By Dan Middlemiss, 29 March 2023
In this age of rapidly evolving naval combat technology, it may seem odd that modern navies, including Canada’s, still cannot accomplish two seemingly simple tasks – reloading and exchanging missiles for vertical launch silos (VLS) at sea.1
Instead, today most naval surface combatants must return to a home or friendly port to reload or redeploy their VLS missiles. In the midst of naval combat, this limitation constitutes a major vulnerability, and effectively removes a warship from the order of battle at possibly a critical point, for days or even weeks at a time.
Moreover, this weakness places even greater stress on getting the pre-deployment missile load-out balance between defensive and offensive missiles right. There will be no opportunity to second-guess once the ship sails. This is especially true for the US and the UK navies which, as part of their AUKUS agreement to confront the emerging Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) more directly in the far western reaches of the Pacific Ocean, have to rely on ‘come-as-you-are’ missile loads. The concern is that the PLAN, operating much closer to home ports and with far greater VLS missile loads per ship, may have a decisive advantage in any future combat engagement.2
However, this situation may soon be about to change for the US Navy. Recently, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), Carlos Del Toro, once again emphasized the need for at-sea reloading at this year’s Combat Systems Symposium.3 Del Toro has championed this concept before, but experts in the field stress that the initiatives being explored in recent demonstration tests, have involved ‘forward re-arming’ via pre-positioned, auxiliary sealift vessels stationed either in a friendly port or in the calm waters of a harbour. There, Transferable Re-arming Mechanism (TRAM) devices can conduct the actual missile transfer to the alongside warships. Real-world results have been mixed to date, but the potential benefits could be enormous for keeping valuable fleet combatants on-station for a much longer period of time.4
Commentators in both the United Kingdom and Australia have recently criticized current frigate procurement programs for bringing seriously under-gunned warships into their respective fleets.5 This missile load disadvantage is exacerbated by the absence of any means to replenish missile stocks at sea. In Australia, Navantia recently proposed a $10bn package of 6 heavily armed corvettes plus 3 additional Air Warfare Destroyers to boost naval firepower against the PLAN.6 Unlike Navantia’s offer which was submitted in time for Australia’s Defence Strategic Review, BAE has also proposed a heavily armed air warfare destroyer with 100-150 VLS missile cells.7 The thrust of these proposals is to deploy and keep more VLS missiles at sea.
For Canada’s future Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), which is already reduced to 24 VLS with missiles, this inability to re-arm at sea is an even greater operational vulnerability. Deploying a very expensive warship to medium-to-high intensity threat environments abroad becomes even more problematic, and it is highly likely that naval planners will opt for a mostly defensive VLS missile load-out. Expert opinion today suggests that even much more heavily armed warships than the CSC would not last more than one or two engagements before they would be either sunk, damaged, or forced to withdraw to port or to a safe harbour for more missiles.8
Given all the high-tech wizardry at sea these days, it does seem strange that allied navies have not pursued more aggressively technological and operational solutions to the vexing problem of re-loading missiles at sea.
Notes
1. The US Navy experimented with reloading missile silos at sea on some of its cruisers and destroyers, but abandoned such efforts in the 1990s as being too slow, clumsy and even dangerous. Despite this, vertical launch systems are among the most adaptable weapon mounts that the navy fields, allowing a ship to carry a variety of defensive and offensive missiles in the same shipboard infrastructure, and to fire them in rapid succession.
2. Western navies, in addition, are likely to be operating within range of Chinese land and air launched missiles. For an interesting analysis of potential Chinese missile capabilities against opposing navies, see, Dr. Sam Goldsmith, Vampire Vampire Vampire: The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile threat to Australian and allied naval operations, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2022; and Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, Winning the Salvo Competition: Rebalancing America’s Air and Missile Defenses, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016.
3. Megan Eckstein, “US Navy prioritizes ‘game-changing’ rearming capability for ships,” defensenews.com, 28 March 2023.
4. For detailed analyses of the issues, possible solutions, and potential benefits, see: Timothy A. Walton et al, Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 23 April 2019; Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton, Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet For Decision-Centric Warfare, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019; and Bryan Clark et al., Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017.
5. See, “Under-gunned Royal Navy warships,” Navy Lookout, 22 May 2021. Accessed at: https://www.navylookout.com/under-gunned-royal-navy-warships/. For a withering attack on Australia’s new Hunter-class frigates, see, Dr. David Shackleton, The Hunter frigate: an assessment, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2022. Also, Malcolm Davis, “Australia’s navy is undergunned for denying long-range attackers,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 October 2019.
6. Cameron Stewart, “$10 bid to build killer fleet,” The Australian, 15 February 2023.
7. “BAE systems proposes Hunter class variant with up to 150 missile VLS cells,” The Australian, 10 February 2023.
8. The CSC will carry separate canisters of Sea Ceptor point defence missiles, but these are relatively shorter range compared to the SM-6 missiles in the VLS cells. Consequently, apart from providing some defence for the CSC itself, these close-in weapons would not provide much protection for a US Carrier Battle Group, for example, where the CSC would be part of of a screening, picket force, and could be 50-100 kms from the aircraft carrier it would be screening. Moreover, the RCN will be incapable of fielding a Task Group of 3-4 CSCs plus a replenishment ship until the 2040s at best. By then, the VLS missile loads of major naval opponents will vastly overmatch the limited VLS cell-counts of any Canadian Task Group. On the issue of the rapid exhaustion of missile stocks, see, Megan Eckstein, “US Navy prioritizes ‘game-changing’ rearming capability for ships”, defensenews.com, (28 March 2023).
14 thoughts on “Missile Reloads at Sea: The Next Big Thing?”
The issues they found last time they tried this was that if the sea state is anything but flat calm it could put the loading crew in harm’s way, indeed having to do this in a sheltered harbor inlet or in a port maybe the only way forward.
With limited VLS going into the CSC this maybe an option for the CSC but I personally can’t see it being done while underway in a mild sea state.
You are absolutely correct Blair. VLS Missile reloads can never “practically” happen at sea. It is just too dangerous for both the CSC and its crew at sea. This can only happen at a port. If not in Halifax or Esquimalt, then at the closest allied naval base throughout the world. If someone can invent a way for this to practically happen at sea within the next few years, then maybe. I still believe that Canada should build larger CSC “ships” in the future with say at least 100-150 MK 41 VLS missile load-outs per “Destroyer”. If the CSC frigates had this capability, that would be awsome but not practicable as it would increase the weight of each CSC frigate to well over 10,000 tonnes and besides stability problems, speed decreases would also be another problem. If you had at least 48 silos forward as well as Midships along with 24 MK 41 VLS silos on either side of the Midships waist areas where the CIWS systems were going to go, that would be a total of 124 MK 41 silos. That would be a better option for existing CSC frigates, but as I said, not practicable.
The main issue with MK41 is it comes in 3 sizes and each has a different weight. There is an option to recycle the MK48 VLS off the current Halifax would could increase cell loads.
24 VLS quad packed with ESSM gives you 96 missiles per ship but you sacrifice other weapons and engagement range to do that.
Overall we have to be careful on the weight of the vessel as well as the hotel load, the MK41 can be power hungry and being coupled with the Aegis system that’s an increased drain on power. I can tell you the Type 45 had issues with this hence the PIP program. (embarrassing)
Hello Blair. The Halifax class VLS System only has 16 ESSMs (8 missiles on each side). These are not quad packs. Yes, putting 24 quad pack silos of SSMs on the CSC frigate will give you a total of 96 ESSMs to shoot but then where would you put the TLAMs not to mention possible future hypersonic missiles? Don’t forgret that TLAMs and Hypersonic missiles only hold one per silo and not 4. Not very good for “future proofing”. Putting another 24 MK 41 VLSs midships behind the CIADS launchers would be a better option along with possible 16 MK 48 VLS quad packs for ESSMs midships on the port/stb’d waists would feasibly work space wise. Again the problem with all of this is weight and speed problems. Cheers!
Well there’s a couple of issues I foresee, the first being what version of the MK41 VLS is to be put into the CSC, there are 3 variants, and only the tactical and strike versions can handle TLAM and hypersonic. Each variation of the MK41 VLS has a different cell length, width and depth, with the strike version as fitted on all American ships being the most versatile (and largest).
If we have gone for the defense version which is the smallest and cheapest variation of the unit (to date none built) then the CSC will not be able to fire TLAM or hypersonic weapons.
I am also curious if Canada would even want to operate TLAM and more curious as to why from a surface ship. Indeed I would propose following in the Royal Navy footsteps and give that capability to the submarines. The Victoria class if you put the software back into the fire control system could handle TLAM as well as Harpoon or NSM (It was there when they were in Royal Navy Service, Canada deleted it).
The way the USN and JMSDF deploy their ships is not with all one battery of the same missiles, it is entirely mission dependent, Indeed if the vessel is going on independent patrol then usually the cells are not fully stocked, either they may have just a small number for self defense only (Most navies do this).
Typically in the USN I have seen a number of cells handed over for ESSM with another number SM2/3 then others given to TLAM but were talking 90 cell +. With Canada I would foresee a similar mix up of munitions just on a smaller scale, If we went with the tactical version and had TLAM I would say that each frigate would deploy with maybe 6-8 TLAM the rest given over to air defense using ESSM and SM2/3.
Putting another bank of 24 Cells midship I don’t think would be wise, the power required might be too much, the area is vulnerable and has some sensitive systems around it then add the weight factor which means you’re re calculating COB / COG again.
I do like the idea of reusing the MK48 VLS on the port and starboard sides that would increase the capability and indeed you can reuse these from the outgoing Halifax, but it you want new then the MK57 VLS might be an option too.
However all the cells require a lot of power so the hotel load would need to be managed adequately or like the T45 DDG you end up in black out. What we failed to realized on the T45 was that the integrated radars plus the VLS and auxiliary systems overloaded the main generation plant, bear in mind the T45 was also planned (and is still capable) of deploying a 16 cell MK41 VLS, without the PIP upgrades going on now the T45 would struggle if be able to have that amount of hotel load on its power plant.
Aegis is a power hungry system so I can see why the number of cells have been reduced downwards. Personally I think 32 cells would be more than enough for what Canada needs, we don’t go roaring around the oceans firing missiles everywhere like our southern neighbors do and nor do we have the budget for it either.
In order to reload missiles at sea we have to have missiles and MK41 first. Solve that first.
Hello Blair. because of the government’s “Secret” posture on what and what not the CSC Frigate will have for weapon systems, we just don’t know what size of MK 41 VLS system silos the ship will carry. One thing is certain though, the ship will have at least “some” strike-length silos with the TLAM being installed along with ESSMs in perhaps the shorter length silos. As far as we know, the CSC Frigate will not be fitted with SM3/6 missiles…..yet. The MK 57 VLS silos would be another option though.
One thing is for certain Blair. If Canada were to add more MK 41 VLS systems, either larger DGs must be added (more powerful) or a separate DG specifically for the VLS systems would have to be added. Don’t know if that is now feasibly possible at this point though.
I would say unlikely without upsetting COB and COG.
Given no orders for self defence MK41 has been ordered I’d make a bet that Canada will have gone for the tactical size Cells (which are still TLAM capable). It would be nice if we could get some SM3 to give the FFG a bit more punch.
The only way to reasonably do it is to redesign the MK41 as a modular payload that can be hoisted out and a replacement MK41 dropped in fully loaded. This could be accomplished by a specialized missile storage ship that would mate up with the frigate and via an internal rail and hoist system drop in the replacement missile payloads.
This just in! “Lockheed Martin Developing New, Larger VLS for DDG(X)”, (Lariosa, Naval News 14 April 2023). Accessible at:
https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2023/2023/04/lockheed-martin-developing-new-larger-vls-for-ddgx/#:~:text=Lockheed%20Martin%20is%20developing%20a%20brand%20new%20Vertical,interview%20at%20Sea%20Air%20Space%202023%20%28SAS%202023%29.
Interesting news Dan from Lockheed Martin. Could these larger G-VLS Cells be “fitted for but not with” on the CSC frigate though or are we “topped-up” future proofing wise?
David,
According to the article I provided, LM is developing the larger VLS cells as a speculative investment venture of its own. From this I deduce that the enhanced VLS parameters are not yet sufficiently developed for inclusion in Canada’s CSC.
As an aside, I can think of no recent Canadian naval procurement in which ‘fitted for but not with’ ever became transformed into ‘fitted with’. This is a recipe that belongs in the wishful thinking category, I’m afraid.
One can always hope & dream though Dan.