By David Dunlop, 28 May 2025
The Lockheed Martin/MDA Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) land-based TPY-6 is based in the LM SPY 7 Radar Technology and is a massive undertaking by both LM/MDA & US. Although they do not say how many RMAs are in each 4-sided Phased Array Assembly blocks, each block is 60 feet by 60 feet so I would think at least 100 to 125 RMAs minimum each block, as can be seen by the pictures of the ones in Alaska & Guam (Just a 'few' more than either the SPY 7 (V1, V2 V3) ships or even the new SPY 6 (V1) on the Arleigh Burke Block III ships would have combined. There is a picture of part of the inside of an assembly array. These Ground-Based LRDR Radars (GBRs) are strictly for ballistic missile defence (BMD) to protect the US and part of Trump's 'Golden Dome' project which Canada is 'considering' joining. Trump has said recently that Canada's costs would be somewhere around $61 Billion US (over $84 Billion CDN or about 54 Billion Euros) but would cost us nothing as the 51st state (take that with a grain of salt)!! I believe Trump is deliberately 'low-balling' the costs just to get the Prime Minister's goat and when all is said and done, we are more than likely looking at a system of at least $500-750 Billion US. I believe the White House will need more partners to invest in this venture and (possibly 2 or 3 Elon Musk type Billionaires) for this system to get off the ground as the US cannot do this alone. This system has already been successfully tested between Guam & Alaska and the technology has been proven by both LM/MDA. There are also videos on line of the process from initial launch to missile destruction. 'If' Canada were to join this program, I suspect the River Class Destroyers (RCDs) must also have this BMD capability. These Arrays would most likely have some very powerful cooling generation to keep the system going. Although this is a generational change program, it may be too rich for us and possibly more than Canada needs as far as NORAD/CUSMA renewal goes. Something to think about.
8 thoughts on “Donald Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ Dream”
I note that there is an unclassified Congressional Research Service document “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated 28 March 2025 which is relevant to this topic.
In that document on page 2 it states “Allied countries that now operate, are building, or are planning to build Aegis-equipped ships include Japan, South Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway. Japan’s Aegis-equipped ships are BMD capable. The Aegis-equipped ships operated by South Korea, Australia, Spain and Norway are currently not BMD capable.
The article goes on to state on page 14, under the title “Other Countries,” that the USA MDA views as potential BMD operators Netherlands, Spain, South Korea, Germany, Denmark, and Australia.
Subsequent to that article, Germany has announced its plans to procure Aegis for its new class of warship.
Also note Canada is not mentioned in that Congressional document (where clearly Canada is planning to procure Aegis, as announced in the press release on the River Class on 8 March 2025), but more important is that just because Canada procures Aegis with Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC), does not mean that the Canadian Aegis fit will include the BMD functionality. That should be clear from the Congressional document.
Further, most of the US Navy Aegis warships also are part of the US Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system, which is a critical tool for Aegis equipped warships to effectively employ the BMD functionality of their Aegis ships. Without C2BMC, the Aegis BMD functionality is likely far less capable.
So there are contractual (and likely cost), and technical and political hurdles for Canada to overcome, to make the Aegis-equipped River-class BMD capable, and to simply assume they will have such is an assumption fraught with a very high possibility of not being accurate or simply based on minimal fact.
Hello Lee Matheson. You are absolutely correct Lee. At the time Canada decided to include CEC within the Aegis component from Lockheed Martin for the SPY 7/CMS 330 software. Under a past Liberal government, Canada was asked if they would also include the BMD/C2BMC capability component. The Canadian government declined that invitation, but also left that door slightly ajar for future-proofing the RCD. Since then, world events have overtaken Canada’s decision and I believe the RCD will need both BMD/C2BMC included as a prime capability of the River-class destroyer. It is not known (for security reasons) if Canada has already included this option with the US for the RCD but if Canada DID decide to be included in the POTUS ‘Golden Dome’ program, it safe to assume Canada will have this capability. I have as yet not read the unclassified Congressional Research Service document “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated 28 March 2025, but it is curious why they did not include Canada on page 14, as a potential customer for BMD/C2BMC. We may never know the truth on this one.
“We have done so much, with so little, for so long, that now, we are ready to do anything with nothing…..forever.”
I noted elsewhere, in response to a different thread, that I believe Canada needs to participate in the C2BMC, where the River-class destroyers could be a contribution to such (and hence a participation in Golden Dome, if the Golden Dome includes C2BMC as a component).
I think it is evident from what transpired in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that warships on mission, protecting other ships or a task force, can themselves be subject to ballistic missile attack. Further recent events between Israel and Iran have shown that naval forces with ballistic missile defence capabilities can contribute to the defence of cities close to coastlines. It is in Canada’s interests for its warships to have such a capability in this evolving world of military attack weapons.
My concern is that if Canada does not participate in Golden Dome by some means, any potential US interceptions of missiles coming over the poll to attack the continental USA risks dangerous fallout over populated Canadian territory. It makes more sense in such an unpleasant hypothetical scenario for any interception of ballistic missiles to take place further from Canadian populated areas … such as in less populated areas of the Canadian far north.
Dependent on the mission and on the threat, geography can work both for and against Canada, and by Canadian naval forces (such as the River-class destroyer) financially participating in C2BMC, Canada can be seen as contributing to a collective North American defence, and maybe have some political influence over any Golden Dome implementation, and possibly providing Canada support in influencing NORAD in their stationing of forces, and in their planning for defence missile interceptions, so to help reduce the risk of fallout from a worst case unthinkable nuclear exchange being over Canada’s populated areas.
Hello again Lee. I have read the unclassified Congressional Research Service document “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated 28 March 2025 with great interest, and could not agree more Lee, I further believe that if Canada does desire to participate in the ‘Golden Dome’ program, some Aegis Ashore facilities in the far north Canadian Arctic areas would need to be established, or at the very least, contracted out to the US for NORAD continental defence (possibly at least 2 or 3 Aegis Ashore BMD sites). These would include both SM3 Block II B Midcourse Interceptor Missiles & SM 6 Terminal Interceptor Missiles using Patriot PAC 3 Terminal High Altitude Area Defence Systems (THAAD) for hypersonic missile defence. The River-class Destroyers would also need an SM3/SM6 capability to be part of BMD as an ‘at sea’ component to augment US BMD-capable area defence ships. These ships could also be stationed in the Arctic as well to act as BMD Aegis Ashore sites but in my mind would be more useful in an area defence role at sea elsewhere in the world.
Possibly related to this topic, I note in the 2024 Department of National Defence document “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,” in Section IV, Delivering on this Vision: The Right Capabilities for Canada, under the sub-heading (Defending North America) where on page-27 it states the following:
—- start of quote —
We commit to making further contributions to the integrated air and missile defence of Canada and North America. In light of the growing variety and sophistication of threats—from drones to advanced cruise missiles to hypersonic weapons — we will work to ensure our new airborne early warning and control aircraft and previously announced platforms such as such as the Canadian Surface Combatants can contribute to this capability as they come online. We will also explore options for acquiring ground-based air defences to defend critical infrastructure from a diverse array of incoming airborne attacks, including drones, missiles and artillery. This more robust approach to integrated air and missile defence could have significant benefits across all theatres in which Canada operates and strengthen our contribution to collective security.
We will acquire long-range missile capabilities for the Army. These missiles will be deployed to enable our forces to shoot at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat. We also commit to providing the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force with the striking power they need to deter threats at an appropriate distance, and will explore options to acquire long-range air- and sea-launched missiles.
—- end of quote —
The document does not mention ballistic missile defence, but neither does it exclude ballistic missile defence. Saying that differently, from what I read, that document does not close the door for C2BMC. Nor does it widely open the door. But it does appear to be written in generalities so to potentially reflect consistency with whatever approach may be deemed appropriate by the Canadian government in the future.
DAVID DUNLOP – Further to our recent exchange of views, news in the past week (~5 Sep-2025) have suggested the Canadian Prime Minister has been in talks with the President of the United States about possible Canadian participation in the Golden Dome. If there is a decision by the Carney government to join Golden Dome, it suggests a modified political position of Canada in regards to direct participation with US missile defence.
Assuming that is the case, my hope is that this will also include ensuring BMD capability is included in the River-class Destroyers. This means going beyond only Co-operative Engagement Capability (CEC) in those destroyers, but also means, for optimal effectiveness, the River-class being a part of the US Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system.
I suspect this means additional hardware (communications/crypto ?) and also additional software (possibly additional Aegis software modules) needed for those destroyers. And likely it means a more expensive missile to be integrated in the VLS, plus if necessary, any hardware to interface with those missiles prior to launch.
As I suggested previously, from a financial contribution accounting point of view, perhaps any money spent to implement the River-class BMD so to participate in the C2BMC could be included in the financial ‘accounting’ as to assess Canada’s Gold Dome financial participation.
I stumbled across a Canadian Forces College service paper which I believe is another read on this topic. The paper is called “Leveraging The Canadian Surface Combatant for Ballistic Missile Defence” by LCrd Damien Ciotti.
At the time in which I post this, the paper can be found here: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/950/192/Ciotti.pdf
Not specific to the River Class destroyer, but very relevant to the Golden Dome, I also note this article:
https://ras-nsa.ca/should-canada-join-the-golden-dome/
where Gaëlle Rivard Piché states
“The NORAD mission is limited to aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. In the event of a ballistic attack, it is USNORTHCOM, not NORAD, that holds sole responsibility to intercept an incoming missile. Canada does not have an air and missile defence capability, leaving the country at the mercy of our adversaries and the goodwill of the United States. In case of a complex and layered attack against North America, one cannot assume that Washington would allocate its limited missile defence resources to shield Canadian targets.”
This in my opinion is very true, and if I can go a step further, to hope to have any priority applied to Canadian defense after any missile attack warning, then Canada will need to contribute to the Golden Dome, and I believe efforts should be made to add the River Class Destroyer to such a contribution possibility.
I thought I mentioned previous but I cannot see such, that I believe the following is important in understanding how, in part, the US Navy is approaching this. My understanding is that a good portion of the funding for the US Navy’s C2BMC participation (in their Aegis BMD capable destroyers) came from outside the Navy budget, and from the USA’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget.
Hence I believe, as stated previously, Canada needs to track all the funds it uses for its AN/SPY-7 and Aegis capabilities in regards to potential BMD functionality to ensure adequate financial accounting is made in case it is desired to show any potential Canadian participation in BMD and/or Golden Dome.