By Les Mader, 6 December 2022
Over the past three years, Colonel (Ret'd) Brian Wentzell, Mr José Cañadas Mendez and I (with advice from Mr Guy Lavoie) have written a series of articles about the development and use of a Canadian Arctic amphibious capability. Such a force would not only be able to protect Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, by deploying capable presence naval task groups to contain and confront an intruder, but would also be suitable to support NATO, evacuation and HA/DR operations elsewhere in the world.
During an ongoing Broadsides Forum discussion about the Mistral LHD I was asked to provide links to these articles. Rather than see such a mass of information 'buried' as the 24th comment in a discussion string that started on 9 Oct 22 I decided to provide an expanded response as a new Broadsides discussion post. It should be noted that some of the articles are currently available only to CNR subscribers.
The general approach found in these articles is to minimize costs and disruption to, as well the duplication of, existing CAF formations and units in order to maximize the possibility of the Arctic amphibious capability actually being developed and successful. Thus, existing units and equipment are incorporated as much as possible.
The strategic context for this amphibious capability is discussed at Canadian Naval Review (CNR) 17.3 pp 20-24 (Subscriber-only access online for about four more months).
The general shape of what could be called a basic Canadian Arctic amphibious capability is described at CNR 15.2 pp 36 and 37 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “15.2” link in the “2019” line). The similar description for an intermediate level of capability is found at CNR 16.1 pp 32-34 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “16.1” link in the “2020” line).
Several aspects of the command and control of these amphibious forces are touched on briefly at:
- Canadian Army Journal (CAJ) 19.2 pp 72-74 (Canadian Army Journal 19.2 (publications.gc.ca)).
- CNR 17.2 pp 33 and 34 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “17.2” link in the “2021” line).
The basic level of capability would use AOPS and JSS (when sea-ice permits) as the required amphibious ships. The intermediate level would require the development and construction of specialized amphibious ships – the working names for the two suggested notional ship designs are: Landing Platform Arctic (LPA) and Landing Ship Infantry (Arctic) (LSI(A)). These are discussed at:
- CNR 16.1 pp 33 and 34 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “16.1” link in the “2020” line).
- CNR 17.1 pp 33-35 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “17.1” link in the “2021” line).
- CNR 18.1 pp 31-34 (Subscriber-only access online for about eight more months).
- CNR 18.2 pp 23-27 (Subscriber-only access online for about 12 more months).
The marine infantry required by this new capability would be found by reroling one to three of the army’s existing infantry battalions. This approach is discussed at:
- CNR 15.2 p 37 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “15.2” link in the “2019” line).
- CNR 16.1 p 33 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “16.1” link in the “2020” line).
- CAJ 19.2 pp 70-75 (Canadian Army Journal 19.2 (publications.gc.ca)).
The initial provision of the helicopters (Cyclones) and hovercraft required to transport the marine infantry to and from their ships is discussed at:
- Helicopters – CNR 17.2 pp 32-35 (Archives & Index – Canadian Naval Review click on the “17.2” link in the “2021” line)).
- Hovercraft (Landing Craft Air Cushion) – CNR 18.1 pp 34-36 (Subscriber-only access online for about eight more months).
For information.
23 thoughts on “A Possible Canadian Arctic Amphibious Capability ”
Hello Les. I like the way you are going with this concept, however, in order for your “Possible” Canadian Arctic Amphibious Capability (CAAC) and a LPA/LSI(A) fleet to be plausible, Canada must first get our reg force strength up to strength in order to create at least one Marine Arctic Infantry Batallion. Your pictorial use of a Mistral class LHD would also be a good start but I would think just a bit bigger by employing Juan Carlos class LHDs instead. In any event, these vessels would have to be “double-hulled” to Polar class 5 specs as a minimum. I don’t know of any LHD/LHA under construction or in service in the world that has this capability….yet so we wouuld most likely have to build our own LPA (A) fleet. My opinion anyway. Cheers!
Good morning David,
Thank you for your comment.
I believe that the army’s three light infantry battalions (3 RCR, 3 PPCLI, and 3 R22eR) would be a valuable (and already existing) means for providing the required marine infantry, as well as continuing to provide parachute infantry company groups and ad hoc airborne task forces. The required personnel increase would be minimal. The Canadian Army Journal article mentioned in my post tries to explain this approach more fully.
I agree with you fully that the LPA and LSI(A) would be entirely new designs. I have used the Dutch Johan de Witt LPD and the Danish Absalon multi-role ship as the basis for understanding what could be accommodated in a hull of a given length, but with the beam and construction of an ice-capable hull form similar to that of the AOPS.
I recognize that such a capability would not be cheap. However, the LPA in particular could be capable of so much more than simply Arctic operations (see the article in CNR 18.2 for a fuller discussion). As well, a decision to emphasize Canadian coastal (Arctic) defence more could free up the required funds.
Hello Les. If you are talking about a dedicated Amphibious Sealift Capability for Canada, we definitely have a long way to go training wise. It took Australia for example, over 20 years to realize its growing amphibious sealift capability and the forces are still not quite there yet. I agree with you that Canada needs this capability however, in order for Canada to go down this path, not only do we need our CAF strength back up to where we were before, but to develop a new capability like this takes time, training and most of all “new money” and, as you said, it will not be cheap. To build a new “ice-capable” LPA fleet we will have to build this fleet from scratch and this would cost much more than we could take on today. The Mistral or Juan Carlos classes are already operational throughout the world and really the only two LHDs in the world today that would fit Canada’s needs for this capability. Their only drawback is that they are not suited for Arctic operations and would have to be built with at least Class 5 Polar specifications which means “double-hulled”. This would make them heavier and cost more, but at least we would not have to re-invent the wheel. Canada would have to increase its annual defence budget by several Billions of dollars to at least 2% of GDP (not including non-defence spending) as requested by NATO in order to do this. This is not just taking whatever LPA we decide on for a Amphibious Arctic and HA/DR Sealift Capability and plug in existing Canadian Batallions, put them on this fleet and ask them to go forth up into the high Arctic and “do the job”. In my opinion Canada is not there yet but….could be in about 20 years from now. Cheers!
Good morning David,
Thank you for taking the time to comment on my post. I agree 100% with you that the development of a Canadian Arctic amphibious capability would be an intense multi-decade effort. The video about the creation of an Australian green-water amphibious capability posted earlier to this Forum makes clear how complex the effort would be (the Australians already had a basic amphibious capability and still needed two decades to get to where they are now).
While an ice-capable LHD should meet all of the requirements that I identified for an LPA, I fear that converting an existing LHD design to Polar 5 would be much harder than one would think. It might even be that much harder given that neither the French nor the Spanish have a solid reputation for building Arctic-capable ships.
Additionally, the two LHDs you mention may be “too rich” for us. No country has more than three of them in service while the more normal is one or two per navy. Canada needs at least three amphibs, preferably four, to cater for our geography and maintenance and refits. Thus, I have suggested elsewhere a mix of LPAs as described at CNR 18.2 and the LSI(A) described at CNR 17.1. Two of each would give us a “two-pack” of one each with each fleet. The LSI(A) is far less capable than the LPA but may well be perfectly adequate for most Arctic missions. A “two-pack” would certainly be a significant force in the Arctic archipelago.
Given the likely resistance to increasing the defence budget to 2% of GDP, we could improve our chances of actually having a relevant amphibious capability by focusing on fielding two “two-packs” for the Arctic mission in priority. NATO, evacuation, sealift of CAF equipment, and HA/DR missions would thus be done with what we had available.
For consideration.
I understand Les where you are coming from. If Canada is to develop this capability of an LPA/HA/DR fleet, We may first have to re-design existing LHDs or, heaven forbid, design a new fleet for our own Strategic Sealift Capability. Both France and Spain may be able to accomplish this feat, but we will have to see. They have the experience and know how to build these Mistral/Juan Carlos and Canberra class Sealift Carriers where Canada just does not at the present time but can either of them develop a design for Canada that includes a Polar Class 5 minimum specifications? My other opinion is that Canada would definitely have to build at least 3 vessels as a minimum (one operational for each coast with one in periodic maintenance). Each of these vessels must be able to carry a Canadian Batallion strength with all equipment including vehicles, ammunition and aircraft to move them. And let’s not forget about the HA/DR missions they would have to employ both domestically or world-wide.
This is a reply to David Dunlop’s comment dated 10 Dec 22.
Good morning David,
Given what we have discussed over the past few days, I would appreciate your thoughts on the LPA discussed in CNR 18.2 as compared to a modified (Polar 5) LHD such as you suggest.
I have to wonder how much Canadian industry could take the lessons learned designing and building the AOPS to scale up to such an LPA.
The other question that I have is what kind/size of battalion landing team do you envisage Canada deploying to an (Arctic/overseas) mission.
Thanks.
Hello Les. I have read your article on CNR 18.2 with great interest. The LPA that you envision has not been built yet. But if it was to be built to at least Polar Class 5 or higher specs it would be a first in the world for an Arctic/HA/DR Sealift capability. In my opinion Canada cannot downgrade the CSC Frigates for a Dedicated Sealift Capability. We need all 15 of these frigates at a minimum to have any naval capability for the future. And by the way, the Cyclone helicopters are an extension of each of these frigates, so you wouldn’t be able to “rob” those helos to create your helo capability for the LPA fleet. The RCN would not like that, as these are ASW configured helos only. Canada would have to buy more S92s (possibly up to 30) for your troop transports. Another thing is that you would need at least 5 helo spots on the flight deck for each of your LPAs at a minimum if you are to get an initial task group off to the “fight” ASAP. As I see it, you would need as a minimum at least 2 battalions (one for troops + all their equipment & one Mechanized battalion) of about 450 troops each battalion + some sort of Army Command structure on board (around 150 personnel) at first and then ferried ashore. There are very few LHDs (LPAs) in the world today that can fit-the-bill. These include:
1. the French Mistral BPC 250 Class-24,542 tonnes full load for export (this was one of two designs being considered by Australia at the time)-648.9M CAD each (2014)
2. The Australian Canberra Class at 27,500 tonnes (Built by Navantia Spain & BAE Systems Australia-1.43B CAD (2007) each
3. Izumo Class JMSDF27,000 Tonnes full load-1.13B CAD (2012) each
4. Dokdo class ROKS Marado-19,000 tonnes full load–$475M CAD (2014) each
The problem with all of these options is that they are all mono-hulled and not suited for Canadian Arctic Operations The Polar class 5 (minimum) problem will not go away so, unless Canada is willing to invest new $$ into this Dedicated Sealift Capability (including infrastructure/training) this idea will die a quick death before it even gets off the ground. Although the HNLMS Johan De Witt option is a good start, it is not what Canada needs for effective Arctic Operations. Sorry to put holes in your article Les, but I call it like I see it (in my opinion anyway). Cheers!
Good day to you both,
Rather than add the complexity and cost of hull strengthening non-“Polar” warship designs for Arctic ice, would it not be sufficient to work with an icebreaker escort? Canada needs a larger and more capable icebreaker fleet anyway. Would that not satisfy the requirement, and could the icebreaker themselves not contribute to the sea-lift capability? Do we need to customize every single procurement to our “unique” conditions?
Best regards!
Good morning,
An interesting idea. I fear, though, that taking non-ice-strengthened troop carriers into Arctic ice could set us up for operational problems during a crisis (when they could have very serious, even fatal, consequences). The images of ice breakers trying to free ships that are stuck in ice without causing a collision between the two ships come to mind. An Arctic crisis is not the time to have hundreds of Canadian sitting immobile in the ice in a troop carrier, the adverse public messaging problem alone of such a situation could seriously affect Canada’s ability to resolve the crisis.
Additionally, the ice breakers are not designed for being shot at (damage control). Clearly, this could be addressed and the ships could be provided with naval crews to avoid the issue of civilians baulking at sailing into harm’s way.
However, one would still have the problem of needing multiple ships, that must work intimately together, in order to accomplish a task.
I agree however that taking ice breakers along during a crisis could have great benefits, such as clearing paths in the ice away from an opponent to speed logistics movement and to provide greater radar coverage using the ice breakers as a sort of radar picket.
Funny you should mention the ice breaker escort Curious Civilian. As you may know, the RCN at one time had its own ice breaker-HMCS Labrador from 1954-1957 when she was paid off and given to the CCG. She was built using the USGC Wind Class ice breaker design and was just over 6,000 tons. I believe the AOPS are a Polar Class 5 design while Labrador was I believe Polar Class 3 or 4 (I could be wrong on that though). Yes, CCG Polar class ice breakers could do escort duties, however they have no defensive weapons capabilities at all to defend themselves and would be sitting ducks. While the AOPS could also do escort duties as well they also would literally be open to enemy fire as they only have a BAE Type 38 25mm gun in a constabulary role only. You would have to arm all CCG ships with much larger guns and perhaps AAW missile capabilities for self defence as well. So…. do we need more firepower for the LPAs? You bet, and at least Polar class 5 capabilities. The AOPS could escort through the North West Passage but would have to hand-off escort duties to a Polar class 2 ice breaker like the Louis St Laurent or the future Diefenbaker class. These LPAs that Les Mader is suggesting would have to be Canadian designed and built with at least Polar class 5 or above capabilities.
Thank you both for your replies,
The type of heavy defense requirements you describe are akin to an international war, not a local crisis requiring a small force intervention.
On one hand, a foreign incursion in our Arctic waters would require ice-breaking capabilities and significant force projection logistics to threaten a CCG or RCN vessel. There are few nations that can do this, and in the event they do it without our permission, we would be on the threshold of a major conflict, not a constabulary action. It seems to me like the requirements for a major incursion/invasion through the Arctic would far outweigh any value of such action, for any nation.
On the other hand, interventions against small criminal groups could certainly benefit from the presence of an AOPS type of vessel exercising a policing role, aided by an ice-breaker. Small criminal groups would have limited small-arms capabilities posing very limited threat to RCN or armed CCG.
My civilian view is that, against the larger threats, we are better off ensuring that international law and formal state relations are in place to avoid such foreign incursions. Standard presence and patrol of our waters would be sufficient in this framework, with no need for heavy defensive and offensive capabilities. Against the smaller threats, I see much value in greatly expanding AOPS and ice-breaking capabilities to support our continued presence and growth in Arctic regions.
Regards.
Good morning Curious Civilian,
Thank you for taking the time to comment on this topic.
While both of the scenarios that you describe (war and criminal activity) could occur in Canada’s Arctic, they are but the two end-points on a continuum of potential crises that Canada could face there. My concern is our ability to respond to the ones in the middle.
Global warming is opening up the Arctic leading to a growing belief that countries can gain wealth and economic and strategic advantage by expanding their operations there. The world’s large predatory authoritarian states would be the major beneficiaries from such incursions into the Canadian Arctic (see CNR 17.3 pp 20 and 21 for further discussion).
These incursions would not necessarily be overt. The Argentinian scrap merchants on South Georgia in 1982 and the Russian “little green men” in Crimea in 2014 are examples of the seemingly-benign being the precursor to a land grab and of the use of (im)plausibly deniable proxy forces to achieve national goals. Both approaches could be used against Canada in the Arctic.
The presence forces I have suggested are intended to provide Canada with the ability to confront an intruder (regardless of how benign they seem) with a range of options that include supporting the RCMP with nearby on-call military capabilities and deploying an armed force that can contain and even confront a belligerent intruder.
Amphibious forces have the advantage in such roles of being fairly self-contained and able to remain on station for months if needed. Having such forces would allow Canada to escalate (and de-escalate) as judged appropriate during whatever the actual crisis is.
Ukraine has shown that international law and formal state relations do not dissuade authoritarian leaders.
I believe that if we do not have presence forces such as described we will be the victims of some authoritarian leader’s whims and avarice.
Good afternoon David,
Thank you for taking the time to read my LPA article and comment on it. As I read through your comments I was struck by two things.
Firstly, we have very similar views about the shape of the amphibious force that Canada requires for ‘distant defence’ (i.e. NATO and NEO missions) as well as HA/DR and sealift. My early thoughts on the topic are found here: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no2/mader-eng.asp
Secondly, I think that we are approaching the Canadian amphibious capability question simply from different imperatives – whether the ‘distant defence’/HA/DR/sealift roles are the priority with Arctic amphibious operations being a residual capability or the reverse. Both views have their merits. Only hindsight will someday tells us which one was most relevant to the events of the next 20-40 years.
Wrt Cyclones, am I to understand that the current fleet’s ASW capabilities are ‘hard-mounted’ into the fuselages so that they cannot be easily removed to allow the aircraft to be used in its utility configuration?
Additionally wrt Cyclones, I agree that a significant amphibious capability would require the purchase of more Cyclones, preferably reconfigurable for either ASW or troop lift. This would ease fleet management and spread the flying hours around the airframes. However, the basic Arctic amphibious capability – AOPS/existing infantry platoons/Cyclones – should be achievable with the current Cyclone fleet. The remaining 27 airframes should not all be required to support the 12 Frigates/15 CSCs all the time.
For consideration.
Hi Les. At the present time Canada has 27 CH-148 Cyclone ASW Helicopters (one was tragically lost with all souls). You can expect as a minimum, 75% readiness for these helos. That leaves 20 Cyclones available to go to sea for both coasts. If we had the Protecteur class (JSS) (say 2 Cyclones per ship) available on each coast that leaves 16 Cyclones still available for 12 Halifax class (7 East & 5 West) and/or 15 CSC Frigates (8 East & 7 West) for both coasts. That leaves a maximum of 1 CH48 available for other duties. Also don’t forget, like Frigates, these helos must go through maintenance periods as well. So as I said before their use for LPA Sealift Capabilities would not be feasible. Yes, you could strip down the S-92 in their utility configuration for troop transport, but then the Frigates would have to sail without one of their most important ASW weapons systems – their helicopters. You would also need space on the LPAs for at least 10-12 of these medium lift helos and as I said before, at least 5 helo landing/take-off spots on the LPA flight deck.
Hello David,
Thank you for your analysis. It makes excellent points.
Given that the frigates/CSCs will not all be sailing at the same time, there ought to be enough Cyclones available to support whichever AOPS are on patrol and/or acting as troop carriers. That said, a major investment in amphibious ships must, I believe, be supported by purchases of Cyclones and LCACs.
Hello Les. Could not agree more with your last musings WRT your LPA fleet requirements. A purchase of more S92’s (or other medium transport helicopters) along with LCACs is the way to go for this new fleet. Yes, the AOPS can certainly carry a Cyclone and/or a Cormorant Helicopter but I’m not sure whether they could maintain them with a full detachment on board?
There are not “extra” Cyclones; we are actually short one now. The math is:
– 15 aircraft to support 15 detachment equivalents in 11 dets (i.e., 7 single helo dets and 4 two helo dets). It is 6 dets east and 5 west (to support the NATO deployer). This is to support one Canadian task group (CTG) at sea with 6 aircraft, two available continuously. I know that the two helo decks are gone, but the numbers at sea remain largely consistent.
– 8 in the training Squadron (which was completely missed)
– 5 in maintenance
The concern comes up when people say things like “Given that the frigates/CSCs will not all be sailing at the same time, there ought to be enough Cyclones available to support whichever AOPS are on patrol and/or acting as troop carriers.” Many Sea King crews lived the result of that type of thinking, it was called jetty hoping. I.e., when the ships come back you go right back out on another one. I did three NATOs in my 3 1/2 years at 423, plus the HELTAS course, and that was normal.
In other words, when the ships come back, the helo dets have to as well, to regenerate, and need their helicopter to do that.
The current manning at Shearwater is nowhere near being able to support 15 det equivalents, and as a result of this the Wing support positions are open, even though the number of dets is also much lower.
Which brings us to the real crux of the problem: acquiring the airframes would be much simpler than generating the crews and techs.
The aircraft can easily be reconfigured to a 22 seat utility config; that was included in the development due to the SCTF experiment. It’s why the console faces sideways again (even though it is horrible for the back ends crew’s posture), and the seats are available.
I am broadly in support of an amphibious capability for Canada, but the SCTF trials tore a hole in 12 Wing which still hasn’t been patched over. Please don’t underestimate that and push to do it again.
This is a follow-on to David Dunlop’s post of 16 Dec 22.
Good afternoon David,
Your comments have left me wondering about the AOPS’ helicopter operations capabilities. I had heard that its hangar was not high enough to permit some major work on the Cyclone’s main rotor.
Should I infer from your comments that the AOPS has other problems supporting and employing a Cyclone?
To your knowledge, does the HELAIRDET form part of the AOPS’ 65 person crew?
Les
Hi Les. Don’t know if the AOPS hangar height would permit work to be carried out by the HELAIRDET crew or not. An interesting question. I believe the crew size would include “some sort of” HELAIRDET for the AOPS but if the hangar height is a problem for aircrew regular maintenance of the Cyclone, that would be a major problem. Normally as well, each HELAIRDET brings with them at least one extra engine to swap out as well, so don’t know if that would be a problem either. Interesting questions! Any answers from forum members on this subject would be much appreciated. Cheers!
Just found out that the Harry DeWolf class has a total accommodation of 65 crew ‘and’ 22 extra berths. The Halifax class has a HELAIRDET on sailing of 21 so a HELAIDET is possible on the AOPS. I cannot however verify the height of the AOPS hangar for work on the main rotor however, so we may need some help from forum members on that one. Cheers!
Good morning David,
Thank you for the additional information.
It will be interesting to see what the Forum provides as follow-on points for the AOPS’ helicopter capability.
It would also be very helpul to have an actual breakdown of the AOPS’ crew establishment (including the HELAIRDET) iot understand how much depth it has personnel-wise and how much room is left over for “passengers” including an RCMP detachment or a marine infantry platoon. I have even seen two different numbers for the passengers that can be carried – 20 and 22.
Such confusion should not still exist when two of the ships are actually commissioned.
Totally agree Les.
Reply to Dwight Bazinet of 7 Apr 24.
Good morning Dwight,
I just discovered your post; the problem with “old” discussion threads having little visibility.
Thank you very much for your insights and info.
Could you suggest how many Cyclones and air detachments would be needed to support 15 River-class destroyers and provide 8 maritime tactical helicopter dets deployed at sea?
Thank you.
Ubique,
Les