By Dan Middlemiss, 11 August 2023
On 8 August 2023, Ottawa quietly announced an infrastructure “investment” worth an additional $463 million to help Irving Shipbuilding (ISI) build the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSCs). This sum is expected to “create or maintain over 800 jobs annually across various industries in the Canadian economy....”1
The announcement stated that Ottawa has amended its definition contract with ISI, and that the “enhancements at ISI will expand and modify their site at and facilities at the Halifax Shipyard and supporting facilities at Woodside Industries and Marine Fabricators in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia.” This amendment allows both Ottawa and Irving to circumvent the terms of the original ‘Strategic Partnership’ Agreement which stipulated that Irving would not seek taxpayer monies to upgrade its facilities, but would instead make any such upgrades via the generous profit margins Irving was provided under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.2
While some people view this announcement with pleasure and optimism because it indicates that something is being done re the CSCs (see the recent post by David Dunlop published herein), this is not progress that taxpayers will want to see. The NSS is the gift that keeps on giving to our downtrodden multi-billionaire shipbuilders. Another interesting tidbit in the announcement, the final CSC is now expected to be completed by 2050. As well, given tight labour markets, it’s a puzzle why the government continues to stress job creation over contracts and schedules. Undoubtedly both the date of completion and cost will continue to change in the future.
Notes
1. Public Services and Procurement Canada, “Government of Canada announces investment in shipbuilding infrastructure for the Canadian Surface Combatant” (Ottawa, 8 August 2023). See, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2023/08/government-of-canada-announces-investment-in-shipbuilding-infrastructure-for-the-canadian-surface-combatant.html
2. For more on the original agreement see, Dan Middlemiss, “Trying to Evade the Terms of the Strategic Partnership Agreement?” Broadsides (21 June 2022). See, https://www.navalreview.ca/2022/06/trying-to-evade-the-terms-of-the-strategic-partnership-agreement/
45 thoughts on “Another Taxpayer Shipbuilding Subsidy”
Sad but true, all three shipyard include in the NSS received or will receive provincial or federal taxpayer money to upgrade their infrastructures. They are not even treated equally by the government. People at Davie must be furious because Ottawa did not want to give money for their upgrade so Quebec government had to step in.
To begin with, The NSS should have been about providing a steady flow of naval project, but the different yard should have been bidding on each project each time forcing them to invest money in order to get the different contract. Canadian taxpayers would not have been held hostages of the situation.
Hello Dan. We all knew (or should have known) and could see this Irving “boondoggle” coming so we have no one to blame but the the inept Canadian government and ourselves. Irving is not stupid and always had this option in their “back pocket” to press the Liberal government with. So let’s not dwell on not giving this $463M to ISL. Let’s hope that at least the government will insist the extra amounts will not be a “forgiveable” loan and require Irving to pay the government back every Canadian loonie…..with interest once the last CSC Frigate leaves the slips!! If the government were smart, once the last CSC Frigate was delivered, I would not do any business with Irving ever again! No refits of any kind; no future ship contracts; no nothing! See how Mr. Irving likes that! For now, let’s get on with the build.
Hi David,
While your hostility to ISL and contempt for Canadians in this matter may be valid, geography and sunk costs will argue against having no dealings with the shipyard located just beside the RCN’s largest naval base and in Canada’s best east coast port.
Instead, we may have to accept what is and hope/seek to ensure that governments manage our money wisely in ways such as you suggest.
Ubique,
Les
Hi Les. I have absolutely no contempt or hostilities for any Canadian as you seem to suggest and imply. As a very proud Canadian and RCN Vet, I have nothing but admiration and respect for most of our hard-working and honest politicians in Ottawa. All I’m suggesting is that Irving has received this extra money for the CSC Frigate build under nefarious circumstances. They had a written deal with Ottawa to not ask for any more money with regard to the CSC Frigate program. Any other monies spent on the program was supposed to be on Irving’s dime and not be on the backs of the Canadian taxpayer! The fact that the government has “given in” to ISL is strictly on the Liberal government and will more than likely come back to “bite them in the rear” next election. The Canadian people are not stupid either and have long memories (thank goodness). Cheers!
Good morning David,
You may well be correct about ISL getting away with something contract-wise. Time will tell.
With regard to better times after the next election, the previous government’s naval record and its progeny’s ideological swing lead me to fear that the CAF, RCN, and CCG will suffer deeply in the future.
Ubique,
Les
My word the hate from some of you people on this forum for Irving. Currently RCN only has the syncrolift in HMC dockyard for internal ship repair and CPFs are the largest ships the dock can take and only for certain times of the month where the tides are favorable to get the ship on and off dock.
So where does that leave us? Surely up the creek if additional facilities are not built at Irving as the additional facilities that will be built will be able to accommodate the new JSS, CSC, and AOPS. Including legacy CPF. Not to mention the additional facilities are being built to take advantage of the lessons learned on the type 26 build to make production more efficient. The government seems to agree with that. Big picture wise it’s a strategic asset that they’re building and ultimately aiding the RCN in time of conflict with multiple docking facilities more than likely being needed.
There is always somebody crying and pouting about the other one getting more government money than the other. From the beginning of the NSS you had Davie and QC waging a PR campaign to be a part of the NSS because they were disqualified from bidding which depending on who you talk to was a conspiracy by Irving. Perhaps Davie never got federal money because they are a foreign owned company based in Monaco, perhaps it’s the over budget and late delivery on certain contracts including the conversions of three icebreakers. Perhaps the RCN is is still sore about having to steal their own ships from Davie facilities when the yard went on strike holding the ship hostage years ago? I would like to see the source that says the federal government denied them funding for upgrades forcing the Quebec provincial government to step in. Perhaps that happened or perhaps it didn’t. My bet is that Davie now as part of the NSS is going to say squat about Irving’s additional funding as they have benefitted and will continue to benefit from the NSS.
Thank you Ted for your insights and comments on this matter.
Hello Ted. No hate here for anyone. Just anger and contempt for a civilian company that yells “please sir, can I have some more”? If ISL had the gonads to put up the money themselves to do all upgrades required before the CSC Frigate program begins, I would have said “good for them”. It would show that ISL really cares about the RCN and is willing to give back towards the build with these upgrades themselves instead of their “bottom line”. When this synchrolift for our future fleet requirements is built, who do you think will have ownership of that valuable facility? Certainly not the Canadian government or the RCN that’s for sure. ISL will be able to use that lift for anything they want in the future and not necessarily have priority for RCN ship refits. And who built this synchrolift for them? Politics can be an ugly business especially when dealing with civilian companies and again the only ones that lose are the Canadian taxpayers, the RCN and the NSS.
Thanks David just the right words here. No hate here. All three NSS shipyard behave the same but some are more successful at getting the money! They are trying to get as much money as they can since they are private business. The problem is how do the different governments manage the situation. We just can hope that the CCG & RCN ends up receiving the ships they deserve in the good quality and quantity they need! Cheers everyone,
Well the RCN will have priority for the new docking facilities as they will (1) be building ships for the RCN until 2050; (2) maintaining the AOPS and the JSS through Thales maintenance which gives the RCN the priority. The CSC maintenance will more than likely be given to Thales as well but whoever gets it will have to dock the ship somewhere and what better place where they were built and Irving is not going turn down their biggest customer by no means. You say a lot of things but you have no idea of the details behind the upgrade investment. We need facts not conspiracy theories.
Well said!!!!! Thank you
Hello Ted. In your comment you said “You say a lot of things but you have no idea of the details behind the upgrade investment. We need facts not conspiracy theories”. Ted, if you know more than other forum members, can you elaborate on the “details” behind the upgrade investments, or is that another government or ISL “secret” as well? I guess that won’t happen until after contracts are signed. Right? What will be the dimensions of this new synchrolift and where will it be built? Somewhere in Dartmouth I would suspect. Don’t get me wrong, building this lift is a great idea but only if the RCN has total priority for it for all future CSC Frigate refits. Like any other government maintenance project required for the CSC Frigates, they will have to be bid on by companies whether that be Thales or others in other shipyards that can “dock” a CSC Frigate. But we are getting ahead of ourselves here. We will just have to bite the bullet…..again, and get on with this build ASAP!
Yes I know things about the upgrades. I can tell you the new docking facilities will be in the vicinity of the filled in areas of the harbor not in Dartmouth. I’ve also seen drawings of the new filled in areas increasing ISI’s land footprint substantially. I would again like to point out that this is a win to increase our building capability for the CSC and later maintenance contract for the CSC. It seems from your comments that you think you are entitled to all these answers and more in regards to the CSC build. You are not, regardless of this being paid for by public money or as a forgivable or payable loan. All these yards have the right to privacy of the terms of these deals as they are private companies and have competitors.
Hello Ted. With regards to your latest comments on 15 August, “this is a win to increase “our” building capability for the CSC”; do we assume then, that you are at present an ISL employee and are not available to discuss ISL business in public without “approval”? That’s too bad as I believe forum members could have a better understanding of what ISL’s future plans for their dockyard will look like. Surely ISL would at least like to have all Haligonians, Nova Scotians and the Canadian public know how they intend to spend our hard-earned taxpayer $463 million Loonies to re-shape the harbour? Privacy to the terms of the deal as you say are not private according to what we know with regard to the terms of the “agreement” which are public and available to everyone to see, which stipulate that ISL is not to ask for more funds on the taxpayers’ dime, before contracts are finally signed for the CSC program which they have completely ignored. I am not saying ISL should let competitors know what they are seeking to do, but at least tell all Canadians what they will be doing to the state of the health of Halifax Harbour.
” We Have Done So Much, With So Little, For So Long, That Now We Are Ready To Do Anything, With Nothing, Forever”!
David you keep going on about this agreement to not ask for additional funds and that’s what the contract says but there are always exceptions. When ISI was given the combatant package it was agreed upon that ISI would build ships up to a certain tonnage and the original upgrades reflected that. Low and behold years later the client decided to change that and wanted a larger ship. Well David larger ships mean more room required, a different launching system and building methods etc. Therefore it’s on the client to provide additional funds to pay for the upgrades, change requests etc because of their shortsightedness. Say what you want about ISI it’s the government that caused it and they should pay. If the government built the ships that they at the time envisioned then Irving wouldn’t need to be upgrading their facilities. People see that Irving is getting more money and lose the plot and don’t actually look at the reason. I’m sure you’ll make a comment is that Irving should pay out of the goodness of their heart because they are reaping all this profit but they are a business.
Ted, re your “opinion” on 18 August 2023, 7:47 am with regards to my “ranting”: Irving knew (or should have known) that the weight of the CSC Frigate was going to change during the Design Phase process (still on-going). Yes, the physical weight of the CSC Frigate is now heavier, however any shipbuilding company worth its salt, would have accounted for that weight change early on in the process. However, the physical length of the Frigate is almost the same as the original BAE Type 26 Frigate and Irving knew that as well. There should have been no exceptions as you say and that is on the government for “giving up” to Irving. No sense in crying over spilt mil” now however. Just take our medicine and be satisfied that ISL is not backing out of the deal…..yet. They are in a “business” alright! Monkey Business! Have A Great Navy Day Ted!
Ah yes, Canadian companies often play the ‘propriety information’ card to protect their ‘competitive position’. Industry and government officials have reminded us that Canadians will be fortunate to learn the full cost of the CSC when the program is completed. In the meantime, shut up and keep paying. After all, why wouldn’t we trust those hard-working DND officials who earned several million dollars of late for their meritorious, but unspecified, deeds?
Remind us again just how many warships ISI or its antecedents have managed to sell abroad? Rounding up, the answer is zero. This includes the Halifax-class frigates and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships. The latter are slow, effectively unarmed, and are not suitable for true arctic operations. Canada intends to add the CSC – a bloated, under-powered, under-armed, and majestically over-priced platform – to this list of non-accomplishments.
In fact, there is no domestic competitor to ISI allowed in Canada for the building of large surface combatants under the NSS. So no domestic competition whatsoever. And given its foreign warship order book, we have to assume ISI’s prime peer competitors are Afghanistan, or perhaps the Central African Republic?
Canadians are likely to remain on the financial hook for bailing out Irving after the next inevitable shipbuilding bust phase. But take heart, Irving will likely declare bankruptcy, move to another province, and start the whole boondoggle all over again.
Truer words were never spoken Dan! “Remind us again just how many warships ISI or its antecedents have managed to sell abroad? ” I believe you have hit the nail on the head with that statement! That is exactly what ISL is trying to accomplish with the CSC Type 26 program, however the Brits would have much more to say about that! I’m sure they would want to have “a piece of that pie”! But who would want to invest in a Canadian CSC Frigate program that is “a bloated, under-powered, under-armed, and majestically over-priced platform” as you say. Afghanistan or the Central African Republic? Ha! Now that’s funny!! I seem to recall that Irving built the 12 Halifax class Frigates in St John N.B. many years ago and where did the order books go for other countries to invest? Guess no one was interested…..again! Cheers!
Another over-the-top rant to the forum. What is the point of venting?
Not “venting” at all Les. Just conversing with Dan Middlemiss’s opinions and expressing my own as we all are. Thank goodness we are free to do that!
Good morning David,
Yes, one has fair freedom to express views in the forum.
However, Dan Middlemiss’ rant is pointless venting that undercuts thoughtful discussion of the CSC’s strengths and weaknesses. He offers no proof that the CSC will be as bad as he claims. Thus, his “bon mots” about the CSC’s performance are simply “click bait.” The reference to Afghanistan and the Central African Republic demonstrate how unserious the post is.
I guess the question clearly is: is the Broadsides forum a place for thoughtful discussion and the sharing of facts or is it a place for bitter people to rant away about whatever they want, unfettered by facts?
Personally, I think that Ted Barnes’ post below on 18 Aug 07:56 adds far more value to the discussion.
However, those who wish to rant can do so (within limits); their posts will simply be ignored as valueless.
Ubique.
Les
To Les Mader-re 18 August 2023, 10:49 am post:Hello Les. Although I will not comment on Dan Middlemiss’ article I will say to you that all viewpoints expressed on the CNR forum are welcomed opinions and should never be censored by anyone unless they do not strictly obey the CNR forum rules. Opinions and expressions by all forum members on any subject should always be expressed with decorum and civility whether one agrees with them or not. That’s the whole purpose of the forum. To generate enlightened debate and express ideas for improvements in whatever topic is being discussed, including anything on the CSC Type 26 Frigate program. “Ranting & Pointless Venting” “by bitter people” as you say, is also a form of “freedom of expression” that you may or may not wish to publicize on the forum. And that’s fair too whether you consider them valueless or not and choose to ignore. Have A Great Navy Day Les!
To Dan Middlemiss:
I whole heartedly agree with your comments about the government funding Irving’s facilities. Any small or medium sized company with private customers would have paid for their own facility out of their own profits, and not expected their customer to give them for free all the assets that will form their business! The government should have insisted on no less. If Irving really couldn’t do it, the government (which as the customer, has the whip hand) should have insisted on an equity stake in the facility, or a loan on relatively punitive terms (Irving has, after all, known about the CSC for more than a decade and should have prepared for it).
But I do not understand this business of constantly ragging on the quality of Canada’s ships. As far as I can tell, the AOPS vessels will constitute the largest fleet of armed ice-capable vessels in NATO. Only Svalbard may exceed them in ice capacity or armament, and it is a single ship. True, Russia has a larger and more heavily armed fleet of icebreakers, but what good are they? Their main function is to defend Russia’s north coast – which is under no threat! If Russia were stupid enough to attack a NATO country through ice covered waters, these ships would be easy targets for air and ground based missiles.
The threat to Canadian sovereignty in northern waters is the illegal transit of foreign ice-capable non-naval ships – most of which are ostensibly civilian controlled. This is where questions should be asked. The Harry DeWolf class can sink a civilian ship that defies Canadian sovereignty – but do we have the political will to do so? Are we prepared to accept the environmental damage associated with sinking a foreign oil tanker? If not, are we prepared to board it, perhaps under small arms fire and with significant loss of life? Is there a third option? Are the ships positioned in such a way that we can reliably detect and intercept a foreign vessel before it exits Canadian waters?
Good afternoon Michael,
Well said reference the AOPS and some people’s seeming loathing of Canadian ships.
The question that you did not ask, though, is: how many civilian ships will keep ignoring orders to stop if they receive a shot across the bow? Additionally, a 25mm cannon does not automatically sink a ship that it engages. With regard to the will to authorize the use of force by an AOPS, that will depend on the specifics of the incident and who is the government of the day.
I have read and reread the press release for the additional money to ISL. It does say what the terms for the money are: loan, partial equity, etc. Have you seen anything that explains what they are?
Ubique.
Les
Thanks, Les.
I think if the government had been getting anything back in equity or interest, that would have been part of the announcement, just as it has been when they invest in other companies. The government has a vested interest in showing the public that it is not wasting money; moreover they are required by law to give an account of their spending to Parliament. So there would be no purpose in keeping these kinds of terms quiet. I can only assume (and yes, it is an assumption) that they got nothing back.
As for whether a ship which is knowingly defying our sovereignty will obey orders: probably not. That is why we must be ready with a plan to use sufficient force that they have no alternative. If we wait to see the specifics of events, we will respond ineffectively and too late. Does Canada have such a plan? The AOPS ships seem to be absent from northern waters during much of the navigable season.
A further complication is that any such vessel is likely to belong to an allied nation that does not respect our claim to the North West Passage. Such as the United States.
Les,
I was wondering – since I have not served in the military myself – what kind of damage would you expect from a 25 mm cannon?
I agree with most of your comments. Irving upgraded their yard as specified in the NSS to build AOPS and the combatant package that specified a certain sized ship to be built. Years later the government changed that and wanted a larger ship that Irving no longer could build, why should Irving foot the bill? This is no different in project management where the client puts in multiple change requests. The simple fact that the government agreed to it because it was on them.
To Dan Middlemiss
Looking at your comments on this and various articles, you seem critical of Irving, AOPS, JSS the CSC and by extension DND public service. In fact you seem critical of the whole NSS and DND from the articles you post here. You seem to miss out on the fact that the whole idea of the NSS is to rebuild the fleets of the CCG and Royal Canadian Navy and to rebuild the shipbuilding industry in Canada as a strategic asset ie the ability to build our own domestic ships in time of crisis. The good news is that the NSS will continue for many years and ISI will be repairing AOPS, CSC and JSS in the new facilities that the government are providing funds for as they changed the terms of the original combatant package requirement and the prime contractor wasn’t able to reasonably provide a product so DND paid as they were responsible for the change request not ISI.
What I didn’t ever read about the NSS is the requirement to build exportable designs to other nations and you make a whole big deal about it and imply the failure of the prime contractor to export their product when the designs they are building are either dated or have been built or building by other countries already. Canada made those decisions ultimately not ISI. Its not like ISI has the facilities or capacity to sell any ships to a foreign nation with their order books full for the next 30 years. A further fact is that the market to provide exportable designs to other nations is a tough nut to crack as there are many foreign nations exactly doing that often utilizing cheap labor. Doesn’t make the shipyard inferior, building ships in Canada is hard to do and the government knew that going into the NSS.
You also seem to like David Pugliese as you quote him quite a bit in past articles and we all know how objective they are with reporting on DND topics, funny you never seem to say anything negative about foreign owned Davie though or the 300M they handed the Davie for a ship we don’t own. Would I want Davie building warships when despite their PR campaign to portray themselves as Canada’s premier shipbuilder has a spotty record on ship delivery. One just has to look at the three CG conversions to see how successful they are. Years ago the RCN had to literally steal ship away from Davie when they went on strike and the workers didn’t want the ship to be taken.
You seem to imply the Halifax class was inferior because they didn’t have any foreign sales, have you sailed on the Halifax Class on operations? Have you sailed on HMCS Harry DeWolf through the NW passage? Seems pretty Arctic capable to me. The Norwegian design calls for that speed and the amount of ice it breaks…did you know during trials the class broke ice way in excess of its design and also in speed? seems to be fine for the Norwegians and of course just like all the informed “experts” you don’t like its gun and discount it as “effectively unarmed” because you have to say something disparaging. Same goes for your comment about the CSC, nothing wrong with the design and its in accordance of what the governments statement of requirements.
As for DND personnel getting bonuses you seem to forget any bonuses are inline with the bonus program in the Public service that the unions and government agreed upon to keep the talent from going elsewhere and common in industry. Its not like performance bonuses is a new thing in government but you dredge it up here to an attempt to make a point.
Sorry if I come off a little hard on what you are saying as you attack many of the institutions that I worked and currently work for. You seem to be a very informed person with an opinion, it may not grounded in facts but an opinion all the same.
Hello Ted. I remember the Davie Shipyard strike fiasco very well as I was on HMCS Assiniboine when she went up there for a 4 month refit that turned into over 18 months! Even before we left HMC Dockyard there were rumours coming from the workers in Davie that they were going on strike. And sure enough, as soon as we arrived and put her “up on the slips” and took off the screws, and the first dockyard matie came aboard, they said, get ready for a long wait, as they were going on strike. So what did they do? As soon as the Captain and crew left and they put her “up on the slips” and took off her screws, they were true to their word. It took us over a year and a half to get her back! And even then, we had to bring a sea going tug to physically remove her from Davie and tow her back to Halifax during the strike! Everybody was angry: the government with Davie; the Davie dockyard maties for the navy having the gonads to physically remove her and the RCN for not having a valuable asset at the time at sea doing her ASW thingie. What a mess!! The moral of this story: never sign a contract with, and trust a Canadian dockyard with any Naval vessel! Nice job by the Canadian government eh?
To Dave Dunlop
“Ted, re your “opinion” on 18 August 2023, 7:47 am with regards to my “ranting”: Irving knew (or should have known) that the weight of the CSC Frigate was going to change during the Design Phase process (still on-going). Yes, the physical weight of the CSC Frigate is now heavier, however any shipbuilding company worth its salt, would have accounted for that weight change early on in the process. However, the physical length of the Frigate is almost the same as the original BAE Type 26 Frigate and Irving knew that as well. There should have been no exceptions as you say and that is on the government for “giving up” to Irving. No sense in crying over spilt milk now however. Just take our medicine and be satisfied that ISL is not backing out of the deal…..yet. They are in a “business” alright! Monkey Business! Have A Great Navy Day Ted!”
How in heavens sake would Irving know the size of the combatant before the actual design was selected? Would you have wanted them to build facilities to take an Aircraft Carrier? Don’t give me this “they should have known” stuff. The simple fact is the CSC changed to the size it did because the client decided not to build three air defence ships and decided to build the type 26 with extra capabilities which increased the size and tonnage well over what was agreed upon and then some. The original combatant package along with expected limits we’re signed years before the type 26 was selected by that time AOPS was underway. Fortunately for the ship builder the government agreed to pay and rightly so.
Hello,
What bothers me is that there was inadequate definition of the project requirements at the beginning of this Strategy. We were promised an off-the-shelf product, which turned into an endless customization exercise, to the point where the name and exterior design are the only thing original to the base plans. So we are stuck paying for a $3 or $4 or $5 or whatever $billion dollar platform that will sink just as easily as a $0.5 billion one. In major armed engagements, such as the current one in the Ukraine, military equipment is used up and it eventually burns in industrial quantities. Throwing endless sums of money into what is essentially an expendable and consumable item is folly.
As for Irving, the product specs keep getting inflated, so Irving’s requirements to deliver are naturally changing. That’s a normal change order. It’s not Irving’s fault that the client is incompetent. It is a problem that Irving has been prime advisor through this process, so has been in a position to guide and educate the client. Time will tell to what extent one party has abused the other.
Ultimately, having lawyers, bankers, businessmen, and professional actors/politicians at the helm has been detrimental, in my opinion. I think this endeavor has shown that defense should not be approached like any other market-driven process. This is defense procurement, not office furnishing. It is of core strategic value to the country’s existence. It should not be open to the whims of market forces and industrial oligarchs, but controlled by the state. The state should be capable and expected to produce and procure what is needed for defense in a timely and cost-effective manner. Our state is incapable, period.
Regards
Reply to Michael Peirson of 18 Aug 23 11:04 and 12:14.
Good morning Michael,
I agree fully with you about the need to create now a full suite naval capability that is able to respond to foreign challenges to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. CNR 17.3 pp 22 and 23 contain an overview of my thoughts on how to achieve this capability. Various aspects of my suggestion are amplified upon in other CNR articles. For now, the AOPS are all that we have. I am not sure why they seem to be fairly absent from the Arctic during the annual navigation season: personnel shortages? teething issues? limited number of ships? Other? Hopefully, in time we will have one or two of them full time in the north from April to November each year.
The use of such a capability would depend on the specifics of the incident (Panamanian-flagged tramp steamer or Russian armed “research ship”) and the government of the day.
A 25mm cannon would be able to damage the hull and superstructure of a commercial ship. Such damage would not normally cause it to sink but would cause the ship’s master to reconsider his/her options and choices. It would also provide excellent (threatened or actual) covering fire for a boarding party.
Ubique.
Les
We have a AOPS with a multinational task group in the Arctic currently.
We do, Ted, and I’m glad to see it, but Harry DeWolf departed Halifax only a week ago. I’m pretty sure the navigable season for a Polar class 5 vessel begins a lot earlier than mid August.
Since I understand you are involved with the build in some way, congratulations on the roll out of Frederick Roulette and the keel-laying of Robert Hampton Gray. I look forward to seeing William Hall delivered soon, and perhaps also the commisioning ceremony for Max Bernays?
Are you in a position to comment on the build schedule for the CSC outlined in the recent funding announcement? First, I was surprised to see them sticking to the 2024 start date when, to all appearances, Irving will not be in a position to cut steel until at least mid 2025. And that assumes that the facilities upgrades don’t cause any delays in production of the coast guard ships.
Second, I was surprised and unhappy to see the end date for the project stretched to 2050, for several reasons. First of all the 15 CSC ships do not represent an expansion of Canada’s navy; they simply restore combat ship numbers to what they were a few years ago. Either Canada will be under-strength in ship numbers for the next thirty years or the Halifax class will have to be kept in service until the ships are 60 years old! That doesn’t seem like a reasonable target to aim at. Second, I do not credit the idea that Irving’s maximum speed is barely better than one combat ship every two years. The yard can and should figure out how to move faster. Many do. Third, the extended delivery schedule will delay production of the next class of armed ships until after 2050; in other words until just about everyone who has worked on the current round of ship design is retired. The old schedule seemed to have it about right; NSS staff working on the early stages of the CSC project could have moved to the submarines, icebreakers, and coastal defence vessel replacement in turn, and been kept busy until about 2035 – just in time to begin planning, say, the AOPS replacement. Thus the extended schedule seems to put at risk one of the main objectives of the NSS – the retention of expertise in ship design and project management.
I would be interested to hear anything you know and can say about the reasoning behind those decisions.
The reason why HMCS Harry DeWolf departed later this year is two fold, one is lack of trained personnel. Adequate sailors but not trained in this class which is fairly unique especially for Marine Technicians. As well for the last two years the East Coast provided a crew for the West Coast ship HMCS Max Bernays which they are now turning over to a West Coast Crew for the transfer to Esquimalt. The other reason is the dates for the Nanook exercise which had the taskforce ships come to Halifax. Eventually when the ships reach steady state you’ll see them in the Arctic for at least 4 months or longer along with Kingston Class ships.
I can’t really comment on specifics for the CSC build as dates are as good as one looks into their crystal ball. Irving probably will start cutting steel in their fabrication facility in 2024 and more than likely will be doing a test module to make sure their processes and jigs are good.
We can count on the first flight of 3 ships to be built with the first one possibility taking up to 6 or 7 years. Then as lessons learned production should increase as more and more ships are built, how fast unknown but in shipbuilding this is usually what happens as processes are streamlined. The upgrades to the production facilities take advantage of the lessons learned for the type 26.
Other than some fitting of minor equipment which can easily be done overseas you probably won’t see any construction in a meaningful way for submarines in Canada. The Kingston Class replacement will more than likely be built somewhere like Heddle in Ontario. Irving will literally be busy with construction of the CSC and refits for AOPS and CSC dockings for the next 30 years. You won’t see CFPs operating for 60 years and it very well may dip before 15 operable ships and you won’t see more than 15 combatants probably for many years if ever. If the Kingston Class replacement goes the Corvette direction you can add those to the combatant list.
Thanks, Ted, for your comments. I had wondered how they were handling crew assignments for Max Bernays, given that the ship seems to have gone through acceptance trials on the east coast, but will be based in the west. And it’s good to hear that there are plans for more extensive northern deployments going forward.
I see that William Hall is scheduled to be delivered tomorrow. Slowly but surely the work goes forward!
Thanks, Les.
I read, and liked, your article. It sounds like a very reasonable approach. I don’t think specialized amphibious vessels are in the cards any time soon, since our shipyards seem to be booked through 2040. Canada will have to make do with whatever amphibious capability the existing classes can provide, but we should not neglect it.
It should be relatively simple to add two more joint support ships to Seaspan’s backlog, for delivery around 2035. Canada might think about ordering two JSS per decade going forward to avoid having the capability lapse. There would be some loss of production efficiency from switching back and forth between ship types, and some of the multi-purpose vessels for the coast guard would have to be delayed.
The full development of the Nanisivik naval station would make it easier to keep patrol ships, and perhaps submarines, in the north throughout the navigable season. I also note with concern that there is no plan to base any of our new search and rescue planes or maritime patrol aircraft in northern regions. These also seem like obvious and easily corrected errors that will reduce Canada’s awareness and slow our response time in any emergency.
Hi Michael,
Thank you for your kind words. I agree with you that Arctic amphibious ships are unlikely to be built anytime soon, if ever. Fyi, CNR 18.2 pp 23-27 discuss further the LPA that I suggested and why it is unlikely to be built. CNR 18.3 pp 30-32 discuss the cheaper and simpler LSI(A) as a risk and cost reduction approach to deploying such a capability.
I agree with the rest of your comments. The solutions that they propose would give Canada, the CAF, and the RCN a far greater capability to deal with crises at home and overseas.
Ubique.
Les
Hi, Michael
There is lots we can do but unfortunately no political will to do it. We could easily expand the newly open port of Iqaluit to have a tank farm for fueling naval ships, jetty space, warehouses and workshops to support a multinational task group that could deploy to the Arctic each summer. Nanisivik is fairly small to operate many ships at a time or submarines but it certainly needs more DFO tank storage capacity. Keep in mind that the further you go North, the harder it is to build or maintain facilities. Iqaluit should be a regional SAR base open 24/7 365, with smaller seasonable bases supported by the main base.
Thanks, Les, for the information about the 25 mm cannon.
On thinking about the limited effect of a 25 mm cannon against a civilian ship, it occurs to me that that may actually be a better enforcement tool than a larger gun. The smaller gun does not cause immediate catastrophic damage. Therefore, if necessary, one or several shots can be fired without fear of causing a devastating oil spill or dozens of deaths. This potentially makes the threshold for using force much lower, and consequently the threat that an AOPS ship will use force will be that much more credible.
Hi Michael,
An excellent way to express a very important point! I must admit that I had not thought of it in such clear terms.
Thank you.
Ubique.
Les
Reply to David Dunlop, 19 Aug 23 16:24
Hi David,
The major problem with fact-free over-the-top ranting and venting is that it provides those who wish the CAF and RCN ill with plenty of click bait ammunition to use in public comments iot ensure that we really do have nothing with which to accomplish the military missions that Canada requires, either now or in the future (when the chickens really come home to roost).
Such individuals will happily elevate whatever rant that serves their interest into the 11th Commandment that is the fount of all knowledge and must be obeyed without thought or question!
Why should the Broadsides make the work of such biased and hostile individuals easier?
Criticism should be fact-based, constructive, and thoughtfully articulated.
Ubique.
Les
Believe me Les, I have no love for any media people who put their own careers ahead of the truth. Especially those that don’t know any better. But they are always entitled to their opinions (whether it is fact or fiction). Most “enlightened and truthful” media professionals pay folks like that no mind as do most of us. Let’s just stick to facts about the CSC Frigate program and let others put their foot in their mouths. They will all just fade away sooner or later. I have always said when I was in the “Senior Service” Navy…”Those who know not and know that they know not….are idiots, ignore them; Those who know, and know not that they know….are foolish, dismiss them; Those that know not, and know that they know not….are Students, teach them!; Those that know, and know that they know….are Instructors, Listen to them!! Cheers!
Hi David,
The problem is not the media per se, but Canadians in general who can be sold a false narrative that is well constructed and supported by selective quotes from “subject matter experts” and “senior defence officials” who say something that supports the narrative, or which can be twisted to seemingly provide such support.
Witness the “discussions” about nuclear submarines and the EH-101 for examples of how facts can go out the window and DND members can be quoted anonymously when they say something that fits the narrative. Jack Layton’s “slush breaker” comment and Terry Milewski’s funding piece on the AOPS are more recent examples. The difference is that they did not succeed in derailing these ships’ production.
I would hate to see rants and emotion-laden comments in the Broadsides twisted in such a fashion.
Ubique.
Les
My goodness! It seems I am not the only person ranting here. When my colleagues and I established the Broadsides forum many years ago, it was with the intention of providing a moderated venue in which ideas, opinions, and observations about day-to-day maritime security matters could be discussed in a timely, respectful manner, without people having to wait for the much longer lead time involved in submitting lengthier, more fully researched articles to Canadian Naval Review.
Posts and comments were expected to be shorter, less fully elaborated, and sometimes even speculative. Good will, humour, and even the occasional dose of pointed sarcasm were not automatically ruled out.
While our hope was that the forum would frequently offer constructive ideas, we did not want to preclude the occasional expression of despair or lamentation that various government or industry organizations were seemingly deviating from expressed government policy or were headed down pathways that might lead to failure or adverse consequences. On the other hand, we were not setting ourselves up to be unthinking cheerleaders for any and all policies and actions that seemed misguided.
One of my major concerns in my posts and other writings has been that taxpayer funds that are being mis-spent or wasted – and, yes, we can have long debates in which we may disagree about how we might define these terms – means that these same funds are not being directed to improving the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces. I believe strongly that drawing attention to the ways these funds are being expended is in the public interest, and that we should not simply accept the assurances of political and bureaucratic entities that all is well, and that Canadians have no right to know.
To bring these considerations back to this particular thread, in some 50 years of writing and discussing Canadian defence procurement and what I perceive as its many foibles, I may have slipped into some expressions of despair and frustration, but in this case it was in a single comment buried well down in the Comments on my original post. Short comments do not provide good vehicles for carefully researched and fully documented insights in every single instance, but they can be a spur to further discussion.
I can also unhesitatingly assure you that I have no remit to impose “commandments” of any sort upon our readers or to impugn the integrity of you or any organization to which you belong. As you and others have amply demonstrated, you are free to take issue, agree or disagree, or simply ignore any comments made.