening, morbid obesity is widespread, fertility rates are plummeting. This is not consistent with the marks of a prosperous society.
Aside from construction material and cars, we don’t make much. We no longer design and manufacture advanced weapon systems, rockets, spaceships, nuclear submarines, large aircraft and vessels. These indicators do not correlate positively with a credible defensive force.
Buying warships of British/American design, mostly equipped with British/American/European systems and staffed by insufficient personnel, won’t re-establish or rebuild Canada as a strong, credible anything.
Leaving aside comparisons of ideology between us and them, very many basic indicators suggest that those states have stronger foundations than we do in many respects. In this context, choosing to go up to their borders and respond democratically by force to anything they do, does not seem viable or credible.
Disagree, by all means, but look at the direct indicators, not the media narrative.
Regards!
Good morning Curious,
Your argument against the democracies doing anything against Chinese aggression and drive for hegemony, other than retreat/surrender, seems to rest on the view that we would have to close in near its coasts to have any strategic effect. This ignores China’s real resource weaknesses. These permit stand-off naval blockades and attrition of responding Chinese forces.
Additionally, you seem to ignore fully China’s many internal weaknesses. Industrial capacity alone does not make a superpower. How many of the problems that you cite for Canada also apply to China?
I am ignoring Russia in this comment, which I suspect that you do not, as it is becoming ever more a comic opera gas station with nukes. Thus, it is not a real competitor for the democracies, other than as China’s useful flunky.
Given all of the garbage on the Internet that masquerades as fact, it would be helpful if you provided links to some of the data sites that you consider credible and relevant.
Thank you.
Ubique,
Les
Hello Les,
My argument is that the concept of distance defense anywhere near the borders of eastern Eurasia is no longer viable.
Yes indeed, China has exposed sea lanes of communication vulnerable to western interdiction, hence the Belt and Road Initiative and all the land-based connections through Asia. They are moving their critical links over land to reduce their exposure. Of course there are internal weaknesses, but which ones do you refer to?
Lifting 800 million people out of poverty ? https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-new-report-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-experience
or its consumer price index being much lower than any western country ? https://www.economy.com/indicators/consumer-price-index-cpi
Compare to ours https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1810000413&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.2&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=05&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2005&referencePeriods=20050501%2C20050501
How about Raytheon saying decoupling from China is impossible? What stand-off attrition when key weapon systems are dependent on Chinese inputs?
Their energy sources: https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/CHN large coal deposits, and imports from the Middle East, Russia, and Central Asia.
Nuclear reactors being built and coming online https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx
Rosatom is responsible for 76% of global nuclear technology exports.
Steel production, China #1, Russia #5 https://worldsteel.org/steel-topics/statistics/world-steel-in-figures-2022/
Energy production and consumption, Russia #3 https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf
Fertilizer export, Russia #1, China #2 https://www.worldstopexports.com/top-fertilizers-exports-by-country/
Trade balance, China #1, Russia #4 Canada #48 https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/trade_balance_dollars/
Gold reserves https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gold-reserves
Debt to GDP ratio Russia <25% Canada 100% US 122%, we've already talked about the overvalued financial focus of our GDP https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD
Here's more, try for any country https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus
Are these really just gas stations?
Regards!
This is a quick list, real simple
Thank you Curious.
Re: China’s internal problems. See Beckley