By P.M. Sanderson, Capt (Ret’d), Canadian Army, Reserve, 9 October 2022
Presently there is no ‘push’ by the Canadian government for amphibious ships nor is there any ‘pull’ from the navy, but by next spring, after Europe’s winter with no gas, the continuing recession and the never-ending Ukrainian war, views will harden – expect change.
Canada belongs to two important groups, the first is NATO: If a hockey fan looked at NATO as a hockey league, he would wonder why Canada is still allowed to be a member; it doesn’t live in the neighbourhood nor does it have a team bus! The second group is the G7, note the amphibious ship holdings of the other members: USA 7 x Wasp-class LHD, 2 x American-class LHA, 12 x San Antonio-class LPD; Japan (the only non-NATO member), 2 x Izumo and 2 x Hyuga-class LHA; Germany 4 x Roll-on/Roll-off ships available; UK 2 x Albion-class LPD; France 3 x Mistral-class LHD; Italy 1 x Trieste-class LHD, 3x San Giorgio-class LPD; Canada = 0.
What else are amphibious ships good for? 2005. Hurricane Katrina was very destructive; Canada wanted to help its neighbour so it sent a frigate loaded with relief supplies – the infamous “sending a Ferrari to deliver gravel.” 2006. The Lebanon evacuation required Canada to lease 7 ships to move 50,000 passport holders the 200 km to Cyprus, for flights to Montreal. The French sent their new Mistral to rescue their citizens. 2010. Hurricane Igor hit Newfoundland hard, washing out bridges and roads, leaving 30 communities cut off. Govenment sent an MCDV, and two frigates with Sea Kings to handle any medical evacuation in the cut off towns. The Combat Engineer Regiment which quickly repaired roads and bridges came by civilian ferry. The West coast of Canada is on the ‘Ring of Fire’ so Vancouver or Victoria could suffer ‘The Big One.’ A ship would survive the earthquake and after-shocks.
Why the Mistral-class LHD is the best choice for both military and humanitarian roles. Cost: Built in a cruise ship yard for 600M euros (2003-2006) using commercial ship building standards including: (1) automation allows it to be run by 20 officers, 80 petty officers and 60 sailors; and (2) all-electric propulsion increases fuel efficiency and the 2 pods and a bow thruster provide better maneuverability and less maintenance. The ship has a technical readiness of over 350 days a year. Mistral was built as a Command Ship with all the radios and antennas for communications, plus a pre-wired, modular, 850 square metre operations centre and accommodation for 200 staff officers. This would also make a perfect Emergency Response Centre. Hospital Ship. Mistral was built around a NATO Level 3 Hospital with its 69 beds and 2 operating rooms. It has the look of an ER prepared for a mass casualty event. Air Mobile Operations. Mistral has the standard 6 position flight deck; below deck there is 1,800 square metre hangar for 16 medium helicopters, 2 elevators and maintenance work shops. Due to corrosion, a marine helicopter must be purpose built, the US Marines’ latest H-1 series fills the bill; the Bell UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper have achieved 84% identical components. The Venom can carry 8 troops or 6 stretchers and it can also carry a heavy sling load to resupply a beach head or resupply medicine to the hinterland.
Amphibious Operations. Accommodations: Mistral has rooms, bunks, washrooms, laundries and messing for 450 troops/evacuees and room for 450 more on cots in the vehicle hangar for a short duration. The 2,650 square metre vehicle hangar can hold 40 tanks or 70 vehicles. Default Load When not on Ex the vehicle hangar would contain disaster response equipment: ‘wheeled’ dozers, loaders, excavators c/w hammers; Bobcats, dump trucks, cranes and Bailey Bridging on flat beds, bowsers, CP vehicles, cargo trucks, field kitchens, water trailers, water purification units, generators c/w lighting, and line trucks. Well Deck can take 2 x landing catamarans (L-CAT); these are a French invention which have a military lift of 80 tons/110 tons overload and are needed for lifting our 25 ton LAV 6.0 and our 60 plus ton Leopard tanks. Since the L-CAT have a speed of 20 kn, a range of 400nm, a sea state limit of 5; they can undertake independent missions delivering construction equipment and other disaster relief supplies up and down the coast. Strategic Sea Lift. Mistral can load and unload from its pier side ramp.
The gov’t should order 2 Mistrals, with reinforced hulls for use in the Arctic, and give the ‘tasking’ to the navy which will have to take the ships as is. There may be an upside in this for the RCN. Sending a Mistral to Europe with one-third of our country’s field force on board, would require a full task force for protection. While these LHDs will fulfill our military obligations, they are also an important national asset for the safety of Canadians.
References:
1. CDFAI Policy Paper: Putting the Cart before the Horse: Why Canada should not purchase the Mistral-Class Ships, for now. Nov 2014.
2. RTO-MP-109 Paper: Mistral: A New Concept of Medical Platform for Tri-Service Long Lasting Deployment Apr 2003.
3. News.usni.org/2014/09/opinion-mistral-canada.
4. Defense News Editorial: The Mistral Amphib is a Goldmine of Good Ideas.
5. navyrecognition.com Mistral Class LHD BPC.
6. Wiki, EDR-R (L-CAT), LCAC, Mistral, San Antonio, Wasp.
7. Wiki, Chinook, Griffon, Venom, Viper.
8. Spark: Constructing the second largest ship in The French Navy, https://youtu.be/bqQzpgVY_ks 50.41 minutes.
9. Navy Recognition: L-CAT Landing Catamaran Landing Craft CNIM EDA-R, https://youtu.be/FI6jA_RegsY, 4.14 minutes.
25 thoughts on “Continued NATO membership may require buying Mistral LHDs”
Good afternoon Capt Sanderson,
I find your point about the possibility of European attitudes changing after a winter of energy rationing to be very important and worthy of close monitoring. However, the conclusion that such a change could lead to Canada being asked to leave NATO and the G7 is far from self-evident. You seem to consider Canada to be a freeloader who has contributed nothing to either group. While it is true that Canada does not spend 2% of GDP on defence that hardly means that what we do contribute is without value. Quality has a value also. Additionally, if we went by defence spending and equipment fielded Russia’s military would be a fabulous addition to NATO’s order of battle. The past seven months make clear how wrong such a conclusion is.
Wrt the idea of purchasing Mistrals as the way to ‘stay in the club,’ I would like clarification of the following before I can comment further.
Why two Mistrals? Geography and maintenance schedules argue for at least three, preferably four.
Why the Mistral? Why not the Juan Carlos/Canberra?
What do you mean by reinforced hulls? Cosmetic additions of steel? Polar Class 5 minimum? If the latter, I suspect that the entire hull would have to be redesigned outside and in. This would greatly increase cost and time to build.
Could French (or Spanish) shipyards produce such ice-hardened hulls in a timely and cost-effective manner? I am not aware of them having much expertise in this area.
What do such ships offer to Canada’s defence of Europe?
What are the four Ro-Ro ships that Germany has available?
Do we know whether the Mistrals meet Canadian expectations for habitability, especially during long Arctic voyages?
What parts of the CAF would you give up to be able to purchase and crew these ships and procure the necessary helicopters and landing craft?
I fully agree with you that Canada should have amphibious ships. However, in order to be cost-effective I feel that they must be at least Polar Class 5 in order to be useful both at home and overseas.
I look forward to reading your further contributions to this important discussion.
Hi Les. Chancellor Willy Brandt threatened PM Pierre Elliot Trudeau that since all our ancient Centurion tanks broke down during the NATO Ex, he would see to it that PET was not invited to the next NATO heads of state meeting – that how we got Leopard 1s. Your questions: (1) You are correct ” if you need 2 working ships, buy 3!” (2) The Juan Carlos Class is for countries who need to fly F-35Bs off their LHD, Australia must, Canada doesn’t. (3,4,7 & 9) The French yard built the Russian Mistrals with “reinforced hulls” not for “winter arctic” use but so they enter and leave Vladivostok in any season. (5) Article 5 requires Canada to come aid our NATO partners – the Mistral is how we take our Army to Europe, landing by beach or pier. Leasing ships (after the Falklands loss of SS Atlantic Conveyor) in war time is not possible; ship owners/insurers want gov’ts to the buy the ships & pay the 2 year loss of income while a replacement ship is built. You are now half way to paying for an LHD. (6) Germany Ro-Ro ships – Google this, it’s interesting. (8) Since Canada is the 10th largest economy in the world and there is lots of funding left in that 2%, remember Canada agreed to that number – try not paying your gym membership, your access card won’t work. Cheers Pete.
Hello Pete,
Thank you for your response to my questions. I must admit that I remain unconvinced of your thesis and the value of Mistrals to Canada.
However, I accept that Canada’s impact in the discussions of NATO and the G7 will be affected by its level of contribution. I also recognize though – as we saw in the FRY and Afghanistan (and the world wars) – that our service and sacrifice do not necessarily lead to greater influence. Thus, we could buy the Mistrals and still have no more impact on these groups’ decision making.
Like you, I believe that Canada needs an amphibious capability. However, I would reverse your approach. Instead of trying to make Mistrals relevant to us, I have argued for the development of Arctic amphibious ships that can also be used for NATO, NEO, HA/DR, and sealift missions.
In effect, we are pursuing the same capability but from ‘opposite ends.’
Les
Hello Capt Sanderson: I must echo much of what Les Mader has commented on although your comments gave me much comedic relief. As you may know, Canada had an extraordinary opportunity to buy the 2 French Mistral class LHDs when they were offered to Canada. The French at the time were building the ships for Russia but the contract was quickly cancelled after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Canadian government decided however to pass on the offer. The vessels were then quickly sold to the Egyptian government. In order for Canada to get into the Amphibious Warfare ‘game,’ we must first update our foreign policy and Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) defence policy to reflect our desire to commit to an Amphibious policy. Even if this were done, it would take perhaps a generation to accomplish this as the Australians can attest to. It took them over 20 years to realize their own Amphibious Sealift Capability. I am not saying the Mistral-class LHD would not be a good start for this capability, however, the more important consideration is how would we properly man and equip these vessels when the CAF is already down almost 10,000 personnel from fixed strength now, let alone the extra 3-4000 CAF personnel required for a 3 to 4 ship Amphibious fleet capability. I would also agree with Les Mader that the Juan Carlos/Canberra-class LHDs would be a much better fit for this Canadian capability if, and only if we were at the 2% of GDP for defence. These vessels would also have to be ice-strengthened to Polar 5 specifications for Arctic operations that would be required by the government which would also increase vessel costs. In my opinion, we can acquire this much needed capability if we have the will to do so. Here is a video on the Canberra class LHD: Cheers!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rI_uqoNtZI8
I remember reading somewhere that the Mistral Class could be retrofitted to support F-35B? If this isn’t correct, do let me know.
I had raised this comment in another article on this website. I noted that the Germans had signed an agreement for shared use of the HNLMS Karel Doorman (A833) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HNLMS_Karel_Doorman_(A833)).
I wonder if Canada could explore something like this. As an example, the British have the Albion Class landing platform dock (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion-class_landing_platform_dock) which has two ships of this class. One is in active service and the other is under extended readiness. Is there an opportunity that Canada could enter into an agreement with the British for use of the second ship? It could be a way for us to initially ‘experiment’ with amphibious operations. Again, this ship may not suit our needs so there could be other options to explore as well.
Just an idea…
Hello Justin Leon: Just about anything, with a little prep, can handle the F-35B. The jet blast is a bit hotter than with the Harrier so the flight deck would have to be coated with better materials. Otherwise there is no reason the F-35B couldn’t operate from any decent sized helicopter carrier. Without a ski jump however, like the Spanish Juan Carlos LHD class, the takeoff weight will be limited. That can partially be compensated for if there are aircraft refueling A/C immediately in the area to refuel them. The F-35B can take off with minimal fuel, allow for a larger weapon load but low takeoff weight, then immediately tank up in the air. The Mistral LHD however, probably does not have the hangar or elevator space to handle the F-35B. Your Netherlands Karel Doorman or British Albion Class ideas have some merit if the Dutch or UK were amenable to doing this. As I told Pete Sanderson, I believe Canada’s best option would be the Juan Carlos/Canberra class LHDs.
Mistral cannot be retrofitted for F35B. Sorry for the disappointment. Unlike the Canberra and Future Italian Trieste. The deck on the Mistral is too narrow for the safe operation of F35B. Even the weakest of the deck can always be reinforced for F35B, like what the Japanese did to their ‘Destroyers,’ but the space for landing and take-off is insufficient for the F35B flight ops. As upper structure on the Mistral is too wide and takes up too much space for safe rolling take-off. That may be the reason why Australians chose the Spanish design over that of the French one. Even though they claim is has nothing to do with it.
Let’s be clear — Karel Doorman is not a landing ship, it’s more of a Dutch experiment for saving money. It eventually turned out to be most effective in the role it was not designed for, as the guard ship for the Dutch Caribbean. So that is why the Dutch are upgrading their landing assets and building new dedicated supply ships. For the Germans, I believe that is more of pan European quid pro quo. If the Dutch are placing their tank force under German Command, it is only reasonable for the Germans to place a force under Dutch Command. Especially the German Sea Battalion also has to do mine clearance and guard naval bases. Their effectiveness with the Germans is highly questionable. (Neither force is effective, the Dutch basically abandoned their tanks and the Germans do not train their Sea Battalion to the Dutch standard. So is more of a show.)
As to the British ship placed under reserve. I doubt Brits would be comfortable with letting the Canadian use the vessel since the Canadian military lacks the Amphibious operation know-how. Any Canadian personnel without the British training standard would automatically become a liability to the rest of the Landing force. But we can always dream…
Hello PASSEDMOST: Although the Mistal LHD has the same beam width as the Juan Carlos/Canberra LHDs, I totally agree with you that it does not have the same hangar, elevator or top side space for a squadron of F35Bs or even the F35B fuel capacity, let alone the Helo fuel requirements like the Juan Carlos/Canberra or Trieste class LHDs have. As far as the UK Albion class goes, this could be an option and a way for Canada to get in on the ground level to start acquiring an Amphibious Sealift Capability in the future.
Haha, Canada doing the right thing by buying ships for Amphibious operations. This may be the funniest thing I have ever read on this site. First Canada needs to build up a transport capability to transport troops to Europe in the event of an emergency. Priority should be given to assets that can secure the supply line first. Then we can start to think about a landing force. The complication is that Canada lacks forces that have experience and know-how in the area of Amphibious warfare. And Canada does not have the manpower and resources to build a force like US Marine Corps as a stand-alone force. Like what David was saying about Australia. It has taken Australia close to two decades to buildup a truly Amphibious force. And that is with help from the UK and US. If you pay attention to some Australian DoD press releases, you will realize even today, the backbone of the Australian Landing Forces consists of advisors and commanders who are British in origin. Without this know-how from the Brits and training assets provided by American forces, Australia would still be struggling with building up the force. So it’s not as simple as buying vessels to solve the issue of Amphibious operations.
What Canada should do is 1) build up a force similar to Royal Marine where the skill and know-how in regard to Amphibious operations can be preserved. In times of crisis, this force can also act as a spearhead force for any follow-on landing operation provided mostly by the Army. This force can also take up the responsibility of Arctic warfare for the rest of CAF like the Royal Marines and the Dutch Marines provide Arctic warfare ability to the respective military. (It is funny that a country like Canada does not possess the ability to truly fight in the Arctic. Photo ops with Canadian Rangers do not mean they can counter any Russian Special Ops in the High North.) 2) Increase the ability to collect hydrographical information for the purpose of landing. In the event of a landing operation, RCN does not possess Geopartial information collection know-how. These responsibilities largely fall on the mostly civilian Canadian Coast Guard. And Canadian military does not possess this very important ability. Without Geopartial information, landing troops on a beach would be equal to a suicide mission. 3) For a war in Europe it is more important to protect the sea lanes and ports where equipment can be quickly unloaded and moved to the front. (War in Europe would look very different compared to Falklands.) So landing should be of secondary importance to the Navy. 4) Even if Canada managed to build a force that can operate in a littoral environment, the force can row in canoes across the Atlantic faster with some rest in Iceland in the same amount of time needed for an LHD to be built and commissioned for Canada.
So let us get our priority straight. First, build up the Navy and replace old equipment. Then we can start to dream big about a landing ship for Canada.
Completely agree with you PASSEDMOST that Canada does not now possess the capability and knowledge yet, like the US/UK and Australia have. As I said before, it took Australia at least 20 years to acquire their Amphibious expertise and they are still not quite there yet…. but they are close. I also believe we must first define the Canadian Amphibious Sealift requirements in updated foreign policy and Strong, Secure Engaged (SSE) defence policy, then build up our manpower requirements to the point where we can then think about a Canadian LHD fleet for both Amphibious landings as well as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. We must first crawl, then walk and finally run with regard to a Canadian Amphibious Sealift Capability.
Hello PASSEDMOST, right on. Last time I checked there was no Statement of Operational Capability Deficiency (SOCD). Unless we suddenly grow balls to land in Crimea, it’s hard to imagine acquiring an LHD any time soon. Let’s address HFX class obsolescence first. NSS does what it can. AOPS, for example. JSS is next. Perhaps not all, but some of us may witness arrival of CSC. VIC class would require attention too, most likely ‘repair by replacement’. Only then new LHDs.
Clarifications. (1) Canada is not Australia. Canada lives next door to a Super Power; while Australia is an orphan in the Pacific with regional responsibilities who hopes their ally, the USA, will be around for them but “Great powers don’t have friends.” The Juan Carlos Class with its sky-jump, is insurance; when you are buying nuclear subs, buying 14 F-35Bs is chump change. (2) The RCRs don’t have to become Marines, you are using worse case scenarios:(i) Mistral as strategic sea lift, if an European port is jammed with our allies then the RCN can just goes to the local beach and dumps the army there. (ii) In any NATO amphibious op, the USMC will be first wave, which means the RCR will go ashore as second wave to move out from the beach head, taking the LHD aviation unit with them. (3) HA/DR ops are for BC, PEI and NFLD foremost. Last winter we got a glimpse of what it looks like when our gateway to Asia was shut down; in this case due to a storm, washing away the road and rail routes to Vancouver. Now imagine it was an earthquake which also flatten the city of Vancouver. With no water or power, 100,000s of survivors would need to evacuate the city but they can’t because routes are blocked and bridges are down – Route clearing is a Combat Engineer Regiment (CER) specialty – the first CH-147s through the mountains would carry two 1CER Fd Sqns which would land on the reinforced bow, #1 position, of the Mistral to disgorge the sappers. They would drive the “Default Load” construction equipment that would clear the evacuation/relief routes and bridge the gaps so civil authorities can reassert control. If the city’s Emergency Response Center didn’t survive then the Mistral can provide an operations center complete with: communications with Victoria, Ottawa and their people; drones to view the situation; helicopters for liaisons visits; accommodation and messing.The helicopters will be bring casualties to the Mistral or if there is a surviving mainland hospital, they will move casualties to it as well. The Mistral hospital was built to be “expandable.” Contingency planning is what they pay us for – to think the unthinkable. In this role, the Mistrals are “National Assets,”not a weapon, like a tank, fighter or frigate and are staffed by navy, air force, army, medical and civilian (additional doctors & nurses, lineman, rescue teams) personnel.
Hello Pete. Either the Mistrals or Juan Carlos class LHDs would be excellent national/international assets for HA/DR ops and are very well suited for those national/international missions. Your scenarios seem to be a bit far-fetched but I’ll give you that. These vessels would be ideal for Canadian HA/DR requirements. Yes, they would also give Canada a Strategic Sealift Capability that we so desperately require. F 35Bs for the Mistral class however would definitely be a no-go as they lack the space required in the hangar as well as elevator space to bring them top-side. You could “lash” them to the top deck, but then what about the Helos? The F35Bs would rust out before they even got to their destination (if we didn’t lose them all in any storm at sea). In my opinion naval strategy is best left to the Navy.
Hello CNR Fan. Yes, you may be correct. It will take a long time before Canada can realize a Sealift Capability. But if we want this capability, we will have to be patient as Australia has been. “Growing” a couple to land in Crimea as you so crudely put it, has nothing to do with “The Price of Tea in China”. Let’s just look at where we can be and not lament on where we are. “We Have Done So Much With So Little For So Long, That Now We Are Ready To Do Everything With Nothing Forever!” Have A Great Navy Day!
Recent article on the NATO Assocation of Canada website about this topic as well:
https://natoassociation.ca/canada-should-increase-its-maritime-power-projection-capabilities/
Obviously, I’m a little late to this string Les, but I entirely agree with you. Just read your latest piece “The LPA: The RCN’s Arctic Linchpin?” Completely concur.
Makes me wonder why we got rid of the Bonnie and ultimately Naval Air?
Thank you Bill. One can always hope for such a multi-purpose capability that is relevant for both coastal (Arctic ) defence and as well as ‘distant defence’ ones.
Interesting video about the Mistral Class
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKlsCvQuFPQ
If anyone is still wandering around this post, I would strongly encourage you to read Les Mader’s latest article “The LPA: The RCN’s Arctic Linchpin.” (Vol. 18(2), (Fall 2022)
Canada doesn’t really have the need for a dedicated Amphibious ship. Canada for a start doesn’t have a marine force like the UK Royal Marines or the US Marine Corps so one could argue the capability would be wasted.
Also to note that Europe has a very large sea lift capability with its Merchant fleets specifically Roll on Roll off ferries and we have seen this capability be used to great effect namely in 1982, 1991 and 2003. Canada also has a number of ocean capable Roll On Roll off ferries which in time of a major crisis would undoubtedly be taken up from trade.
Therefore logistically speaking there’s no requirement for a dedicated amphibious force centered around a LPD LHA or LHD type of vessel. However there is certainly room for improvement in capabilities indeed if we take a look at the Danish Absalon class this ship is a multi-mission ship, it has good ASW capabilities and helicopter handling facilities while retaining limited amphibious and logistical capabilities, all the while being able to conduct similar missions to a frigate and being armed with anti-ship missiles and a VLS system for air defense.
Indeed having two ships of this type would enhance the RCN all round and could in theoretical terms reduce the number of Type 26 CSC frigates required by having ships similar to the Absalon in the fleet while systematically increasing the RCN capability. Moreover they could indeed be built in Canada potentially using a modified existing design to save costs, I am thinking of the Harry De Wolf class here which is of the similar tonnage but shorter (by 110ft) than the Absalons.
Therefore I believe that having a dedicated LHD is not really a necessity for Canada.
Good morning Blair,
I agree with you that LHDs, LHAs, and LPDs are not the most relevant amphibious vessels for the RCN. Over the past three years a different approach to Canadian amphibiosity has been articulated by Colonel (Ret’d) Brian Wentzell, José Cañadas Mendez, and myself. It is based on developing capabilities for use in the Canadian Arctic, which could be used elsewhere if needed.
The Marines for such a capability would be found by reroling one to three of the army’s existing infantry battalions. See CNR 15.2 p 37, CNR 16.1 p 33, and Canadian Army Journal 19.2 pp 70-75.
The context for such a capability is discussed at CNR 17.3 pp 20-24. It’s general structure is described at CNR 16.1 pp 32-34.
The ships for the capability are discussed at CNR 18.2 pp 23-27, CNR 17.1 pp 33-35, and CNR 18.1 pp 31-34.
The helicopters and hovercraft to work with these ships are discussed at CNR 17.2 pp 32-35 and CNR 18.1 pp 34-36.
The overall approach is based on minimizing costs and disruption in order to maximize the likelihood of success and implementation.
Any thoughts that you had on this force would be of interest.
For your information and consideration.
Les Mader
Thank you Les
I’m fortunate enough to have been on the Dixmude and also the Anwar El Sadat some time ago that coupled with HMS Albion & Bulwar the three Bay class and many other types of vessels during my career. What strikes me the most is that going back through my memory, none of these vessels would be suited to Canada. Indeed the only one I’ve ever found that could be a good fit was the Absalon which has limited Arctic capabilities given it does from time to time patrol around Greenland.
I would be very interested to find out about the proposal regarding the new ships and the possible formation of forces etc. And I shall endeavour to look at the fore mentioned articles
I tend to look at things from the logistical side to ascertain if a project is viable. I would be interested in seeing the proposals if they are indeed public
I am currently away at the moment I’m due to return home in a couple of weeks but I can formulate a draft reply ready for when I get home
If you have any links to the documents mentioned, please do share them
Regards
Good evening Blair,
The relevant links are found at a new Broadsides Forum post “A Possible Canadian Arctic Amphibious Capability” dated 6 Dec 22.
I look forward to any comments that you want to add to that post.
Canada is not a world maritime power with the need of an amphibious platform to project force globally. Its best contribution to NATO would be in supplying ASW platforms: Frigates and Destroyer types to help escort troops and supplies across the pond to Europe. The U.S. Navy’s Reserve merchant ships and roll on roll off hulls are aging and Canada would have a greater impact shoring up that need.
Greetings,
We could swap out 1 sub / 1 csc for 2 mistrals I’m thinking… $$$ (to thereabouts)
Our JTF could be tasked to ‘incorporate’ the AAS into their operations… just thinking out loud
D