By Blair Shaw, 2 May 2023
The House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence issued a report in April entitled “A Secure and Sovereign Arctic.” The report gives an overview on areas of defence that are under-funded or not present but also gives a few statements about how to rectify this situation and discusses current programs that are ongoing.
One key note for the navy mentioned by Dr Perry is the submarines. He states: “We need to broadly be looking at replacing those submarines with either new submarines themselves or a system of underwater vehicles that could be operated remotely—perhaps working in conjunction—as well as additional sensing capability to be able to detect other people's submarines that could be working in Canadian coastal waters and approaches.”
He also mentions an underwater sensor network that can detect offshore submerged threats. He says: “underwater sensors would be an area that I think we should focus on, so likely acoustical devices,” which could be “put in the water at a place where you want to listen ... to have an idea of who is operating there, even if you don't have your own ship or submarine” at that location.
This report should highlight the need not only to replace the submarine fleet with some haste but, also the idea of an underwater network of hydrophones to secure the region allowing a multi layered defence of the region. Using a combined surface, sub-surface and air assets in conjunction with the network it would undoubtedly make it harder for potential adversary states to operate within our waters.
The Broadsides forum may find this report interesting. Find it at https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/NDDN/Reports/RP12342748/nddnrp03/nddnrp03-e.pdf
8 thoughts on “A Secure and Sovereign Arctic”
It will be very interesting to see the government’s written response to the Defence Committee’s 26 Recommendations. We can only hope that the government’s reply will not be as tardy as their responses to other Defence issues.
From the recommendations, it seems to me that the committee has gone for the two extremes of Arctic capability: surveillance and hard kill (F35s and submarines).
It ignores the in-between steps of being able to confront an intruder in an escalatory fashion, from: RCMP and border services (with CAF back-up on the ground) advising the intruders to leave through to containment/confrontation and then up to arrest/seizure, with the readiness to employ CAF supporting firepower if required.
Surveillance alone makes Canada a well-informed spectator to an intruder’s actions while hard-kill may well be politically and internationally unacceptable depending on the specifics of the intrusion. Imagine if the UK had had only those two options when the Argentinian scrap merchants had asserted Argentine sovereignty over the South Georgias in 1982.
The committee’s report is an education opportunity missed.
Hello Les. F35s & Subs are only part of the solution as the report also says. Other surveillance recommendations are there as well, such as better satellite surveillance; underwater SOSUS type systems throughout the Arctic choke points; an enhanced NORAD surveillance system; upgraded bases for fueling along with improved roads and rail systems; manned submarines/ships patroling the high Arctic; upgraded air bases with possible SMRs for stable power and XL Underwater Autonomous Vehicles for better surveillance and sovereignty missions. A lot to consider and do, so best we get on with it very soon!
Hi David,
All good points. And a lot to do!
Still, I have not seen any discussion about the need for the type of presence forces that I described on 4 May 23. Building on Col Brian Wentzell’s idea ( see CNR 15.2 pp 34-37) we could easily establish a basic Arctic amphibious capability this year using HMCS Harry DeWolf, HMCS Margaret Brooke, 3 R22eR, and some of the Cyclones in 423 Squadron. The incremental costs would be minimal and the lessons learned and experience invaluable.
I am very concerned that we will miss the boat and fail to make such investments and have to improvise them during a crisis, with all the attendant risks and muddle.
Better to muddle before the crisis and get things right!
Hi Les. Well said, however I would rather “muddle” with a more legitiment vessel like an Absalon class or two to get our feet wet in the our quest to get into the “strategic Amphibious sealift” capability. If we are going to “muddle” let’s muddle the right way! Cheers!
Hi David,
Agree entirely. See CNR 18.3 pp 30-32.
However, while such ships are being procured we can learn a great many things using the AOPS and other units as described above on 6 May 23. A simple question like command and control has great scope for confusion and parochial turf battles. These, and many other matters, can be discovered and addressed starting this Fall, if a trial capability is set up as suggested.
Canada has already done work in demonstrating underwater sensors in the Northwest passage on Devon Island. Very promising. The sensors along with radar would be an excellent capability to develop.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/cause-array-drdc-test-1.4232348
But not the only capabilities that Canada should develop Ted.