By Brian Bertosa, 19 September 2021
It is said that an unlikely personal friendship between Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, widely regarded as the person most responsible (in the West, at any rate) for the development of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) as a form of submarine propulsion, and Admiral of the Fleet Louis Mountbatten, the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord, greatly facilitated the transfer of PWR technology to the British in 1958. None of Rickover’s successors as director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has even remotely had influence of that kind, and the decision announced this week involving the transfer of nuclear submarine technology to Australia must have come right from the top. I very much doubt that US president Joe Biden has taken a sudden liking to Kylie Minogue, Paul Hogan, or Skippy the kangaroo, and so I think this decision tells us far more about American attitudes to China under Xi Jinping than it does of their opinion of Australia.
The French have reacted negatively. (That is probably the most neutral way of putting it.) One of the reasons may have to do with the fact that they would no doubt have liked the opportunity to export their own naval nuclear propulsion technology, but nobody had a clue that the Australians were looking at nuclear this seriously. Let us not forget that Naval Group’s Shortfin Barracuda, which was going to form the basis of the RAN’s Attack class, was a specially developed variant of their nuclear-powered Barracuda. Lest anyone think the recall of ambassadors was a reasoned response, though, I would point out that the French did the very same thing to the Russians in 2015, when, due to political pressure over the Ukraine crisis, they cancelled the deal to provide the Russian navy with helicopter carriers of the Mistral class. Two ships had already been launched—which have since been sold to Egypt—and the French had to refund the money.
These subs will take a very long time to become operational, no doubt encompassing the terms of numerous Australian parliaments. The current Labour leader may be supportive—with conditions—but it is unclear if the Australian decision will, over the long haul, keep the support of any other party but the Liberals. I wonder, then, if Australian prime minister Scott Morrison and his defence minister, Peter Dutton, will become another Brian Mulroney and Perrin Beatty, whose 1987 Canadian Defence White Paper called for a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear boats. I remember 1987 very well, and at the time, the response to the Tory plan on the part of most people was primarily puzzlement, combined, perhaps, with even a bit of embarrassment. It will be very interesting to see how this plays out among the Australian populace at large. Speaking in generalities, now, over the years I have found Australians, overall, to be more pro-defence than Canadians, but also much more anti-nuclear. The submarine decision will only have the support of those who are both pro-defence and pro-nuclear, and I am not certain that that constituency is large enough, even in Australia, to see this project through over the long haul.
Given that all this would likely never have come to pass if it weren’t for Xi Jinping, is it possible that, if a new, more moderate leadership should take hold in China—one can never predict with certainty what is going to happen in that country—the impetus behind this colossal undertaking might lose momentum? Even more imaginatively, if that were the case, what would happen if one of China’s conditions for ‘playing nice’ with its regional neighbours, and the West more generally, were the cancellation of the submarine program? If the United States were desperate enough for a rapprochement and therefore agreed to that, there would be very little Australia could do about it.
What of the British? Seriously. There is, after all, a ‘UK’ in the name of this new security pact, AUKUS (to be pronounced “ockus,” presumably). What meaningful role can they be expected to play?
The specifically nuclear side of all this, as it pertains to Australia, would properly require a full-length article of its own, but I would just like to point out a couple of things. Since the new boats will be coming from either the US or (less likely) the UK, they will have cores of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which will allow each reactor to function on a single fuel charge for the life of the boat. This is all to the good, because refuelling a PWR is a complicated business. (French vessels use low enriched uranium, necessitating periodic refuelling.) As each boat decommissions, will the US (I am assuming that only the Americans can seriously fulfill this program in the time, and in the numbers, envisaged) take their highly radioactive spent cores back for disposal? The Australians certainly have nowhere to put them. A centralized repository for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, which does not include spent reactor fuel, is still in the planning stages, and is intended only to cater to current needs. They will need to make it very much larger. With the addition of at least eight good-sized power reactors to a country that has never had them, their production of low-level waste from almost any kind of maintenance activities at all on the primary coolant circuits, to say nothing of the reactors themselves, is going to vastly outstrip whatever they are producing in that country now. I hope they know what they’re getting into. Either way, if this program really gets off the ground, it will surely be a bonanza for expats with nuclear experience, possibly even some Canadians.
Mr. Dunlop speculates that the Australian decision might make it easier for Canada to acquire similar boats, but the issue has already appeared on the campaign trail, and the prime minister has, not surprisingly, firmly put the idea to rest. (We have trouble enough keeping more than one conventional boat going, but that’s another story.) More likely, perhaps, the French will come knocking, offering us a good price for some Shortfin Barracudas.
3 thoughts on “Some Thoughts on the “Changes to Australia’s Submarine Plans””
Thank you Mr Bartosa for your informative article. In my opinion to say that the French have acted “negatively” is an understatement, but not surprising given what DCNS and the French government have done to Australia for the past five years after the contract for 12 Barracuda Block 1A French variants was signed. The contract as signed was supposed to be for $45B AUD for total take-away of these boats. The “dirty-deed” price five years later went up to over double the amount of a whopping $91B AUD. I am just surprised that Australia waited this long to squash this so-called “deal”. The French knew they were in deep trouble with this contract at least months, if not years ago, and they knew the “Aussies” were very upset with the contract. Australia was more than likely in negotiations with both the United States and United Kingdom months ago to form this AUKUS Pact for this nuclear technology. Altogether it should be a good deal for Australia. This PWR technology is, and always will be, US technology that the British had to buy before they started their own nuclear submarine program in 1958. Australia is just looking out for their own national security requirements despite the French. The Astute class SSN would be a better option for Australia ($$) than the Virginia class but either way, for 8-10 of these SSNs certainly less expensive than the DCNS deal offer ever could be. One question though: can you cite the reference on the campaign trail for the “Liberal” leader’s statement that he has “firmly put the idea to rest” for nuclear submarine technology coming to Canada anytime soon. Let’s not forget that he is not the Prime Minister…..yet. Don’t expect Canada to fall for any French offer to buy any Barracuda Block 1A’s either. “Once Bitten….Twice Shy”!
Yes, it’s Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Canada Caught Off Guard by Exclusion from Security Pact,” Globe and Mail, Ontario edition, September 17, 2021, page A17: Mr. Trudeau is quoted as saying “This is a deal for nuclear submarines, which Canada is not currently or any time soon in the market for. Australia is.”
With the release of the new design drawing of the UK’s Dreadnaught SSBN. There is a very interesting bit of technology that was revealed in the drawings. Using the new hull design and building a Type 216 class SSN would be perfect for the Canadian Navy. Is almost double the size of the Type 212CD class, which looks like a capable boat. Since there is no set design for the Type 216 yet, private/RCN could work together with TKMS to build a sub to fit Canada’s needs. The new hull tech combined with AIP and a conservative 18000km range, VLS capability, littoral, and deep sea operations are a great fit for Canada. The type 218 SG class for Singapore is half the size at 900 million USD/ 1.125 billion CAD. A quick design scale up and figuring in the cost for the new hull tech could put you under 2.5 billion CAD per boat possibly less. No one wants a Barracuda 2.0 situation. Acquisition of 12-18 boats would drive the cost further down, build 4-6 overseas. Build infrastructure for two yards, one west coast and one east coast. Canada could crank the boats out and maintain them. Foreign sales could be possible as well. I can think of many countries would could use a few of these new style submarines. New hull tech with AIP and hull shape would make a potent sub. The Russians are catching up quickly, not quite equal to US or UK subs. They are going to present a serious problem in the Arctic Ocean, for all of NATO. The longer the wait, the longer it takes to get the subs and the price will keep rising. Submarines are going to be essential for Canada in the Arctic. F-35s/F-18E/fs/Gripen’s/*F-15EX perfect for RCAF*, the CSC (Barracuda 2.0 for Canada) and submarines. These are the biggest issues I see for the Canadian Armed Forces. It it a lot of money, but if Canada met the 2% GDP NATO minimum that would be enough extra money support these programs, increase weapon systems made in Canada, make improvements to existing bases, and build a few more. Canada needs to accelerate all these programs. It needs to provide for its own defense and contribute to allied nations in times of war and peace. Good luck, I hope the politicians get it together.