By Moderator, 6 July 2026
The decision has been made! Prime Minister Carney announced today that the TKMS’s 212CD has won the competition to build the RCN’s next submarines. The German-Norwegian TKMS consortium will now advance to discussions on the building of up to 12 submarines. Both Hanwha and TKMS have been aggressively courting Canada with promises of money spent in the country, but it seems that relations and interoperability with a close NATO partner have won over the possibility of closer ties to an Asian country.
Image: Prime Minister Mark Carney announces TKMS as the preferred bidder for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project on the flight deck of an Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship in Halifax on 6 July 2026. Credit: Mark J Carney's X account.
16 thoughts on “New Submarines for Canada”
What’s this – the biggest procurement in history and nobody has anything to say on Broadsides?
It is good to have made a decision and be moving forward
Hi Michael,
Perhaps the ‘usual crowd’ is trying to find the dark cloud around the silver lining!!
This is excellent news.
Ubique,
Les
This is good news for the RCN.
I think many of us were watching this with massive curiosity, as both the two finalists, KSS-III-batch II and the Type-212CD appeared based on unclassified press to be excellent choices for the Royal Canadian Navy. In many respects it appeared to be a win-win for the RCN. I suspect there is a lot more we don’t yet know which has not yet appeared in the unclassified press.
PM Carney stating possibly 4 x Type-212CD by 2034 from TKMS was a massive surprise given TKMS on their website say first boat only in year 2033. I note though German language news source ( https://www.hartpunkt.de/kanadische-regierung-will-bis-zu-12-u-boote-bei-tkms-kaufen/ ) claims TKMS will be increasing their production of the Type-212CD stating “TKMS is currently developing Wismar (on north coast of Germany on the Baltic coast) into its second production site alongside Kiel, where a second pressure hull assembly line is also under construction. According to (TKMS CEO) Burkhard, the plan is for each shipyard to eventually produce 1.5 boats per year. However, the goal is to become even faster.”
The RCN has a big challenge ahead of it to
(a) Man the existing Victoria (Upholder) class to prevent a critical capability gap.
(b) Maintain the existing Victoria class as it ages into the 2030s
(c) man the project office to support subsequent negotiation with TKMS for the Type-212CD
(d) continue staffing that project office to oversee the massive multi-year procurement process
(e) recruit personnel to be trained to both man and maintain the new Type-212CD, including creation of new training pipelines
(f) monitor/support the major infrastructure changes needed at places like Halifax (or nearby), Esquimalt/other for berth and alongside maintenance area of these submarines
(g) support any submarine industrial offset verification directly related to submarine equipment.
Being a new submarine class (as it is a massive change from the Type-212A), I think we all hope there will be no cost over-runs. Presumably by now, the design of the Type-212CD is frozen, which should help reduce the risk.
If all 12 submarines are procured, I can’t help but think that will bring about a fundamental shift internal to the RCN, a shift in terms of Canada and NATO maritime aspects and even a shift with RCN and USN, as Canadian submarines could start patrolling areas, or waiting quietly in strategic northern ‘relative bottle neck passages’ which until now were mostly the domain of USN submarines.
I hope the very best for the RCN to rise up to this challenge of manning this new boat – and sorting not just the manpower recruitment/retention/training/maintenance, but also sorting all the other strategic aspects.
Everything you mention is true. There will be a lot of challenges ahead for sure.
I hope there aren’t many teething troubles, being a new design, but the lineage of the boat suggests hopefully it will be just minor bits as a lot of the tech is already proven.
It will be good for NATO commonality and indeed hopefully could foster more exchange programs.
It is good news and hopefully they do build 12 and we can eventually crew 12.
I think the main first hurdle is going to be infrastructure upgrades which they need to start doing pretty soon to accommodate the new boats.
Further to my previous comment , noting that the preferred bidder selection of the TKMS Type-212CD for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project marks a welcome milestone for the RCN, I think it also immediately raises interesting operational questions regarding sustained under-ice endurance in the Arctic. Operating a fleet of up to 12 conventional submarines across three oceans means the RCN may wish to consider the reality of forward-deployed logistics if NATO allied support is not available. If the RCN intends to fully exploit the Type-212CD’s capabilities in the Arctic, reliance on distant dockyards such as Esquimalt and Halifax risks imposing practical limits on submarine deployment range and on station time. This suggests there is a case for investigating a dedicated, ice-capable mobile support base specialized for submarine support — a specialized submarine tender designed to reside (be pre-positioned) seasonally in northern Arctic waters, while sufficiently flexible for more global deployment.
Such a capability need not be prohibitively expensive if the RCN strictly controls the vessel’s displacement and operational scope. There is a cost risk in a more expanded auxiliary procurement arising from the temptation to turn a utility hull into a multi-mission Swiss Army knife. If this support ship is deliberately restricted from acting as a tactical replenishment vessel for all surface combatants — avoiding the massive engineering premiums of more complex, high-tension Replenishment-at-Sea (RAS) masts, explosion-proof fleet pumping systems, and heavy double-hull fuel architecture needed for servicing surface combatants — then the platform could remain comparatively affordable. By keeping the platform focused on submarine support, with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) winterization standards, the capital expenditure could more likely be kept within a manageable range.
Rather than over-scoping the hull with built-in combat systems, the vessel’s utility could be enhanced by allowing it to dual-purpose also as an ocean-going diving tender for global deployments. This could complement, rather than compete with existing diving tender programs. I believe the RCN’s current Naval Inshore Support Vessel (NISV) project may be limited to a 30-meter length and a 350-tonne displacement, meaning those replacement diving tenders are structurally restricted to shallow, localized harbour and coastal operations and not ocean going. A larger, ice-capable submarine tender with basic diving support capability would provide a blue-water platform for deep-sea clearance divers globally—an environment where the RCN’s current planned coastal vessels are simply not intended to operate.
Finally, such a platform would potentially provide the RCN with a globally deployable submarine rescue support ship. Having a flat-deck auxiliary ship capable of embarking specialized rescue submersibles or hyperbaric systems could be an important asset for both global and northern under-ice emergencies.
This seems like a genuinely good idea. If Canada can accept displacement under 1000 tonnes or delivery after 2040, there might even be an NSS shipyard available to build it. Delivery in the 2040s doesn’t sound crazy, considering that the subs themselves will not be fully delivered until then.
So, you mean a ‘submarine tender’?
Hi Lee. I had another thought. Not too long ago, The Canadian Naval magazine “ReadyAyeReady had an article had an article entitled “Canadian Navy Eyes Amphibious Landing Ship for Arctic Defence.” This vessel is based on the new ice-capable Polar Class 2 Canadian Ice Breakers now being built in Vancouver and Davie Shipyards. This Amphibious Landing Ship could also do double duty as a Submarine Tender as well. Sort of like Swiss Army Knife as an Amphibious/Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Vessel; a Command Ship; and a Canadian Submarine Tender as well. Probably 4-5 of these ships would need to be built at around 30,000 + tonnes each. Just a thought? See below:
https://readyayeready.com/canadian-navy-eyes-ice-capable-amphibious-landing-ships-for-arctic-defence/
I’ll throw in my usual comment here – we can’t even begin work on any more large, complex vessel classes for the next 15 years because we don’t have any spare capacity in the NSS yards. So any talk about amphibious vessels, sub tenders, or anything else is aimed at the navy in 2045.
A very short time ago people were saying there might not be enough work to sustain two shipyards over the long term; now there are three; the corvette program will have to add a fourth yard at the very least. Any more increases in capacity and we might as well admit that we are abandoning the central point of the National Shipbuilding Strategy and embracing a full-on boom-bust cycle.
Good afternoon Michael,
I agree entirely with your point. Given the government’s stated intention to augment the defence budget massively, we must reconsider the NSS. It was brought in by a miserly government (remember the JSS fiasco) in order to rebuild a moribund shipbuilding capability while providing the RCN and CCG with some desperately-needed ships. The program was not, however, meant to deliver ships in a timely fashion – the last DDGH would not have been delivered until the 2040s. Instead, it was more focused on providing some ships at a pace that kept two shipyards functioning steadily. This plan was bad enough that it did not come close to meeting the CCG’s needs; only two icebreakers announced to replace seven/eight.
This leisurely pace might have met the needs of bowler-hatted accountants but failed miserably to address operational requirements. Thus, we must aggressively embrace your idea of at least four NSS shipyards: Halifax, tied up with the DDGHs; Vancouver, focused on the CCG after the two (!) AORs; Levis, providing icebreakers and other polar-capable ships – such as submarine tenders, LPAs, and perhaps LSI(A)s?; a new shipyard, the CDCs; and possibly a fifth shipyard if the four already mentioned cannot keep up with the operational requirements.
This expanded capacity could lead to the bust portion of a boom-and-bust cycle in the 2040s. However, one can answer this concern with two questions. 1. Is this a worse problem than having Canada’s fleets collapse in the meantime due to a lack of production? 2. Might not the refit needs of the additional ships and likely new construction (for example for the AOPS replacements) stave off/delay a “bust?”
Clearly though, plans to employ four(+) NSS shipyards must be built on the ability to have and/or train the necessary workers. I would suggest that unaddressable production capacity shortfalls are a greater issue than the “need” to avoid boom-and-bust cycles.
Ubique,
Les
Hi David. I appreciate the reference to amphibious concepts; if such vessels are fully funded, they would certainly be a welcome addition to RCN capability in the Arctic and globally, which I for one, would fully support. However, I am concerned that a ‘Swiss Army knife’ approach —combining amphibious assault, surface replenishment and submarine/diving tender functions into one class — could lead to a prohibitively expensive vessel. I worry that rising costs for such an ambitious platform might leave us with no northern mobile base at all. My hope is that RCN leadership, given the funding available, adopts the approach that best fits the budget to better help ensure Canadian northern sovereignty – whatever the RCN leadership assesses that to be.
Hi David, Further to the idea of a mobile base seasonally pre-dispositioned in the Arctic to support Arctic deployed submarines, … I believe to be truly effective the scope may be a bit larger to attain full benefit.
To ensure the sustained operational effectiveness of a polar-class mobile base ship or polar class submarine tender stationed in the Arctic, it may be prudent to establish a distributed aviation network to provide further support. Something to assess is the merits of a hypothetical possibility of assigning a detachment of up to nine helicopters (CH-148 Cyclone, or CH-149 Cormorant or CH-146 Griffon), strategically dispersed across three chosen northern airports, the idea being to create a resilient “hub-and-spoke” logistics system. This configuration could potentially enable the reliable relay of urgent supplies, specialized submarine components, and personnel from southern Canadian bases—such as Esquimalt or Halifax—to these northern nodes via fixed-wing transport, followed by rapid helicopter transit to the mobile base ship – where the assumption is such a hypothetical submarine tender/base ship would have a suitable helicopter deck.
Operating in the High Arctic presents unique challenges, including extreme weather, long distances, and the necessity for redundant maintenance infrastructure. By distributing the helicopter detachment across a few airports, the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force could in part mitigate the risk of operational disruption due to localized weather events or mechanical issues, ensuring as best practical that the mobile base remains tethered to its supply chain. While this approach offers a possible aid to assist in maintaining northern sovereignty and submarine endurance, the viability and total lifecycle cost of such a large-scale seasonal deployment clearly requires further, detailed examination to ensure it aligns with overall defence priorities, infrastructure capacity, and budget. A smaller scope than what I hypothesized may be more than adequate.
Possible airports to be considered and assessed for the feasibility of such include CFB Resolute Bay (CYRB), Iqaluit Airport (CYFB), Rankin Inlet Airport (CYRT), Inuvik (Mike Zubko) Airport (CYEV), and Nanisivik Naval Facility (Public/Government Airfield) – where an appropriate subset likely would need be selected.
My previous post was long. I want to add, that stationing many helicopters in multiple selected northern airfields, so to be able to fly to/from the airfield to/from a polar class Canadian submarine tender, would be an expensive proposition.
That leads to me speculating that by running through those financial numbers for such an expense – and then comparing such to the cost of a “swiss army knife” mobile base ship (with submarine tender functionality) where that ship embarks a few helicopters, the financial trade-offs as to which approach is most economical might better be done. Further the amount of equipment/personnel on any given helicopter flight would likely be limited to only the most urgent of needs.
Perhaps such calculation being made – dependent on the outcome of the numbers – could help justify the extra expense for making any such a polar class arctic mobile base (with submarine tender functionality) financially justified.
I do love the German submarines I do think they are a good fit for the country but, the Korean offer economically seemed to be a lot better.
Hopefully we can get a deal done without being raked over the coals on cost and a confirmed schedule on boats delivered.
Let’s all get behind this Mark Carney decision! The real work now begins for Canada and the TKMS Type 212CD to hammer out the final details before the build begins. If contracts are not signed before 2027 and negotiations go south, don’t forget that Hanwha Ocean waits in the wings!! The KSS III Batch II is a larger & heavier sub (4000+ tonnes) and is also a great choice for Canada. It would also be a great choice for the RCN as well. Again, let’s see what happens by this time next year!! Cheers!!