Procrustes, 22 November 2020.
Following the Parliamentary Budget Office’s (PBO) release on 17 November of its cost analysis of the government’s Joint Support Ship (JSS) program, DND immediately issued a statement [1] basically saying the Department did not misjudge the cost of its planned JSS from Seaspan.
This is depressing news. I think it would have been more understandable to have misjudged the overall $4.1 billion price-tag, than leaving open the inference that it is still willing to accept such grossly over-priced supply ships – and ships that are based on a more than 25-year old German design. Clearly cheaper options are available, even in Canada, as Davie has ably demonstrated with its Asterix supply ship.
And while it may be true that Asterix lacks some of the ‘Canadianized’ add-on capability features, it is also true that Seaspan’s JSS will not meet the basic NATO standard for a minimum four RAS replenishment masts – a basic deficiency which the DND press release conveniently neglects to mention. The JSS will only have two of these RAS stations, which will greatly limit its underway supply capabilities. These stations will presumably be more useful to what, in both cases, are essentially floating gas cans, than will the navy’s concern to require the JSS to have war-fighting systems such as close-in and other air defence systems, as well as other advanced battle management and cyber-security technologies. Basic rule of thumb – gas cans should stay far away from actual things that go bang!
One other notable point of comparison. Through the 2018-2020 period, Asterix has already exceeded its stipulated operational days at sea by a wide margin. On the other hand, Seaspan’s first JSS won’t even be ready for service until 2023 at the earliest, while the second is expected in 2025. In the meantime, Asterix has participated in numerous international exercises, and has conducted many operational refuelings.
Conclusion? Canada’s ponderously slow NSS procurement system just keeps on s-l-o-w-l-y chugging in order to keep our domestic shipyards happy. Meanwhile, the navy waits ... and the taxpayer pays.
Reference:
- Ottawa, Department of National Defence, “Statement by the Department of National Defence on the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s Report on the Joint Support Ships,” 17 November 2020, Accessed at: https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2020/11/statement-by-the-department-of-national-defence-on-the-parliamentary-budget-officers-report-on-the-joint-support-ships.html
3 thoughts on “The DND Response to the PBO Supply Ships Cost Comparison”
Excellent comments to DND’s response to the PBO cost analysis report on the MV Asterix vs JSS ship programs. I had not realized that 4 station RAS positions were the minimum requirements for NATO and its ships. If this is indeed true, then the Canadian government should immediately re-assess its JSS design to include these two extra RAS posts on the JSS project soonest! Was this a cost saving exercise by the government to save money? If so, then shame on them! Yes, the navy waits …., and the taxpayer pays…., and pays….., and pays…., and pays…..
David,
According to the NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG), No. 1310, “Design Criteria For Replenishment Aspects of New Construction Naval Vessels”, “A minimum of two stations per side is required, one of which shall be the DUAL type.” In addition, there was a requirement for an astern refueling station.
The original, German BERLIN class did have 4 RAS stations, and so did the 2009 JSS Statement of Requirements (see below), but the Navy and Ottawa agreed to delete the forward refueling capability as well as the after cargo crane in favour of other changes.
There were a number of other modifications to the original German design, some of which will make the JSS superior to the Asterix. However, in its initial report, “Feasibility of Budget for Acquisition of Two Joint Support Ships”, (28 February 2013) The Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) estimated that the Canadian variant of the BERLIN design would require 85% ‘new design’ (p.7). This, of course, would drive-up program risks and along with that, program costs. [See, PBO, ‘Appendix C: JSS High Level Requirements’ for a table summarizing the original November 2009 JSS Statement of Requirements, p.27]
For an interesting, but obviously biased, assessment of the relative capabilities of the Seaspan JSS compared to Davie’s own Asterix, go to: http://www.davie.ca/resolve-frequently-asked-questions/ . Here, Davie disputes certain DND claims about the alleged deficiencies of the Asterix, and points to how Asterix might be superior via its deployable, secured, in-hull type propulsion thruster.
Bottom line again: Asterix = 1, JSS = 0.
Totally agree Procrustes on Stanag 1310. Was it the RCN or the Ottawa government which decided to delete the forward refueling RAS station capabilities as well as the after cargo crane in favour of other changes for the JSS? What were the “other changes” that were “agreed” upon? This JSS ship actually gives the RCN less of a capability than required by NATO.