By Peter M. Sanderson, 10 September 2026
It all started with an article in Canadian Defence Review, followed by their video: CDR “Why Canada Needs Landing Ships for Arctic Sovereignty | Damen LST -100 Analysis,” in which Admiral Angus Topshee suggests the Damen’s commercial Landing Ship as a timely and cost-effective solution to his Arctic sovereignty challenge. I wish to tweak that (click on Reference 1). But since I am not the guy, cap in hand, standing in front of Treasury Board trying to get them to approve a ship bigger then our allies; it behooves me to provide the winning arguments.
Comparing the Damen Ro-Ro cargo Landing Ships with the original WW II Landing Ship, Tank (click on Reference 2):
* Weight of a combat loaded tank
Damen LST-100 role in Arctic sovereignty
Aid-to-the-Civil-Power. Most of the Inuit communities in the Arctic don’t have a port and only a short runway but they do have a beach. If their local Co-op burned down, they will have no food or clothing for the winter. With a lot of manhandling, the AOPS could help but a LST just beaches, a large all-terrain fork lift delivers the locked sea containers to the new store site then the building materials for the new store – in and out, the right tools, professional.
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). During the summer there many cruise ships in the Arctic, if one was to hit a rock or have a catastrophic fire and sink, putting 200 people on a AOPS or icebreaker would be grim, putting them aboard a troop ship would be professional contingency planning.
Military Role. Building infrastructure in the Arctic is expensive with long led times, the LST makes a cost-effective mobile base; it can also deliver a HIMARS or an anti-aircraft missile battery, establishing ‘temporary distributed defence sites.
Damen LST- 100 role in Indo-Pacific Littoral
The RAN’s 8x LST - 100s are to replace the former HMAS Tobruk (L 50) which could deliver 18 Abrams.
The USN is acquiring these ships to enable small USMC ‘area denial missile’ teams to move discreetly among the islands. The USMC MEP no longer includes tanks.
Damen LST - 120 role in Europe
After the SS Atlantic Conveyor loss in 1982, the shipping industry decided that during an armed conflict it would no longer lease ships to the military, rather it will sell the ship at ‘replacement cost.’ During the 2006 Lebanon Evacuation Crisis, Canada learned other lessons: during an evacuation crisis everybody else is looking for ships too; and the Europeans will look after their customers first, so we will end up buying these big ships, paying top dollar for someone else’s, old, secondhand ships. The smart play is to build these less expensive LSTs in Canada, get their use and GDP benefit. For the sake of our troops in Latvia, the Damen ships are as capable as the originals – they can resupply, reinforce, redeploy or withdraw our units as needed.
Damen LST - 100 vs 120: The significance of the 20 meter hull block extension
The Chart shows that the 20 meter hull addition gives increased speed, range, troop carrying and davits for 4 LC.
Accommodating the New Barrels Lengths. The reason the original LST could carry 20 tanks, is the M4 Sherman had a short-barreled gun, allowing the hulls to chained down tight ‘nose to tail.’ In contrast, modern tanks have a 5-metre gun barrel while gun barrels on self-propelled (SP) artillery are 8 metres (52 caliber), hence the extension. Now you see the genius of the French Caesar 6x6 SP 155mm Expeditionary Gun.
The Landing Ship Tank is as Canadian as Apple Pie
Canadian Crewed. The only Landing Craft that did not appear on the RCN establishment was the LST, and yet we have all seen the photos and films of the RCN delivering CA Shermans in Sicily, Italy and Normandy landings. What gives? A strange arrangement called the ‘Personnel Loan Agreement,’ the RCN were loaned RN LSTs (see Reference 3).
Canadian Produced. In February 1944, Britain ordered 100 Mark 3 LSTs from Canada, for use in the Pacific Theatre. The Mark 3s were longer, 106.6m, had a wider beam, 16.7m, and could launch LC. At the time of the surrender of Imperial Japanese Forces, 26 ships had been completed and accepted. The 5 yards involved were: Canadian Vickers, Montreal QC; Davie Shipbuilding, Lauzon QC; United Shipyards, Montreal QC; Marine Industries, Sorel QC; and Yarrows, Esquimalt BC (see Reference 4). Canada was once a player, a country of 11 million, 1.5 million in uniform, the homefront mobilized into a ‘command economy,’ that was more productive and efficient than Russia’s or Germany’s. PM Mackenzie King’s Minister CD Howe and his ‘dollar-a-year-men,’ left us their manual (see Reference 5).
The CDR video suggests that the first ships could be built by Damen and the remainder by one of the big 3: Davie, Irving or SeaSpan. Since these are only commercial ships, I trust the statement was meant to be provocative. Our second tier yards are modern and efficient, all they need is a purchase order, Damen’s $3.3 million technical data package and they will cut steel.
References
1. CDR https://youtu.be/L777hb0VdHM?si=gCkYcmzwBGRl5FRL
2. Damen LST – 120 https://youtu.be/jCTPSoaUtwk?si=5xpVT5nVFb9wM8Ib
3. Fact Sheet #28 Landing Ships & Landing Craft by Capt (N) (Ret’d) Michael Braham
4. Naval Marine Archive.com The Canadian Collection – Amphibious Warfare Ships (LST)
5. Kennedy, J De N, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply – Canada in the Second World War. Two Volumes. Kings Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1950
Image: A graphic of Damen's LST 120 design. Credit: Damen.
3 thoughts on “Arctic Defence: The Case for the Damen LST – 120”
Good afternoon Peter,
I am not aware of VAdm Topshee ever saying that the LST 100 is a timely and cost-effective solution to his Arctic sovereignty challenge. Any inference to that effect from the CDR video seems to be due to some clever editing of the admiral’s December 2025 interview. Can you provide another reference to correct my belief?
From the information that I have been able to obtain on the LST 100 and the Harry DeWolfs, I have serious concerns about the value of the Damen LST 100 for operations in the Canadian Arctic. In particular:
– It has no capability to operate in sea-ice. I believe that this makes the vessel a non-starter for Canada, as sea-ice is a problem even in the summer as the wind and currents cause it to drift around. VAdm Topshee mentioned a Polar Class 2 amphibious ship (Ref: (Navy ponders concept of Canadian-built amphibious landing ship for Arctic operations | CBC News) see 0.25 of embedded video) in his 2025 interview. Even the Harry DeWolfs are Polar Class 5.
– It is limited to beach landings or docking at proper wharves, as it has only a very minimal aviation capability. This means that it cannot operate fully where suitable beaches and docks are not available.
– Its shallow draft – 3.5-3.9 metres versus the Harry DeWolf’s 5.63-5.5 metres – and smaller tonnage – 4,000 tonnes versus the Harry DeWolf’s 6,660 tonnes – likely make it a very uncomfortable sea boat in the North Atlantic Ocean and Bering Sea, especially in winter and near-winter conditions. The resultant consequences for the embarked landing forces could seriously degrade their readiness and ability to operate once ashore.
– Its shorter range – 4,000 nautical miles versus the Harry DeWolf’s 6,800 nautical miles – will greatly reduce its operational capability and flexibility. This is of much greater concern in the Arctic compared to the Pacific Ocean (where the Americans and Australians plan to use it), as friendly ports and ice-capable resupply ships do not exist. Additionally, simply deploying from Canada’s naval bases to the Arctic is a major voyage by itself.
I am not sure what the motivation for the CDR article and video was. However, I hope that the RCN ignores their recommendation.
I accept fully, though, that a properly designed LST(A) might be a valuable, partial alternative to the LPA and LSI(A) that I have suggested elsewhere.
Ubique,
Les
There is a reasonable argument for Canada acquiring some form of landing ship or tactical sealift capability, but that is not the same as proving the Damen LST 120 is the answer to Arctic sovereignty. The LST 120 is designed primarily as a shallow water amphibious transport. What is missing from the argument is the obvious question: if Arctic operations are the justification, where is the ice class, winterization and Arctic operating requirement? Canada already has AOPVs designed specifically for northern operations, with cargo capacity, cranes, vehicles, boats and aviation support. Given the real world experience the RCN has in the Arctic, these would not last long in those conditions.
The example of an Arctic community losing its Co-op also overlooks something rather fundamental: the annual Arctic sealift. Every year civilian ships and barges already deliver thousands of tonnes of food, vehicles, construction material, fuel and heavy equipment to communities without conventional ports. Much of that cargo is landed by barge at established sealift areas. If an emergency resupply was required, that existing commercial system, with crews who already know the local waters and landing sites, could be rapidly utilized or expanded. An LST could certainly help, but it is not creating a capability that does not already exist. Is it the RCN’s responsibility to restock a Co-op?
The cruise ship example is similar. Canada has already exercised essentially that exact scenario in the Arctic. During Operation NANOOK 2014, the exercise included a simulated cruise ship grounding in York Sound, Nunavut, requiring a coordinated response involving the CAF and other government agencies. That is how a real Arctic maritime emergency would be handled: Coast Guard, AOPVs, aircraft, helicopters, medical support, search and rescue and civilian vessels working together. Putting several hundred people aboard an LST might be useful, but troop accommodation does not automatically equal an Arctic mass rescue capability.
The Australian and American examples are also being stretched. They are acquiring landing ships for littoral manoeuvre, distributed logistics and moving military forces around contested coastal areas and island chains. That actually strengthens the argument that Canada might need an LST for Army support, tactical sealift or overseas operations. It does not prove that the same ship is automatically an Arctic sovereignty vessel.
The military argument about landing HIMARS or air defence systems in the Arctic is interesting, but again the ship is the easy part. Those systems require surveillance, targeting data, communications, ammunition, fuel, maintenance, force protection and sustained Arctic support. Dropping a missile launcher onto a beach does not create a functioning Arctic defence network. Define the military requirement first, then decide what ship is needed to support it.
So yes, I think there is a legitimate case for Canada to examine landing ships. But build that case around an actual CAF requirement for tactical sealift, littoral manoeuvre, Army support or humanitarian operations. Do not start with a particular commercial design and then search for Arctic problems to justify it. Canada already has AOPVs, Coast Guard icebreakers, annual civilian sealift and established Arctic emergency response mechanisms. The Damen LST may well be useful, but a bow ramp alone does not make it the missing answer to Arctic sovereignty.
Good afternoon Ted,
Thank you for highlighting the annual Arctic sealift. I personally believe that it is vital to the assertion and maintenance of Canada’s sovereignty of the Arctic Archipelago.
The CBC produced a very interesting and informative documentary series about it which premiered in 2020. I would highly recommend it to anyone who wants to know more about the sealift itself and life in the Canadian Arctic in general. Only bits of it are available on YouTube. It has been rebroadcast several times on the television. The linked trailer provides a sense for what it contains.
Ubique,
Les
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8EdL1lmeJA