Procrustes, 22 November 2020. Following the Parliamentary Budget Office’s (PBO) release on 17 November of its cost analysis of the government’s Joint Support Ship (JSS) program, DND immediately issued a […]
Dan Middlemiss, 17 November 2020. Today, Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer released a detailed cost projection for the two supply ships for the Canadian Navy [1]. The PBO analysis compares the […]
Originally published: Navy News, 16 October 2020. With the release of Canada’s defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged in 2017, the Government of Canada signaled its commitment to renewing the Royal […]
Unless the RCN wants to rely on friends and allies, Canada needs support ships/Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) ships when RCN ships deploy. Until about five years ago, Canada had two […]
You might want to check out an interesting article in Maritime Engineering Journal (Volume 93, Summer 2020), “The Canadian Surface Combatant – Starting a New Conversation on Canada’s Major Warship […]
At the end of July 2020, the first Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) – HMCS Harry DeWolf – was handed over to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). This was […]
Procrustes, 11 August 2020. The recent confirmation that the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) will conduct and deliver yet another report on the mounting costs of Ottawa’s preferred bid winner for […]
RCN Media Release, 31 July 2020. The ultimate milestone in shipbuilding procurement is finally here, a first for the Royal Canadian Navy under the National Shipbuilding Strategy! The first Arctic […]
Procrustes, 23 July 2020. Are cost overruns the norm in Canadian naval shipbuilding? If so, why? The Canadian warship procurement system is centrally oriented to keeping Canadian shipbuilders in business. […]
Procrustes, 15 July 2020. Is Ottawa going against an international cost-reduction trend in putting all its surface warship eggs in a one, large, expensive Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) design basket? […]
Procrustes, 05 July 2020. There has been a longstanding debate in Canada about the extra costs (i.e., the ‘domestic premium’) for building warships in Canada. Certainly the best exponent of […]
The largest part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy is the construction of the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSCs). The proposed 15 CSCs are to replace the retired Iroquois-class destroyers and the […]
On June 10, the Joint Support Ship (JSS) Build Contract was awarded to Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards Ltd. (VSY). This $2.4-billion contract will undertake the full construction phase for the replacement […]
Procrustes, 17 June 2020. See: “Part 1 – Future Domestic Orders” The second component of Dave Perry’s observation is not so obvious and would seem to fly in the face […]
Procrustes, 16 June 2020. Can the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) stand a ‘mini-bust’ without the load-leveling principle wholly unraveling? That is, if skilled workers have to be laid off at […]
The National Shipbuilding (Procurement) Strategy (NSS) to build ships for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard was announced in 2010. That’s 10 years ago. So where are […]
Procrustes, 08 June 2020. This is further to my earlier post about NSS contracts. An early unpublished, but apparently widely circulated, 2015 Price Waterhouse Cooper study concluded that these types […]
Procrustes, 08 June 2020. Shipbuilding contracts generally tend to be shrouded in mystery, and normally stir few passions. However, Canadians deserve slightly more information than they are receiving about the […]
If you cast your mind back, you may remember discussion 10 years ago about a policy to build new ships for the Canadian Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Navy. […]
Trevor Wekel, 30 May 2020. As a proud Canadian, I am saddened by the state of our Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard. Years of neglect have led to difficult […]
