By Mikael Perron, 3 July 2024
You probably learned like me that the CSC program has become the new River class destroyer and that is a great news! I was reading through the new updated RCN website section concerning the River class and I discovered something strange; the Rolling Airframe missile is now being referred to as a close in defense system instead of the previously mentioned Sea Ceptor missile! There is always a surprise!
Here are the links to the RCN's latest web update concerning the new River class destroyers!
https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface/river-class-destroyer/fact-sheet.html
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/rcn-mrc/documents/ships/river-fact.pdf
https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface/river-class-destroyer.html
35 thoughts on “River-Class Destroyers”
Construction Schedule Uncertainties
In an interview before the announcement event, which seems to have been primarily a morale-boosting ceremony for Irving workers and the RCN, Minister of National Defence (MND), Bill Blair stated, “We’re very hopeful that with the cutting of steel that we’ll be able to deliver the very first of these ships by the early 2030s. Hopefully nine of them by 2040, and ultimately all 15 of them being delivered by the 2050s”. (Jesse Huot, “Canadian defence minister speaks about upcoming Navy ships, national defence budget”, CTVNewsAtlantic.ca, 28 June 2024). Official clarification was that the first ship would not be available for operations before 2035.
To deliver 9 of the new DDGHs by 2040 seems to be an aggressively optimistic estimate. Note the series of conditions that will have to be satisfied to achieve that objective: no pandemic shut-downs, no major supply chain problems, no shipyard strikes, no major construction obstacles, no change in government and timely government approvals of follow-on batches, no major operational issues encountered in sea trials, and greater success in recruiting and retaining sailors. I will leave it to others to judge how likely it will be for all of these conditions to be met.
Moreover, Ottawa planners expect the design to continue to evolve over the first and later batches. (Meaning fitted for, but not with?) This brings into question even more the cost and schedule expectations. This also suggests concurrent production for at least the first batch, thereby reducing the time to incorporate lessons learned, and adding to the risk that costly design changes may occur.
A senior government official said getting the new ships as soon as possible is imperative because of ongoing maintenance concerns for the aging Halifax-class frigates. The official also downplayed concerns about the schedule by pointing out that technology improvements will be added along the way, improving the ship capabilities over time. Additional upgrades are also expected for the Halifax-class frigates, the official added. No cost figures or specific details on that work were provided. (Pugliese, “Construction begins on new fleet of warships for Royal Canadian Navy”, defensenews.com, 28 June 2024).
Even with 9 new warships built by 2040, Canada will have at best only 1 or 2 deployable modern warships available for operations on each coast by 2040. [using the commonly accepted 4:1 rule of thumb. See NAC discussion in its Canada In Extremis Report of May 2024, p.32]
Once again, there is a noticeable lack of urgency in all this, especially given the well-reported concerns about the rapidly deteriorating international security environment expressed by the outgoing CDS, a former MND, and by several expert commentators, to say nothing about how the navy will be able to keep the Halifax-class frigates going until 2050.
It is puzzling that Vice-Admiral Topshee chose to emphasize the air warfare (AAW) and Command and Control capabilities over the ship’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Surely, this draws attention to the proposed warship’s weak missile armament compared to current operational frigates, and especially to the missile capacity of existing true destroyers, let alone those likely operating in the 2040s and beyond.
The new DDGHs will be seriously under-armed by modern AAW destroyer standards, and will likely be one of the most expensive in terms of missile cells/launchers by platform cost.
Moreover, by dropping the VDS, the navy has undermined one of the purported best qualities of the original Type-26 design, its ASW capabilities. So, at least for the initial batch, our River-class will likely be burdened by a lot of design effort that went into quietening the ship for ASW.
Finally, the navy’s approach appears to be one of achieving government ‘buy-in’ of a much reduced capability for the initial batch (or batches) to reduce ‘sticker-shock’, and then hoping that this will force Ottawa into agreeing to more costly weapon system upgrades in future batches. [Note: this tactic may still require the later elimination of certain system capabilities for weight and stability reasons (e.g. the multipurpose mission bay)] Fitted-For-But-Not-With has never been a very successful strategy for the CAF generally. Moreover, attempting to lock governments into cheap buy-ins and expensive follow-on additions seems to be a very risky approach.
I am concerned that they are seriously under armed when it comes to VLS, if the current 24 cell layout is to be achieved then it’s less cells than our outgoing type 23 frigate (32 cells) however the MK41 can be quad packed with ESSM meaning theoretically a total of 96 missiles could be put onboard. (I know this is likely to never happen.)
What I am getting at though is with the number of cells it does restrict numbers of munitions type carried, while yes you may quad pack maybe 8 cells what are you filling the others with and will it be in any meaningful amount.
Another issue is that the Halifax’s will be by 2040 50 years old and we are already seeing issues with them, this doesn’t seem like a good plan, and given older platforms require more maintenance it’s likely going to be expensive to keep the aging platforms around.
A lot of the issues with the design really is that Canada, like Australia, has taken a prime ASW frigate design and tried to make it a do all platform, it generally doesn’t work out well when you do that.
Hello Blair,
While I understand some concerns regarding the armament of the CSC, I don’t share in much of the “doom and gloom” spread by many throughout the various defence communities. I would point out that the armament of the Type 23 frigate is entirely CAMM in single use cells, meaning that CSC could match the 32 missile armament of the Type 23 frigate using ESSM quad packed into 8 of its 24 cells. I will also point out that ESSM Block II has double or more the effective range of CAMM and CSC is a vastly superior AAW platform than Type 23. With that hypothetical 8 cell ESSM armament, you can still carry 16 individual SM-2 IIIC missiles while RAM exists on the ship for close in protection. I would ideally prefer 32 cells of course however, 24 is a workable baseline minimum.
I am unsure what you would want Canada to do regarding the Halifax class? They have no other option but to continue soldiering on until CSC is completed to replace them. Canada will not attempt to purchase interim frigates or a two tiered system like Australia as purchasing from abroad jeopardizes the National Shipbuilding Strategy and there is no other domestic yards to build frigates. Any other design jeopardizes the viability of the CSC to the RCN, meaning they will never be considered. It is an uncomfortable reality but one that the RCN will have to deal with.
The problem with the CSC and Hunter class programs is that the designers of the Type 26 promised that it could do everything and Canada/Australia proceeded to take them up on that offer, finding out that things were not so simple. Even with these concerns though, the process now is still faster and cheaper than trying to design a bespoke vessel from the ground up. Canada and Australia both wanted a top shelf ASW design but couldn’t stomach the lack of capability in other areas that the baseline Type 26 provided, so here we are. Canada’s proposal is far more workable than Australia’s in the end, CEAFAR II radar itself is a bit ridiculous and is causing a great many headaches alongside their 32 VLS.
TFLAS which Ultra calls its Variable Depth Sonar has NOT been cut. The only change is the elimination of CAMM and the installation of 2 MK 49 SEA RAM for a total of 42 missiles.
I see you quoted the latest from the Ottawa Citizen which is just a rehash of criticism from previous articles including Alan Williams’ talking points. Trying to downplay a significant milestone for the project.
It’s certainly going to take 10 years for the first ship of the class to reach operational capability just the same as the type 26. However as they are built in mega blocks more than one ship will be under construction at any one time. As for delays and so forth, welcome to modern ship building. The ships are being built in flights to take advantage of the latest tech and not a cost-cutting measure or being fitted for and not with, much the same are the A Burke Class. The current VLS load out was minimized due to weight, probably would have been solved if we delayed again. CRCN made sure the project proceeded regardless and is looking at mitigation for that. The ships are still pretty capable even with a reduced VLS load out and easily corrected down the road. You are correct that something may have to be cut as the design is pretty maxed out and losing the mission bay for instance is not the end of the world, just a different variant. I’m all ears if you can come up with a viable solution to speed up construction.
Good morning Ted,
Thank God for a voice of reason and actual thoughtful analysis!!
Please keep it up.
Ubique,
Les
Ted,
You are quite right, I made a mistake. I was trying to come up with an explanation for why the navy was now placing so much emphasis on the AAW capabilities of the new DDGH River-class, and saw the comment in another Forum thread stating that VDS had been eliminated. I should have checked out that claim more carefully. Careless research on my part. Has Ultra sold its TFLAS to other navies, or is the system under development for the River-class?
My real issue concerns the approach of trying to continuously inject newer technology into the warship while the ships are under construction. Many analysts argue that this has not worked well for the USN in its Littoral Combat Ships, Zumwalt-class, its Ford-class carriers, and now with its Constellation-class.
Concurrency, the practice of simultaneous development and construction, can work well under a very well established warship design, but our River-class can hardly be said to exemplify that. The design is still evolving even now apparently and will continue to change throughout the construction phases/batches. I gather that the real problem is not that every single design drawing is finalized, but rather that the tendency is to install immature and unproven technology during construction. Then considerable effort is expended trying to debug this technology and then back-fit it into previous hulls. This is slow and expensive. This did not work well for the LCS and now these ships are being withdrawn early from service. (The same was true for a large number of US F-35 fighters which are now unusable) These ships become near useless ‘concurrency orphans’.
To me, our navy seems to be trying to come up with CONOPS for the new River-class on-the-fly to meet quickly changing operational requirements. Furthermore, I worry that Canada will not have sufficient numbers of surface combatants to provide adequate numbers of operational ready ships. The NAC, Canada In Extremis Report (May 2024) argues for 24-32 new warships, and urges speeding up the construction process. However, that study provides no clear idea of how this acceleration can be accomplished. I have argued many times that the philosophy underlying the National Shipbuilding Strategy is not geared to providing badly needed warships to our navy on an urgent basis; rather the NSS rests on the principle of gradual ‘load-leveling’ to keep our shipbuilders in business. Some commentators suggest that Canada needs to produce one ship a year after the first River-class is built, but I seriously doubt that we can ever approach that target.
Finally, my suggestion would be to avoid tunnel-vision about our naval requirements, and to re-consider what the RCN’s most urgent needs are for the defence of Canada right now in the face of a deteriorating, almost-war maritime security environment. Alas, the irrational, in both economic and psychological terms, fallacy of ‘sunk investment’ often clouds clear thinking just when it is needed the most.
Ted,
You state that, “The ships are being built in flights to take advantage of the latest tech and not a cost-cutting measure or being fitted for and not with, much the same are the A Burke Class”.
However, two sources (one Canadian) provide a River-class graphic which apparently shows an additional 6-cell Mk41 VLS aft.
(See the graphic in, https://www.navylookout.com/a-guide-to-the-future-canadian-surface-combatant-the-river-class-destroyers/
https://vanguardcanada.com/exploring-the-future-of-canadian-naval-warfare-the-river-class-destroyers/)
Quite apart from the atrocious spelling in the graphic (“pannels” and “Sea Senator”), are these sources simply badly confused about what will fitted with and perhaps ‘for’ in the first batch of the River-class?
Hello Dan,
Navy Lookout has confused the vestigial ExLS cells that previously housed the CAMM battery with Mark 41 VLS. The renderings are not up to date with the RCN factsheet which specifies the removal of CAMM. CAMM is being removed in favor of RAM, which means the ExLS is going as well considering RAM was never integrated to be vertically launched, alongside the fact VL-RAM is inferior to a pair of 21 cell Mark 49 launcher likely to be used aboard the River class. Vanguard cites Navy Lookout, so it’s a circular use of incorrect information.
Blk -2 Ram can in fact be vertically launched from ExLS cells. Both the Ratheon site producing the missile and the Lockheed ExLS Brochure graphics confirm this. So… is it possible that the government cheaped out again and simply swapped for a cheaper missile in the same numbers to fill the ExLS cells? Knowing this government’s record, it would be a safe bet and the reason the new graphics state that RAM is used but show no MK-49 or SeaRam launchers.
Kevin,
According to one reliable source (Shimooka, No Other Option, pp.30-31), RAM was the RCN’s first choice for a close-in weapon system from the outset. He states that it was initially excluded because of ADM (Mat)’s ‘diktat’ against any further non-essential design changes.
Hello Kevin,
I have seen claims from LM with their ExLS system that RAM could be integrated however, I have been unable to find any information that RAM is able to be vertically launched and has been tested as such. The Government is removing the ExLS cells from the River-class destroyer design at this point to be replaced by Mark-49 RAM launchers however, the render has not been updated to match this yet. Launching RAM from ExLS would remove the main advantage of magazine depth from the deck launchers, so I do not see it happening even if RAM can be vertically launched.
Hi Blair you’re not wrong in assuming the Halifax class maintenance will be expensive. In fact millions are being spent at Irving, Davie and Victoria Ship yards for multi year refit that address mechanical and structural issues, but really what choice does the RCN have?
As for the amount of available missiles that is an identified issue. What do you you suggest we do about it? It’s not as simple as jamming in more VLS in an already bloated design. Decisions were made and we will have to live with them for now.
The VLS question is quite pertinent because fewer cells means less defence in depth due to number limitation.
Yes you can quad pack ESSM into a cell which gives you 96 short range missiles. The reality is you’re not going to do that, you’re going to need to give cells over to other munitions.
I would have suggested a 32 cell would have been the best balanced solution but here we are at 24. At least it’s not as bad as the Nansen class with 8 cells for their Aegis frigates (except Armundsen has 16).
The other thing we certainly must look at is laser weapons — can we jump on an existing program?
And with the shortfall in VLS, could we fit two SeaRam systems to cover the close-in threat enabling more ranged ordinance to be carried?
24 is a step up from 16 I guess though, and a more versatile launch system too.
Hi Blair,
CSC will be dropping the 24 CAMM placed in the ExLS cells aft and replacing them with two Mark.49 RAM launchers, 21 cells on each side where the other Type 26 variants place their Phalanx mounts. This will provide the CSC with nearly a doubling of their magazine depth, increased logistical efficiency with the USN, the ability to reload these weapons at sea and cause less headaches for AEGIS system integration.
Laser weapons might happen eventually but it would likely be at the cost of something like RAM, as there is precious little space remaining topside to fit laser systems anywhere.
Dan, the only way to get ships faster is to have two yards building them such as what the UK is doing. Unfortunately we do not have the capacity in Canada. That being said and I believe Canada should get into the federal shipbuilding business building their own yard in Atlantic Canada such as at the old Saint John shipbuilding in NB or something in NS. The benefit is a continuous building cycle and a strategic asset.
The current designs are what they are but have been engineered to accommodate easy upgrades in different batches and not like what the US are building. Pretty much all change orders are stopped as the current design as seen in the 24 VLS not increasing in this flight despite pressure to increase.
The NAC puts out alot of opinions but rarely are achievable or practical. I think the best we can hope for is that a plan is put into place to cut down the build time and innovation to increase the missile load in a way not to affect the build time.
Are there any confirmations aside from Wikipedia that states the RAM blk 2 missiles which can now be fired vertically, won’t just be quadpacked into the EXCL cells and are for sure using mk-49 launchers. Can ESSM then not be loaded into those cells opening up MK-41 cells for other missile types like SM-2 or SM-6 etc.? Or is this too much top weight?
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/VLS_Host_ExLS_Launcher_Product_Card_8.5x11_042419.pdf
Ted,
Thanks for this!
As a follow-up, I would be most interested in your elaboration of “The current designs are what they are but have been engineered to accommodate easy upgrades in different batches and not like what the US are building.”
What do you mean by this? Perhaps we have a difference of semantics here. To me, “shipbuilding concurrency” is simultaneous and continuous systems development while ship construction is underway. On the other hand, a ‘block upgrade’ represents the introduction of new technology only at the beginning of a new batch of ships.
Further, exactly how does upgrade engineering differ between the methods used in the United States and those that will be used on our new River-class? The Littoral Combat Ship had containerized payload modules which could be swapped out at home port. On the other hand, the US has used plug-in payload module hull inserts for its Virginia-class submarines. The USN is also proposing for its next-generation destroyer, the DDG(X), a payload plug-in module that will be a hull insert that can accommodate additional VLS and other payloads.
One problem with payload modules of either type to add new technology is that it is difficult to predict exactly what the total SWaP-C requirements will be in advance. Integrating new complex software is especially troublesome, I gather.
In any case, any additional light that you can shed on these matters would be greatly appreciated.
I agree with the need for a federal shipbuilder, and continuous cycles for both military and civilian needs.
This should be extended to other sectors as well; let business produce and sell consumer products, and let the state handle defense, strategic resources, assets and capabilities.
Regards
The heavy high SPY-7 imposes a lot of weight constraints down the line. It is likely that we will end up with mk-144 launcher with 21 missiles times two from what I have heard. Hopefully SeaRam can be retrofitted to AOPS and JSS. I’ll be interested to see what we come up with for more missile capability. 42 RAM and 24 Mk41 isn’t bad plus the 8 NSM. Still an ASW frigate in my opinion.
Hello Wayne. Ted Barnes is very much correct when it comes to the weight of the SPY 7 (V3). You may also want to take a look at BAE’s proposal when it comes to Batch II for the Australian Hunter-class ‘frigates’. See below:
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/indo-pacific-2023/2023/11/bae-offers-evolved-up-armed-hunter-for-australia/
Hi David I’ve seen that proposal before.
Neither Spy 7 and Ceafar are from the base design. Both include considerable weight and height penalties as I understand it over Artisan. Without a height and weight distribution image comparing the three it is difficult to make too many comparisons. But the more weight up higher, the more weight one will need down low or around the center of gravity. The Spy 7 is higher than CEAFAR as I understand it even if it has less weight. The difference may cancel each other out. Spy 7 from what I have heard results in a 900 tonne gain over the base design. The Australian and Canadian designs are thus 1.5m longer and the Australian 0.65m wider last I heard. Somehow the Australians have managed to keep 32 Mk41 with all that. Aegis will undoubtedly have many down range impacts on the RCN, quite a change from previous situation.
this is a good one too
https://www.navylookout.com/adding-firepower-to-the-type-26-frigate/
I have seen that Outlook magazine article as well. This is the proposal from BAE to make the Hunter class more of an AAW ship platform for Batch II Hunter class ship which may or may not come to reality. Cheers!
I wouldn’t mind that for us too, depending on how much one has to sacrifice for some extra VLS and another 8 NSM. If it just costs the mission bay it would be worth it in my opinion. Go back to a 12/4 arrangement of ASW/GP:AAD or 8/8 or 8/6. Whether it’s 64 or 32 extra VLS or something in between, I hope we are looking hard at it
Hello Wayne again. Yes, I could live with no MB or MBHS for 4 x CSC River class DDGHs that would be AAW orientated (ships 12-15?) either 64 ExLS MK 41 VLS or 32 VLS midships, with the first 11 CSCs having the ASW original orientation. What say you?
Hi Dave, I think it is going to be looked at very carefully — the tradeoff of the Mission Bay vs more MK41VLS. It will also take some time to mature the engineering design if it’s being looked at seriously. I do prefer more than the 3 or 4 replacements for the Tribals, part of why I use 16 instead of 15 which is already a downgrade from what we had at our recent peak.
Actually the Spy 7 is fairly light compared to the Hunter Class radar. Probably 2 Sea RAM launchers oriented port and stbd and the elimination of the launchers for CAMM. This may come back in later flights if they can design in a weight reduction.
Ted, the Spy 7 is in relation to the UK model. I don’t think it will be SeaRam but mk 144’s. Weight reduction I suspect is going to be hard to come by and adding missile magazine depth without deleting the mission bay or other features might be difficult. Another 2×4 NSM remains my preference as an add on.
Dan, generally the drive train and power generation will not require upgrade throughout the life of the ship as it’s all stable technology.
Combat systems are where the upgrades will come from. Spy 7 will most likely remain pretty similar for many years except for computers, and software upgrades. Launchers such as the MK41 haven’t really changed except for the missiles and if the launcher does change, the replacement will be more in line with the footprint.
The great thing about the 3D AI modeling software is that systems can be engineered in such a way that any potential upgrade or replacement can be undertaken with minimal down time. Except for the mission bay which has the potential for easily swapped payloads, everything should remain static for many years.
That being said, for later flights of ship such as the last one of four it is entirely possible that significant changes are made such as some of the flights of Burkes that are very different from the original.
The radar on the type 26 is definitely lighter but the trade off is range and a lesser radar and no AEGIS. It appears now two launchers oriented port and stbd 42 missiles capacity
Canada’s Combat Management System (CMS-330) has apparently been quietly dropped from the River-class design in favour of the US-built Aegis combat system. (David Pugliese, “Introducing The River-Class Destroyer, The RCN’s New Warship”, espritdecorps,ca, 12 July 2024. https://www.espritdecorps.ca/feature/introducing-the-river-class-destroyer-the-rcns-new-warship)
Early in the CSC project the Canadian-built CMS-330 was touted by Lockheed Martin Canada and other Canadian government officials as one of the crown jewels in Ottawa’s plan to inject more “Canadian content’ into the project. Heralded as an internationally proven, affordable system with low life-cycle costs, the CMS-330 was also an ITAR-free design with no US export restrictions on its use.
Thus far, Canadian officials have not revealed what high-tech, Canadian-made systems remain in the modified River-class design.
Dan. The CCS 330 Combat System for the Halifax class Frigates was designed & built for the RCN by Lockheed Martin way back before the first HMCS Halifax ever hit the water. The CMS 330 system for the CSC River class was also built by LM “based on the latest Halifax class software” but with the Lockheed Martin developed Combat Management System (CMS)-330/Aegis Combat System (ACS) with Aegis Common Source Library (A-CSL) in support of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and the Canadian Tactical Interface (CTI). This was a requirement by the RCN in order for the CSCs to have compatibility with US baseline 10+ software for missile engagements based on the SPY 7 (V3) LRDR. This software is also used by the new Spanish Frigates SPY 7 and will be used by the Japanese Frigates along with other countries in the future as well. My take on this issue anyway.
Hello Dan,
I would take Pugliese with a grain of salt as his bias against the CSC program clouds his judgement on this topic. Pugliese is only partially correct in his assertion that CMS-330 has been dropped in favor of AEGIS, both AEGIS and a development of CMS-330 are being fitted to the River class destroyer. As is seen on the newest fact sheet provided by the RCN and found in Maritime Engineering Journal Spring 2024, the River class destroyer utilizes the AEGIS combat system in concert with the Canadian Tactical Interface or CTI. CTI is based upon software and code from CMS-330 and is an advancement on that previous system, still developed by Canadian industry.
AEGIS handles items like the SPY-7 radar, cooperative engagement capability, part of the ESM capability, VLS and its weapons, NATO Link16/22 and anti-ship missile strikes.
CTI handles items like laser warning countermeasures, another part of the ESM capabilities, the ASW suite, main and secondary guns, main gun fire control, the integrated bridge system and the integrated communication system.
AEGIS and CTI both work together to seemingly merge and blend all aspects of the CMS, sensors, weaponry, etc into one comprehensive system.
Jimmy,
Many thanks for your clarifications of both the Navy Lookout article and for your explanation of the Aegis-CTI issue.
One of my constant frustrations about DND/RCN ‘messaging’ about the CSC/River-class is that Ottawa officials seem to want the best of all worlds – tight control of any information that is doled out in teaspoon-sized tidbits every so often when the Prime Minister’s Office staff deems that its nominal political masters need a positive boost from the naval realm. The River-class ‘Destroyer’ announcement for example, was made on a slow news, half workday Friday before a long weekend by a few ministers and navy officers who wanted maximum spin about stuff we had mostly heard about before, but also maximum deniability – hence the restrictions on who could or could not be named in reference to the Technical Briefing.
The spin worked to some extent, because one gullible local CBC reporter gushed that the announcement marked the start of the actual contract work to build 15 new warships (perhaps he was looking for a job after the CBC is defunded in a year or so!).
But for the rest of us, because of the paucity of real information, we are left – as so often appears to be the case – poring over the meaning of a newly released graphic to try to divine, like the auguries of long bygone days, what this or that small blurry detail means. So, back to the Navy Lookout mis-labeling of 6 VLS cells. I believe what you say, but the graphic is exactly the same as the one released by the government about the principal features of the new River-class. The 6-cell whatever can still be seen, sort of. Now you, as a presumed insider, tell us that is the wrong rendering. Who is to blame for that? Ah, the answer is – nobody of course, after all, these folk only had months to prepare the graphic, and close enough is always good enough for government work, as the old saying goes. Another good ‘messaging’ day for DND!
As for the Aegis-CTI link, I had seen the Maritime Engineering Journal article by Gilpin, and I note that he states that the CTI is ‘loosely based’ on the previous CMS-330. Fair enough, and I fully accept your explanation. However, what I was really after was some broad strokes indication of how many Canadian jobs would be sustained by this new work. I assume the will be very little if any ‘Canadian content’ in either the mainstream Aegis combat system due to security concerns etc, nor do I expect that there will be much more than metal bashing and assembling regarding anything to do with the SPY-7 radar itself. Another question concerns whether or not the Canadian CTI work will be subject to similar FMS security/ITAR restrictions as that relating to other aspects of Aegis.