By Timothy Choi, 19 November 2021
Earlier this week, my fellow CNR colleague Dr. Dan Middlemiss published some thoughts on a latest report on the Australian Hunter class frigate program and what lessons they may impart for Canada. Although I agree with his broader observations regarding the general difficulties and challenges both countries will continue to face in their quest to adapt the base Type 26 design for their respective frigates, I would like to address - and dare I say to such a distinguished figure in Canadian naval history, correct - a few points brought up in his post.
1. One of the observations brought up was the notion that the Canadian CSC, like the Aussie Hunter, has only "32 VLS - at the low-end of most current frigates." In actuality, very few frigates in service have more than 32 VLS. Indeed, many frigates have fewer. The following selection of in service and in-progress frigates should suffice to demonstrate the point:
Italian FREMM: 16 VLS
French FREMM: 32 VLS
UK Type 23: 32 VLS, single Sea Ceptor per cell only
UK Type 31: 24 VLS, single Sea Ceptor per cell only
Danish Iver Huitfeldt: 32 VLS, currently empty (though SM-2s are on their way), operating in the mean time with modular ESSM launchers, totalling 24 missiles.
US Constellation class: 32 VLS
German F125: none (!)
German MKS-180/F126: 16 VLS
Spanish F-110: 16 VLS
Norwegian Nansen class: 8 VLS (3 ships), 16 VLS (1 ship)
Netherlands De Zeven Provincien: 40 VLS (note this is the only Western ship classed as a "frigate" with more than 32 VLS!)
Netherlands/Belgian joint Future Surface Combatant: 16 VLS
India Shivalik: 32 anti-air VLS, 8 cruise missiles
And moving over to East Asia's arms race central, we have the following:
Japan FFM-1/30FFM: 16 VLS
Japan Akisuki (formally classed as a destroyer): 32 VLS
South Korea FFX Batch II: 16 VLS
PRC Type 054A: 32 VLS
Russia's Admiral Gorshkov class is perhaps the only class of "frigates" with substantially more VLS cells than the CSC/Hunter, though that number varies greatly depending on the particular generation, and some of those missile cells are dedicated to cruise missiles rather than universal ammunition choice.
There are ships classed as destroyers which may or may not have more cells, but the line between frigate and destroyer is quite blurry these days and I won't get into that here.
2. Secondly, the CSC actually has 38 VLS, not 32 (officially, anyway: the latest CGI graphics showing only 24 Mk 41 cells are a cause of some concern). This is because of the 6 Extensible Launch System (ExLS) cells aft of the funnel. Each of these cells, just like the Mk 41, can quad-pack smaller anti-air missiles (but, unlike the Mk 41s, not larger missiles). In the CSC's case, the missiles in the ExLS will be the Sea Ceptor, intended for use in the close-in defence role. Yes, the CSC's last-ditch armament of 6x4=24 Sea Ceptors is the entire air-defence armament of Britain's Type 31 frigates! No wonder the massive savings predicted by the PBO earlier this year for the Type 31 option.
Indeed, to use an overly simple, but perhaps the most straightforward, comparison of combat capabilities that can be brought to bear by the CSC versus the current Halifax class, one can count the maximum number of air-defence missiles carried by each: a CSC, with 32 Mk 41 and 6 ExLS, can theoretically carry 152 quad-packed ESSM/Sea Ceptors, while the Halifax class carries only 16 ESSMs. This is an ENORMOUS change in the defence capacity of the new ships, and should not be downplayed. Obviously, in actual employment, many of those Mk 41 cells will be employed for single missiles like the SM-2s or Tomahawks, but the point still stands that the new ships have a defensive capacity that are a huge step up from the current fleet. Even the 6 ExLS cells alone will have a fifty percent increase in anti-air capability versus the Halifax, regardless of what goes into the Mk 41s.
Is this order-of-magnitude increase in missile capacity enough for the future? That is debatable, but what cannot be denied is that the CSC is well ahead of the pack of current and in-construction frigates. If they are deemed "obsolescent" by virtue of their VLS count, then so are nearly every other frigate sailing the 21st century seas.
3. Tonnage is an uncertain beast: there is a vast difference nowadays, on the order a thousand tons or more, between a ship's light displacement and its full load displacement. Without knowing which one a given document or media quote is referencing (and I have yet to see one that makes this clear), the difference in displacement growth may well be less than currently assumed.
4. This isn't a point raised by Dr. Middlemiss, but it is always worth remembering the widely varying budgeting methods employed by different countries. Both Australia and Canada employ a program-based budgeting, resulting in the lumping in of infrastructure, ammunition, program management, testing facilities and contingency costs (15-20%!) outside of the actual construction of the ship itself. For navies like ours where only one program is going to make use of all those things, this "all in one" approach certainly makes sense. For larger navies like the US or UK, however, those costs and the things they pay for are used by other projects and ships, making it more useful for them to budget those items as separate programs. While this may seem a dismissive attempt to make mountains out of molehills to excuse the high figures we've been seeing, in actuality the construction costs of the ships themselves are estimated to be around only 65% of the program figures.1 So instead of the ~$60-$70 billion, the number we should be looking at is around $39-46 billion CAD. Converted to USD, that's currently ~$31-36 USD, or $2-2.4 billion USD per ship. This is still a substantial increase over the $1 billion USD Constellation class, but there's no denying the economic benefits of a superpower's supply chain and institutional experience. Furthermore, it should be reminded that these are all *budgeted* costs, which are merely estimates. None of the figures are proven as actual costs for their implementation. And, of course, the lack of spare capacity in the US shipbuilding industry is well-known: to take advantage of their lower costs, we'd have to buy from their yards, and the Americans simply do not have the ability to build ships for both themselves and us unless additional funds are provided to expand their yard capacity, which would eat into any savings from buying abroad.
26 thoughts on “Some Comments on CSC Armaments & Aussie Comparisons”
Tim,
My apologies. You are quite right to correct my sloppy use of the term “frigate” in describing Canada’s CSC, Like others, I fear I have been subliminally brain-washed into describing Canada’s proposed CSC as a frigate, when that is no longer a term used much any more by officials in Ottawa and even in the RCN.
What I should have said was that the CSC will have a total number of VLS that is at the low-to-mid range of warships of comparable size and tonnage when it finally comes into operational service. And, by most standards, the CSC will be closer to what we think of as a “destroyer” than a current frigate.
And it is true that warship tonnages are bandied about quite loosely these days, but I based the weight of the CSC on a statement by Mr. Kevin McCoy, who, until the spring of 2021, was the President of Irving Shipbuilding. Hence he was well acquainted with the proposed design for the CSC at that time. McCoy stated: “This is a big ship, lots of capability” and indicated that full displacement for the new frigate will likely be about 9,400 tonnes; almost double the 4,700 tonnes of the current Halifax-class.
As others have pointed out in comments to my post, the CSC will likely be roughly the same size and tonnage as an Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyer. The latter is equipped with 96 VLS, and is also less costly than the CSC is likely to be. (As an aside, I know of no official in Ottawa who is still trying to argue that the CSC will roughly the same cost as other surface combatants of a similar size and weight)
So, by redefining more carefully what we are talking about in terms of warships of comparable size and full load displacement, we thereby eliminate many of the “frigates” which lie in the 4,000-5,000 tonnes full load range which you slyly slipped in as legitimate “frigate” comparables to Canada’s CSC..
Even some of today’s “destroyers”, which fall in the 7,200-8,000 tonne full load range, possess more VLS today, than the CSC will likely have when it enters service in the mid-2030s.
For example,
China’s PLAN Type 052D destroyer is 7,500 tons full load and has 64 VLS plus a 24-cell SAM launcher
Japan’s Maya-class destroyer is 10,250 tons full load and has 96 VLS and 8 anti-ship missiles in quad canisters
India’s Visakhapatnam-class destroyer is 7.400 tons and features 4×8-cell SAM VLS plus 2×8-cell VLS for anti-ship missiles
To conclude, I think we can both agree that it is very difficult to talk comparables when in fact it will still be at least several years before a production contract is signed and steel is cut on Canada’s CSC. However, I did think it was instructive that Marcus Hellyer would raise these concerns about the Australian Hunter-class – the rough equivalent of Canada’s CSC – which is currently under construction. And, for the record, Hellyer does mention Canada’s CSC in his analysis, and I simply alluded to his observations.
Notes
1. Murray Brewster, “It will be a decade before Canada sees any of its new frigates”, CBC News (13 February 2021). Accessed at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-shipbuilding-decade-frigates-1.5912961
Hi Dan,
Thank you for the thoughtful reply!
To further beat the definitional horse: the logic involved strikes me as unavoidably circular. “This ship should be treated as a destroyer because it’s 9000 tons which makes it a destroyer because it’s 9000 tons which makes it a destroyer”. I find that conceptually unsatisfying and it does not, as we will see below, conform with the empirical evidence.
I compiled a fairly lengthy list of “frigates” to demonstrate that there are vessels of all sizes within that general category which have similar or lesser VLS counts than CSC. The ~7200t German F125, for example, have zero VLS (and thus a complete failure of a warship, if one arbitrarily compares it to any similarly-sized warship instead of the German navy’s own requirements!), and their dedicated next-gen warship F126 with 16 VLS are ~9000t and is longer than CSC at 155m. To approach things from the other direction, there are larger ships out there that do have more VLS than CSC, but not by an amount that would “justify” that size compared to other compatriots: the in-progress Italian DDX is exceeding 10,000t and 175m long, but with only 48 VLS (https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/11/09/italy-plans-new-destroyers-for-2028-delivery/ – again, a failure compared to the Maya, Burke, or current Spanish F105/Aussie Hobart!). The infamous Zumwalt, despite displacing 50% more than Burkes, have fewer VLS cells than the latter. To take the logic that “displacement => certain amount of VLS, else it’s a failure”, we can even say that the Burkes’ 96 cells are a step back from the Ticonderogas’s 122 cells, nevermind everything else! Taking things to extremis, we can then criticize the whole swack of 10,000t OPVs that are coming online and why they don’t have missiles at all. In other words, the “VLS cells per displacement” metric on its own would render A LOT of ships out there (both existing and in design) as being incredibly underarmed or obsolete!
Fundamentally, it’s about what we want the ships to do. We *could* probably replace the CSC’s mission bay (which is what most other frigates/destroyers with either more VLS cells or smaller sizes lack) with more VLS tubes, but is that what we want our navy to exclusively do? Personally, I want these ships to not just contest sea control against enemy forces in a war, but to exercise it as well in peacetime. Would we rather have 32+ more VLS tubes that we won’t use 90% of the time, or would we rather use that space to carry a bunch of containers, drones (aerial, surface, underwater, both peacetime and wartime), supplies, special forces, boarding craft, water purifiers, hospitals, etc? These latter items are vital for a navy’s constabulary and diplomatic roles.
Then, of course, we have hull numbers. While many Europeans are buying only small batches for their frigates/destroyers (two here, four there), we’re aiming for 15. Even if each ship has a lower VLS count than their peers, the dramatically higher number of hulls provides an aggregate ability that few others would be able to match. It would even match the Royal Navy for Mk 41 equivalents (6×48 Type 45 [well aware their Sylver cells aren’t Mk41, but let’s simplify for long-range air defence ammo] + 8×24 Type 26=480, versus CSC’s 15×32=480, not including dedicated Sea Ceptor cells. Even if our Mk41s are reduced to 24, that’s still 360 – the RCN having 3/4 the Mk 41 equivalent of the Royal Navy is nothing to shake a stick at)! We could go with a mixed fleet to perhaps bring a better balance of dedicated high-end warfare+low end patrol ships versus the current across-the-board “medium” option (which still remains an order of magnitude “more ship” than current), but the myriad drawbacks with availability, training, maintenance, eggs-in-one-basket etc. have been well-discussed elsewhere.
To bring this rambling to a close, VLS cells per tonnage expectations should not be the main metric for measuring the value or suitability of a design. Ships that are outwardly similar fulfil different expectations for their individual navy’s uses, and universal comparison baselines can be quite misleading. The real question that needs to be asked is how much should a navy devote their force structure to peacetime utility versus high-end combat – the answer to that shapes their ship’s balance of weaponry versus general purpose capabilities.
(I really should put this into a Making Waves…)
I absolutely agree with you, we also need to remember that the last of the CSCs will begin construction in the 2040s and will may very well be sailed into the 2060s. In terms of technological development, a lot may (will) happen so it is imperative to leave room for growth in the design in terms of power and weight. Take for example the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missiles that the US is developing, which are too large to fit inside the standard MK 41 VLS cells aboard U.S. Navy AEGIS warships and the MK 57 VLS cells aboard the three Zumwalt-class destroyers. Instead, larger Advanced Payload Module (APM) launchers will need to be used (1). The US is also beginning work on a counter-hypersonic interceptor called the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), of which the diameter is yet to be determined (2). By the time the last CSC is built the US could very well be on its third generation of frigate possessing these advanced systems (based on the current projected US Naval force structure). It’s possible that if weight isn’t the main restriction, then the decision to drop from 32 to 24 MK 41 VLS cells may be in part to leave room for a future VLS system should it be required based on the future threat level. What concerns me though is the power plant being used relative to the tonnage of the ship, and the fact that it may not be adequate to support future integrations of sensors and energy weapons. Then again, we don’t know the power consumption of the current design.
1. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/latest-details-on-hypersonic-missile-integration-aboard-zumwalt-class-destroyers/
2. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/11/mda-selects-raytheon-to-develop-counter-hypersonic-interceptor/
That’s a great bit of insight on the future option for larger-diameter launchers if we leave off the fourth Mk41 module, Alex!
Hello Timothy: I have it on “some authority” that in fact some or all of the CSC Type 26 Frigates will only have 24 Lockheed Martin (LM) MK 41 VLS Canister silos forward and not 32 LM Quad Pac MK 41 VLS as has most often been reported. Some or perhaps all will be extended length to accommodate Tomahawk Cruise missiles and/or future missile capabilities. I suspect this was done to save weight and $$. This “authority” however is not willing to share his source. I have tried several times on the Global Defence Hub forum, but he will not divulge his “in-the-know” CSC Frigate SME source. The latest CSC computer graphic seems to bear that out. The CAMM Sea Ceptor ExLS CIAD missile silos just behind the funnel are in fact from a European Company MBDA-UK’s CAMM CIAD VLS canisters and Launch Management System (LMS) and not LM MK 41 VLS launchers. The reason (rightly or wrongly) why Canada went with the Sea Ceptor system was to get away from having 2 x CIWS/Sea RAM (port/stb’d-midships) systems for CIAD, in favour of 6 X Quad Pac CIAD CAMM launchers for a total of 24 CIAD missiles to save weight and $$. To say that the CSC Frigate will have 32 MK 41 VLS canisters forward then seems not to be accurate. Even if you called the 6 Quad Pac CIAD silos- MK 41 VLS canisters, that would only add up to 30 launchers and not 38 as you say using the concept of 24 MK 41 VLS Quad Pac canisters forward. Still a big improvement over what we have now and better than most NATO and allied countries have or will have in the future. In my own opinion (IMOO) I believe the first batch of Frigates will indeed have 32 cells forward with the remaining CSC Frigate batches having 24 cells forward. I would like to see Canada keep the 32 LM MK 41 VLS canisters forward for all 15 CSC Frigates.
Hi David,
Thanks for your comment, but I think we’re in violent agreement. At no point did I claim the 6 cells behind the funnels are Mk 41s. As I noted in my original post: “This is because of the 6 Extensible Launch System (ExLS) cells aft of the funnel. Each of these cells, just like the Mk 41, can quad-pack smaller anti-air missiles (but, unlike the Mk 41s, not larger missiles).” I’m well aware that the Sea Ceptor/CAMM launchers are NOT Mk 41 cells, but the fact they launch similar missiles to ESSMs means the effective capacity for other missiles are increased for the Mk 41 launchers. From a comparative perspective, the ExLS launchers are functionally the same as the Mk 41s of some other countries’ frigates (e.g. Norway’s)!
As for the uncertain quantity of Mk 41 cells themselves, I like “Alex”‘s point that leaving one of the Mk 41 modules off may allow for fitting a future launcher for larger-diameter missiles. Wishful thinking, perhaps…
Hi Tim: My only question with your last comment is that: Why leave the other 8 cell MK 41 VLS Canisters off the drawing board anyway? To say that space would be used for the fitting of future “larger diameter missiles” doesn’t seem to cut it. We could just as well put the other 8 empty cells in now and wait for “future” missiles to be decided upon. If the missiles are slightly larger in diameter, then the silos could be retro-fitted. No. the 24 cells are exactly what the government wanted to save weight and speed which was always the plan.
Hey Tim.
Interesting post. You make a lot of good points and i agree with a lot of them , especially the bit about numbers (even if i think you are more likely to end up with 12 rather than 15 CSCs) and also the overall capability of the CSC. However IMO some of your comparisons aren’t entirely fair, and at the risk of further beating of long-dead horses, i’d like to point out a few of them :
1. Save for perhaps the F126/MKS180, all the vessels in your list are all much smaller than the destroyer/cruiser like CSC, some barely more than half the size in fact. In addition most of them are older, in-service ships. Designed in, what at least seemed to be, more peaceful times, when the standard and foreseen need for VLS capacity was less than today.
Wrt the Iver Huitfeldt class, it should be noted that while 24 ESSM is indeed their standard fitout, they are, without any modifications, able to accommodate as many as 48 ESSMs in the standard flex mounted MK56 VLS( at the cost of foregoing Harpoon missiles, however as a compromise they could chose to retain 8 SSMs and still fit 36 ESSMs). As the aft 76mm gun is also a standard flex position, the theoretical potential maximum ESSM capacity of the Iver Huitfeldt class is a whopping 188!…On a ship 50% smaller than CSC.
The main point here being that while CSC has a respectable VLS fitout by today’s standard, broadly comparable to existing frigate sized surface combatants, it is FAR from overwhelming when taken in relation to their larger size and the fact they won’t be hitting the water until the 2030s by which time the threat level will only have increased even further. It might very well be an acceptable compromise for Canada and the RCN, but i think it illustrates the drawback of using a very large, specialized and expensive ASW hull as a basis for your AAW/ASuW/ capability.
2. T31 might initially have as few as 12 Sea Ceptors according to some sources!…a token capability at best. However ascribing T31’s modest cost to the anemic weapons fitout would be disingenuous as the total cost of guns and missiles would barely amount to 10% of the £250M pricetag (which is incidentally not much more than 10% of the projected CSC cost!)
Even in an upgraded configuration with a missile loadout to match that of their Danish parent design, they would barely reach a quarter of that price, and i think it very likely that T31 will eventually end up with at least 16-24 MK41s (currently FFBNW).
3. Agree… the different displacement standards used are bewildering and make direct comparisons between vessels somewhat difficult.
T26, Hunter and CSC numbers in particular are all over the place, from BAE’s original quote of 6900t for T26 to the insane +10.000t figure bandied about for the Australian Hunter class.
Both displacement figures cant be true for the same size hull, which might support the rumor of the Ozzie hull being significantly enlarged compared to T26. What is beyond question is that all three designs are BIG. Much larger than any contemporary frigates.
4.Arguably my biggest gripe with the CSC…..no matter which way you cut it $2B+ per ship is a MASSIVE sum of money and compares very unfavorably to pretty much any other remotely comparable surface combatant out there, most notably to its own parent design, the T26, which is nigh half the cost.
That is IMO very difficult to justify and while i know you disagree Tim, i really think RCN would have been better off with 6-8 off-the-shelf T26 combined with 6 dedicated AAW/GP vessels based on a simpler and cheaper hull. Each design could be built for about half the cost of the currently projected CSC and would have given the RCN marginally less flexibility, but far greater overall capability at the same (or less)total cost.
5.”Furthermore, it should be reminded that these are all *budgeted* costs, which are merely estimates. None of the figures are proven as actual costs for their implementation” … I can’t think of a single case from naval shipbuilding where a build came in significantly below projected cost ….I think it’s safe to say that odds are that cost projections are far more likely to increase rather than the opposite. And the question is how much cost increase a 60B canadian dollar project can take before something has to give…(hence why i think you will end up with 12 CSC)
Hello Morten Knorborg Poulsen: I have it on “factual authority” that all of the CSC Type 26 Frigates will only have 24 Lockheed Martin (LM) MK 41 VLS Canister silos forward vice 32 LM MK 41 VLS as has most often been reported. Some or perhaps all will be extended length to accommodate (in any combination) of 32 ESSM missiles in 8 Quad Pac VLS canisters, 8 x SM2 mode 111C AAW missiles in 8 VLS cell canisters and 8 Tomahawk Cruise missiles or Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) in 8 cell canisters along with future missile capabilities. I suspect this was done to save weight and $$. The latest CSC computer graphics seems to bear that out. The CAMM Sea Ceptor ExLS CIAD missile silos just behind the funnel are from a European Company MBDA-UK’s CAMM CIAD VLS canisters and Launch Management System (LMS) for a total of 56 VLS launched missiles per CSC Frigate or 840 missiles total for all 15 ships. The reason (rightly or wrongly) why Canada went with the Sea Ceptor system was to get away from having 2 x CIWS/Sea RAM (port/stb’d-midships) systems for CIAD, in favor of 6 X Quad Pac CIAD CAMM launchers to again save weight and $$. To say that the CSC Frigate will have 32 MK 41 VLS canisters forward is not correct. Still a big improvement over what we have now and better than what most NATO and allied countries have or will have in the future. In my own opinion (IMOO) I believe the first batch of Frigates will indeed have 32 cells forward with the remaining CSC Frigate batches having 24 cells forward. I would however, like to see Canada keep the 32 LM MK 41 VLS canisters forward for all 15 CSC Frigates (fitted for but not with-“future-proofing”). Canada should not go below the bare-bones minimum of 15 CSC Frigates.
There is however, a way to have both a future ASW and AAW/AsuW capability. Perhaps a re-think here in Canada seems to be appropriate. Build just 12 of the 9,400 tonne “Monster” CSC Frigates. Then build 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 destroyers here in Canada before the CSC Type 26 Frigate build starts. The ABs would have at least 3 times the MK 41 VLS capability with dedicated Tomahawk, ESSM/SM2/SM3/SM6 missile capability. Australia is now contemplating that very concept to build at least 3 more Hobart class destroyers. The ABs would be in service in the RCN well before the first CSC Type 26 comes off the assembly line. They would each cost much less than the CSC Frigate as well. Canada could build 4 Arleigh Burke Flt 111 AAW Destroyers for $5B CAD for all 4 (at 2021/2022 prices) take away. Of course this would not include the price to build here in Canada, Canadianize the ABs and the final operational price list which would include armament, missiles, bullets, stores and personnel, so say $10B CAD in service for the RCN for all 4 “Destroyers”. But still, a bargain compared to $4.3B CAD for only one CSC Frigate bringing the CSC build requirements down to just 12 CSC “Frigate’ units at 51.6B CAD (at 2021/2022 prices). The sticking point would be acquiring the design “blue-prints” from the US and building them here in Canada if, the US would allow that, but one could always ask. These “Destroyers” should be built in Canada to politically pass the “sniff test” and we should eventually have an official third Yard (possibly Davie Shipyard) in the NSS to pick-up the slack. In order to ensure maximum commonality with the CSC and to fit our unique needs, it would need a few modifications. Of course the main propulsion plant should not change. The AB uses two LM2500 GTs per shaft for a total power of 78 MW but operate 99 percent of the time with a single GT per shaft for speeds up to at least 26 kts. The AB class can run on two 3.8 MW electric motors (one per gearbox) for speeds up to 15 kts without the GTs. With a good engineering team it would be feasible to modify the AB design in less than a year while the basic parts of the ship were being built. The first change would be to replace the MK45 Gun with the Vulcano 127/64. The 25 mm MK38 gun could be replaced by the CSC’s BAE 30 mm gun. We would need to fit our new multirole boats (MRBs) to the boat decks (port/stb’d). The main effort would happen aft in order to fit a single CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and our SKELDAR V-200 helicopter drones along with support facilities and our own CSC frigate VDS and Towed Array sonar systems. The flight deck could be easily extended further aft for C-RAST to be fitted. The new single hangar would need to be moved toward the center but the configuration of the Gas Turbine generator situated there may be a problem although there is ample space to move things around once you go down from two to one helicopter. Moving from two to one hangar would allow for the torpedo launchers to be installed in a fashion close to the Halifax class and using the same launchers as the CSC with the tubes situated inside the ship, in order to help those changes and to more easily fit within budget. Decreasing the number of MK41 VDS launchers aft from 64 down to 32 plus increase the six ExLS CIAD Quad launchers to 12 (48 Sea Ceptor ExLS missiles) along-side the MK 41 launchers removing more weight up forward and maybe allowing for the installation of at least eight NSM launchers. In that configuration the weapon fit would closely match the CSC “Frigate” but with more missile AAW/AsuW capability. The ships would carry a total of 64 MK41 VLS cells (32 fore and 32 aft) for any combination of ESSM, SM2, SM3, SM6 and Tomahawk cruise missiles. We could probably lower the number of crew needed to operate the ships but it would still require more sailors than the CSC. Operating on two LM2500 GTs most of the time would use more fuel than the CSCs. We would definitely need to commission another “Asterix” if that were to happen. These AB Flt “IVs” should be configured as closely to the CSC Type 26 as much as possible. They would also be excellent Command ships. Crewing size may be an issue though although with Command Staff on board, perhaps not as much. The things that need to change would be: Replace the current AB mast with a slightly larger CSC Frigate mast. The SPY 6 V1 radar would be replaced with a “beefed-up LM SPY 7 (V) (more RMA’s). This radar has already proven that it can out-perform the SPY 6 radar with longer ranges along with whatever MDA’s X Band Illumination radar will be. Keep the CMS 330 Combat Management System which already has the Aegis Baseline for CEC commonality (and BMD capability) with the CSC Frigate. The good news is that when (and if) this were to happen, most if not all of the integration for the CSC Frigate will already have been done by LM during the CSC Design Phase so integration of all of the CSC Frigate software for the AB’s “Flt IVs” would happen more quickly. The CSC Frigate guns should also be used on the AB’s. The NSM might be increased from 8 to 16 as the Constellation class frigate already has and the CIWS could be replaced by the Dragon Fly DEW laser system port/stbd as the BAE Type 26 British version will have. As stated before, the main “sticking point” would be a built-in-Canada design (possibly Davies Shipyard) which the US would have to agree on. Other than that, these Arleigh Burke “Flt IVs” Canadian design could work well, would be an awesome Command ship for Canada and could be built for the same price as 2 CSC frigates currently cost. Something to think about!
In reply to Mr. Dunlop’s comment, I agree on re-thinking of the AAW/ASuW capability and address the gap left by the Iroquois class until the first CSC units are commissioned, however I would not dare to state those four AB flight IV could be built for the same price as two CSC currently cost. Not with so many (and not so minor) modifications, not if the ships are to be built in Canada. These two issues would lead again to project risks and to start a new convoluted process to set up a new production capacity just to get four orphan-class vessels. Honestly I do not think that is an optimum path to deliver the desired capabilities for the RCN.
Why not buy off-the-shelf as much as possible? Would not it be cheaper to purchase directly the Burkes from the U.S., in their latest configuration? Don’t they already fulfill interoperability standards?
On the other hand, as already pointed out, it might be the case Australia could begin building a new batch (or flight?) of their Hobart-class AWD in a near future. Joining them by ordering three or four more AAW destroyers for the RCN may be also a reasonable approach. The project would be virtually free of risks. If any Canadianizations had to be made, they should be limited to a minimum, main ones being: a) supersede the Phalanx CIWS by 24-36 CAMM missiles (Sea-Ceptor as CIWS), b) substitute the Australian CMS interface by its Canadian equivalent, both operating based on the AEGIS “platform” (minor project risk, while providing high added-value canadian return), c) if deemed appropriate, replace the AN/SPY-1D(V) radar – I would dare to suggest – with Raytheon’s AN/SPY-6(V) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN/SPY-6], already developed and delivered to the US Navy, to be installed both in Ar. Burke flight III destroyers [4-sided variant, 37 RMAs per array] and Constellation-class frigates [3-sided variant, each side with 9 RMAs]. Clearly a low-risk alternative.
Hello Jose: Yes, it may be cheaper to buy “off-the-shelf” AAW/AsuW units as you say but is often not cheaper and certainly would take much longer to be built outside of Canada in the long run. The costs I mentioned for the 4 Arleigh Burkes Flt IVs to be built in Canada, were “take-away” prices only and not the final costs. No matter what Canada did however, we would still have to buy the AB Flt III technology first. The other point is that Canada would have to join the AB Flt III program and slide into the “que” somewhere down the line if they were to be built in the US. The Flt III program is well underway now and our chances of “jumping the que” sooner would probably not happen as far as the US is concerned. The Flt IVs would still need to be “Canadianized” as well. Although looking towards Australia for say 4 Hobart class destroyers is an interesting option, we would still have to do the same process as we would for the ABs if we were to deal with the Australians as well. In any event, building “off-shore” vs domestically may not be as feasible ($$) in the US or Australia (time wise) before the first CSC frigate comes off the assembly line.
One thing I would challenge you on is the AB Flt III SPY 6 (V1) radar visa-vie the Lockheed Martin SPY 7 ((V1) radar. This is a far superior radar in every way alongside the SPY 6 (V1). It is the world’s most advanced radar that can track more targets across longer ranges than any existing radar including the SPY 6 (V1). In today’s environment, information is the most powerful resource we have. The SPY 7 (V1) radar is a critical tool for any warfighter around the world. To scale Canadian radar technology to the size and scope, we need an at-sea radar to track small or large number of targets. The SPY 7 (V1) does this in spades. The SPY-7 (V1) has 3.3 times the detection ranges of the existing SPY-1 radars and better detection ranges than any competitor radar including the latest Raytheon SPY 6 (V1) radar. With the increase in advanced threats, it’s critical to be able to identify which threats are real, and which aren’t. SPY-7 (V1) has polarization diversity, which means its better able to classify and identify threats. This means the RCN can better focus their attention and responses on real threats to keep CSC frigate crews safe. With something as important as situational awareness and threat detection, it’s critical to be able to see 24/7. Most traditional radars have to shut down some or all sensing capabilities to allow for service. SPY 7 (V1) is the only sea-based radar that allows operators to perform maintenance while still operating the radar. The sooner defense forces have this radar with increased access to situational awareness, the better. This mature technology is already in production today for the CSC SPY 7 (V1) due to the technology leveraged from the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR). LRDR is a precursor to SPY 7 and has already completed production and been successfully demonstrated in the US. Canada, Spain, Japan and the U.S. have all selected SPY-7 (V1). Both Canada and Spain have selected this radar for their newest combat ships, and Japan has stated they will deploy SPY-7 on their latest frigates. The U.S. currently uses it in land-based applications. The Raytheon SPY 6 (V1) and Australia’s CEAFAR radars are also much heavier than the SPY 7 (V1) as well.
Hi every one, it is hard to find some time to write these days but here are a few minutes available… The more we talk about the idea of building four AB class destroyers the more I like it. But we need to take a step back and ask why it would be a good idea. While our Halifax class frigates are getting older there is no sign of any CSC being available for operation before the early 2030’s and we still lack the area air defense capability lost with the retirement of the Iroquois class destroyers. Considering the CSC, there is criticism about the lack of missiles to be carried, the weight growth (that might lead to a slower ship and lower range) and the immaturity of the SPY-7 radar to be fitted to a ship.
So what we would need is an almost off-the-shelf proven design that would be affordable to build and affordable to operate too. It shall require minimum modifications so it could start building within a year and be delivered within 5 years or so. I believe the Arleigh Burke class flight III to be the right choice for such a proposal. It shall be built in Canada under the NSS program because doing otherwise could jeopardize the whole thing since we want to build back an industry. For it to be affordable and be done within the specified timeframe, we should refrain from doing any expensive modification to the actual design. That means that combat system and associated radar shall be left alone so we go with SPY-6 radar. Although it might be doable to switch sonars to use the same as the CSC without to much technical challenges. The propulsion plan shall also be left untouched but we should incorporate the Hybrid electric drive that is fitted to the USS Truxtun to our ships. (The US Navy have five conversion kit on a shelf somewhere that they do not wish to use). That HED allows the ship to cruise on electrical motors for speed up to 13 kts without the main LM2500 gas turbine engine. The flight III AB class is particularly well suited to do so thanks to the 3 gas turbine generators developing 4 MW each vs 3MW each on earlier flights. With the four fitted LM2500 GT the ship is able to reach speeds in excess of 30 kts. In order to maintain an ‘’affordable cost’’ we should restrict the changes to maximize commonality with CSC in the form of the main and secondary guns. We should fit it with our new Multi-role boat and reshape the aft section in order to accept the CH-148 cyclone helicopter. The flight deck shall be enlarged so the hangar will be moved forward by reducing the number of VLS cell and move the remaining ones on either side of the hangar. Remember that missiles are quite expensive and that each 8 cell section weights about 15 tons. I would leave 16 cell Mk41 cell and 12 Exls cell back aft. That still gives the ship the potential load of 48 CAMM missiles plus, let say 64 ESSM aft and still carry 16 SM2 missiles and 8 TLAM in the forward 32 MK42 cells. The removed weight would allow for at least 8 NSM missile to be carried being the main funnel just in front of the hangar. So here we go with the same armament as the CSC but more missiles, a faster ship with a faster delivery.
Although there are to be drawbacks. First, with a different combat system comes the requirement for dedicate training facilities and it becomes more difficult to move personnel around. Second, an AB class destroyers requires many more sailors to operate than a CSC even though some of the modifications could allow for a slightly smaller crew. The ship is still a gas guzzler above 13 kts! If the CMS 330/AEGIS/SPY-7 combination prove to be great, the AB class could be retrofitted once the CSC are operational. Also, if we are building Flight III destroyers simultaneously with our southern neighbors, that might put pressure on the supply chain and cause some delays (guess who would get their parts first?).
Even without such a project, it will probably be a tough challenge for Davie Shipbuilding to build back its work force with the actual labor crisis. And if the USA are unwilling to allow us to build AB class under licence I have another crazy Idea but I am running out of words and time here. Until next time… Cheers,
Hello Mikael. I like your thought process, and nice to have someone else in the Arleigh Burke “Flt IV” corner. Let us know what other ideas you may have on the issue! Of course this all counts on the US giving Canada the nod on all of this and very soon for this to happen, but like I said before, one can only ask. Cheers!
Hello again Mikael. I would agree that the majority of the changes should be in the Midship/Aft sections of the AB however what would be more comfortable is to reduce the number of MK 41 VLS silos from 64 down to 32 which as with the forward MK 41 VLS system which would leave room to increase the number of CIAD CAAM from 6 to 12 silos and possibly double the NSM capacity from 8 to 16 as the Constellation class has. Centering the “one” hanger door for the Cyclone helo and moving the hanger forward some in order to lengthen the flight deck for the RAST system would give more room for the CSC frigate VDS system and moving the MK 54 torpedo tubes inside the ship as with the CSC frigate would also work. I don’t know how much room would remain for the SKELDAR V200 drones, but they should be able to “fit in”. I still believe the SPY 7 V (1) radar (with more RMAs) along with CMS 330 software is a much better fit though for the ABs.
Some very interesting ideas here. I like the idea a building 4 or possibly 6 Arleigh Burke destroyers at Davie Shipyard. (Having three on each coast would ensure that one is always deployable with each fleet.) A dozen CSCs would then be enough. (A somewhat larger Navy than is currently planned, but warranted considering the direction China and Russia are heading in.) I think we should use the same radar and combat management system as CSC, perhaps with a more powerful version of SPY 7. One question I have is, wouldn’t the Cyclone fit in AB’s hangar as is? I don’t believe the footprint of a Seahawk is any smaller than a Cyclone. Why not keep room for two?
One more question, are you proposing to put the radar on the sides of the superstructure, as with the current Arleigh Burkes, or on a mast higher up?
Hello Andrew Shaw. I can’t see anymore than 4 ABs to be built (2 east-2 west) with one on each coast always in refit. Using the SPY 7 but “beefed up” with possibly up to 24 or 36 RMAs would be great. I would us a larger mast “as is depicted on the latest CSC Graphics” to receive both the larger SPY 7 radar and MDA X Band Illuminator radar and for commonality the CSM 330 combat system. I believe just one Cyclone helo would suffice and leave the hangers as is (we need space for the SKELDAR V200 drones don’t forget.
Dear all, hello again. I would not like to extend too much on this topic, but let me better explain my stance.
First, I am in favour of the “build in Canada” tenet, however it should not be considered as a immutable dogma. Shipbuilding abroad might be an option when talking about small number of vessels (as the case is) specially when savings can be achieved through synergies . Industrial benefit returns might (should) then be attained by other, political, means, in the form of cooperation agreements for further defence programs.
I fully agree with Mikael Perron on “So what we would need is an almost off-the shelf proven design that would be affordable to build and affordable to operate too. It shall require minimum modifications so it could (…) be delivered in 5 years or so”. Nevertheless, ABs will not be affordable to operate, not from a manning perspective (300+ crew) nor due to fuel consumption and the cost of gas turbines overhauls. This said, a Canadian Arleigh Burke (AB) variant would address two identified subjects: the gap on missile-deploying capability (i.e. increased number of VLS cells) as well as the time gap until first CSC is delivered. Assuming that both the procurement process and the shipyard set up (probably Davie?) all run smoothly, it could take 1+5 years as Mikael states, or maybe 2+6, depending on the number and nature of customizations, to take delivery of the first ship. In any case, industry stakeholders should be consulted to assess the actual production slots and capabilities, including willingness for licensing agreements and technology transfer. Otherwise, the Hobart-class alternative would probably meet these constraints, specially if we take into the equation Navantia’s experience on technology transfer and support to local shipyards.
Regarding the radars, while the SPY-6 radar installation and integration on the first AB-flight-III started earlier this year, neither the CSC nor the F-110 frigates have been laid down yet, meaning that naval, seaborne SPY-7 will surely become a better sensor but still poses a significant project risk since it’s not mature enough (IMHO at least). Therefore in order to (hypothetically) equip a short series of combatants to be delivered within this decade, I would rather prefer the former, SPY-6. If the ABs had to have the SPY-7 radar installed, the engineering and development costs for such specific integration could rocket, as a consequence of the possible technical risks, not to mention foreseeable delays; moreover add to this the manning scarcity and the higher operating costs (crew, fuel and maintenance) of the ABs, as said above. At this point I would alternatively propose a step backwards and instead wait for a second CSC flight to incorporate increased number of VLS cells. The modifications to be made and risks to be taken should not reach that much further and still one of the two above identified subjects would be resolved.
Finally, I would join and support David Dunlop in asking Mikael about his (for sure not so-) “crazy idea” on the issue.
Cheers!
Hello José: Your “immutable dogma” idea, although great, is not plausible as the US are well into the Arleigh Burke Flt III build. The US will never let us jump-in-line to build us 4 ABs Flt IV ships within 4-6 years. That will never happen as their schedule is “cast in stone” for their own ships. No I believe Canada would have to “bite the bullet” and buy the AB technology first and build here. Yes, the ABs are “gas guzzlers” and as I said before we would probably have to acquire another MV Asterix to fuel the needs of this class of ship. To wait another 10-12 years for the first CSC Frigate to come “off-the-line” is just not feasible. The Halifax class will more than likely run out of “at sea” ships before that ever happens.
You might as well add there is no shipbuilding capacity to build 4 ABs in Canada, the ships need to be Canadianized along our lines of naval standards and occupational health and safety. By the time the contracts are signed and anything starts we are talking about a decade. Not to mention there is no way in hell the US will license the design to us, others have tried. Keep dreaming. I can say in regards with certainty that the Halifax Class will be at sea doing the business for the next 15 to 20 years at least.
Hello Retired RCN….me too! Yes, absolutely correct. I mentioned that in my reply to Morten Knorborg Poulsen. I believe though, your time lines for the build of the ABs Flt IV may be pessimistic at best. These contracts could very well happen before the end of next year with builds in say Davie Shipyard by 2023 and not 15-20 years at least as you theorize. If Trudeau were to just ask Joe Biden, things could happen quickly. Your certainty that a few Halifax class on each coast will still be “operational” by 2041 just does not make any sense. I see the glass as half-full vice half empty. Have A Great Navy Day!
Hi David I think you need to read what I wrote. IF all of a sudden the US somehow licensed the AB design to us, you think we would be starting the build at Davie in 2023? May be wishful thinking on your part. If tomorrow we officially asked the US government can you license the design to us, the process to actually turn over the plans and TDP would take a long time. We would have to stand up a project office and staff it, find a yard to build it, redesign aspects of it, sign contracts, order the specialized equipment with a long lead time that we most certainly be at the end of the line for. This is not going to occur over a couple of years and should I mention we have a broken procurement system and political leaders that dither. If you look at my comments I said a decade.
If you think Davie is in any position to build anything for us you need to check your sources. Davie is in the process of configuring their yard to build the heavy ice breaker and CCG ships as part of the NSP. I’ll further that the government of Canada hasn’t even signed a contract for Davie to be the 3rd yard on the NSP or signed a contract for the icebreakers. They still haven’t even delivered on the icebreakers conversions they are doing for us and the CPF refit they’re doing, well I’ll let your use your imagination.
Let’s talk CSC timelines based on the latest from Ottawa. Cut steel in 2023, around 7 years to build the first one and that includes a substantial expansion to the assembly hall in Halifax and possibility an acquisition of a floating drydock and there is no docking facility in Halifax to handle a type 26 variant. So the first CSC if we’re lucky to be delivered around 2031, with the next 6 to be delivered with a timeline of 16 months per and the later ones 12 months if you can believe that. So the Halifax Class will have to last in some form for the next 15 to 20 years. That being said a lot of money is currently being spent on refits to address that and I won’t get into the scope of the work but it is extensive taking into account how long we need these ships to last. I am confident that we know how to maintain these ships to the point we need them. I think you’re overly optimistic about our special relationship with the US and Joe Biden. Cheers
Hi everyone, I am very busy but I will try to write it and illustrate it over the weekend. Thank you for your patience…
GREAT PUBLICATION
What is it with all these silly AB fantasies? The AB is a fifty year old design which is well past its sell-by date and which the USN is looking to replace. The T26 is a modern cutting edge design which will be arguably the best AWS platform on the planet. What is it with this nostalgia for a patched-up pig?
Very Informative – Thanks