By Ted Barnes, 18 February 2026
Major (Ret’d) Les Mader's ‘tripwire corvette’ proposal, as described in the recent issue of Canadian Naval Review, confuses political grievance with practical naval strategy. It suggests provoking confrontation at sea with vulnerable ships and expecting deterrence, which is not a sound strategic approach.
Canada is already deploying a blue-water continental corvette, addressing Mader’s concerns about lacking heavily armed ships. This new vessel is in its capability phase, built for endurance and credible force projection across the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic. Therefore, an additional ideologically driven fleet is unnecessary, as current programs meet real continental defence needs, although it's unclear if Mr. Mader is aware of this project or not.
The article ignores the ongoing reality that Canada is fundamentally and continuously integrated with the US military, both operationally and legally and I surmise many Canadians are also not. Given joint operations, systems, military sales and protocols like NORAD and 2nd Fleet, it is inconsistent to propose provoking US naval forces while relying on shared resources and coordination. This contradiction undermines the feasibility of such proposals.
Despite practical realities, HMCS Yellowknife is currently working with the US Coast Guard on Operation Caribbe with a USCG boarding team embedded, reflecting standard cooperation between Canadian and US forces. Suggesting a fleet concept based on confrontation with this partner ignores how Canada ensures its own security today.
The selective invocation of Israel’s Saar 6 only further exposes the problem. The Saar 6 works because it is embedded in a dense national Israeli air defence and strike architecture operating in confined waters, not because it is some mystical small ship with oversized bravado. Applying that logic to Canada's three ocean, ice-affected environment without considering endurance, survivability, logistics, or escalation control is not real analysis, it's just empty rhetoric about hardware.
Most troubling is the article’s acceptance of escalation as a feature rather than a failure. Tripwires work only when backed by overwhelming escalation of dominance and political clarity, not when they are designed to be expendable irritants daring a superior force to react. Canada does not deter by daring the United States to sink a corvette. It deters itself by being credible, interoperable, persistent and indispensable within alliance frameworks that matter.
Canada needs practical, reliable ships to work effectively with allies, not vessels built for online praise or grievance signaling. Despite the rough waters Canada and the United States are experiencing, the United States is still our ally. A navy based on such narratives lacks true strength and sovereignty.
Image: HMCS YELLOWKNIFE rests alongside the jetty in Montego Bay, Jamaica, as the sun sets
during a port visit in support of Operation CARIBBE on 10 February 2026. Credit: Canadian Armed Forces Imagery Technician.
