Procrustes, 6 February 2021
As more details slowly emerge from the bowels of the Ottawa defence mandarinate about the rising costs and technological challenges of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project, one may be struck by the apparent parallels with some of the ambitious warship construction fiascoes south of the border.
A lengthy article entitled, “The U.S. Navy’s Titanium ‘Tin Can,’” Mark Thompson outlined just how badly awry the US Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyer program has gone.[1] His is an engrossing story of how overweening navy ambition for the latest and greatest technology, blithe disregard for, and obfuscation of, costs, the crass over-selling of the capabilities of the ship, and the absence of effective mechanisms of accountability have combined to lead to a large waste of funds and, ultimately, to the operational denouement of the warship itself.
Beginning to sound familiar? From the outset, Canadian navy planners, aided and abetted by a shipbuilding sector determined to return to the ‘Big Leagues,’ have proceeded to cram as much of the latest technological wizardry into an originally appealing UK Type-26 design, all without serious attention to the real development costs and attendant risks of new and untested systems to the CSC project as a whole. Only recently, under the anticipated scrutiny of Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) and the Auditor General of Canada, has concern begun to focus on how this largely unfettered design process may lead Canada into its own ‘Frankenship’ quagmire.
Delivery of the first of the proposed new warships has now slipped from the mid-2020s into the early 2030s. Commentators are already speculating about how Ottawa may have to re-shape the CSC project – by delays, severely reduced performance capabilities, or reduced numbers – to keep the project on track politically. Some trade-offs are now acknowledged to be inevitable. For example, planners may decide to eliminate the most risky and expensive advanced technologies from a first batch of CSC ships to reduce costs. But this is an old dodge, because these same planners will be immediately pressing the government for additional funds to re-incorporate the jettisoned technologies in these early ships. The net result would be no real cost savings.
One may wonder what these planners were thinking. For example, recently a CSC Project Management official gushed that the CSC was so advanced that the navy expects to be still developing the design of the vital Combat Management System (CMS 330) – the system which ties together all the other sensor, communications, and weapons components – even after construction work has begun on the structure of the first ship.[2] This is more than a little worrisome. It is axiomatic in a major procurement project that the final design is frozen against further changes before production begins in order to prevent costly knock-on alterations to other ship components and structures later on.
Of course, by the time Ottawa finally approves the CSC and the project gets underway, those bureaucrats who were responsible for the design over-reach and costly delays they caused will have long since moved on to new positions or will have retired. In short, they will escape any accountability for their actions.
Can we now muse that the CSC is well on the way to supplanting the Avro Arrow, the EH-101 helicopter, and perhaps the F-18 replacement for the accolade as Canada’s worst-ever major defence procurement project? What illustrious company that could prove to be!
Notes
1. Mark Thompson,"The U.S. Navy's Titanium 'Tin Can'", pogo.org, (10 January 2019). Accessed at: https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2019/01/the-u-s-navys-titanium-tin-can/
2. Cdr Andrew Sargeant, “The Canadian Surface Combatant – Starting a New Conversation on Canada’s Major Warship Replacement Project”, Maritime Engineering Journal, No. 93 (Summer 2020), 20.
15 thoughts on “The CSC: Canada’s ‘Frankenship’?”
Anyone who still thinks the Type 26 will be built is dreaming. NDHQ has to stop creating creating new specs that the design is not workable, like the reengining the overweight passenger aircraft CH-148 so it could fly.
We have no choice if we really want an RCN for the future. Or perhaps that is what you would like to see Dave?
Dave, as is often the case your comment is, as my grandkids would say, just plain silly..
Jim: You obviously would like to see the CSC Frigate program die a natural death and fail miserably. Thank goodness there are saner heads prevailing WRT the RCN. Have A Great Navy Day!!
Hello Procrustes:
Your analogy of a CSC Frigate “Frankenship” seems to be right on! The parallels and comparisons with the USS Zumwalt-class destroyer program debacle and how the US Naval planners envisioned for that class to be “all things great and wonderful” I believe have emboldened our own planners to attempt to create our very own CSC Frigate Type 26 “monster” seems to be a fair comparison. The Type 26 no doubt will be a very effective ship, but what Canada is trying to do with its own version makes this ship look like a “Muscle Car” on steroids compared with any other frigate in the world today. We can all speculate what the next PBO report at the end of this month will indicate. No doubt costs will increase again for the CSC Frigate program but by how much? 72-75B CAD? These jaw-dropping prices are caused by inflation rates, technical specifications, some top-of-the line weapon systems (including the SPY 7 V 1 radar) and to be honest, government inaction on the CSC file. We have had no indications from government whatsoever on how the CSC Frigate Design Phase process is progressing because of government secrecy and a hands-off approach. We can only speculate that changes to the CMS 330 Combat System are causing some of these delays. One can see why, with the amount of new weapon systems that must be incorporated. Crew training on all of these new systems must also be factored into the equation. In my opinion, two things have to happen with this project. An all-party committee must be struck quickly in order to make hard decisions on what to save and what to throw away. The government must then quickly sign a contract with Lockheed Martin and Irving Shipyard this year to get this project back on track. As it stands now this program is a greater disaster than the Avro Arrow, EH-101 and CF-18 replacement programs were combined! The only losers in this mess are the Canadian people and the RCN!
Bit of a snow day in Halifax so I thought I would make a few comments. I don’t think it’s a fair comparison with the Zumwalt at all. Other than the CMS 330 which is not really new as it’s used in the Halifax Class, Harry DeWolf Class and in use in New Zealand and is going to be used in the Chilean Navy’s three Type 23 frigates, all the technology exists and is use. The issue is the system integration which I have been told is well along actually. In case of the Spy 7 it’s building on existing technology. The CSC doesn’t have a 550M dollar gun that it can’t source ammo for and the CSC is certainly not a white elephant without a task.
The CSC is a ship that will do a lot and replaces three 280 class and twelve Halifax Class by making it a both an air defence and ASW platform with a great radar, giving us drooled over new capabilities such as long range strike capabilities and possibility of ballistic missile defence.
What it all boils down to is dollars and cents. Ever since the start of the NSS and the decision to build AOPS before the CSC the price has been going up due to a variety of factors such as inflation which shouldn’t surprise anyone that there was going to be cost overruns over the years past the original placeholder budget of 26B. In addition making everything seem worse is the way the PBO costs everything in a total lifecycle package instead of the sail away price, again for anyone in the know not new information.
The government hasn’t done itself any favors by not keeping its webpages updated because it seems to be a big deal for people including many on this page and they haven’t done much promoting the design except for the RCN.
In my opinion this is what’s going to happen. The PBO report will be released, the Ottawa citizen will drop some for articles about how it should be cancelled and the government will have to take action or seen to take action. The project is too far along for cancellation and I can very well see several possible outcomes. The same amount of hulls with less equipment ie fitted for, not with, or less hulls with the same equipment. I can live with say ten hulls as there is always the option to add hulls by the government. More than likely you will see Irving panicking that the project facing cancellation will come up with a way to start earlier. There are rumours that Irving is eying buying NAD and using it as a refit yard and production facility and this may figure in starting the CSC project sooner. Excellent place to start cutting steel and building modules early.
In all of this is the people said “I told you so” but really with a 10 year period between the start of the CSC, a broken procurement system and the premium of building in Canada. it shouldn’t be surprising to anyone the cost increases and given what we want this ship to do. Can we live without some of these capabilities or should we hold fast and accept nothing less.
Hello Ted,
I think you are mistaken about a couple of things in your Comment. First, the SPY-7 radar is not yet proven or tested. The Japanese government cancelled its land-based variant of this radar, and it is clear that Lockheed Martin is trying hard, via Canada’s CSC, to get a toe-hold in the lucrative U.S. naval market with its proposed new radar. The company has been striving to supplant Raytheon’s well established SPY-6 radar on future U.S. surface warships. Why Canada needs to assist Lockheed in its commercial ambitions is beyond me, but it is notable that neither the U.K. nor Australia will be using the SPY-7 on their variants of the Type-26. Second, the PBO only really differs from DND in incorporating federal sales taxes in its cost projections. Neither include full life-cycle costs in their estimates. A competition for the Life-Cycle Maintenance Contract will take place only after the CSC build contract is finalized. According to a recent study by Alan Williams, the full life-cycle costs of the CSC will approach $200 billion.
In addition, the well respected analyst, David Perry, notes another likely finding of the forthcoming PBO report:
“The net result, as material recently released by the RCN makes clear, is that the CSC as currently envisioned is a very different ship than the Type 26. It is both heavier and longer. And while the hull and related systems are largely the same, virtually the entire combat system is different. Costing out the differences between the major components of the combat system would presumably be a key feature of the PBO’s report, including the radar, major weapons systems, combat management system, and the Cooperative Engagement Capability sensor network. Similarly, the PBO might try and assess the implications of Canada acquiring a ship with a purpose-built combat system and the extensive design and systems integration work that will be required to make it combat effective, including the impact on schedule”. (David Perry, “Canada’s Surface Combatant Costs”, Canadian Naval Review, 16:3 (2021), 41.
As a final point, on February 26 The Auditor General of Canada is expected to release its report on how well the NSS has met its scheduled delivery goals for the various construction programs. This will be equally bad news for the government. No one has yet explained how the Navy can be expected to operate its current Halifax-class frigates well into the 2040s while we pay for Irving’s on-the-job training in modern warship construction.
It’s a solid state radar made by Lockheed and is based on existing technology and some innovations, the Japanese are reconsidering it for future ships including the US for upgrades to its earlier flight Arleigh Burkes and the Spanish will be operating it before the CSC on their new F-110 Frigates. Sometimes we need to make bold choices to be on the forefront of new technology and I highly doubt that these radars will be lemons. Kind of makes sense that Lockheed will push their radars since they are the prime contractor no?
It is also notable that Australia and the UK are doing many things differently from the CSC but it doesn’t necessarily mean we’re doing things incorrectly does it?
In regards to costing we should only should be costing it from its sail away costs, just like other navies. At the end of the day the public doesn’t in my opinion need to be concerned with the price of fuel, wages, food, maintenance etc because these items will cost us pretty much the same anyways.
I agree that it is a very different ship from the UK or Australian version. We have known this for some time now based on the requirements and what it replaces and what the RCN envisions it to do. This is the most powerful warship Canada has ever designed and I would hate to have to settle on a FREMM or a type 31.
In regards to operating the Halifax Class into the 2040’s, more than likely before that you will see some of the older ships be put into extended readiness for parts as they are replaced by CSC. If we need to operate ships into the 2040s and it shouldn’t be many ships that we have to do that to. We have the skills and capability to keep the Halifax class going until we finish replacing them, the maintenance costs will go up of course but it’s doable in my opinion.
Ted: The USN will never change the SPY 1 radar on the Arliegh Burkes Flt 1/11 with anything but the SPY 6 radar and will not be receiving the SPY 7 V 1 radar. This would be shocking news to Raytheon! With respect to the Halifax class Frigate, by the time 2045 roles around, the first Halifax will be 50 years old and if not rusted out by then, would definitely be in extended, extended work period (E-EWP)-read never going to sea again! We only have 12 CPFs-7 east/5 west.Of that, at least 2 on each coast would be in or going in to EWP. That would not count any major problems with the remainder CPFs (and there probably will be some by then at that age). Counting frigates at sea for deployments or other missions, what does that leave left? Not many! Yes, our sailors have the expertise to keep some of these ships going with rubber bands, but by then where are the spare parts coming from? Again, robbing Peter to pay Paul as we always have done. Not a way to run any Navy! Other than that, I agree with the remainder of your comments.
Hi, David LM is looking to bid on the new replacement for the SPY1 once the program gets off the ground, will it happen perhaps not but it not a done deal by no means.
https://seapowermagazine.org/lockheed-martins-spy-7-radar-is-going-to-sea/
Being a person involved with the Halifax Class there will be challenges but unless there is major issue with the hull they will keep chugging along in my opinion and everything is fixable if we throw enough money at it.
Hello Procrustes:
Yes, the Japanese Land Based Aegis Ashore SPY 7 Radar has been scrapped. Down, but not out. The Government of Japan is considering a couple of alternatives. One would be to construct 2 larger Destroyer size ships (around 10,000 tons) to mount the SPY 7 Radars on and the other is to construct 2 sea-based platforms, (like oil rigs) anchored at sea to do the same (see below). I would suspect the latter option to be more preferable. The Land Based SPY 7 Lockheed Martin technology has been proven and soon to be tested in Alaska. The sale of the SPY 7 to the Japanese military is definitely not “commercial’ as you say. The Japanese are ready to buy the sea-based SPY 7 V 1 radar for their own new frigates they are building as well. The contracts have already been signed for the 15 CSC and the five Spanish F110 Frigates for the SPY 7 V 1 radar system, and perhaps more effective than either the British or Australian designed AAW S Band radars. Raytheon’s SPY 6 AMDR radar series RMA’s are much too top-heavy for the CSC mast structure. I totally agree with your suggestion of how the RCN can be expected to operate the Halifax class well into the 2040s. The hulls will suffer metal-fatigue and rust out before that happens. Having 50 year old military ships at sea is inherently dangerous.
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/09/0dffc22966e9-japan-reveals-3-sea-based-alternatives-for-scrapped-aegis-ashore-plan.html
Hello Ted Barnes:
I agree with some of what you have said, but disagree with much more. The comparison and parallels that the CNR Webmaster has expressed with the Zumwalt class were not with the class of ship (destroyer) but with the substance of how the class came to be in the first place. The US Naval Planners have made the same mistakes as the CSC Frigate Planners with our own comparisons both on a political level and with the RCN requirements. Comparing the Halifax class Command & Control System (CCS) 330 software with the much improved Command Management System (CMS) 330 software is like comparing apples to oranges. Not the same at all. I know, as I have dealt and worked with the the CCS 330 Halifax class system for many years in my Naval Service. Can CCS 330 integrate with the 127mm MK 45 MOD 4 gun? Can CCS 330 fully integrate with ESSM Blk II, Sea Ceptor, SMII/III, the Naval Surface Missile (NSM), the Long Range Surface Missile (LRSM-Tomahawk Missile)? I think not. Yes, the Halifax class has an S Band AAW radar capability, but nothing compared to the SPY 7 V 1 or the ESM RAVEN System and the list goes on and on. The Iroquois class by the way, originally had four 280 class platforms not three. Do you have an “in” with both Lockheed Martin and Irving Shipyard WRT the on-going System Integration more than what the Canadian people have been told by our government or are you just speculating? If you know something on the Design Phase then please share it with CNR Forum Members. And this is a “big deal” for all Canadians. Your own opinions are certainly relevant and should be expressed. One thing is crystal clear though. Canada cannot build all 15 CSC Frigates at once. Perhaps in “batches” as the British have done. Say 3 or 4 in the first batch contract; then 4 or 5 in the next 2 contracts over “X” number of years. The first contract would have to be signed between Lockheed Martin/Irving and the Canadian Government this year though in order to keep this program on track. In my opinion, we should “hold-fast” and accept nothing less in capabilities for the CCS Frigate, no matter what the PBO report says the end of this month. The Canadian people & the RCN will accept nothing less.
“The comparison and parallels that the CNR Webmaster has expressed”
To be clear, the authors of Broadsides posts are, unless unspecified, the name on the first line of the post. In the case of this Broadside posting, that would be Procrustes. “CNR Webmaster” is merely the intermediary who receives the posts and puts them onto this forum.
Oakley Doakley Procrustes. WILCO.
Sure in that context similar I guess, I just think a better comparison than to quote that white elephant and the avro arrow.
I mentioned three Iroquois Class and didn’t mention Huron as a fourth since those billets went away way before the other 280’s were paid off. The numbers of CSC was determined on a one for one basis of the three 280’s and twelve Halifax Class, Huron was not considered.
Yes I know lots about the CSC and I’ll leave it at that. Certainly know the CCS 330 is a matter of integrating all its systems and understand that the systems envisioned for the CSC are more complex and of greater number than the Halifax class has. I have no doubt that this is solvable and more along than most people realize.
As I understand there may be a long lead for the first ship to be built and tested with other ships coming with greater frequency. You very well may see batches or different flights. The great part of using virtual technology is that the ship can be built with future upgrades or future proofing with the ability to bring new upgrades and technology to bear easily and cost effective unlike the Halifax Class. Another reason why buying the intellectual property rights is important for the future. I agree we should accept nothing less.