By David Prior
There is growing awareness that the RCN requires Arctic-capable ships that can provide true logistical capability throughout the Arctic at any time of year. The USCG also recognizes this need for Arctic multifunctional security vessels. It was discussed at the 7 December 2022 House Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation hearing on the "U.S. Coast Guard’s Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental Responsibility."1 Requirements included multifunctionality (minutes 1:18:53 to 1:19:41) and oil spill mitigation (minutes 1:20:40 to 1:25:55).
Recently CBC presented information on the issue,2 which included a live interview3 with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the RCN. In the CBC video, we hear of the need to protect Canada’s Arctic with Canadian naval ships equipped with amphibious capability. Assisting an Arctic community in distress in Canada’s far north was presented as one example of the non-military aid that such a vessel could provide. Sustained capability is essential; it requires an amphibious ship that can remain on station as an Arctic base for as long as the emergency requires, which could be many months. A naval amphibious assault ship is presented as a possible solution. Looking at a typical amphibious assault ship, the USS Iwo Jima, we see that they are big, boxy ‘cargo’ ships (minutes 1:00 to 1:32). That exceptional cargo-carrying capacity is ideal, indeed essential, for rendering assistance and sustaining remote communities.
Seaspan is offering to add amphibious capability to a standard Polar Max icebreaker, which is Polar Class 2 and thus fully capable of reaching anywhere in Canadian Arctic waters at any time of year (minutes 1:38 to 1:42). However, all conventional icebreakers, including the Polar Max, are not big, boxy cargo ships; they are powerful, sculpted, massive structures of steel crammed full of internal machinery and equipment. To use a land-based comparison, conventional icebreakers are massively powerful, very expensive and very complex bulldozers. However, the job of being a floating Arctic base requires a fleet of heavily armed, moderately priced, 18-wheelers, not a single very high cost, very attractive target which is all that Canada can afford. We can expect a single RCN Arctic amphibious armed icebreaker to cost $5 billion CAD. A non-militarized Polar Max is approximately $3.25 billion CAD.4 An American amphibious assault ship5 without polar capability costs approximately $3.28 billion CAD.
For the same $5 billion CAD, the RCN can have 12 (twelve) PMSVs6 (Polar Multifunctional Security Vessels) stationed at several DND bases across the Arctic. The current war in Ukraine has taught us that deploying a fleet of smaller, heavily armed vessels is a better strategy than deploying a single floating fortress, especially when the smaller vessels are heavily compartmentalized (like PMSVs) so that they are highly resistant to downflooding and more amenable to fire control7 in the event of a large missile or torpedo strike. A typical amphibious assault ship, built like a massive, thin-walled, floating warehouse with huge openings, has much in common with ocean ferries.8 With a fleet of economical PMSVs available, one of Canada’s conventional Polar Max and/or smaller conventional icebreakers escorts one or more PMSVs (which are truly amphibious, heavily armed floating bases) to the scene of the emergency, after which the icebreaker(s) can leave to perform other duties for which they were built. Meanwhile, the far less expensive and far more capable floating base(s), the PMSV(s), remain at the site of the emergency for as long as it takes.
A fleet of 8 PMSVs plays a role in this Canadian Arctic scenario.9
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKITrB1j5Mg
- https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/navy-canada-arctic-defence-landing-ship-9.7027777
- https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.7028592
- https://www.davie.ca/en/news/2025-03-08-pm-announcement-en/
- https://hii.com/news/hii-awarded-contract-to-build-amphibious-assault-ship-lha-9/#:~:text=Construction%20on%20LHA%209%20is,the%20Navy%20and%20Marine%20Corps
- https://www.navalreview.ca/2022/12/the-case-for-a-polar-multifunctional-security-vessel/
- https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2816283/navy-releases-extensive-bonhomme-richard-fire-report-major-fires-review/
- https://www.originalshipster.com/blog/archives/900; https://www.ukpandi.com/news-and-resources/safety-advice-training/article/articles/2022/the-capsizing-of-the-herald-of-free-enterprise/
- https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/defence-ideas/element/contests/challenge/ideas-fictional-intelligence-contest-polar-paradigms-2045-defending-canada-sovereignty.html
Image: The Global Logistics, Aviation, and Medical Support platform concept proposed by Davie includes an icebreaking hull for Arctic operations. Credit: Chantier Davie
6 thoughts on “RCN Polar Class 2 Amphibious Icebreaker”
Hello David. Your G-LAAM Polar Class 2 Amphibious Ice Breaker is a great start but in order for it to work within the RCN, you will have to give the vessel the size and power to at least match the new Canadian Polar Class 2 now being built by both Davie & Seaspan. It would at least have to have a Polar Class 2 Amphibious Capability to move a Canadian battalion strength with all its mechanical land capabilities. An ability to at least defend itself with a main gun with the ability to fire from at least ‘stand-off’ ranges and a decent AAW capability (possibly VLS SM2/NSM/Tomahawk/RAM & power enough for a laser weapon capability). It should also have a Command & Control System (CMS 330) with a Lockheed Martin SPY 7 V (3) OTH capability. A more than decent HA/DR capability will also be essential including LCVPs to ferry civilian personnel to & from the ship. Hospital capacity for all casualties should have enough space for at least 80-100 personnel with Operating rooms/CT/MRI Scans/Dental/Recovery Ward facilities. A Level 2 ashore hospital facility will be essential as well. Enough space for at least 2 Sqns of Helicopters.
Your G-LAAM concept seems to be on the right track but needs much more in order to be effective in the high Arctic. Enough space for Ship-A/C Fuel as well as space for UAV/UUV capabilities. Let’s not forget the number of RCN personnel, air crew and land personnel that would also have to be factored in and the training that will be required for all. The biggest factor would have to be power output. Enough power to move this ship to at least 25 kts with larger and more powerful diesel generators and bow thrusters. I would suspect this G-LAAM would have to be at least 1/3 larger than the CCG Polar Class 2 Icebreakers (Possibly over 30-35000 tonnes & well over 180 meters in length with a larger width & draft). And that’s just for one of these Amphibious Ice Breakers at a projected cost of between $4.5-5 Billion CAD in 2026 dollars. A minimum of at lease 3 of these ships will be required so it will not be cheap. My two cents worth. Cheers!
Your analysis of the proposed G-LAAM is highly accurate and confirms why G-LAAMs are the wrong choice for Canada, particularly in the Canadian Arctic. They are voracious money-pits and highly desirable targets. Unfortunately, by placing all of Canada’s ‘eggs’ in one mighty basket, all the Canadian eggs go down with the ship, taking with them Canadian taxpayers and perhaps Canadian Arctic sovereignty.
This is not the first time Mr. Prior has advocated for PMSVs on this site, and it was a bad idea then for the same reasons it is a bad idea now: it substitutes an attractive paper fleet for the hard realities of Arctic access, lift, endurance, crewing, and basing. The Royal Canadian Navy has been explicit in recent media that this discussion is a thought exercise and anyone who follows Canadian defence planning knows exactly what that means: exploratory, unfunded, and far behind much larger priorities already straining the system. Regurgitating PMSVs as a supposed alternative to Polar Class logistics capability ignores physics and cost accounting alike; twelve hypothetical “cheap” vessels do not magically replace a year round PC2 hull, nor do they conjure ports, maintenance, crews, or sustained command and control in the High Arctic. Dressing this up with Ukraine analogies and “floating fortress” rhetoric doesn’t change the fundamentals: Canada’s Arctic problem is reach and staying power, not salvo density, and the RCN has far more urgent, real world capability gaps to close before indulging in another round of advocacy dressed as innovation.
Totally agree Richard with all of your responses to David Priors’ article. Even with a G-LAAM with Polar Class 2 capabilities, It will still not have the Amphibious Arctic capabilities the RCN requires. Nothing less than an LHA/LHD type vessel with at least Polar Class 2 capabilities will be required in order for the RCN to do the job required for amphibious & HA/DR duties. We already had our chance years ago when the French were willing to sell Canada the Mistral Class (but has no Polar Class designation) for amphibious & HA/DR, and we all know how that worked out. I still contend that the Spanish Juan Carlos LHD Class (if built to Polar Class 2 requirements) would be a much better option for the RCN. The training to evolve this amphibious capability will take a long time though. Just ask the Australian Navy. It took them over 20 years to develop their amphibious capability and they are still not quite there yet! The Juan Carlos LHD is roughly about 27,500 tonnes and with a PC 2 requirement, it would bring total weight well pass 30,000 tonnes alone not including ‘full load’ and could be built in Canada as well. Canada could never acquire 12 of these ships ($$) as Mr. Prior envisions, however a fleet of at least 3 Amphibious HA/DR LHD icebreakers will be an effective alternative and could work for the RCN and the CAF.
A very large, year-round PC2 hull does not magically replace a fleet of smaller PMSV hulls that rely on widely available harbours (that are built in the coming decades) and icebreaker escorts. Like it or not, Canadian ports are coming to the Arctic, each of which will be quite capable of hosting a few thrifty and low-maintenance (epoxy composite hulls) PMSVs. Maintenance crews and sustained command and control in the High Arctic are also coming. Build a fleet of PMSVs, which provide exceptional redundancy plus logistics storage space, and fit with the future realities that are coming much faster now in a fast-changing, more dangerous world. Do not waste money building massive PC2 amphibious assault ships designed for beach invasions in southern waters. These do not require the RCN.
The current war in Ukraine has taught the world that, today, a massive, and massively expensive, weapon can be defeated by a swarm of less capable but still adequate weapons. An amphibious assault vessel like the above amphibious icebreaker might be quickly dispatched by the first swarm of 100 submarine-launched, AI-guided drones attacking its bridge windows with high explosives, probably followed within seconds by drones entering the interior and destroying the bridge, control and communications centres. Tiny drones packing a powerful punch can now go almost anywhere inside a structure. In twenty years or less, it will no longer be “almost”. Old-fashioned ships like the above amphibious icebreaker will be the first to go when the shooting starts. Also first to go will be the light armament on the vessel, swiftly removed by drones or AI-guided missiles https://x.com/NavalInstitute/status/1784753615267131809 (28 shells just to sink a small fishing vessel).