By David Prior, 30 December 2022
In October 2022, General Wayne Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, told the House of Commons defence committee studying Canada’s security posture in the Far North that the region does not face an immediate threat. “Right now, today, we don’t see a clear and present threat to our sovereignty, not today, not this week, not next week, not next year,” Eyre said, “However, in the decades to come, that threat, that tenuous hold that we have on our sovereignty, at the extremities of this nation, is going to come under increasing challenge.”1
Canada’s Arctic has a number of security requirements that an ice-class Polar Multifunctional Security Vessel (PMSV) can effectively and economically satisfy. Unlike a conventional wide-ranging patrol vessel or warship, a PMSV is akin to a mobile base in a remote and hostile environment. It is equipped with powerful defences to protect itself and Canada’s territory, has modern Arctic-class oil spill technology, offers heliports for up to 2 large helicopters in need of landing, and is a place of refuge and support for survivors from accidents or natural disasters. It has ample space for medical/dental clinics in addition to basic shelter for the full complement of an evacuated cruise ship. A PMSV has a powerful presence and its ice-class mobility allows it to disrupt intrusions by hostile players violating Canada’s territorial borders. Pipe-berths for 150 troops will fold up; the space can then be used for materiel. Centuries ago, wooden ships over-wintered in a vastly more hostile Arctic; a modern steel PMSV can likely do the same, providing a secure year-round military base.
To recover spilled oil, break ice or engage in hostilities, the PMSV takes on water ballast to greatly reduce its freeboard. The vessel transforms from a catamaran with normal freeboard to a monohull with much less freeboard. (A Royal Norwegian Navy fast corvette utilizes a similar feature.) This capability enhances its ability to withstand ice pressure; it also provides the PMSV with a unique military advantage. Even when stationary in winter ice, the PMSV continues to serve as a base for troops, eyes and ears for the military, a heliport for aircraft in need of one, and a research hub for year-round work in the Arctic. If mobility in heavy ice is required, icebreakers can assist. PMSVs would be effective complements to the Harry DeWolf-class AOPS.
PMSVs are not expensive high-tech warships or research vessels. They are ice-class cargo ships with light icebreaker capabilities and, with hull/beam ratios of 14:1, likely 25 kt capability on open water. Overall beam is 24m, allowing access to the Great Lakes and effective assistance from heavy icebreakers.2 While not slow, they are not high-powered greyhounds. The PMSV’s durable and slippery anti-stick hull coating, necessary for oil spill clean-up, also provides anti-fouling, faster hulls and enhanced icebreaking.3 Multifunctionality means better value, and PMSVs can play important roles.
The world is full of heavily armed warships. Like nuclear weapons, they are sometimes too powerful and lethal for the job at hand so cannot be utilized. Force needs to be applied against intruders in a measured way. In the Iceland-UK cod wars, for example, rugged British offshore work vessels dominated Icelandic patrol vessels simply by pushing the patrol vessels out of the way.4 The frigate commanders could not justify retaliating with lethal firepower so they could not defeat the lightly armed patrol vessels. In a shoving match Polar Class PMSVs will have the thrust and strength to dominate modern warships. A PMSV is built for tug-like pushing, and for ramming if necessary. In ramming, an aggressor is often damaged as much as the target vessel. PMSVs, however, are designed for ramming. Hardened corners at the bow and stern will puncture the hull of an intruder several metres above the waterline, forcing it to withdraw to a shipyard but not sinking it.
A PMSV armed with large calibre guns can respond if an intruding warship escalates the confrontation with lethal force. It’s worth noting that modern fragile warships are not designed for close quarters combat that may occur in ice-covered seas. A well-armed USCG cutter recently had to immediately retreat from an old Chinese fishing vessel.5
PMSVs could provide constabulary duties throughout the Arctic, and with teeth. They are designed for very close encounters and do not need to withdraw when the situation becomes hostile. PMSVs have the capacity to dominate any vessel in close encounters. Each of a PMSV’s twin hulls are subdivided into dozens of seawater ballast/oil storage tanks; it can withstand being rammed without being crippled. For constabulary duties, PMSVs can be stationed in strategic areas to monitor traffic and quickly respond to intruders. PMSVs can also provide the ‘muscle’ to help AOPS enforce regulations in a measured way without undue escalation. AOPS were designed when the Arctic was to become a peaceful region of cooperation and friendly competition. China and Russia apparently never agreed. We can expect Russia and China not to follow international rules but to continue to act unpredictably with dangerous aggression.6 The West needs to revise its plans to address this reality. PMSVs address this military challenge, while bringing logistical, environmental and commercial benefits to the polar regions.
PMSVs can be equipped with the same armament and aircraft as the Harry DeWolf-class AOPS but will possess additional features that overcome the military weaknesses of conventional patrol ships. In a hostile encounter at close quarters, the first indication an AOPS may have that an intruder is responding with lethal force is when an RPG removes the 25mm gun from the AOPS’s fore deck. To meet that threat, the PMSV utilizes the fore deck for an extra heliport and mounts 25mm guns high on each side of the superstructure. Each 25mm gun will have an arc of fire slightly greater than 180 degrees, providing 360-degree coverage. The superstructure may protect one of the guns from direct attack.
The main deck of the PMSV’s superstructure contains armoured compartments housing larger calibre guns. These guns will have a 90-degree arc of fire and will fire through vertical slits protected by sliding armoured doors and smoke screens. The doors open and close extremely briefly during the firing of the guns. A Royal Norwegian Navy corvette utilizes a similar, but slower, arrangement to fire missiles. These heavier guns will not be vulnerable to RPGs. The PMSV’s armour-piercing shells will minimize exterior hull damage on the target vessel. The goal is to disable the intruder, not sink it and pollute the ocean. Responding to an intruder, the PMSV will first reduce freeboard with water ballast, allowing it to fire directly into the side of the hull of the intruding vessel, a few metres above the waterline to avoid flooding. One armour-piercing round will likely end the aggression by a hostile vessel. PMSVs can be equipped with defensive missiles but they will not be required, or even possible to use, for close engagements. MANPADS and RPGs will prove more useful.
Located below the gun room and between the twin 7m wide hulls filled with seawater ballast will be the PMSV’s armoured control room and crew pipe-berths. The normal bridge, exposed high on the vulnerable superstructure, can be evacuated before engaging in dangerous confrontations. The PMSV can mount dozens of cameras with adequate redundancy. The PMSV will become a semi-drone, with the operators isolated from the conflict. Cameras also record the sequence of events. The images can be transmitted in real time -- all-seeing witnesses in future diplomacy battles.
Confrontations with China and Russia may increase in Canadian polar waters. Without being overtly warlike, PMSVs have the needed ‘teeth’ required to dominate them. Unlike the USCG cutter chased away by an old Chinese fishing vessel, the PMSV can stand its ground in a close action against the most powerful opponent. The PMSV dominates the grey area between war and peace. AOPS (peace) and frigates (war) are unable to do that, yet the grey area is the most likely scenario in confrontations with Russia and China in the Arctic.
Conclusions
In the near future the biggest threat to the Arctic is environmental – climate change and oil pollution. The threat of oil pollution is increasing rapidly as traffic increases. Ocean currents in the Arctic continuously move oily ice and water, and the cold inhibits degradation. Oil stuck to ice soon becomes encased in the ice and will not sink; it can continue to poison the ecosystem for decades. As the ice melts, the still-fresh oil will be released into the ecosystem, but this time possibly thousands of kilometres from the accident site. Oil spilled at Russian and American offshore oilfields and shipping lanes may migrate to the Canadian Arctic. That is why spilled oil must be removed and safely stored as quickly as possible. This requires being at the spill site within days, not months.
PMSVs are not just useful for security operations; they have the strength, size, workable Arctic oil spill tools and on-site storage capacity to achieve success, particularly in winter conditions. A single PMSV can store 40,000 bbls of recovered oil in below-deck heated tanks. All existing technology must wait for the ice to melt, which is months too late to prevent the escape of the oil and the poisoning of the ocean, shoreline and community ecosystems.
As well, PMSVs stationed throughout Canada’s Arctic would be equipped to handle medical emergencies, routine medical needs and evacuations. With their large decks, cranes and interior spaces, PMSVs can also deliver essential goods, including in the winter with icebreaker assistance. In the event of a cruise ship incident, PMSVs have highly trained crews, available interior space and an ability to facilitate the offloading of lifeboats by lowering freeboard and side doors. PMSVs can supply instant medical assistance and adequate food and shelter for hundreds of people.
The most important role of Polar Multifunctional Security Vessels is a military one. PMSVs can meet military requirements by responding to and defeating intruders in a measured way, and by assisting with the logistics of troops and materiel in the Arctic. They can also play a significant role in security against oil spills, cruise ship/community evacuations, year-round remote search and rescue and heliport services. Canada also needs more Arctic research facilities. PMSVs can support this activity. Only PMSVs are capable of realistically and successfully handling all these challenges.
Notes
1. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-arctic-russia-china-defence-1.6621040
2. https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/icebreaking-deglacage/fleet-flotte-eng.html
3. https://www.seacoat.com/commercial-marine-2/
4. https://allthingsiceland.com/the-cod-wars-iceland-vs-britain-ep-36/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FsOytZMRXo0&t=64s
6. See for example: https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/us-concerned-about-increasingly-dangerous-behavior-by-chinese-aircraft-us-defence-secretary/ar-AA14oO1Y; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/21/china-accused-of-seizing-rocket-debris-from-philippines-navy-in-south-china-sea-dispute; https://defenceindepth.co/2020/11/27/russian-military-latest-another-russia-us-naval-confrontation/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrzMI7-URcM; https://www.arctictoday.com/nato-allies-take-bigger-steps-to-counter-russian-military-force-in-the-arctic/; https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/nato-allies-wake-up-to-russian-supremacy-in-the-arctic/ar-AA14aSQU
89 thoughts on “The Case for a Polar Multifunctional Security Vessel”
Hello David.
I have read your article on PMSVs with great interest and I must say I have more questions on what final form this PMSV Fleet will take. For example, if you are going to transport at least a Battalion strength of troops to the high Arctic for ashore operations, I believe that you will need more than just 2 “heavy helicopters” for airlift activities (possibly at least 4 or 6). And if you are going to operate these PMSVs in the high Arctic, I believe you will also require these vessels to be at least Polar Class 3 specs as a minimum and not AOPS Polar Class 5 as is the current designation for that class and then you may still require a Polar Class 2 or 1 CCG ice breaker for assistance in 2nd or 3rd year ice in high Arctic conditions. The use of the PMVS for oil spill recovery of up to 40,000 barrels of oil seems plausible but will increase vessel weight as well. The use of anti-stick hull coating for oil spill cleanup and anti-fouling to increase ships speed is also worth consideration. And have you considered RCN crew size? I don’t believe you can get away with 60-65 crew (officers & sea personnel). More like 90-110 naval personnel. If you are going to operate the PMSVs as high Arctic year-round bases, you will have to consider re-stationing the ship on a regular basis to maintain positioning and that would require at least Bow and Stern Thrusters along with Azipod twin screws because ice flows are never stationary. What will be the overall dimensions of the PMSV be? It should be between 600-700 ft (182-215 m) long, with a maximum load-out weight of around 32-35,000 tonnes in order to fit everything in. Your beam of 24 meters (78.7 ft) may have to increase a bit possibly between 26-28 meters (85-92 ft) and you haven’t mentioned draft which should be as less as possible. Your catamaran vessel idea seems to be plausible however what kind of power generation would you use to create enough power for at least a sustained 25 kts to get where you want to go and for “ramming operations”? You should consider at a minimum of 2 X LM 2500 gas turbines for short duration speeds of 25 kts with 4 X DG’s for operational speeds of at least 15-18 kts using CODELOG power generation. 2 X 25mm guns on the top of the PMSV is a good start, but what size hidden “heavier guns” would you use (76/127mm with AP Shells)? What type of defensive missile systems would you use? Sea Ceptor VLS silos for CIAD or the Saab man-portable MANPADS air defence system RBS 70 VSHORAD would be the best options for the PMSV. My final question is, how many PMSVs would you build? If you intend on keeping these ships up there as “bases”, I would suggest at least a minimum of 4 or more probably 6 vessels in the fleet. So, although I like some of your ideas, as you can see, there is much more to consider with your PMVS fleet than meets the eye.
Hi David, thank you for your detailed comments. There are many questions to answer, starting with what capabilities each PMSV needs to meet. Once that is determined, the size of the vessel can be decided upon. My choice of 100m x 24m x 5m is just one example. Every choice has advantages and disadvantages. Any ship is a target that can be attacked. There are advantages to spreading the workload, and the assets, among several smaller vessels rather than one high-value target. The current war in Ukraine is teaching the Russians that lesson. Also, these are regional security vessels. As fire stations are situated throughout a city to optimize response time, so should PMSVs be dispersed throughout the Arctic. I would agree that a small fleet is required. 4-6 of the larger PMSVs that you describe, or perhaps 8-10 of my smaller PMSVs, would suffice. With the size decided, the naval architects can go to work and design what’s needed. My estimates of propulsion requirements could be short of what’s required. The N/As will calculate that. Ramming speeds will likely be very slow-motion events at shallow angles of attack. The weight of the PMSV will do the work. The goal is just to rip the hull plating, encouraging an intruder to leave and go to a shipyard for repairs. Based on AkerArctic’s work on multihull icebreakers, there appear to be no technical obstacles to building a sound vessel https://akerarctic.fi/app/uploads/2018/09/trimaes.pdf (Note: the old-fashioned oil spill tool they show is too fragile for the Canadian Arctic). I don’t envision PMSVs to be serious Arctic icebreakers. In challenging ice they would always require icebreaker assistance. Since they are not meant to be constantly on the move, and likely stationary in winter, that requirement may not be a burden on the big icebreakers, especially as the ice continues to fade. Thrusters fore and aft are standard equipment. More than that is to be determined by requirements. PMSVs are meant for the future, when sea conditions will be different. To deal with the weight of captured oil, seawater ballast will be offloaded to compensate. When recovering spilled oil, the vessel only travels at 2 kts, perhaps for months. Because the vessel is a modern-technology oil spill ship, it has large interior and exterior spaces to accommodate all the equipment and activities listed. It’s more a swift regional cargo ship than a high-speed JSS designed to circle the globe https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/joint-support-ship.html . Your comments on weapons is welcome. I know virtually nothing about such matters but the PMSV is a good platform for many systems. The focus will be to isolate all systems from ice and cold. That will require a little thinking outside the box, but nothing radical is required. All components will be off-the-shelf. For anyone that is interested, I have a larger document with more details. I can be reached at nst.spill@gmail.com.
Hello again David. I have taken a look at the Finnish ARC 131 design PDF doc. and you may have something here for a more robust PMSV vessel but on a much bigger scale with some naval weapons “teeth”. I believe the PMSV should be perhaps somthing larger than what you suggest. Perhaps somewhere between 110-150m in length with a Beam of about 28-30m with a Draft of around 8m and Canadian Batallion strength personnel properly embedded within the ships mess-decks. It should also have a Naval crew of perhaps 100 ships company. Cheers!
Many features can be adjusted to optimize the PMSV. Because the vessels are so basic, several variations could even be built. However, in vessel design, usually gaining one advantage means sacrificing another. Going beamier means sacrificing construction, maintenance and operations on the Great Lakes, which leads to less competition among shipyards and perhaps costlier initial construction and future maintenance. Deeper draft negatively impacts oil spill capability and community access, which could compromise oil spill recovery and community aid. In 2010, BP had essentially zero capability to remove the oil from the surface of the GoM. This lack of capability cost BP an EXTRA 40 Billion USD for a single incident. There also are benefits to deploying 4-5 smaller vessels instead of one high-value target, especially when these vessels serve as regional bases. In regions where travel can be challenging, having 4-5 bases distributed across a large territory is safer than having a single one. Being a modern oil spill ship, the vessel has abundant interior spaces that can be utilized for personnel, both for permanent crew and transitory passengers.
Sorry David, I had forgot to ask some other also important questions. Oh, so many!: What CMS system will the PMSV have? It should obviously be the CMS 330 CMS as the CSC Frigates will have. And what about radars like the S Band SPY7 V3 LRDR along with X band navigation radars as well? If you are also going to have 2 or 3 PMSVs up there permanently at any one time, it would also be nice to be able to communicate in real time with them and NDHQ Ottawa if you are going to ram an invader (with Ottawa’s permission of course)? Just other thoughts that came to mind. Cheers!
Hi David, I don’t know my electronics but you are right that modern, real-time communication is essential. Whatever it takes at the time; it’s a fast-evolving world. Ottawa will definitely have to give permission to “bump into” a vessel, thereby causing superficial damage (torn hull plating). The PMSV’s many cameras will bear witness. I don’t believe a high-speed run at such a relatively fragile target (military vessel) will be necessary or desirable (very dangerous). We’re Canadians; we ram politely with minimal fuss when we puncture hull plating. PMSVs don’t need to be particularly fast in order to patrol their assigned station. The more PMSVs deployed into the field, the smaller each “patrol territory” can be. Hull speed is likely fast enough, and does not require massive power. Multihull hull speeds are normally higher than those of monohulls. Among other radars (TBD) the PMSV’s will carry oil spill radar and CL35 oil spill searchlights
https://rutter.ca/wp-content/themes/RutterWebsite/pdfs/OilSpillDetectionBrochure.pdf
https://www.tttbv.com/media/files/datasheets/glamox/Glamox-Luminell-product-catalogue.pdf page 46
PMSVs fit in with this article today: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-year-end-interview-1.6695469
“During a separate appearance before a different panel of MPs, he warned that Canada’s hold on its Arctic archipelago is “tenuous” in the face of great power competition.
“Well, it’s a zero-sum game, and we have to find a way of paying both Peter and Paul, but perhaps not as much,” he said.”
I believe it is possible to build, outfit and deploy 4-5 PMSVs for the cost of 1 JSS ($2B):
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2020/06/backgrounder—understanding-the-cost-of-the-joint-support-ship-project.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/joint-support-ship.html
Our Arctic is a vast region and needs many Canadian security vessels to provide adequate coverage and presence. PMSVs are normally not travelling very far; they don’t need to. They are like a fire station or police precinct station, responsible for patrolling a neighbourhood. In contrast, the JSS is specialized to support overseas missions which require quickly transiting large cargoes across vast distances. The two missions are very different and require very different solutions. PWSVs also don’t have to do everything individually. It is not uncommon to see several fire stations send trucks to a single fire. PMSVs can do the same, sort of like swarm technology (which my oil spill technology can utilize). Oil spills on the ocean often require months of cleanup effort, even under ideal conditions e.g. BP’s DWH spill in the summer 2010 in the balmy GoM. Cleanup will take longer in the Arctic if ice is present. There will be time available for other PMSVs to join the effort.
Very best!
So this proposal is becoming more and more like an Aegis system on a large icebreaker. If that is the case two things should be considered. First, the haul of an icebreaker vessel with the intention to spend quite some time in the thick ice. This means the speed of the vessel is never going to be too fast. The idea of 20-25 knots will never be realistic. Does not matter how many gas turbines you put on the vessel. Second, the size of the ship will never be smaller than AOPS. considering the task you are envisioning them conducting. And the size will probably be greater than the Jan Mayen class of the Norwegian Coast Guard. It is possible that the vessel would probably be around the size of a Russian nuclear ice breaker. If you want the vessel to conduct the mission, well carry all the equipment.
In conclusion, is this a great idea? Yes, it is. But the Canadian military lacks the ability to conduct operations in the Arctic. The first things to solve and buy are not new icebreakers but to build a new road connecting the population center to the high North that can be used all year around. Docks that work. Airfield system that can move aircraft up North safely without the need to go to Greenland or land on a gravel runway. Also if we really want to take the defense of the North seriously, the navy needs to establish a Hydrography office with the intention of conducting a detailed survey of the North. Coast Guard does the job, but it can never conduct a survey with future conflicts in mind. If the navy lacks information on the weakness and strengths of the high Arctic, then any wishes to strengthen the North are just talk not real actions. Also which infantry unit is going to fight in the high North? Canadian Army lacks units that are equipped to fight in the North — lack of know-how, lack of equipment. And Rangers would be more or less useless when confronting a properly trained military unit. So who are we going to send up North? Who can fight there? We lack Arctic units and Arctic mobility.
The last line of your comment presents challenges that PMSVs can help meet. You said “So who are we going to send up North? Who can fight there? We lack Arctic units and Arctic mobility.” From CBC comes this: “General Wayne Eyre also said the military needs to have increased transport capacity to quickly move troops into the region and sustain them.” Presumably these Arctic units will be created, and when they are, PMSVs can transport them and their vehicles throughout the Arctic, and even land them directly on the shore. In a land with few harbours or ship-size wharves, this capability is an asset. General Eyre also wants these troops sustained. PMSVs are armed icebreaking cargo ships, ideal as supply bases for the troops in the field. They can supply food, shelter, medical attention, many types of vehicles of all sizes, and a vast quantity of diesel fuel to support troop actions. Tents and sleeping bags may not be viable in mid-winter blizzards at -50C, at least not for very long. A viable base is required.
PMSVs are not heavily armed roving greyhounds. PMSVs do not need the Aegis System. It’s likely that the RIM-162 ESSM or the Oerlikon Skynex System will be adequate missile systems to handle short-range defensive needs. You are right that icebreaker hulls are incapable of high speeds. However, slim catamaran hulls are very fast https://usa.austal.com/ships/expeditionary-fast-transport-epf . PMSVs solve this dual-use problem by taking on seawater ballast to reduce freeboard by 70% before icebreaking. The hull shape at the higher waterline is optimized for icebreaking; the hull shape at the lower waterline is optimized for speed. Using different waterlines for different tasks is off-the-shelf technology; it’s how every Harry DeWolf class ship was floated into Bedford Basin.
The PMSVs are larger than the Harry DeWolf class AOPS (25% greater beam). A PMSV can transport 150 troops but it cannot carry every vehicle they require. However, a PMSV can transport some of every type of vehicle required by the troops, from ARGOs to main battle tanks. Enclosed barges can transport the remainder; the PMSV has all the equipment needed to land the remaining vehicle onshore. You said “If you want the vessel to conduct the mission, well carry all the equipment.”. The PMSV approach is to not carry all the equipment in single vessel. Rather, spread the load among a small fleet of PMSVs, barges, cargo ships, AOPS etc. This small convoy can be escorted by heavily armed warships and RCAF aircraft. Ukraine’s forces send out a small fleet of defenceless drones and Russian flagships sink. It’s best not to create a high-value target if it’s not necessary. PMSVs make it unnecessary. As you point out, there is much to be done in the Arctic. PMSVs help mitigate that problem by providing many types of Arctic security that none of the specialized vessels (icebreakers, warships, cargo ships) can perform. I think PMSVs could be an excellent fit with the Rangers.
Hello PASSEDMOST. Your use of the Norwegian Jan Mayen class as a template has some merit. I believe Canada should have acquired this design rather than our present AOPS. Having said that, you are absolutely correct in that even this class would not be big enough or effective as a PMSV for what Canada needs. One of Russia’s Nuclear ice breakers as a template would be more like it, however that will never happen for the obvious reasons. The future Diefenbaker-class Polar 2 ice breaker would be closer but still not quite there. Building new roads to the high Arctic, perhaps larger docks near Alert with more substantial airfields would also help. You are also correct in that the Canadian military at present lacks the ability to conduct real naval operations in the high Arctic. A lot of what you say makes a lot of good sense. I like your thinking. Cheers!
A PMSV is a Polar Multifunctional Security Vessel. The key word is “multifunctional”. Polar security consists of more than military security. Environmental security in polar regions is a more urgent requirement for Canada and the planet. In 2009, the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) identified oil spills as the most significant threat to the marine environment from shipping in the Arctic https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/54 page 5. “The most significant threat from ships to the Arctic marine environment is the release of oil through accidental or illegal discharge.” In 2023 we can add Arctic oilfields to the threat: https://www.arctictoday.com/russian-oil-companies-see-to-soften-environmental-law-ahead-of-a-big-push-into-the-arctic/ . These oil spill threats will continue for centuries. Long after the world stops burning oil, the drilling and spilling will continue (oil is a valuable feedstock). The AMSA document was published before the lessons from BP’s DWH oil spill cleanup were available so the 1970’s-era equipment and methodologies described in the 2009 AMSA are identical to the equipment and methodologies utilized by BP in 2010 and throughout Canada today. BP only recovered 3% of the DWH oil spill and created a health and environmental catastrophe by using dispersants and in-situ burning.
The PMSV utilizes a fully automated new-technology oil spill system; the ship itself is the oil pickup tool, guided by autonomy and AI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3dMFr09OeI&feature=youtu.be . The shape and size of the vessel required to recover spilled oil at sea provides the added benefits of large decks and interior spaces that are available for other functions (multifunctional). Here is the PMSV’s oil spill technology in action: http://spilltechnology.com/ltdaccess/GRi_OilSkimmerFinal.mp4
http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/Ohmsett_EST_12m.mp4
Conventional patrol ships, icebreakers, frigates, cargo ships etc cannot protect the environment from oil spills (e.g. DWH cleanup attempt) or evacuate communities effectively so they are not PMSVs. Their limitations are the reason why PMSVs are a good asset for Canada; they mitigate several polar security threats.
Land-based infrastructure development can be useful but does not fully address the military and environment security challenges. For example, roads and wharves do not clean up oil spills; people need to be added quickly. In 2010, BP added 48,000 people to capture 3% of the DWH oil spill. The logistics appear challenging when the oil spill site is many hundreds of km from the nearest wharf, especially mid-February when the polar bears are on the ice. Troops and equipment delivered to docks near Alert may still need the ability to land on the shore if they are required to be, for example, 400 km to the west of Alert. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the vulnerability of helicopters in an open sky. Also, the logistics of re-locating a large number of troops and their equipment and supplies from Alert to a distant High Arctic wilderness location may be complicated by Arctic weather, especially mid-winter. PMSVs are a safer and more reliable method.
Interesting concept. The first thing I would say is the RCN is not in the spill cleanup business or want to be, that is the CG realm of responsibly. There is no effective way to clean up oil spills in the Arctic except not to have them in the first place. What is this anti stick hull coating you are talking about, never heard of it, can you direct me to source on that? No sailor in their right mind will want to be stuffed in one of those things in the Arctic during winter. You mention that 100’s of years ago people wintered there, well yes they did however lost people….many people. You are correct that slim catamaran hulls are fast but incompatible as ice capable and you can’t do dual purpose not to mention that the example of the fast catamaran you gave has an aluminum hull which is not compatible in the Arctic.
Reply to Ted Barnes. It’s true that RCN has not been in the oil spill business. Theoretically CCG is in charge of that in the Arctic but CCG is incapable of cleaning up oil spills anywhere, including in the summertime Gulf of Mexico
CBC Doc Zone _ Blowout NL offshore oil spill 2010 (minute 11:05 to 12:48) (minute 22:38 to minute 27:23)
http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/Doc%20Zone%20-%20Blowout%20-%20Is%20Canada%20Next%202010-12-09.flv . A paradigm shift is required to protect the Arctic. The modern oil spill technology utilized in the PMSV is fully automated and requires no extra crew. Autonomous and AI technologies can be added. Nobody gets exposed to toxic oil. RCN has the skills to handle that. In addition, the technology takes up very little interior space inside the superstructure (maybe 1%). Oil spills in the Arctic cannot be handled like fires in a city. Canada cannot afford to have single-purpose oil spill ships using this modern technology deployed throughout the Arctic like fire stations in a city. Arctic oil spill ships may never be used if that’s all they can do. On the other hand, these oil spill ships with their modern oil spill technology are the only method of protecting the Arctic from oil spills in the shipping lanes and oil fields. We need them. “Pretend” oil spill equipment like that used in BP’s DWH oil spill cleanup is completely useless in the Arctic (as confirmed by the Commandant of the USCG). In the DWH spill, in the balmy summertime GoM, BP only recovered 3% of the spilled oil (Report to the President page 168). That is why the oil spill professionals turned to chemicals and fire, which were also ineffective (8% and 5%). It’s worth noting that in-situ burning of spilled oil produces vast amounts of black soot http://www.sciencepoles.org/article/black-carbon-playing-major-role-in-arctic-climate-change . These tools are all that Canada has, or is planning to have, for the Arctic to make the spilled oil “go away”, hence the urgent need for a paradigm shift away from them. http://spilltechnology.com/ltdaccess/506179351.mp4 https://tubitv.com/movies/628034/pretty-slick . Not having oil spills (Black Swan events) is a good strategy but hard to achieve. For example, “prevention” always fails sooner or later. Here is the anti-stick coating; new ones are under development and may prove better (graphene etc) https://www.seacoat.com/commercial-marine-2/
Regarding right-minded sailors, what about the ones crammed into nuclear submarines on 3-month missions? They don’t die by the hundreds when they spend months under the ice because they are in modern boats. PMSVs are not only modern, they are spacious, comfortable, offer immense privacy and amenities just like most modern ships. I explained how straightforward it is to do two-purpose hull shapes. Catamarans can be built of anything, from Kon-Tiki (reeds) to advanced composites to aluminum to steel. High speed catamarans are built of aluminum but a PMSV is only a medium speed catamaran, so can be built in the required steel. The slim-hull advantage, which I was illustrating, is still there regardless of what the hulls are built of. Twin hulls are very compatible with ice, as I explained (refer to AkerArctic).
Reply to Ted Barnes. I should add a note about oil spill technology. You said “There is no effective way to clean up oil spills in the Arctic…”. While that has always been the case, it no longer is the case. Ron MacKay (Retired Senior Response Officer CCG) has stated that the modern oil spill technology inside the PMSVs that I refer to is the first truly innovative oil spill technology since the 1970s. CCG Deputy Commissioner says in response to BSEE in Washington: “In response to your request for access to a Canadian Coast Guard oil skimmer, the Coast Guard is unable to grant your request as the skimmer is an essential piece of response equipment that we maintain in Atlantic Canada.” Note: The above CCG oil skimmer contains the same modern oil spill technology that is in a PMSV. Finally, Captain Mark Turner, Danny Williams’ right-hand man, said: “As I mentioned I am a a strong supporter of your innovative technology, especially the omission of moving parts and the capability as a collection and containment tool as opposed to the outdated and conventional methods utilized today.” Today we have the modern oil spill technology and modern vessel designs that will effectively recover oil spills in the Arctic. Innovation means the future no longer has to look like the past.
It will be up to the Canadian Government to tell the RCN what, and what is not the updated policy with regard to the new defence policy coming later this year. Sailors go to sea to implement government policy and if the government says that these PMSVs will be required to help with unexpected oil spill cleanups, then that is what they will do. A sailor’s place is at sea no matter where that sea or ocean is, and land is just a navigational hazard and if the RCN is directed to remain up there (on a rotational basis), then that is what they will do. The Canadian people deserve nothing less. My opinion only of course.
I think overall as the Arctic will become one of the main theatres in the coming decades, this isn’t such a bad idea but I would also stress that the Arctic region should also include a submarine contingent. After all the main Arctic opposition will come from Russia and it has a plethora of submarines.
While this isn’t an argument for nuclear submarines, we certainly need to look at the options for replacing the Victorias closely and we should obtain suitable non-nuclear submarines fitted with AIP systems for this role.
Could not agree more Blair. Canada needs new AIP submarines to replace the Victoria class soonest The German Type 216 if it were an AIP design of around 5-6000 tonnes would certainly help. Besides the Russian nuclear powered submarines, don’t forget about the Chinese Nuc boats (let’s not pretend that they are not up there in the high Arctic as well). Although the Nuc option would solve a lot of sovereignty woes for Canada.
Or buy some submarine that works first! Then we can talk about Nuc Subs! We have to have people who know how to actually use submarines. And training that takes the boat deep enough to offer experience for the entire crew!
Hello PASSEDMOST. I strongly disagree with your statement; “We have to have people who know how to actually use submarines”. Canada’s submariners are among the best in the world. Their experience has borne this out on many occasions by most of our NATO allies. Canadians actually know how to use submarines no matter what class they are sailing in. Certainly they would have to have some training on any new class of AIP/NUC boat but this would not take that long to accomplish as the “silent service” personnel are very adept at this.
Buy the new Singaporean type 218 first! It is in production and not that expensive! We do not need to pay a premium for a stop gap measure (design fees)! Replace the four Vic class! And start to build up sea time within the fleet! In a decade or two, when the navy proves to Ottawa they can actually get their s@@t together under the surface. Ottawa maybe more willing to consider Nuc subs.
Hello again PASSEDMOST. Singapore Navy’s First Type 218SG Invincible-Class Submarine may be a fine boat for Littoral Ops but not a great boat for high Arctic or open ocean Canadian missions. She is smaller than the Victoria class in all respects. I would go with the German Type 216 boat (if it had an AIP capability) first. Or possibly the Japanese Soryu class. They would both fit Canada’s requirements much better than the 218SG.
I also believe that we are getting off the original topic for Dave Prior’s original “Case for a Polar Multifunctional Security Vessel PMSV. Let’s just leave the Canadian discussion of submarine replacements for another day. Cheers!
A1. I’m standing by to answer questions, or get flummoxed.
The 218SG would not be a good option for Canada, they are designed specifically to what the navy of Singapore needs which is a decent littoral submarine as such it is designed and built in this way. (Same as Swedish boats)
They are also 20 meters shorter than the derivative they came from the type 216, they are also slightly smaller than the Victoria class and narrower too.
They also are built with many features that the RCN does not require nor would be workable in a Canadian climate so the deletion or change of such items would raise the price of acquisition by quite a bit.
To give you an example they use a different type of steel and it is treated in a different way to the German type 212A this is because of the saline conditions around Singapore, moreover the 218SG is specifically designed to operate in tropical climates no good in high arctic conditions.
While the 218SG does have some legs being able to stay submerged for 28 days this is no real great achievement when you consider its smaller stable mate it capable of the same endurance and handles the open ocean much better too.
Canada requires a submarine that is capable of limited under ice capabilities with the ability to punch through an ice sheet, it also requires long endurance for trans Atlantic and Trans Pacific operations something the 218SG would find very difficult to do.
The Soryu are fine boats yet also have limitations that would mean not fit for Canadian service, they are not true AIP boats in the pure sense they use sterling engines to remain submerged (from Sweden) so technology transfer would have to involve the Swedes before any sale proposal could be made.
They are also not capable of operating in the Arctic and what’s more they too are optimized for warm water operations.
That said they are capable of long endurance missions submerged but another handicap is that Japan has no export experience and the Soryu is no longer being produced either.
I forgot to add we should be looking at a submarine that can work with other arctic assets such as the PMCV, and as we use a lot of European and American technology we should look in that direction.
The PMCV should have the ability to operate as part of a multi layered operation encompassing Aircraft such as the P8A / CP140 the PMCV and Sub this would effectively cover all arctic aspects.
Perhaps if the design was to go ahead there could even be a logistical element put into the PMCV to enable scientific research and resupply for arctic camps, you could also utilize the PMCV to restore a submarine as well.
Reply to Blair Shaw: Agreed. PMSVs are ideal for supporting submarines in the Arctic. PMSVs have the interior volume for that role. The moon pools may prove useful. They can also provide other services, as seen in the conclusion: “PMSVs are not just useful for security operations; they have the strength, size, workable Arctic oil spill tools and on-site storage capacity to achieve success, particularly in winter conditions. A single PMSV can store 40,000 bbls of recovered oil in below-deck heated tanks. All existing technology must wait for the ice to melt, which is months too late to prevent the escape of the oil and the poisoning of the ocean, shoreline and community ecosystems. As well, PMSVs stationed throughout Canada’s Arctic would be equipped to handle medical emergencies, routine medical needs and evacuations. With their large decks, cranes and interior spaces, PMSVs can also deliver essential goods, including in the winter with icebreaker assistance. In the event of a cruise ship incident, PMSVs have highly trained crews, available interior space and an ability to facilitate the offloading of lifeboats by lowering freeboard and side doors. PMSVs can supply instant medical assistance and adequate food and shelter for hundreds of people.”
Reply to Blair Shaw: I overlooked your reference to research work. Indeed, the PMSV is well suited to incorporating a large, permanent research area c/w moon pools and accommodations for many researchers.
I think the 216 is a dead duck it looks good on paper and undoubtedly would be but the fact is none have been produced and quite frankly there is something better out there.
Currently the type 212CD version being built for Norway & Germany with the possibility of the Dutch joining the program would be a better fit, and also with TKMS being worked up to add additional building capacity the speed at which these boats could hit the water will likely be fast, Norway has ordered 4 boats out of 6 the first to be laid down this year and be in service by 2029.
If Canada could jump in on this program I could foresee great cost savings with acquisition and build moreover the speed at which we could have them deployed would be pretty quick too.
However provided we don’t try and radically alter the design this could indeed enhance the number of submarines to 6 rather than allowing greater flexibility in the fleet.
The CD is a step up from what has gone before with its diamond shape outer casing providing additional stealth characteristics, increased range and sensors among other things.
The type 212A while is a proven design and the CD is a much refined and enlarged version being 17m longer and 3.2m wider and utilizing AIP giving longer range options.
The 212A a few years ago undertook a 3 week submerged transit without surfacing the CD version could potentially double that making operations under the ice more viable for the RCN.
Overall if you look at the NAC Discussion paper written by Vice admiral Robert Davidson titled “submarine procurement widening the aperture of operations” there’s one key note he makes that chimes with me.
He writes “Key strategies to achieve this include avoid using unique designs and a built in Canada solution”
The type 212CD isn’t a unique design (the 216 is) it has a proven stable mate in the 212A and at least two other nations will operate the class with a potential of a third, not to mention the countries that already operate 212 Variants (Italy, Greece & Israel).
What this means is Canada wouldn’t be the first to operate the boats so all the kinks and problems should already have been worked through by the time potential Canadian boats come online, expertise, parts and equipment etc will be plentiful and not custom built like the Victoria class, what is more German ship yard workers could help train Canadians (like they did with Greece, Israel, Singapore & Italy) while in build so our own work force will be much better equipped to maintain the boats if acquired.
Operating the 212CD will allow Canada the ability to better train with our NATO partners in the future as they would operate nearly identical boats which ultimately means better options for crew exchanges and joint training.
As for a nuclear option while I see a lot of merit in obtaining such vessels I do think overall that it is well out of our reach even for the longer term, I don’t see the political side green lighting a nuclear program like this given the huge costs involved in acquiring, maintaining and operating such a vessel. Moreover the time it would take to train crews on the type would be very long (Australia is doing this now) we’re talking at least a good decade to obtain the right training.
I would also point out that facility infrastructure would need a major upgrade costing billions of dollars on top of the program cost and quite frankly there’s no votes in it for the political class nor would they be able to justify the expenditure to the electorate.
I did somewhere write a paper on this a few years ago when the UK was looking at options for increasing the submarine fleet of the Royal Navy the problem they faced was the other way around
Hello,
This would essentially be an ice-hardened and militarized version of semi-submersible support ships (see Vard/Fincantieri https://vardmarine.com/vessels/vessel-gallery/?cat=CSS%20Designs). Are there any other comparable platforms?
I understand the desire to identify synergies and the opportunity to co-locate capabilities, but is it wise to cram so many requirements into one platform? It seems like it would translate to significant construction and maintenance complexity. Wrapping a lot of special capabilities into a single unit seems like a bottleneck. I’d like to see the capabilities distributed to multiple platform types. Leave oil-spill cleanup to specialized unarmed units that can be escorted by icebreakers. Let constabulary/police and defense duties be performed by armed RCN units, and allow this multi-functional vessel to optimize as a semi-submersible mobile base meant to extend presence and work in tandem with onshore facilities and infrastructure. The crews of separate vessel types can therefore be more specialized and effective instead of being required to do too many things.
Using such large vessels to ram or push smaller ones seems counter-intuitive to me. Assuming the belligerent vessels can operate in such ice-prone conditions, wouldn’t they be more agile and manoeuverable than the proposed PMSV?
Regardless of the platform, I like the idea of more bases and permanent Canadian presence in the North.
Regards!
Hello Curious Civilian, Unfortunately there don’t seem to be any comparable platforms out there right now. Yes I believe David Priors PMSV ‘exercise’ has some merit and should be at least seriously examined. Is it too much for one vessel? Maybe, but what other options can you put forth with other vessels now in service? The use of these PMSVs as oil-spill cleanup could be turned over to the CG but they have no vessels at the present that can do that task effectively. The RCN at this time has no vessels (including Halifax/CSC frigates, Victoria class SSKs and Protecteur Class JSS) that can continually operate up in the high Arctic. We need a vessel that can do everything. Like a Swiss Army Knife, jack of all trades and master of ‘some’. These PMSVs, depending on size, could be utilized for David Prior’s proposals for any size of foreign actor ships. His idea is that it doesn’t need to be sunk like a Titanic type of vessel; just disabled enough so it could not be utilized and would have to go back ‘home’ for significant repairs.
A PMSV has nothing in common with a semi-submersible support ship. A PMSV is a much more compact version of this vessel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_onINY4rq74 (minutes 4:20 to 5:30) and this vessel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqQzpgVY_ks
The main differences with a PMSV are that a PMSV is dominant in close-quarters hostility, is ice capable, can launch and retrieve landing craft in much rougher seas, and can protect the ocean and ice from spilled oil (an immediate danger to the Arctic). A PMSV is not an overly complex vessel, not much more complex than a DeWolf-class AOPS. The oil spill technology is fully automated and has no moving parts other than pumps. It’s a drop-in module. Installing pipe berths and other accommodations for 150 troops in a warehouse-like space is normal and simple ship technology. Interior space for vehicles and research is also just a by-product of the design requirements for oil spill recovery. It’s empty space awaiting a purpose. The landing craft well is just a ramp, a gate, a door and two standard marine winches. No extra crew are required to perform the non-military tasks. It’s too expensive to have multiple ships designed to address various threats which rarely occur but are catastrophic so must be prepared for. Vessels intruding into Canada’s Arctic, particularly in winter, will likely be larger than a PMSV. Regardless, a PMSV is quite maneuverable (twin widely spaced propellers, bow and stern thrusters) and quite fast. All vessels operating in heavy ice have restricted maneuverability. A PMSV is capable of interfering with the progress of any intruding surface vessel, thus encouraging it to leave without using lethal force. If escalation occurs at close quarters, a PMSV will dominate any intruder and force it to retreat.
Hello David. I understand completely what you are proposing rather than vessels like the Juan Carlos or Mistrael class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs). Not an LHD but larger than an AOPS. Something between say 10,000 to about 23,000 tonnes with a Catamaran steel hull. Just trying to give you some options with this PMSV. Norway & Finland do have vessels that may be able to fit more closely within your vision like Norways Kronprins Haakan Polar class 3 ice breaker or Finlands Polaris class Polar class 4. The US is ready to build its new Polar class 2 ice breaker USCG Sentinel class. The new Canadian Coast Guard Polar class 2 John G. Diefenbaker class may also be an option, although they all do not have Catamaran construction but possibly could be converted? They are all between 110-150m in length with Beams between 21-28m and Drafts between 7-10.5m. Full speeds between 17-20+ kts. If you wanted ice breaking power, I would consider the Sentinel or Diefenbaker class as possible options. My only concern is that your assumption that if an escalation does occur, why would any threat get that close to any PMSV. They would just “stand-off” and take care of the PMSV PDQ (Pretty Darn Quick) and shoot to kill or have their SSN do the dirty work which tactically you would also have to consider. This would have the PMSV either retreating PDQ or sending it to a premature death. Obviously the element of surprise by the PMSV would be critical to any ramming scenario. I believe though with what you want to achieve with this PMSV Class, it has not been designed or built…..yet.
While the PMSV has a wider beam than an AOPS, there is no need for it to have more displacement. One of its most important roles is to protect Arctic waters from oil spills. Currently there is little concern about this damage but that will change as the oceans and climate deteriorate into a deepening crisis. Conventional oil spill technology, first developed 50 years ago, could not protect the balmy Gulf of Mexico in the summertime in 2010; BP only recovered 3% of the DWH oil spill (Report to the President, page 168). Such equipment and techniques will never protect Arctic waters. Installing it on conventional icebreakers won’t turn them into oil spill ships. Only truly modern oil spill technology will work in the Arctic and that requires a catamaran or trimaran hull. Also, because a PMSV is an oil spill ship, it has to follow the oil, including into shallow water. Deep draft is a disadvantage for an oil spill ship while likely an advantage for an icebreaker. They are not interchangeable ships. A PMSV has to be a modern oil spill ship but does not have to be a true polar icebreaker. A PMSV can rely on true polar icebreakers to break ice in heavy ice conditions. Polar Class 4 is likely adequate. For dealing with intruders into Canadian territory, PMSVs service the “grey zone” — no longer peace (AOPS) but not yet war (frigates and submarines). An encounter with an intruder will likely begin as a constabulary action which will bring the vessels closer together. The Cod Wars were a good example of this kind of confrontation. Unlike AOPS, PMSVs will be heavily armed, and armoured, to handle both close engagements and distant ones. Because of its multiple roles and unique design (hundreds of internal bulkheads for tankage, etc), the MFSV will likely be more survivable when attacked than an intruder. It’s also likely that a PMSV will not be alone and isolated when it approaches an intruder. Long before the PMSV approaches an intruder, I think NATO submarines under the ice will have already positioned themselves to respond to hostile submarines or vessels attacking the PMSV. The goal of the PMSV is to police and dominate without shooting, but if the shooting starts, the PMSV will have the upper hand to force a fast withdrawal. The ramming does not rely on surprise to be effective at persuading an intruder to leave. Just the intent to ram will likely get the desired results. The recent example of the old Chinese fishing vessel chasing away the armed USCG cutter comes to mind. The goal is to make the intruder go away, not sink it. Although a PMSV has not been designed and built yet, hundreds of vessels incorporating one or more of the PMSV’s features have been built over hundreds of years. The engineering knowledge and research facilities have long existed to develop, design and build a simple PMSV, which has more in common with a Ro-Ro cargo ship than a frigate. https://nrc.canada.ca/en/research-development/nrc-facilities/ice-tank-90-m-research-facility .
Hello again David. I have a couple of questions reguarding your PMSV project as related to the type (s) of aircraft on board. What size is your hangar area for your Medium to Heavy lift helicopters going to be? I suspect that if you want to transport at a minimum 150+ soldiers ashore, you would have to have at least 4 to 6 helos (possibly 4 CH 148 Cyclones and/or at least 3 Chinook helos). Were you considering carrying UAV Helo Drones like the SKELDAR V-200? As you may know, the RCN and Canadian Army have already acquired this Helo Drone for at sea or land based aerial reconnisance for the Halifax class and the CSC frigate as well (possibly 2). Video below. Cheers!:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeFHnwfQzek
Reply to David Dunlop: The helicopter hangar can be as large as 35m x 15m. This can accommodate four CH-148s. The SKELDAR V-200 looks like an excellent match. A PMSC drone hangar can measure 25m x 15m and accommodate fourteen of these drones.
Hello David. You may want to think about a slightly larger hangar space for A/C maintenance and spare parts. I don’t think you will need 14 SKELDAR V-200 HELO drones per PMSV (perhaps 3 or 4 per vessel & a couple of spares), but yes at least 4 CH 148 troop transport helos or 4 Chinooks would do. The Saab designed SKELDAR drone would be excellent units for the PMSV fleet. You can either house them in regular 20ft containers or have their own dedicated spaces within the hangar. Of course you would have to account for crew for these drones (2 operators and maintenance crew per drone). Cheers!
Reply to David Dunlop: Regarding helicopters and drones, there are two jobs to be done. The first job is to operate them as part of the PMSV’s normal duties. For this role, two CH148s and four SKELDAR V-200s should suffice (the AOPS only carry one CH148). This smaller number of aircraft allows ample hangar space for maintenance and spare parts. It is unlikely there will be 150 soldiers, requiring four CH148s, onboard the PMSV when it is performing routine tasks. The second job is to transport 150 troops, with extra CH148s for the troops, plus materiel like extra drones. If troops are being delivered to a conflict zone the extra drones would be advantageous for the troops to have onshore. Extra drones and CH148s may also be useful for search and rescue. Having the ability to increase the number of helicopters and drones carried onboard a PMSV is a flexibility worth having in the Arctic. A PMSV and a JSS are not interchangeable; they each have unique, and essential, advantages. They complement each other. Putting all our Arctic eggs in a few large baskets is a risky strategy and does not satisfy the need for as many “bases” as possible to support Canadian year-round activities throughout the Arctic. A year-round presence of PMSVs throughout the Arctic may also reduce the likelihood of having to send an expeditionary force to the region. With PMSVs deployed, the Canadian Arctic will be a fast-reacting porcupine, not a slow-reacting sitting duck. The “reaction” is slow because it only begins to be effective after the expeditionary force has arrived at the location where it is needed. That takes considerable time and a lot of money to accomplish. The war in Ukraine suggests that being well-prepared, and deployed, before the intrusion begins may prevent the intrusion from occurring.
Hello and thank you for the replies.
I don’t intend to be critical for its own sake, just poking at this concept constructively. You both confirm that there is no current comparable vessel or known applicable hull design of this scope and size? If so, then the PMSV would be a new design with unknown hydraulic and operational characteristics. Starting a new design from scratch with unknown operational variables will be inherently complex, even when the end-use appears simple.
If there are no existing analogs to this vessel, it is difficult to take at face value what such PMSV “can” do.
Do we have the capability in-country to produce and evaluate such novel designs? Our northern maritime advantage suggests that we should be leaders in ice-capable marine technology. I hope one outcome of the National Shipbuilding Strategy will be to build this capability. I wish our federal government would establish an enduring naval research body that can innovate in this sector outside the boom/bust defense cycles. I wish we established a testbed for innovative water craft with the long-term capability to produce things like this PMSV.
Once we’re capable of conceptualizing, designing and producing specialized equipment through our own efforts and resources, then we’ll have gone a long way towards true sovereignty.
Regards!
There already exist vessels that have much in common with a PMSV https://usa.austal.com/ships/expeditionary-fast-transport-epf https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/spearhead-class/ . The main difference is that the Spearhead class ships are built of lightweight aluminum in order to achieve very high speeds. Although a PMSV has not been designed and built yet, hundreds of vessels incorporating one or more of the PMSV’s features have been built over hundreds of years. The engineering knowledge and research facilities have long existed to develop, design and build a simple PMSV, which has more in common with a Ro-Ro cargo ship than a frigate. https://nrc.canada.ca/en/research-development/nrc-facilities/ice-tank-90-m-research-facility . A PMSV occupies territory familiar to engineers and shipbuilders.
Canada has the capability in-country to produce and evaluate novel ship design. This is not new ground for Canada
https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/services/history/ships-histories/bras-dor.html . Today, Canada is capable of conceptualizing, designing and producing PMSVs. Compared to a “flying” warship, developing and building PMSVs is quite pedestrian.
Hello David. Yes, the USN EPF design is certainly something that could be looked at along with the spearhead class EPF JSFVs would also be worth looking at but with larger specifications for a PMSV Trimaran concept.
Hello Curious Civilian. If you take a look at David Prior’s reply with respect to the Finnish Aker ARC 131 design concept [https://akerarctic.fi/app/uploads/2018/09/trimaes.pdf] you will see where this Trimaran vessel concept comes from. It is a unique design and David is trying to visualize this design within a 100m vessel design of a PMSV for the RCN with some “teeth”. You are right in that there are no ships of this concept anywhere and must be built from scratch, but he believes this can be accomplished within Canada. So, the concept is there however Canada must take the next steps to realize this kind of vessel. Cheers
Reply to David Dunlop: The USN EPF dimensions are indeed suitable for a PMSV, plus the fact that only 21 core crew are required https://www.austal.com/ships/expeditionary-fast-transport-t-epf . A multifunctional PMSV may require more crew, but not a lot more. However, the USN EPF’s need for speed limits its capabilities for other essential tasks that a PMSV needs to perform (icebreaking, oil spill recovery, stern ramp for launching a heavy landing craft or hovercraft). High speed requires a lot of sacrifice and money. PMSVs, like AOPS, do not require high speed.
Hello David. You said that the PMSV “may require more crew, but not a lot more” and that the PMSV has a “core crew” of 21 personnel. Of that 21, how many officers and crew would you have and what trades would they be? A naval crew would have to be made up of trades like Boatswains, Naval Weapons Techs (NWTs), Combat Operators (for your operations room) and Combat Techs, Marine Engineers + at least a 21 man air crew to man & repair your helos not to mention Admin/stores personnel as a minimum with enough personnel of each trade to “man” all stations in a 1 in 2 watch system. I don’t believe that the 21 ship’s company is going to cut it, not even double that. If you are going to have SKELDAR V200 drone crew they would have to come from the HELAIRDET portion of your air crew as well. Here’s what I believe the PMSV will require at a minimum for your ship’s company:
Boswains for Deck duties-14; NWTs-10 (to repair/replenish weapons systems); Combat Operators (to include, Naval Combat Information-NCIOPs/Electronic Warfare Operators (EWs) (for Surface Warfare); Sonar Operators for under-water threat detection; Communication Operators COMMs) – a minimum of 20 personnel for an Operations Room/COMMs Room for that department alone; at least 20 Marine Engineers (to make the ship go & handle the oil spill systems); Admin/Stores/Cooks personnel (Including a ships Coxswain)-12; Medical staff (2 as a minimum) Officers -at least one officer for each department-6; 1 Executive Officer (XO) and one Commanding Officer (CO) for a grand total of 91 ship’s company/HELAIRDET at a minimum divided up into a duel watch system of around 45 personnel per watch at a minimum. Extra deck space will also have to be included for civilian scientists/personnel. So I can envision total personnel for your PMSV on sailing of around 100 personnel each with bunk and locker space for each “body”. If you can see less personnel, let me know. Cheers!
Reply to David Dunlop: I was referring to the USN EPF which apparently has a core crew of 21. The total for the PMSV will be more than 21. Certainly the PWSV can accommodate 100 personnel in acceptable accommodations. They will all be better than some of the offshore fo’c’sles I have inhabited, similar to this one (mine were off NL, but still…) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPBaqh3dcVM. Permanent crew need more privacy and space than transient crew. Each AOPS, with one CH148, apparently have 65 crew https://www.lookoutnewspaper.com/new-ships-mean-improvements-quality-life-sea/ . Do AOPS have 21 permanent air crew personnel? A PMSV can operate two CH148s if desired but it may not be necessary. Drone operators will be needed. The oil spill system requires no extra personnel. It is a very simple, automated system with no moving parts. Some crew will multi-task in order to keep them productive. All in all, a PMSV can accommodate many people, but it is a naval vessel, not a cruise ship. In a conflict scenario like an expeditionary force, materiel needs will likely intrude on personnel space but that is likely to be a rare occurrence. The interior spaces can be designed for flexible roles.
Reply to David Dunlop: Another note on accommodations. A PMSV should be able to offer, at a minimum, the following as basic accommodation for permanent crew: a room measuring approximately 2.5m x 2.5m containing two single beds. Large storage areas can be located above and below each bed. Each bed can have a small floor-to-ceiling closet at one end. Each room will have one window with a small table under it (passenger train style) for writing or laptops. Blackout curtains on each bed. There will be one compact 3-piece single-occupant bathroom for every two rooms (4 crew)….. similar to but larger than an aircraft bathroom, and with a shower head and floor drain. Could be modular. Very easy to clean and maintain. Extra bathrooms will be located on every deck throughout the vessel. All bathrooms will be accessible to anybody. The devil is in the details but I think this package is doable and economical because the superstructure is a space-efficient rectangular box. A proper gym and other amenities can also be easily located within the vessel.
For David Prior: Hello David. It is clear that you do not appreciate how a Naval ship with a full crew operates at sea. Crew accommodations on any Naval ship are made up of Mess Decks for the crew anywhere from 12 to18 personnel per Mess. Each Department or Section would have their own “Mess Deck”. For example, The Combat Department operators consisting of NCIOPs/Nav Comms & Meteorlogic Staff would have their own 12 man Mess. Each mess will consist of 3-tier bunks with black-out curtains, one locker for each mess member, a Settee area with a small table and possibly a small desk for reading or writing. The other Departments (Combat System Engineers including Naval Weapons Techs-NWTs, Marine Engineers, Boatswains, Supply-Admin-Cooks/Stewarts-Medical Staff, HELAIRDET Junior NCMs would each have their own Mess Deck as well. One Mess Deck would be allocated to more Senior NCMs (PO1/PO2). There would be Showers, Heads and Sinks enough for all Ships Company. There would be 2 person Cabins for officers (including female officers) and Senior Chiefs. The XO, Air Det Commander and Coxswain would each have their own Cabin with a small desk and sink area. The CO would have his own State-Room and Cabin away from others but close to the Bridge during any emergency. There are no “Single Beds” as you call them, only bunks. If there were enough female NCMs aboard, they too would have their own Mess Deck with separate Shower areas. The Galley would feed the Ships Company from a central area. All Junior NCMs would have their own eating and lounge areas as would all Chiefs & Petty Officers. All officers would have a Ward Room for eating and lounging. Your size for Cabins sounds about right however each Heads/Washrooms would probably be around 6-8 officers with 2 stalls and 2-3 sinks for them. Remember this is a Naval ship and not a civilian vessel or cruise ship. Yes, whenever an operational AOPS deploys, it would carry a full HELAIRDET for the CH 148 Cyclone.
Hello again David. One other question. Have you seriously thought how you would “house” your Company strength (120-150) of Army personnel? Yes you could use army cots in the hanger areas but what about sanitary issues (Heads/Washrooms). Certainly some of the Army’s cooks could be utilized in the Ships galley to feed these heros but how would you look after their sanitary issues. Bear in mind that most of these lads probably have never been to sea before so sea-sickness would be an issue and they would need extra wash places/Heads to service all their needs. I would suggest another set of large washrooms/stalls just off the Hangar Deck for that (probably around 6-8 sinks/stalls & shower facilities both Port/Stb’d in the Hangar Deck. If you do not do that, the ship’s Medical Staff would be very upset with you. Certainly any female Army Officers could bunk in the female Officers Cabins and Female Army NCMs in the Female Mess Decks (if there were any available bunks. But the rest of the “grunts” would have to be satisfied with their Cots and Kit Bags in the Hangar (if they could keep their gear from rolling around in heavy seas!). Just a thought. Cheers!
Reply to David Dunlop: The layout you describe can likely be installed in a PMSV. That’s for the naval architects to create. I did not go into details of eating etc. As you can guess from my approach, I value privacy, a lot. The important thing is that interior space is available for 100 or more crew, layout TBD.
Reply to David Dunlop: While the PMSV can accommodate most interior layouts, including traditional ones, a PMSV has the space and design (rectangular spaces) to easily allow some (or all) accommodations to have more privacy. Some people may value this increase in privacy and be more inclined to join the Navy, especially on vessels destined for long periods in the Arctic. This could assist with recruitment. The skills that modern navies require may require broadening the appeal of life onboard; more privacy may increase the appeal. Unlike a submarine or frigate, more privacy is easily achieved in a PMSV.
Reply to David Dunlop: The requirements (pipe berths, messes, bathrooms) for some of the 150 troops can be installed in the space beneath the fwd heliport (15m x 25m). More personnel and all personal equipment can be stored in the similar-sized space beneath that. The same arrangement can be created in the space beneath the main deck aft of the superstructure (8m x 35m). The aft space can be widened by carving into the port and stbd hulls. Emergencies like cruise ship or community evacuations may require some people sleeping on thin mattresses wherever there is floor space. For that reason, having many bathrooms situated throughout the vessel is a good idea. As you say, seasickness will likely be present; I believe it will be everywhere and there will be lots of it. The good news is that multihulls are generally much steadier than monohulls. It may not be necessary to invade the hangars because, except for the engine rooms, the hulls are mostly empty water ballast tanks and oil storage tanks and can be adapted easily to temporary quarters (a place to lay a mattress and sleeping bag or even install permanent pipe berths). Adequate ventilation must be provided for enclosed spaces (very dangerous). Water ballast tanks will always be clean and safe to use if well ventilated. Powerful temporary ventilation systems that insert through manholes are off-the-shelf items.
Reply to David Dunlop: Another consideration for cabins and bunks is that we are increasingly living in an age of pandemics and highly contagious diseases, aggravated by global mass air travel, urbanization and environmental degradation. This situation will not change for many decades to come. The fewer bunks per cabin, the easier it will be to control and contain contagious diseases. This issue becomes important in the Arctic because fairly large crews will be quite isolated inside remote “space stations” for several months during the winter. Disease control becomes a top priority. Frigates and submarines packed with equipment don’t allow much living space and a chance for crews to spread out into many different spaces; PMSVs, however, have this option.
I have read your most recent comments with interest. Most of what you say can be achieved, however there are some things that are different, comfort-wise, on any naval vessel. For your PMSV to “work” though, you have to convince the public that joining the Navy in this kind of craft is going to have to work for them if we are going to get recruitment up over the next few years. This kind of ship is going to have to be comfortable enough to entice males/females to want to join the RCN. Sort of a recruitment endeavour for the RCN because being up in the high Arctic for months at a time with not much to do is very boring and you could lose them over a long period of time. Depending on the time of year that the PMSV sails, will depend on how much sea sickness there is amongst the crew & “guests”. Even on a Trimaran, there will be days of rough seas. Yes, diseases are always a problem, but with a good medical staff and lectures on effective cleanliness that should keep things down to a dull roar. One of the things the RCN has learned over COVID-19, is that at least 2 weeks prior to deployment, crews are quarantined before sailing on any long deployments to get rid of any viruses. For single or married men and women on board this PMSV, there may be “certain urges” which must not be tolerated no matter what. That is why during NATO deployments for example, half the ships crew is rotated out to home (depending on where the ship is and if they can be spared to go home) and relax for a couple of weeks before returning to this “stationary” PMSV. I would have an entertainment officer posted to each PMSV to coordinate all activities for the crew. The new CSC Frigates will be light-years ahead of any ship we now have in the RCN and will be much more comfortable for ships crews during long deployments.
Reply to David Dunlop: Space is an important asset that a PMSV has. As you point out, the new CSC Frigates offer a great deal more of it, some of which can be used to benefit crew health and comfort. More living space is an added level of protection to protect health, both physical and emotional. Even a clean environment can become exposed to contagious disease if the PMSV is engaged in humanitarian work like ship or community evacuations, or even SAR. The more levels of protection, the better to avoid problems, or control the unavoidable. Your recommendations (crew rotations, entertainment officer etc) are doable on a PMSV, and important. A heavy icebreaker may need to assist in some of the logistics but such a vessel will be operating in the Arctic anyway. You mention a trimaran hull form, which is proven and works well. However, a catamaran hull has added benefits (more space on the same footprint and better strength and protection for military engagements and heavy ice). My original concept is evolving, in a good way, thanks to all these comments from readers (input from the real world).
Top-flight ventilation may help with recruitment as well: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jan/26/covid-roulette-clean-air-ventilation-long-covid
Hello David Prior,
The Northern Spill Technology website you linked with the Oil Skimmer technology lists you as founder, President and CEO: http://www.spilltechnology.com/company.html
Has there been any movement on this since the 2012/2015 tests?
I understand that the pumps and tanks can be modular and movable, but the oily water intake must be built between the two catamaran hulls. If this is a dedicated oil spill ship, then should an oil spill occur in an area surrounded by thick ice, the vessel would require dedicated ice-breaker escort to get to the spill, and capture as much oil as possible in ice-free calm conditions.
Otherwise, an ice-breaker hull would require significant customization to also carry out the oil recovery using the method you pioneered. I think it would prove difficult to effectively reconcile some conflicting requirements in a single platform.
Best of luck pushing the oil skimmer technology further.
Regards
There has been more validation of the technology; the Chinese Coast Guard (MSA) tested it with bunker C heavy fuel oil (very successfully), and several oil companies like it (Aramco, KOC, BP). However, opposition to modern oil spill technology runs deep. In 2009, CCG stated that my technology was the first truly innovative oil spill technology in 40 years. There has been no innovation since then. That must be a record for any industry. Aircraft technology has changed somewhat since 1972, but not oil spill technology. The pumps and tanks are integral with the structure of the vessel (the tanks add strength). The pumps require little space. The PMSV can recover oil spills in 10/10 broken ice of any thickness. In heavy ice, a powerful icebreaker needs to assist in reaching the oil spill site and in “preparing” the ice for the PMSV to steam into for oil recovery. In lighter ice, the Polar Class 4 PMSV does not require icebreaker assistance. The oily water is decanted before being taken into the vessel because the technology uses gravity, not brushes or conveyor belts or vacuum pumps to capture the oil. There are no moving parts to break, the hull is large, and there is no free surface effect in the system; thus oil recovery can take place in quite rough seas. The 100m PMSV hull itself is the oil spill tool, unlike the current technology in which a tiny oil spill tool is hung off the side of a 100m hull http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/RBS_TRITON_Offshore_skimming_system.m4v.flv . AkerArctic proved the viability of multihull icebreakers https://akerarctic.fi/app/uploads/2018/09/trimaes.pdf . You are right that a conventional icebreaker’s hull is unsuitable for modern oil spill technology.
I wondered why you were so passionate about new oil cleanup technology and it turns out you are the CEO of the company developing it. You should have disclosed that in your original article. From what I see, some small technology demonstrations but no test in the Arctic yet under actual ice conditions. The interesting thing about the Arctic is that technology doesn’t always work out the way you think as it’s a hostile place. It appears you may have created the concept of PMSV to cart your currently unproven in the arctic oil recovery technology. I find it also interesting that you mention China as a potential adversary in the Arctic however no mention of you demonstrating and presumably trying to sell this technology to the Chinese Coast guard which carries out on a regular basis illegal maritime activities. This is academic anyways as the government and more importantly the RCN will more than likely not build your concept. Report back when you deployed a full sized ship in the Arctic equipped with the technology and I’ll fully support it.
Thank you Ted for shining the light of knowledge on this discussion!
I would be a poor CEO if I was not passionate about the product my company was selling. If the CEO does not believe in it, that is not a good sign. So yes, I am passionate about my technology and happy to share it. It is not a secret that I need to disclose. My enthusiasm and dedication do not alter the facts that I’m presenting here for all to read, judge and debate. Let’s stick to the engineering. I have enough proven experience to know that my technology works very well indeed without ice. I also know it will work very well in ice because it utilizes the same approach that was published under the auspices of Canada’s Environmental Studies Revolving Funds ISBN 0-920783-17-1 Report 018 in 1986 in Ottawa. The Norwegians have confirmed the validity of the work done in Ottawa. Lamor uses the same principle for dealing with ice with their Sternmax 28. https://www.lamor.com/equipment/sternmax28 . My system does not use a brush, it uses gravity, but the ice grid systems in all three cases use the same principle. This “wheel” will not be re-invented and demonstrated again because it is long-proven to be effective. What is different is the method of transferring the oil floating on the water into storage tanks in the oil spill vessel. My system is the only one capable of extreme Arctic conditions because it uses gravity, not moving parts. It’s true that the PMSV is designed to incorporate my oil spill technology which is why I call it a multifunctional security vessel. Arctic security involves much more than just military security. Environmental security is of prime importance. A sole-purpose dedicated oil spill ship that can actually function in the Canadian Arctic is an extravagance that Canada cannot afford because it has to be large (expensive). To be cost-effective, it has to have more tasks to perform than just waiting for an oil spill to occur. At the same time, bolting a Sternmax 28, or worse, to the back of an icebreaker will never work in challenging Arctic ice, temperatures and winds. It is too fragile, too slow, exposed to the extremely cold atmosphere, cannot be fully automated and has many moving parts with close tolerances which will ice up. It also takes up valuable deck space and brings highly toxic oil onto the deck; oil which will invariably find its way inside the ship. With the oil comes toxic fumes (inside a tightly sealed ship operating in -50C temperatures). The PMSV has none of these problems so has the only oil spill technology compatible with Canada’s Arctic. The Sternmax 28 is more suitable for the Baltic Sea, where it was developed. All other oil spill technology in the world cannot even deal with the balmy summertime Gulf of Mexico. In 2010, BP spent 14 Billion USD on direct costs trying to clean up the DWH oil spill and only recovered 3% (three) of the spilled oil (Report to the President page 168). Arctic environmental security requires a PMSV. That is what the science and all experience tell us. The CNR article is limited to approximately 1500 words so many things had to be left out, including the work in China. Details on that, and more, can be seen here under “Brief R&D History” http://www.spilltechnology.com/company.html . It’s true that China is a military threat which is why the article mentions aggressive Chinese behaviour in Note #5. I was trying to sell to China and just about every other country on the planet oil spill technology, not PMSVs. Boeing does a lot of business in China selling passenger aircraft, but not F-35s. It can be done, and is done everyday. People who want to learn more about the PMSV and its technologies can reach me at the email address I added to the comments on January 2 (nst.spill@gmail.com). Don’t expect an elevator pitch; it will be closer in size to “War and Peace”. NDAs may be required. Deploying a full sized PMSV in the Arctic will cost more than I happen to have at the moment so I will have to proceed without your support.
If you wanted to push your product you should have done that, while being upfront about your personal stake in the discussion.
I agree. Hidden agendas are so irritating. Now back to the engineering….
This is the Lamor Sternmax 28 in action https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LbIsNRqfeQ
As they say, there is nothing entirely new under the sun. In 2004 the EU invested 2M Euros in a 3,547,500 Euro project to develop a trimaran oil spill ship measuring 146.6m LOA, 40m BOA, 7.2m Draft, with a tonnage of 14,000t https://slideplayer.com/slide/13856937/ https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/516230 . It was estimated that the vessel would cost approximately 150M USD to build in 2008. The Oil Sea Harvester (OSH) vessel was fine for open waters but was too fragile for the Canadian Arctic or for use in hostile situations. Its capability was also substandard compared to a PMSV. For example, its harvest capacity was only 6,000t compared to a PMSV’s harvest capacity of 40,000t, and its oil spill recovery was an antiquated brush conveyor system, which is directly exposed to the cold and ice. It would soon be destroyed in the Arctic. The PMSV oil recovery system uses gravity, nor brushes or conveyors, and the entire system is deep under the surface (and ice) or inside the heated interior of the vessel.
Correction: I said 40,000t, above. That should read 40,000 oil bbls (6,000t). While both the PMSV and the OSH can store the same amount of recovered oil, the OSH is twice as large as the PMSV.
Regarding weaponry: There is no need to pack the PMSV with high-tech electronics and long-distance weapons like a frigate. Long-distance situational awareness and defense can be provided by NATO satellites and other assets. The PMSV focuses on short-range and close-range hostilities. Weapons like these, emerging from the roof of the superstructure only when ready to fire, are suitable for a PMSV https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYgBy7S-T_g&t=176s minute 6:25. All weapons on the PMSV will emerge from the roof of the superstructure when ready to fire. At minute 8:15 we can see weapons suitable for a PMSV. Twin Mark 38 guns (port & stbd) are likely a better match with a PMSV than the 76mm gun on the Norwegian vessel https://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-38-machine-gun-system.htm . Other weapons might be these https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-162_ESSM. More powerful guns are an option https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DXpPmpmcak . When a hostile situation is developing, the superstructure can be evacuated and the control room, situated between the hulls and immediately beneath the armoured main deck gun room, will take over the vessel. The control room, the most protected space on the vessel, will contain hot-bunks and messes etc for the entire crew.
Hello David. The NSM Surface to Surface Missiles that you talk about are the same missile the CSC Frigates will have (only above deck). This is not a short range missile but a Medium/Long Range Surface-to Surface system with an effective range of 185 kms. The RIM 162 ESSM latest model is also housed in the LM KMK 41 VLS system (like the CSC Frigate) for AAW. Do you intend on deploying this system inserted in the top deck of the PMSV as well? The MK 38 MOD II remote control guns either side of the top deck would be a good addition as well but why not buy the Marlin 30 RC gun system like the CSC Frigate will have from Leonardo to save money? I believe though that the Command & Control System for these armaments to be effective must have a robust CCS system like the CSC Frigate CMS 330 system. You say that the entire ships company can be housed within the Operations Room/Control Room with hot-bunks/messes for the entire crew. Sounds great but what about those poor “grunts” (120+ soldiers)? Will they be housed there as well? If so you will have to increase the number of Messes in the Operations Room. One surface strike missile from an adversary into the middle of your Operations Room/Control Room would “take-out” most of your crew and probably your Helos as well. That would not be good for your PMSV concept. You are correct though that a 76 mm or 127 mm gun would probably not be that effective up in the high Arctic.
Reply to David Dunlop: All weapons and control systems TBD by experts (not me). I think all weapons, with the exception of the large calibre guns, should be housed under the top deck of the superstructure, away from the elements and cold, emerging only to fire (a swift procedure). All control systems should be housed and operated in the control room deep in the core of the vessel. We should expect the superstructure to be demolished and plan accordingly. Crew messes and hot bunks will also be located below the main deck and everything can be strongly partitioned to minimize damage. The core measures 35m x 14m and is protected on top by the heavily armoured gun room on the main deck and on the sides by the heavily partitioned (tanks and bulkheads), ballast water-filled hulls. The floor of the control room is at or below the ocean’s surface (the hulls extend much deeper below the surface than the bottom of the core). I think with good engineering that the core can be made quite secure from strikes by missiles and artilley. You’re right that the forward troop pipe-berth accommodations are vulnerable. The forward pipe berths are on the main deck with only the forward helideck for protection from above. Thus, the messes, some bathrooms, and the hot bunks should be located in the space below the pipe berth deck. The pipe berth area is on the main deck. Below the main deck, all areas are protected on the sides by the hulls. An armoured main deck and armoured helideck above it can help bring protection up to a level that is satisfactory to protect the troops in the messes/hot bunk zone located beneath both armoured decks. Advances in armoured deck design etc will help (composite armour etc). The aft troop pipe berths can get the same treatment. One advantage of the PMSV is that there will be two distinct troop areas, one fwd and one aft of the superstructure. Both these areas can be heavily bulkheaded to further limit damage from a strike. Composite armour could play a big role in saving weight in bulkhead construction. The core area is like the magazine on traditional warships (pretty much impenetrable). My company has nothing to do with building and equipping the vessels but I believe Canadian shipyards can handle all aspects of this. My company supplies only the oil spill system (less than 2% of the price tag). You’re right that the helos will be vulnerable. The PMSV can have two hangers, one for each helipad, with a serious transverse bulkhead separating them. The forward hangar door will need an outer sliding door to handle wave impacts, but that’s basic fabrication.
In my opinion this innovative approach would present too many risks, which arise from the aim of trying to design a platform with so many functionalities. Moreover, as Ted Barnes has already stated above, “the RCN is not in the spill cleanup business or want to be”, nor has to have a dedicated platform for that.
This being said, in case of oil spill in the Arctic, if not handled by the CCG, I would dare to propose that a LPA (Landing Platform Arctic), a type of ice-strengthened vessel either similar to a LHD or a LPD, could deliver to the area a few boats with this spill technology. One or two in the well-dock (boats could range from maybe 14m up to about 30m long) and maybe two more on davits, ranging from 12m to 16m long. The LPA would also take along multiple containerized tanks for the recovered oil, pumps and other equipment as required, as well as the cleaning response teams.
Good luck with the project!
Hello J. Cañadas M. As I told Ted Barns, what ever policies the government designates for the CAF to accomplish will be what the RCN will do for any Arctic mission in whatever RCN vessel the Government says it will use. If this requires training on oil spills, then that is what they will do. Whether it be in PMSVs or LHDs/LHAs or LPAs. This technology is new and yet to be “tested” in the far north. Much more discussion will come first with Parliamentary Defence Committees before anything is “cast in stone”. Although I disagree with David Prior on some things such as using a PMSV as a slow “ramming” vessel, the technology is very interesting and could be a “game-changer” for any oil spills that may happen up in our high Arctic environment and should be seriously considered. An LHA/LHD could also work if they were ice-strengthened to at least Polar Class 3 or 4 specs. Let’s just see where this Canadian Technology leads us before we disregard it. Cheers!
Response to David Dunlop. I guess you can say that about anything, however it’s highly unlikely we would ever be tasked with that as we have a whole large organization which actually does that and sails in the Arctic on a regular basis and has large red and white ships. You are right, the technology is not tested and until it is and it appears by the amount of actual customers this technology has, it won’t be soon.
Hello Ted. Yes the CCG has “fiddled” with some out-dated oil spill technology and has not fared that well however. This “not yet tested” new technology seems to be much more effective to clean up Arctic oil spills in the future and should at least be looked at closely by Canada. perhaps give this technology another look Ted and you may see that David Prior just may have something here. The only problem I have with his PMSV Characteristics is his “ramming” abilities especially when it relates to foreign Arctic Naval “Super-Powers”. I just don’t think that would be the right use for the PMSV fleet. I can’t see a Russian Frigate or even their Nuclear Ice Breakers ever getting that close to a PMSV before they decide to make the PMSV “have a bad day”. Cheers!
A PMSV will commence engagement with intruders as a constabulary action by the PMSV, not with hostile and threatening aggression. This allows coming close alongside. When alongside, an intruder cannot use heavy weapons like missiles; even deck guns are limited by ultra-close range. In addition, by the time the PMSV comes alongside an intruder, NATO sea and air assets are likely becoming part of the equation. These assets may encourage an intruder to hold its fire. If an intruder ignores orders from the PMSV to retreat, the PMSV can ram and render the intruder unseaworthy, forcing it to withdraw without using lethal force. An example of this can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FsOytZMRXo0&t=42s minute 54:00. If the intruder escalates hostilities with lethal force, the PMSV can respond in kind with its large caliber guns, which are ideally situated for firing close alongside. One AP round will likely lead to a fast withdrawal by an intruder. At all times, lethal fire by the PMSV is defensive fire, responding to lethal fire from an intruder. The Cod Wars created the blueprint for dealing with “peace-time” intruders 50 years ago. If a fast intruder ignores the slower PMSV, the PMSV can follow and harass it until it leaves. This is traditional naval strategy. There will be no secret, unmolested intrusions into Canadian territory.
For David Prior. Hello David. If you intend on this “constabulary action” engagement between a PMSV and an Admiral Gorshkov class Frigate, you had better get “special” dispensation from our masters in Ottawa first. No naval vessel, Russian or otherwise, would ever let you get that close to them for that kind of engagement. A stand-off range of at least a few miles would be as close as you would ever get to any intruder worth his salt. If you even tried that trick, your impressive ramming PMSV would be at the bottom of the Arctic ocean before you had a chance to call for help. None of our present or future naval ships would be able to come to your assistance anyway because we don’t have anything in the “kit bag” that could respond because we do not have anything that can go that far north in the high Arctic so you would be on your own. And don’t forget about the Akula class Nucs as well. Any sign of aggression with the PMSV and you would most likely find a Russian torpedo landing in the PMSV operations/control room. So, what I would suggest is have a plan first. Make sure that if you intend on cleaning up oil spills, that is exactly what you should do and not think about doing something irresponsible like attempting to ram a heavily armed Russian naval ship. I would suggest having a little insurance policy with you in the form of an Astute or Virginia class SSN to give both the Russian ship and its Akula class pause as we do not have a Canadian submarine that can help you either. Your traditional naval strategy simply will not work against modern naval threats. You will lose not only an excellent oil-spill vessel but several hundred brave sailors and “grunts” in the process.
How do you know your scenario is the one that will play out? We had better hope it won’t, for the sake of our Harry DeWolf AOPS. Icelandic patrol vessels were not afraid to take on frigates and Ukraine was not afraid to defeat Russia. Were they irresponsible, or courageous and skilled? I don’t see why Canada would be afraid to enforce Canadian law in Canada’s Arctic. It’s unlikely that Russia or China will attempt to sink a PMSV, creating unknown consequences which will almost certainly be extremely negative for them for a good long time. Risking war in order to defend the right to trespass is very unlikely to happen. No modern nation violently defends that absurd and minor “right”. Of course, invading is a different matter. Confronting trespassers is pretty normal activity for any navy. How often has addressing peace time, non-violent trespassing escalated into pre-emptively sinking ships? If the number is not zero, it’s close to it. Engaging in war action in the Arctic is also highly risky for the aggressor. Wild animals are smart enough to know that they must avoid getting wounded, even if they are capable of being dominant in a fight. Hungry polar bears attack and eat walruses, and sometimes die in the attempt (tusks). Intruders in the remote Arctic know they cannot afford to be badly damaged in a violent encounter, particularly when trespassing on foreign territory. Help will not arrive. They are not likely to pre-emptively engage in risky behaviour over something as trivial as trespassing. They will retreat before it escalates because they will know the PMSV has weapons and techniques instantly capable of inflicting severe, possibly crippling, damage and that PMSVs are backed by NATO. Deliberately trying to destroy a PMSV is an act of war. It goes without saying that headquarters will determine which tools the PMSV can deploy, and when. I believe they are called Rules of Engagement.
You say “Your traditional naval strategy simply will not work against modern naval threats.” . The PMSV does not sound like today’s traditional naval vessel; nothing quite like it has been built. Innovation is not tradition. While Iceland successfully used the techniques deployed by the PMSV, they have not been used enough to become a tradition. PMSV tactics were once traditional (200 years ago), but today’s traditional naval tactics are the exact opposite. Today, traditional naval tactics include attacking the opponent at very long range with weapons which have zero capability of being a measured response to minor hostile action like trespassing. Tradition today means doing nothing or trying to sink an opponent committing a minor crime. Neither alternative is acceptable when not at war. Only a PMSV offers an appropriate response, which is a measured response with minimal escalation. The PMSV is designed to meet all challenges, adequately and effectively. Is the work safe at all times? No. Military work is inherently unsafe much of the time, even in peacetime. Most police work is usually risky. At least the crew on a PMSV are better protected from weaponry and disease than on many ships.
Reply to David Prior. Yes David, we all hope that “my scenario” as you say will not have to be played out. You seem to forget that Russia has thrown out the Rules-Based Order and replaced it with a crazed tyrant who seems to be willing to go to any lengths to get what he wants by any means necessary. Thankfully the Russian people have mostly seen through his lies and hopefully will make him come to his senses soon. It’s not simply a matter of Canada enforcing its own laws, but having the military backup to do it. If you think that both Russia and China have not already been in Canada’s Arctic waters over the past few years, then I suggest you think again. Their SSNs have and will again in the future trespass on our North West Passage Archipelago to test our resolve with no permission given. At least when NATO enter our waters, they have always asked permission to do so. Canada has used these “ramming techniques” before during WW II with our Flower class corvettes to sink German U-Boats. This Rule Of Engagement (ROE) would not be given to any PMSV lightly by Ottawa, (if at all) and in consultation with our NATO partners. It would only be given as a “last resort” by NDHQ. If you don’t think that foreign “actor states” would not know that information about a future PMSV vessel, then think again. If they get caught with their “Hands In The Cookie Jar”, then the stand-off begins and they probably would hasten to exit “Stage Left” (NORTH) and live to fight another day. Just having a PMSV there in the high Arctic should be enough to give them “pause”. If not, then as I said before, have a “back-up plan” to include NATO SSN units available for immediate duties. One thing is for certain though. Ottawa would never give the PMSV that ROE unless it were fired upon and only as a last resort. In which case, God help us all! Oh, by the way, Canadas RCN has always been “Ready Aye Ready”. The PMSV is a good concept for oil spills and Canadian high Arctic sovereignty missions, but it must be prepared for any eventuality and think carefully about the Akula class SSN, which you cannot see and probably never pick up on sonar until it was too late. “Have A Great Navy Day” Mate!
The modern oil spill technology installed in the PMSV was tested at Ohmsett in 2012 https://ohmsett.bsee.gov/ . Ohmsett is located at US Naval Weapons Station Earle in New Jersey, USA. This modern oil spill technology achieved an efficiency of 94%. The same year, the technology was tested in China by the Chinese Coast Guard (MSA) using bunker C heavy fuel oil (much more challenging oil than at Ohmsett). Results were the same because the PMSV’s modern oil spill capture system uses gravity to capture the oil, not brushes, conveyors etc. Unlike oleophilic brushes and conveyor belts etc, gravity works equally well on any oil, from the stickiest gunk to the thinnest sheen. This technology has been presented at conferences in North America, Asia and the Middle East. Not a single credible scientist or engineer doubted that the system would fail to work effectively in any part of the world, including the Arctic, because gravity is widely available. Gravity is also easily scalable to meet the demands of the job and the size of the oil spill vessel. There are no moving parts that need to be scaled up. Everybody agreed that the technology showed great promise, including Saudi Aramco who assisted in the design of a 20m oil spill vessel for their southern waters. CCG utilizes only conventional, long-proven oil spill technology with strong sales https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/11/06/2122006/0/en/Global-Oil-Spill-Management-Industry.html All this technology was invented soon after the 1969 Santa Barbara, CA blowout. It remains essentially unchanged today. The largest demonstration of all this technology occurred during the 2010 DWH oil spill cleanup; BP deployed 48,000 workers, 6,000 oil skimmer vessels, nearly 4,000,000 metres of floating boom and 120 aircraft. The total direct cost to BP in 2010 was 14 BILLION USD for a single accident. There will be more. Oil spills cannot be predicted and they cannot be prevented https://www.allcountries.org/uscensus/390_oil_spills_in_u_s_water.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=FCVCOWejlag . BP recovered only 3% (three) of the DWH spill: Report to the President, Page 168, Pie Chart https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121211005728/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf . In the oil spill world, there is no link between strong sales and successful performance. Obviously, the proven oil spill technology deployed by CCG and everybody else is proven-failed. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/oil-spill-cleanup-illusion-180959783/ . When the proven-failed technology deployed by CCG is demonstrated to the public, there is no sticky, thick, weathered, real-life oil being demonstrated; quite the opposite https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEoDGzBcxoI . Because “proven” in the oil spill industry means only “proven-failed”, industry and governments decades ago gave up trying to remove the oil from the water and switched to chemicals and burning to sink it into the water columns or send it up into the atmosphere as black soot https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/apr/10/black-carbon-threat-to-arctic-as-sea-routes-open-up-with-global-heating . These highly destructive techniques are also proven failures. In the DWH spill, under ideal conditions, only 5% of the oil was burned and 8% made to disappear by using chemicals (above pie chart). In the Arctic, all the numbers will be much lower and the toxic damage much greater. The obvious conclusion is that the CCG, relying entirely on state-of-the-art long-proven-failed oil spill technologies, will never be able to protect the arctic. It’s time to recognize this and start again with a clean slate. First, we need to recognize that the RCN is in charge of fighting wars, including wars against the environment. CCG has long proven that it is not up to the job; CCG, with its proven-failed oil spill tools, is actually part of the problem http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/60%20MINUTES%20interview%20w%20Toxicologist%20Wilma%20Subra.mp4 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2018.00389/full?&utm_source=Email_to_authors_&utm_medium=Email&utm_conten https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/csas-sccs/Schedule-Horraire/2021/03_01-12-eng.html Only the PMSV can incorporate the modern oil spill technology that is a paradigm shift away from the proven-failed status quo. By using intelligent engineering analysis, we can assess the likely performance of the PMSV’s oil spill system in all oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. Hundreds of credible scientists and engineers in North America, Asia and the Middle East have concluded that the technology will work well. Contrast that with the long-proven-failed status quo used by CCG and other oil spill professionals who earned 14 BILLION USD in 100 days for cleaning up only 3% of the DWH oil spill. There is a strong incentive not to innovate; the worse the performance, the longer the job takes; and they are all paid by the hour. For all the above reasons, PMSVs need to take over the job of environmental security in the Arctic and, at the same, greatly enhance military security; all this at a moderate cost.
It’s true that the PMSV’s modern oil spill technology has not been tested in the far north, but no oil spill equipment has ever been tested in the far north, probably because it has never worked effectively even under perfect conditions in southern oceans. Ohmsett, fully funded by industry, claims to test conventional equipment in “Arctic” conditions. None of this testing reminds me of the Canadian Arctic in winter (Arctic shipping and oilfields are year-round enterprises). All the tools are exceedingly flimsy and small, and loaded with moving parts that will break and freeze up, which is the opposite of a PMSV’s modern oil spill system: https://ohmsett.bsee.gov/Gazette/Ohmsett%20Gazette%20Spring%202020.pdf https://ohmsett.bsee.gov/gazette/Ohmsett%20Gazette%20Spring%202015_Final.pdf
https://ohmsett.bsee.gov/gazette/Ohmsett%20Gazette%20Spring%20Summer%202013%20Final.pdf
The PMSV’s ability to “slow-ram” an opponent is a valuable, proven technique (Iceland-UK cod wars). Tugs do it all the time, the only difference being that tugs try not to damage their target; tugs have rounded bows, heavily bumpered. Slow-ramming is a valuable weapon because it can wound the largest and most powerful opponent without causing it to sink, or causing fatalities. Slow-ramming can apply overwhelming force in a measured way, essential to minimize escalation. To maximize this ability to surgically disable a target in a measured way, a vessel must be a catamaran like a PMSV, not a conventional ship with a single hull. Compared to a PMSV with widely spaced propellers, conventional ships are too clumsy in close quarters for ship handling that requires finesse. Conventional ships also have to rotate much more to effect a slow ram. LHAs/LHDs are incapable of incorporating the modern oil spill technology utilized by a PMSV so will never function as oil spill ships in the Arctic.
While the modern oil spill technology in the PMSV has not been tested in Canada’s arctic yet, it has been carefully developed, including work done at MUN https://asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/offshoremechanics/article-abstract/137/2/021301/376511/Hydrodynamic-Simulation-and-Optimization-of-an-Oil?redirectedFrom=fulltext https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Wei-Qiu-2056814556 https://www.mun.ca/engineering/about/our-people/wei-qiu/
Canada’s frigates and submarines are filled with many functionalities (anti-ship, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, covert landings, SAR, patrol, humanitarian missions, etc). All these functionalities are performed effectively and they are orders of magnitude more challenging than the various tasks aboard a PMSV, which is basically an armed cargo vessel. It’s true that the RCN is not in the oil spill cleanup business, but neither is anybody else. CCG is supposed to be in charge of cleaning up oil spills in the Arctic but they cannot even clean up oil spills in the balmy summertime Gulf of Mexico, and neither can anybody else in the world. CBC Doc Zone _ Blowout NL offshore oil spill 2010 (minute 11:05 to 12:48) (minute 22:38 to minute 27:23). http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/Doc%20Zone%20-%20Blowout%20-%20Is%20Canada%20Next%202010-12-09.flv Current oil spill technology will never clean up oil spills in the Arctic https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/adm-zukunft-we-are-not-ready-for-arctic-oil-spills CCG has declared that there has not been any true innovation in oil spill innovation in 50 years except for the modern oil spill technology in the PMSV. RCN vessels are the right home for this new oil spill technology because it will not work with CCG icebreakers or DFO vessels. We need a clean slate and the new PMSC can perform several important military tasks that are currently not being met by existing RCN ships. The oil spill function requires only 1% of the interior space and 0% of the deck space of the PMSV. The remaining space can benefit both naval and oil spill activities, or benefit only naval activities. The result is that 99% of the vessel is supporting naval activities. While oil spills are rare, they must be cleaned up. It is going to get worse: https://priceofoil.org/2022/02/08/norway-briefing-press-release/ https://www.arctictoday.com/russian-oil-companies-see-to-soften-environmental-law-ahead-of-a-big-push-into-the-arctic/ https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2022/11/putins-top-oilman-praises-xi-jinping-invites-china-arctic . All oil spills (petroleum, biofuels, vegetable oil in bulk ships) need to be cleaned up asap because they are all lethal to ecosystems. They all kill feathered and furred creatures by hypothermia. Meeting these challenges will require innovation. With the PMSV, the RCN is demonstrating innovation in action. Chemicals and burning will not be allowed in the future. Several of Canada’s northern neighbours in NATO have banned the chemicals. Chemicals have no future https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0269749112004344 https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/csas-sccs/Schedule-Horraire/2021/03_01-12-eng.html . Neither does burning the oil http://www.sciencepoles.org/article/black-carbon-playing-major-role-in-arctic-climate-change . You propose various smaller boats to clean up oil spills. In trying to clean up the DWH oil spill in 2010, BP deployed 6,000 oil skimmer boats, most of them small. When a large ship was deployed, its oil spill tool was very small so the big ship was no more effective than a small boat http://www.spilltechnology.com/videos/Trans-Rec_Skimmer.mp4 . The only oil spill tool that actually worked was the Big Gulp barge which was 100m LOA. Its oil capture tool, the hull, was crude and highly inefficient but it worked better than anything else because it was so big https://app.louisianasportsman.com/lpca/index.php?section=reports&event=view&action=full_report&id=79147&catID= . Any oil spill boat small enough to fit on a ship is far too small to be effective in the Canadian Arctic. Heavy ice will simply push it aside. These small boats will also require storage for the captured oil. These tanks will need to be heated in order to pump out the oil. The PMSV can store 6,000t of captured oil in heated tanks inside the hulls. That is a lot of heated, containerized tanks (160) to store somewhere on a ship. Transport Canada estimates that a tanker ship accident will spill 20,000t of oil. The container ship “CMA CGM Benjamin Franklin” has an oil tank for its main engine that holds 15,000t of fuel oil. These are big numbers a long way from home and infrastructure. Only PMSVs can handle the logistics. A PMSV’s modern oil spill system also offers a unique military benefit. Because its modern oil spill system is fully automated, it can utilize autonomous vessel technology https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3dMFr09OeI&feature=youtu.be and also AI when operating in ice-free waters. An oil slick is not an unbroken carpet of oil. Usually, 50% of the oil slick zone is oil-free water and 50% consists of hundreds or thousands of patches of oil. AI allows the vessel to travel over the patches of oil but not waste time and fuel passing over oil-free water. Sensing technologies detect the oil patches https://rutter.ca/oil-spill/ https://www.glamox.com/global-marine/products/outdoor/searchlights/remote-controlled/lncls-35012-af/ The AI utilizes this information to steer the PMSV over the patches of oil but not over the oil-free water. The AI can also coordinate a swarm of oil spill drones from the PMSV mothership when conditions allow. The RCN may create other uses for these drones. Ukraine has had recent success with swarms of sea-going drones. This Boston company is going flat-out developing their AI vessel technology with the UK and US navies https://mas400.com/ . They like the PMSV.
In my previous comment to you I included a link to the Report to the President, Page 168, Pie chart. It has recently become an inoperative link. This link currently works: https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121211005728/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf
Agreed. Militarily, what the PMSV brings to the table are responses that fill the gap between wagging a finger (AOPS) and unleashing a “nuclear” response (missile or torpedo). As you say, Russia and China are outliers and will not play by the rules unless forced to. All they understand is sufficient force deployed against them. In addition, the PMSV is not operating in a vacuum, all by itself. The Russian SSN tracking the PMSV would know that it is also being tracked by someone from NATO. This awareness will help keep rash actions at bay. A friend of mine served on US nuclear subs and would say that there are only two kinds of naval vessels, submarines and targets. A bit cheeky but worth keeping in mind that, even if one is in a submarine, one can also be a target of a submarine. The goal of the PMSV is to deploy effective force without incurring casualties and escalation, and with minimal fuss. Ripped hull plating does not count as a casualty. WW II escorts violently ramming U-Boats had as a goal the sinking of the U-Boat. Slow-ramming to damage an opponent is much less dramatic; it is more of a deliberate accident where nobody gets hurt. It can be used with less concern about consequences. Thanks to its unique features, only a PMSV can most effectively utilize the slow-ramming tool. As you say, the fact that intruders know that PMSV “porcupines” are present will likely give them pause about trespassing. No warship can afford to have its hull damaged in the Arctic, especially when intruding where they should not be. There are bound to be consequences, military, diplomatic or otherwise (storm waves).
Hello David. Yes, your Submariner friend is correct. The only threat any submarine has is another submarine Nuc or Diesel, and there are only targets for them. Well, this has certainly been a very exciting forum response to David Prior’s PMSV ideas (82 Comments so far – must be some sort of record) and has open up many eyes as to what Canadian Technology is out there today for tomorrow’s oil spills in our high Arctic. I will now bow-out on this topic knowing that there is something out there that can really help with future spills world-wide. Good luck David with this new technology and I will see all forum members on other topics. Cheers, and Have A Great Navy Day!
Thank you David. All the forum comments, both pro and con, have helped to refine the PMSV concept. I know my thinking has changed because of the forum. Thanks to all.
The current issue of the Journal of Ocean Technology, https://www.thejot.net/current-issue/ , has a guest article by John Risley that emphasizes the need for new thinking https://www.thejot.net/article-preview/?show_article_preview=1407 . Mr Risley’s editorial concludes by stating that: “I hope I have reinforced the idea that there are no silly suggestions. We need action, and we need it now.”
The Ukraine war drives home why John Risley is right when he says “We need action and we need it now.” Russia increasingly relies on the Arctic to export its oil: “Oil tankers without ice-class protection could soon start shuttling on Northern Sea Route” https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2023/03/oil-tankers-without-ice-class-protection-could-soon-start-shuttling-northern-sea-route . This activity is now underway: “Still plenty of sea-ice as Russia sends two major oil tankers through remotest Arctic waters” https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2023/07/still-plenty-sea-ice-russia-sends-two-major-oil-tankers-through-remotest . Arctic currents will sweep spilled Russian oil to the West, where there is currently zero capability to clean it up as it arrives. We know this because the worlds greatest oil spill mitigation effort in the balmy summertime waters of the Gulf of Mexico, in the industrial heartland of America, only recovered 3% (three) of the oil (see the pie chart on page 168): https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121211005728/http:/www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf ).
Without PMSVs, it will be a different outcome in the Arctic…..0%, although poisoning by the preferred oil spill tools will remain the same:
– https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/csas-sccs/Schedule-Horraire/2021/03_01-12-eng.html
– https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by0MhP4bW0k&t=269s Minutes 4:33 to 4:55 are interesting. The scientists trying to refine their 1970’s oil spill tools (dispersants, surfactants and mineral fines) in order to better sink the highly toxic oil compounds into the fragile Arctic Ocean ecosystem recognize that it is very important to “physically recover any oil that is released from the experiments” in order to protect the Arctic. However, their experiments and oil spill tools actually guarantee that the oil will be dissolved into the water column, impossible to recover and lost forever. Only PMSVs meet the stated requirement of the oil spill experts, a requirement necessary to protect the Arctic……”Get the oil physically out of, and off of, the water.”
Armed Chinese Coast Guard vessels recently acted illegally against Philippine vessels, forcing the Philippine vessels to retreat: https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/philippine-supply-boats-breach-a-chinese-coast-guard-blockade-in-the-hotly-contested-south-china-sea/ar-AA1fEpQZ?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=f740715f77db4e4a8208b6e95bcc07df&ei=48 “One Chinese coast guard ship came as close as 46 meters (50 yards) as it crossed the bow of BRP Cabra to block the Philippine coast guard ship, which maneuvered fast to avoid a collision,….”.
A PMSV would not have to change course, stop or flee. The Chinese vessel would be the one changing course if it wanted to stay intact. Of course, COLREGs state that both vessels must make an effort to avoid a collision. The PMSV will normally make an effort but, in such close quarters and in the face of erratic and unpredictable behaviour by the offending vessel, that effort will depend for success upon the hostile vessel also making an effort to change course or back away. Confusion may ensue. If the hostile vessel engaged in illegal maneuvers fails to make an adequate effort, or makes the wrong response or no response, and a collision results, the hostile vessel will be the vessel at fault, and also the vessel seriously damaged. The PMSV is designed for such unintended accidents so will suffer only superficial damage. If the hostile vessel escalates its aggression, the PMSV is designed and built to effortlessly deal with all of it in a measured way, and always to the detriment of the hostile vessel. An immediate, determined response to illegal aggression is often the best way to de-escalate a hostile situation and prevent its recurrence. PMSVs are designed for that tactic.
“One Chinese coast guard ship came as close as 46 meters (50 yards) as it crossed the bow of BRP Cabra to block the Philippine coast guard ship, which maneuvered fast to avoid a collision,….”. This recent incident reveals that Western navies have a new challenge to meet, namely policing international waters, and their own waters, against illegal and dangerous aggression from China and Russia. The threats needing policing are no longer just pirates and Iran. This aggression will likely spread to the Arctic https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2023/08/23/gigantic-russian-flag-unveiled-on-arctic-ocean/ . Current Canadian naval vessels are designed primarily for patrol duties (Kingston class and Harry DeWolf class) and to fight wars (frigates). For a number of reasons, none of these vessels can effectively police international waters or Canada’s Arctic when hostile countries refuse to follow the rules of UNCLOS etc.
The first rule of policing is to never be defeated by the criminals. Lightly armed coast guard and naval patrol ships can be, and have been, defeated when they try to impose the law because they lack a viable response against ships of any type that refuse to play by the rules. For one thing, they are built too lightly to risk getting into a brawl https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-chinese-fishing-vessel-tried-to-hit-uscg-cutter-off-galapagos . Policing requires a measured response to avoid escalation. While warships can begin applying force with small caliber arms and 30mm guns, their next step is firing missiles and 127 mm guns, both of which lay outside the scope of policing. Their only available option is retreating (being defeated).
PMSVs, on the other hand, are ideal policing vessels for handling powerful, hostile players. PMSVs are the very definition of a measured response, an ability that is essential to policing and that includes the ability to avoid defeat in a conflict. Being essentially heavily armed and fairly fast ice-class cargo ships, PMSVs have the fuel capacity etc. to have double the range of AOPS and frigates. Not being a patrol ship roaming long distances, a PMSV’s average daily fuel burn rate is also lower. They can be on station anywhere in the world for 4-5 months if desired, not just 2 months. This capability is valuable in remote regions. Canada’s NATO allies are clamouring for Canada to invest more funds in its military. A fleet of multifunctional PMSVs is a good and economical place to start. Canada can show leadership on successfully and safely policing distant waters in dangerous neighbourhoods.
Thanks for the blog loaded with so much information. It’s really informative.
This recent article in the The Barents Observer describes the need for increased U.K. military presence in the Arctic and further makes the case for PMSVs: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/12/uk-urged-bolster-arctic-defense-grey-zone-threats-rise-report . This statement sums it up and essentially describes the need for the capabilities possessed by PMSVs: “This readiness is crucial for responding promptly to a spectrum of scenarios, including environmental disasters, search and rescue operations, as well as potential challenges posed by Beijing and Moscow, the committee said”. These are the same capabilities recommended to the USCG Subcommittee in Washington one year ago, and that only NST’s PMSVs possess.
This statement further supports the need for Canada and NATO to deploy PMSVs full-time throughout the Arctic: “While it is not in Russia’s interest to start a conventional conflict in the Arctic, sub-threshold activity and accidental escalation represent significant risks to the region’s security,”… Conventional military assets are not suitable for such long-term deployment (too expensive, too fragile, limited endurance, limited value for expeditionary forces etc).