By Les Mader, 9 August 2022
From its initial appearance, the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) and the warships that it is producing have generated a great deal of public comment. Some have been informed and helpful, such as Andrew Kendrick’s sobering analysis which was brought to the Forum’s attention on 27 July 2022. Other commentaries have been overtaken by events1or have bordered on conspiracy theories. Still others have been hyperbolic.
For example, in 2007, eight years before the first steel was cut for the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), Jack Layton – then-leader of the New Democratic Party – denounced them as “slushbreakers.”2 The lack of knowledge behind this comment has been shown clearly by the passage of time. Despite this fact, as at 30 July 2022, it was still found in the Wikipedia article on the Harry DeWolf Class AOPS.
Additionally, again as of 30 July 2022, the same article still contained the following text, which is based on a 2013 article by Terry Milewski:
In May, the CBC revealed that the projected cost of the design phase of the project was many times what other countries paid for similar ships based on the same Norwegian class for design, construction, and full-up operational deployment of multiple ships. … The projected design cost of the ship class is $288 million, … The Norwegians spent less than $100 million for the initial design and construction of the vessel in 2002. Denmark built two ships for $105 million in 2007, and Ireland did the same for $125 million.3
Some of the ideas in the Milewski article continue to be used in various places, including recently in Canadian Naval Review itself, to attack the AOPS and the larger NSS. Even Mr Kendrick uses the $100M cost for the Svalbard in his article, sometimes appropriately, but other times – indirectly – seemingly to support his contention that Canada is overpaying for the ships that the NSS is producing.
All of this is disappointing since the costs of the Svalbard, the Danish ships (likely the Knud Rasmussen class4) and the Irish ships (likely the Samuel Beckett class5) are little relevant to current discussions about our AOPS, given that the price for the Svalbard is from 20 years ago while those for the Irish and Danish ships are some 12 and 15 years, respectively, in the past. Equally important, these latter four ships have only one-third of the displacement of the AOPS and cannot support extended helicopter operations and do not have the AOPS’ autonomy.
Additionally, the Irish ships are not ice-capable, while the Danish ones can only operate in 40 centimetres of sea ice – one-third of the AOPS requirement. Also it is not clear to me, despite an Internet search, that Svalbard could meet the autonomy, hot climate operations, and Arctic Ocean pollution-mitigation requirements that the AOPS must. Surely, if we are going to compare NSS ships to other vessels, let’s compare like-for-like or at least state where the comparisons are weak.
It is very clear that the NSS is currently unable to deliver the required ships in a timely fashion. Action is required to correct the NSS’ course. However, every easily-refuted hyperbolic comment about the NSS undermines the credibility of those who point out its actual shortcomings and makes it easy for others to argue that it should be ‘steady as she goes’ with respect to the NSS. Thus, it would be very helpful if the critics of the NSS stuck to providing clear expositions of where it is failing and offering helpful, practical suggestions about how to give the navy the ships it needs in a timely fashion.
Hyperbole may make for good ‘click bait’ and ‘sound bites’ but will not identify or advance the required solutions.
Notes
[1] CBC News, “Arctic patrol plan headed for ‘disaster,’ says report,” April 11, 2013. Arctic patrol ship plan headed for 'disaster,' says report | CBC News
[2] Canadian Press, “Canada should do more to protect Arctic sovereignty: Layton,” Aug 6 2007. Canada should do more to protect Arctic sovereignty: Layton | CBC News
[3] Terry Milewski, “Shipbuilding contract holds $250M mystery,” CBC News, May 02, 2013. Shipbuilding contract holds $250M mystery | CBC News
[4] “Knud Rasmussen-Class Ocean Patrol Vessels,” Naval Technology. Knud Rasmussen-Class Ocean Patrol Vessels - Naval Technology (naval-technology.com)
[5] “Samuel Beckett Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs),” Naval Technology. Samuel Beckett Class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) (naval-technology.com)
8 thoughts on “NSS – Needed: More Facts – Less Hyperbole”
Hello Les Mader! Although it seems that the NSS in some respects is not working WRT the CSC Frigate program, I believe Irving eventually will be able to deliver the AOPS program within NSS on time and within budget. The AOPS as based on the Norwegian Svalbard class is nothing at all like that class or Denmark or Irelands classes. The AOPS is designed to be a true Naval platform, able to cut through more ice and has capabilities to perform and work with our Frigates (Halifax and CSC classes) and future JSS vessels. Is Canada over paying for these ships? Possibly, however the end product is something the RCN can be proud of. Don’t forget the CCG is also getting 2 of these vessels along with the 6 AOPS ships for a total build of 8 ships. Is the Naval Shipbuilding Strategy flawed? Most definitely, and must be either revamped or scrapped but with the AOPS, not so much. The CSC frigate program however is definitely another “kettle of fish” mostly because of design delays and government incompetence. How to change it will require a “new” government’s decision soonest to “fish-or-cut-bait” or loose the CSC program and the RCN altogether. IMO it is past time that Canada sign a contract with Irving for the CSC Frigate program now even though the design phase is not completed and get this project back on track and at least try to save the NSS. My thoughts anyway. Cheers!
Hello,
It strikes me that the sole emphasis of the NSS is on Navy and Coast Guard. There is no discourse of long-term commercial shipping. National armed forces are an expression of national economic and structural capabilities. If there is no robust commercial basis for ship-building, how can Navy procurement be successful?
Furthermore, Irving, LM and BAE are currently in a monopolistic position as the only vendor for RCN’s needs. There is no competition, and the product specifications keep creeping upwards. There is therefore no incentive to be economical when the client is captive. In terms of “price discovery”, the anticipated costs of these vessels keep rising because the product specifications keep changing and rising. The CSC is no longer a $1-$2 billion frigate, but rather a far more expensive vessel with yet-undefined design limits. The spec limits are not set, so the end price has yet to be discovered.
As it stands, Canada needs these naval platforms, so we will pay whatever it costs and the RCN will probably get a couple of these vessels at the price of $4-$5-6$+ billion a piece. Who knows what comes after that, but we aren’t hearing any news of contracts for commercial vessels, and a shipbuilding industry can’t survive on Navy maintenance alone.
The biggest challenges to the ship-building program in Canada are not the government or planning. Is the fact that we do not have the people and skills to build it anymore. As more and more vessels are built in Korea and China. (A position Japan and Taiwan can no longer claim) Skills builders and suppliers are increasingly harder to find in the West. With retirement and no skill has been passed on to the next generation of tradesmen. The cost of construction will continue to rise. We could look no future than the Nordic countries. During the boom years of the North Sea oil trade. Nordic shipyards built warships for their respective navies. That is no longer the case. Most new major naval warships of Nordic Navies either come from a foreign yard in Southern Europe or joint production with Eastern European Yards. Well UK and Netherland still manage to retain some skilled workers in the shipbuilding trade. The UK relies on the submarine program and the Dutch rely on conversion work on merchant’s vessels. They still needed to look elsewhere for a production partner.
Canada’s problems are more pronounced. On top of the skilled worker shortage in shipyards, as a country, since the end of WW2. Our shipbuilding industry was never the priority for the government. As well as the industry. Canadian shipyards could not compete globally both in innovation and price. And that translates to the military program as well, with more safety rules and complex equipment on board warships. If they do not build civilian vessels, how can we expect these companies to build warships at a reasonable price? Take the Svalbard Class of the Norwegian Coast Guard for example. That vessel was built in the early 2000s. Back then Norway still had a reasonably competent marine construction sector. So of course, the price would be lower than the Canadian one, even taking into consideration of inflation adjustment. Well, I would agree with the Irish vessel price tag being more nonsense from political commentators. At least the Irish know they cannot build the vessel domestically and went to an English shipyard for help. Canadians cannot grasp this concept.
Using the example of the JSS program. West Coast has not built a ship of that size and complexity for at least two decades. So when the report of cost overrun came into public eyes, how can we be surprised? or even waste our brain cells to complain about it? If you think the JSS are bad. Expect the Icebreaker program to be the worst. Two shipyards on the opposite side of the country, on two different oceans. Building the same design. Either somebody in Ottawa had a stroke and pointed at Quebec, or we again encounter the biggest elephant in Canadian politics Vis-A-vis the “Quebec Problem”. It is hard to imagine the solution to accommodate Quebec is to build the icebreaker again without taking into consideration the cost of the program. Well, the Quebec yard should have been able to have a part of the NSS pie. There should have been a better way around it. Like building some smaller warships in the Quebec Yard in order to grow the size of the Navy. But no. Smart people in Ottawa could not comprehend that. Hint-hint Kingston Class replacement.
Going back to the JSS program. Why didn’t we go to another country for help in the first place? Countries like Japan. Japan still has a well-organized marine construction sector. By going to Japan to build the hull of the JSS then towing it back to Canada for fitting out, we would not need to even bother with constructing the hull in the first place. Australia was more extreme in this regard. No matter how Canberra plans it, constructing a new Resupply vessel inside Australia would just be way too expensive. So they build the new tankers. Entirely in Spain. That saves on the cost. As well as improved the bilateral relationship between Spain and Australia. That being said, I am not in fact suggesting we should have built the entire vessels abroad as the Australian did with the supply Class. On the contrary, I am proposing a solution more similar to what Australia did with the Canberra Class. Build the hull abroad, finish the upper part of the vessel in Canada. In that way, we would have shortened lead time and also improved the relationship with an Asian-Pacific power that Canada has long neglected. On a side note, I doubt buying a partially completed hull would violate the Japanese Constitution.
Follow on to my earlier rant. It should be noted that I am not proposing Only Japan as a possible partner. Other countries work too. Japan was just an example used to make a point.
Hello PASSEDMOST. I agree with most of what you have said (ranted) about the NSS and build “off-shore”. Australia seems to have gotten it right as far as their ship building goes. Yes we lost a lot of skill-set during the past few decades and it takes time to recover. But I contend the concept of NSS is in deep trouble mainly due to government inaction and bungling. We do not seem to build things from scratch very well. In My Opinion (IMO) the JSS Protecteur class could have very well been built in Germany where they have the expertise with the Berlin class. Build the hulls there and then bring them back to Canada for outfitting and “Canadianizing”. Better and cheaper in the long run. Again, if Canada were to ever have a “true” Strategic Sealift Capability, the Juan Carlos class could be built in Spain and then shipped to Canada for outfitting of the Island in a “suitable” shipyard as Australia has done. The CCG Polar class icebreakers being built in two shipyards instead of one could be a blessing in disguise. Both Davie and Sea Span competing to see which yard could build better and sooner would be interesting to see if they both signed contracts and started together. If you get a chance please read Rear-Admiral (Retired) Ian Macks article, “Military Procurement Innovation Now,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, June 2022. A very interesting read. Accessed at: https://www.cgai.ca/military_procurement_innovation_now. Cheers!
David,
Your innovative idea of towing a completed ship hull to Canada, and then finishing the outfitting at a domestic yard to save time and money is a non-starter for several reasons. I know you were referring to the Joint Support Ship, but some readers may mistakenly think that this buy a hull abroad concept might result in big cost savings it applied to much more complex warships. Not so.
First, modern warships tend to be built in block modules and these include parts of the hull structure. So, the issue is not one of simply ‘filling up’ an empty hull with components selected from a catalogue.
Second, even if such a hull could be found, modern warship design must take into account size, weight and stability considerations flowing from the components chosen. For example, the size, volume, weight, and characteristics of the main radar and its mast will create numerous design issues concerning placement, topside stability, power consumption, and even crewing. These, in turn, create follow-on design issues of a similar nature. Missile cells, helicopter hangars, and various antennae also create structural design issues regarding firing arcs, airflow, stealth, and basic safety. These and a myriad other seemingly small outfitting issues will inevitably affect the size, weight, and basic hull structure of the ship.
Third, given the extensive degree of “Canadianization” usually demanded of any of our major warships, the original manufacturer of the basic hull could not be expected to foresee these in advance, and hence the hull form itself may be wholly inappropriate for the many components ultimately reserved for Canadian firms.
Fourth, typically the cost of building the hull of a modern warship only represent 13-15 percent of the total ship constructions costs. Therefore, savings on this ‘metal-bashing’ phase of warship building will not amount to very much compared to the much more expensive combat systems component.
Finally, history has conclusively demonstrated that once Canadian companies become involved in the lucrative business of outfitting warships, delivery schedules are inevitably delayed, and costs tend to balloon dramatically.
Dan Middlemiss
Hello Dan. I was not referring to “major” warships like a Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) Frigate or new Destroyer or Cruiser but an Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Ship (AOR) class like the Joint Support Ship (JSS). This is all hypothetical of course, as Canada has gone too far in with both the CSC Program and JSS Projects to back out now. But if you read retired Rear-Admiral Ian Mack’s article, you will see the possibilities. The main reason that costs are ballooning with both CSC and JSS projects is that we have not built such large AORs or Frigates in Canada for a very long time and Canada has lost most of the expertise to do so whereas Germany still has the knowledge to build these vessels. They have built 3 Berlin class so far and are slated to build at least 2 more. Although the CSC Frigate is loosely based on the design of the UK Type 26 Frigate by BAE, Lockheed Martin (LM) and the Canadian Government design have/will be to build her, design delays or not. The top-side stability of the latest LM version of the CSC Frigate’s mast does give some concern however, I’m sure LM has taken all that into account during the design phase. The replacement AIP Submarines for the Victoria class however, WILL be built outside of Canada (possibly in Germany with either the 212CD or 216 class). Although, in the past, I have been in favour of SSNs for Canada, I now concede that Canada will never acquire these boats.
I think we are giving DND HQ too much benefit of the doubt in regards to defence procurement. They even CAN NOT even buy pistols right! Nonetheless, I have my reservation about how much of a mess they can make for the Icebreaker.
PS, Somebody could probably write a book on the subject in the future.