By Barnacle Bill, 15 April 2025
In recent weeks concerns have been raised across the Western world (and beyond) over the Trump administration's foreign policy. The President has publicly rehabilitated a revanchist Russia, launched a potentially ruinous trade war that threatens to beggar his own and others' economies, expressed contempt for liberalism and multilateralism, and threatened the sovereignty of Panama, Greenland and Canada. All this (and more) have raised questions as to whether the United States will re-position itself as an independent, self-regarding actor on the world stage.
That, of course, is Washington's right, if it chooses to do so. But where does it leave allies of long standing, including those subject to Mr. Trump's belligerent rhetoric? The issue of American 'reliability' as the security provider of last resort is now at the forefront of strategic discourse. Are there dangers in remaining in close partnership with a hegemon that, at least under Republican leadership, no longer shares the liberal-democratic values that it once did? Sensing nothing but disruption from Washington, allies are beginning to hedge their bets.
One sub-issue falling out of this is the reliability of the US defence supply chain. Can allies who have happily and safely invested in US equipment be confident that their purchases will be useable throughout their lifespan if a dispute with Washington arises? Recall that the administration briefly cut off supplies and intelligence from Ukraine until it fell in line with Mr. Trump's quixotic search for 'peace' with Russia. Is it now too risky to allow a vastly different America so much leverage over the strategic choices of our allies and partners?
Such was undoubtedly on the minds of two Canadian academics who authored a provocative piece in the 8 April edition of The Globe and Mail. In it, they noted the sea change in the strategic landscape that MAGA represents, and the intention of a Carney government to re-evaluate further purchases of F-35 fighter planes. Based on the risks outlined above, the authors suggested that the same risk calculus be applied to the River-class Destroyer (RCD) programme.
The authors do not suggest that Canada search for a new warship design. Instead, they suggest exploring the desirability of finding non-American suppliers to outfit the RCDs with combat systems, as well as sensors and effectors. Is this politically desirable? Is it feasible given the stage at which the RCD programme finds itself? How can we know?
There are a total of three variants of the Type 26 - one from Down Under, one from Blighty, and one from the Great White North. Therefore, Canada has two ready-made alternatives to choose from if it felt compelled to swap out the gear sourced from Lockheed-Martin and its Canadian subsidiary. The blueprints for the mature RN version are available and the eight-ship programme is off to a promising start.
Of course, Canadian industry might be disadvantaged by an abrupt change in plans. And re-designing the main mast, the Ops room, and buying stuff from BAE systems or someone else will not be cheap and could very well delay the delivery of the ships. To be sure, if the RCN wanted the UK's design it could have gone that route in the first place. A forced re-think/re-design would throw the RCN's requirements reconciliation process out the window.
Are there other options? Could Canada recycle hardware purchased as part of the Halifax-class Modernization (HCM) and Underwater Warfare Suite Upgrade (USUW) programmes and re-install it the RCD -- not in the first three ships under contract but perhaps in hulls 4-15? Recall that the RN's Type 23 ships went through their own HCM-like refit, and will now see their Artisan 3-D radars and their Type 2150 hull and 2087 towed sonars grafted onto the Type 26 frigate. If there is sufficient operational capability left in the combat systems and sensors of the HCM and USUW programmes, can they be integrated into the RCD? Will the result be a useful ASW-centric sub-class of the RCD? Or would it be more expedient to adopt the RN's design and negotiate workshare for Canadian firms with BAE?
Or does Canada maintain course and leverage the whole project as a way of demonstrating to the United States Canada's commitment to 1) balanced trade and 2) adding at least some weight to future sea-based missile defence plans? Put another way, what strategic issues are most important to Canada? Is it the diversification of our relationships, even if that sets back the delivery of hulls 4-15? Or do we maintain course, leverage current plans to show our worth to a skeptical Washington, and discretely look for other opportunities to diversify our defence supply chains?
Just as there are political, financial, and logistical risks in truncating the F-35 programme and filling out the vacant slots with a non-American fighter plane, there are risks in altering plans for the RCD. The path forward might be informed by the results of an expected bilateral dialogue on security and trade between Trump and the Prime Minister of Canada after the federal election. For the moment, concerns over Canada's ability to exercise air sovereignty on its own terms is raising the possibility of a dual-equipped RCAF fighter force. Will those same concerns prompt a re-think of the manner in which Canada re-capitalizes the RCN surface force?
Image: A graphic posted by the Department of National Defence on June 28 2024 shows a rendering of the Canadian Surface Combatant, now named the River-class destroyers. The first three ships will be named HMCS Fraser, St. Laurent, and Mackenzie. Credit: DND
4 thoughts on “Political Trajectory of the US and RCD programs”
By the time even the first of these under armed destroyer escorts touches sea water, Trump’s presidency will have come to an end. This article is pure nonsense in order to rationalize another Sea King fiasco in defence procurement. Even the careerists in the NDHQ bubble are dragging their heels on the F-35 ‘review’ because even they are not so addled minded as to undermine national security on the basis of grandiose delusions.
You are assuming that Trumpism and its damages and dangers end on 20 Jan 29.
That is possible. However, wise planners should prepare for the more likely result.
Ubique,
Les
You certainly have a point that Trump will be long gone before the first batch of three ships is built. The ship was always meant and designed to be ‘future proofed’ to allow easy and cost-effective upgrades of technology. End of the day, for the most part US combat systems are the gold standard and simply the best gear available.
As for under-armed, except for the VLS lacking the cells that we would have liked to see, it’s no slouch in warfighting.
As mentioned before, it’s all rhetoric south of the border and actually has calmed down somewhat despite the efforts to keep things inflamed enough for the moment to keep Canadians in fear for political purposes. Despite all of that, Canada still maintains a good tactical relationship with the US on defence with joint US/CAN missions, NORAD, joint naval cooperation and US port visits along with procurement. Next month Canada will be sending ships for Fleet Week in the US to celebrate our historic relationship with the US Military. Talks of review of F35’s, P8-A’s and now RCD are politically motivated for the most part but certainly still dangerous in the sense that any cancellations or delays will create greater gaps in defence coverage and capability.
It is simply too late to change the combat suite as the ship has been literally built around the Spy 7 and AEGIS. Some things to consider are we currently have sailors in the US being trained on that system and we’re basing how we fundamentally control our future fleet operations rooms based on that system. We should refrain from paying too much mind to ‘academics’ musing about F35 and RCD purchases. The simple fact of the matter is that the US still make the best gear and it’s simply speculation that the US would turn off or disable any of our combat suites because that would cross a line. I acknowledge that we will assume risk here but honestly the positives of these systems outweigh the negatives of not having them for our future fleet.
It’s also a simplistic view that we could just copy a UK or AUS Type 26 variant to our purposes, very different ships in all sorts of ways not being considered and correct that it would certainly delay the project significantly. You may as well scrap the whole project if that was the case. As for the idea that Canada could repurpose combat equipment from the legacy Halifax to the River Class I would say by the time that needs to happen that those systems will be fairly old and we would be better off maintenance-wise to buy new gear. Some systems could possibly be repurposed for payloads for the Harry DeWolf class such as the 57mm and Harpoons as a payload or shore-based deterrent.
In my opinion what Canada should be doing is staying the course of all procurement from the US thus saving us from penalties from breach of contract and showing the US that we are A. serious about our defence, B. Willing to shoulder the burden which could be looked on favourably post-election in talks with the US on trade and defence. We need to stop using the procurement as a anti-USA political strategy. Down the road yes certainly look for alternatives to US procured gear as long as the combat systems are not inferior and we cut capability.