By Jeff G. Gilmour, 27 April 2024
In 2010, with great fanfare, the federal government in Canada announced the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) that was intended to strengthen this country’s marine industry. To date, things have not gone well. The initial program promised that a number of types of ships would be built for both the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Canadian Coast Guard at two shipyards; Seaspan in Vancouver and the Irving Shipyard in Halifax – a third shipyard, Davie in Levis, Quebec, was later added.
Many of the projects have been seriously delayed, as noted by the Auditor General, or could be cancelled based on budget projections. For example, several years ago the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) estimated the fifteen Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) ships would cost over 88 billion dollars. There is no possible way such costs can be absorbed by the DND budget, which has already been substantially reduced. The eventual outcome might be two or three CSCs coming out of Irving. The other negative fact from this particular program is that the first of these ships is not expected until the 2030s and the final one some time around 2048-49.
The premise of this article is to sound the death knell of the surface fleet of the RCN in the future. The war in Ukraine has already shown how effective drones have been against Russian ships in the Black Sea/Crimea. Add to that list cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles and the surface fleets around the world are now exposed targets, including the US Navy carrier groups. For the latter fleet, this requires it to operate further and further offshore, which affects the range their aircraft have to hit potential land targets.
It is interesting to note that data was recently obtained from a Russian 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missile which was intercepted over Kyiv on 25 March 2024. It was determined that the launch involved an initial ‘mortar’ launch followed by the activation of a booster stage propelling that missile to a very high altitude and then obtaining a constant speed of 5.5 Mach.[1]
It has a range of 1,000 kilometres and up. Ukraine has reported that Russia has fired five hypersonic Zircon missiles at Kyiv this year alone.[2] The Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, has a range of around 1,500 km. The PLA Navy’s long-range hypersonic missiles, which arrived last year, have a range of nearly 3,000 km.
I firmly believe Australia has taken the right course in teaming up with the UK and USA in a trilateral AUKUS defence agreement to operate nuclear-powered submarines, which can sail further and faster than Canada’s Victoria-class conventional submarines. Australia is also purchasing three Virginia-class attack submarines from the US and building five new SSN AUKUS-class in alignment with the British Astute-class replacement.
In my opinion, it is disappointing Canada did not pursue the same deal with the US/UK as did the Australian government for the purchase of eight attack SSNs. For example, such boats would be instrumental in protecting our interests in the Arctic from potential threats from Russian and China. On the possibility our government examines nuclear attack submarines as the way to deter foreign marine threats, a number of fundamental questions would have to be addressed.
1. There would have to be a strong business and political case since the NSS has shown the strong connection between ship construction in this country and domestic economic benefits.
2. How many nuclear submarines would be required to fulfill the maritime tasking in our three oceans?
3. What would be the cost to build relative to the total cost for the CSC?
4. Recognizing the existing problems of building ships in our own shipyards, what is the business case for purchasing them directly from the US or UK. It would also encounter possible problems with the transfer of nuclear technology from either of the two countries?
5. What would be the infrastructure and timing costs to reorient the focus from the surface to a submarine fleet?
The surface fleet remaining would consist of the AOPS and fast coastal patrol ships protecting our Pacific and Atlantic coasts.
I believe, based on the current threats against surface fleets, the nuclear attack submarine deterrent is the appropriate response, particularly in our Arctic Ocean. Why is it not possible to enter into something similar to the Australian AUKUS agreement with our allies in developing a nuclear attack submarine force instead of a surface fleet which could be exposed to potential waves of drones and missiles on the open ocean.
[1] D. Malyasov, “Ukraine uncovers secrets of Russia’s new hypersonic missile”, Defence Blog, March 27, 2024.
[2] Reuters, April 1, 2024.
31 thoughts on “The Demise of the Canadian Surface Fleet”
Good morning Jeff,
Please confirm what other vessels your version of the RCN would possess beyond the SSNs.
Ubique,
Les
A few points:
The national shipbuilding strategy, Irving aside, is largely focused on ships for the Coast Guard (and a few for transport Canada); these ships are needed to maintain current functions of the Coast Guard. So whatever one thinks of the administration of the strategy, cancelling it and saving the money is not really an option. The bespoke ships Canada has asked for are not produced anywhere else in the world, and certainly not routinely or cheaply.
Much has been made of the billions for the NSS, but the stated cost is largely a result of Canadian accounting procedures. We persist in pretending that we can estimate today costs which will not be incurred for twenty years. Anyone who has run a household budget knows that you can’t forcast accurately even a year in advance. Nor can we accurately forcast our needs. The Houthi attacks on shipping were not forseen even a few days before they began. Western nations were able to respond (not necessarily in the best way) because they had ships already built and in the region. If I buy a minivan today, I might realize next year that I should have bought an F-150, but it is far better to have bought the minivan than to have nothing. That is the real choice. Canada has invested a decade in designing the best ship we can think of. Maybe we’ve got it wrong – who knows? If we build the ships we’ve planned, at least we will have ships. In a crisis, smart people tomorrow will find ways to use them, even if those ways are not the ones we imagine today. Indeed they are certain not to be. Our enemies are not so stupid as to do exactly what we expect.
As for those enemies, they do not think that surface fleets are useless. China has built a surface navy to challenge America. Russian shipyards are fully engaged. India seems to launch a new vessel every week. Iran keeps practicing its swarm techniques and has recently interdicted commercial vessels. So does the rise of aerial drones, unmanned surface or underwater vessels, and missiles signify the end of the surface navy? Maybe eventually. But definitely not yet. It is worth remembering that the main advantage of drones is that they are small, cheap, and quickly produced. Canada can make these things too, and on short notice in the event of war – assuming we maintain our core industrial skill set. Can engineers and welders trained on complex unique vessels also build simple mass produced ones? Yes they can.
For the claim I see repeated so often here – that most of the planned CSCs will never be built: there is no evidence of that, except the fears of people who have been disappointed before. The current government is proceeding with the plan. The Conservatives leader has been silent about his plans for National Defence (and for nearly everything else), which doesn’t inspire great confidence in his commitment, but the NSS was a Conservative idea in the first place, and defence critic James Bezan appears competent. International relations look ominous – always good for defence investment.
For submarines, it would be nice if a decision came more quickly but the government and the navy are both saying the same thing and it is likely the right thing. 8-12 new conventional submarines purchased from a foreign supplier with no design modifications – just change the language on the labels – will be the fastest and cheapest way to restore Canada’s fleet. Admiral Topshee recently suggested that battery technology may already have advanced to the point of meeting Canada’s under-ice needs. And we have little need to dominate the far oceans. If we placed the order today, Korea or Japan might well deliver all 12 before Australia and the UK begin production of their new nuclear subs.
Good morning Michael,
Such excellent points!!! Thank you for taking the time to make them in such an articulate fashion.
Ubique,
Les
Thanks to the government our military, especially the navy is nothing more than a Great Lakes navy. An embarrassment to Canadians. We couldn’t defend our coastline from enemy tug boats and row boats.
And what would you suggest be done?
Ubique,
Les
Les, first of all let’s get to our 2% of GDP for the military and quit wasting money on social programs that never get off the ground. They made promises, honour them. It shouldn’t take 10 years to buy 20 million in pistols for the army. Get the ships, submarines, offensive and defensive missiles we should have. Stop lying to our NATO allies. Give our soldiers the equipment they need, recruiting will come on its own. Quit saying we will do all this in 10 to 15 years, what a joke we have become.
20 million pistols?? 16,000 perhaps. :)
An embarrassment to Canadians? Yes. But it is our own fault.
Hello Jeff. I agree that the NSS program (although brought in by the Harper government) has been politically “botched” by the Liberal government. As you know, the $88B CAD price tag for building 15 CSC Frigates by the PBO has been vigorously disputed by DND over the past years. Even if the build for these “behemoth” ships starts by the end of 2024 (I believe early Spring 2025 is more like it), we will still be farther behind where we should be. Even if the PBO estimates are close, the life-cycle costs for these ships will be close to $300B CAD over their life-span of 40 years (about $20B CAD per ship) over that time period. If the defence budget were to balloon to well over 2% of GDP by the end of 2024 (as required by NATO), then maybe…..just maybe these jaw-dropping costs could be absorbed with some “creative” planning. The increasing fact that more technologically advanced Drones, Cruise, Ballistic and Hypersonic missiles will expose fleet Carriers as “big fat targets” is a worrying thought for our little Canadian CSC ASW task groups although with the on-coming air-to-air refueling drones being out-fitted on Carriers, that may reduce that problem.
I firmly believe that before the AUKUS deal was ever signed, Canada was offered an equal partnership in the alliance by the US, but the PM firmly rejected the offer, not because it was a good deal for Canada, but it was too much of a political football for him and his party. Although the eye-watering infrastructure costs for 8 Canadian SSNs is a negative sticking point, all NATO SSN countries could have shared those infrastructure costs on all three Canadian coasts for “common infrastructure use”.
Here is what I would propose as a balanced CSC Frigate/SSN fleet approach:
1. Reduce the number of CSC Frigates from 15 down to 12 ships. This would save approximately $15B CAD for 3 ships not being built with the savings applied to an SSN program. The first Batch I of 8 (4 per coast) ships would be ASW orientated as originally planned. The Second Batch II of 4 ships (2 per coast) would be AAW orientated and re-configured to have 64 MK 41 VLS ExLS cells midships as with the proposed BAE Hunter class design with 4 x 4 NSMs midships as per the Constellation class program (this of course would mean losing the MMB & MBHS midships). The Sea Ceptor systems could also be upgraded to 48 cells vice 24. The FWD VLS cells would go back to 32 MK 41 VLS ExLS cells.
2. Create an 8 x Canadian SSN program (subs to be built in the US and/or UK) to Canadian specifications. There would be 3 SSNs stationed on both the East & West coasts (one always operational; one in ramp-up/ramp-down and one in EWP). The other two SSNs would be stationed in the Arctic at a designated infrastructure base (possibly Iqualuit)-one operational and one in ramp-up mode on a rotational basis from both the East & West coast fleets. The costs for this SSN fleet however will not be cheap (possibly around $100B+CAD with infrastructure). Canada must of course first acquire the nuclear technology from the US/UK (a difficult task at best).
3. Build at least one more Protecteur class AOR for the surface fleet and a submarine tender for the submarine fleet.
4. Canada should also consider a fleet of tanker drones for the RCAF F35 program.
An ambitious fleet yes, but well worth the effort.
I’ve got to re read the comments and post again it’s hard to do on the phone away from home. But one thing caught my eye about SSNs and that was “have them built in USA or UK.”
In reality you have 0 chance of this because in the UK our only builder is fully committed to Dreadnought and the following SSN AUKUS so there won’t be any space for a Canadian SSN not forgetting the Australian components.
American yards are not only at capacity right now, they are at capacity at least until 2040s with the production of Virginia and Columbia classes. You also have maintenance backlogs as well to deal with.
So I would safely say rule these places out because their order books are full and they won’t expand just for 8 submarines for Canada.
I think it will be a case of if you want it build it yourself.
Blair, you very well may be correct however, countries like France may have something to contribute to this question. Canada has long since lost the experience of building submarines for Britain during WW I, so we just do not have that expertise anymore. Canada does have a world of expertise in building SMRs & SMMRs however, which could be useful in any future Canadian SSN program. If Canada does indeed want to acquire an SSN fleet, yes, we may have to gain that experience and “build it ourselves” as you say. We may have to acquire a 10-12 AIP/LIB Subs off-shore first, while trying to gain the SMR/SMMR build expertise for future AIP/LIB replacements. A generational change but worth the effort? Only time will tell. Cheers!
France has its own issues. Like the UK, it has one facility that produces its nuclear submarines and right now it is in the middle of building the Suffren class, and after that is built they will very likely roll onto the SNLE 3G building which is due to take place around 2030/33 replacing the current Le Triomphant class.
The above means that for at least the next 2 decades France isn’t an option either as they won’t have any capacity to build in France.
France though could assist if they were to be built in Canada. However, as you pointed out, Canada hasn’t built a submarine for over 100 years and the level of technical detail and capability to build such a vessel is incredibly high.
The problem comes with funding and I don’t see any government wanting to put tens if not hundreds of billions into this type of program, I think the politicians would have a collective stroke if they saw the bill.
Currently France has been assisting Brazil in building a nuclear submarine the projected launch is 2028 they started the program in 2008.
So if you use that as the base, you’re not getting a SSN from scratch with help for at least 20 years, then add in all the infrastructure costs on top and, well, I just can’t see Canada ever going down that route.
The logical and more practical option is AIP, either jump on the 212CDE program or KSIII, buy them as is and don’t try and Canadianize them. History has shown that doesn’t work well.
I think we spoke before about SMRs and the fact they produce 5 times more waste than a normal reactor I will try and dig that up, it’s probably way back in the pages, but each refueling is expensive it also produces a lot of waste not to mention puts the unit out of service for a period of time.
If you want to see what happens when you put a reactor into a conventional boat, look at the Rubis class of France. The boat is basically an Agosta class with a K15 reactor wedged in it, the boat has serious flaws it under-performs, it’s slow noisy and oddly has a reduced endurance compared to other SSNs.
The Russians did a similar trial with a Project 651 boat called 651E NATO Juliet that also didn’t go to well for them.
If you’re thinking of just slamming a reactor into a conventional boats hull even a SMR then I would say think again very carefully.
10/12 boats I would certainly love to see but I have a feeling it’s never going to happen. I think we are going to have to lower our expectations somewhat because I don’t think any government is going to go for either plan, we would probably be lucky to get 6 off the shelf AIP boats (you also have to consider crew as well).
Hello Mr. Shaw:
With respect to the source you have that states that SMRs produce “5 times more waste than a normal reactor,” there are reasons to question its trustworthiness. Confining the discussion of ‘waste’ to the spent fuel rods removed from a reactor core during a refuelling outage, if one reactor contains five times more fuel than another, then, generally speaking, its thermal power output should be something on the order of five times greater.
Similarly, in the case of diesel generators, for example, if one genset burns five times more fuel at full power than another, then chances are that it will have something on the order of five times the electrical output.
Most, if not all, of the Small Modular Reactor designs that are likely to attain commercial viability are simply smaller versions of existing reactor types. There is nothing about their design that is going to violate the relationship between fuel and power output that I’ve described above. For a given power output, there is no way that an SMR is going to hold five times more fuel in its core than a reactor that is not an SMR, and therefore, it will not produce five times more waste.
As Michael has said above, many people keep putting forward that the CS program will seemingly be canceled, cut down and otherwise compromised without proof of such a thing even being on the radar of the government. The RCN has been steadfast in their support of 15 CSC’s while both the Conservatives and Liberals seem entirely unwilling to lose potential votes by removing jobs from Atlantic Canada and across the country with the supply chain. The CSC program is the backbone of the RCN going forward and without it, Canada will need to entirely change how it plans to deal with defense at home and abroad. Accusations seemingly without proof and against all signs thus far does not sit well with me. The overall $88~ billion or whatever figure is being put forward will be paid off over many decades, not being frontloaded and somehow breaking the RCN’s budget in one fell swoop. None of the political parties will be lining up to cut down a long term, multi-billion dollar vote buying program throughout Canada.
The war in Ukraine has shown how effective drones have been against incompetent Russian crews aboard either outdated Soviet vessels or newer production ships which are woefully inadequate to properly defend against even Ukrainian drone attacks. I would not get ahead of ourselves as well, even these poorly equipped and trained Russians have been destroying many, many Ukrainian aerial and naval drones before hits eventually occur. Western ships have been equipped and their crews trained to properly deal with small boat and aviation attacks for decades since the USS Cole bombing, what applies to Russia now does not apply to western nations now and especially into the future. Cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missiles are able to be dealt with by current air defense platforms to various degrees, the assumption that surface ships are merely targets now does not hold water.
What is workable for one country might not be for another, Australia and Canada are no different. Canada does not have the available political willpower, funding, infrastructure, manpower and training to even operate nuclear submarines anytime soon. Nuclear submarines are a fundamentally unrealistic and poor choice for Canada’s limited defense budget, hence why Canada has not entered into something like AUKUS. Even if we wanted to now, there is no more shipbuilding room in Australia, America or Britain for Canadian boats to be produced. It seems unlikely that the boats for Australia will be produced anytime soon, Canada surely isn’t developing domestic SSN production capability either. The cost of an SSN program for Canada would easily eclipse that of the CSC program, it is not a cost effective solution.
Downgrading the RCN’s surface fleet to AOPS and ‘fast coastal patrol ships’ I feel is a poor decision. SSN’s are well suited to unseen patrolling and wartime strike duties however, they are very poor peacetime ships and wartime units for a variety of roles. Canada has peacetime and wartime obligations to meet within NATO, deploying surface vessels on missions across the world. Such a limited surface fleet with a major SSN contingent would be entirely unable to meet these goals, severely diminishing many of the roles and missions undertaken by the RCN. Losing the ability to project our own surface powers into domestic and foreign waters is a major loss, alongside being able to provide anti-submarine warfare, air defense and general escort to friendly units. Presence missions are important and by their nature, SSN’s do not do presence very well. Going all in on SSN’s at the expense of the remainder of the fleet seems short sighted.
Surface vessels are not obsolete or useless considering how the majority of navies around the world continue to build them in droves. Unmanned systems and the variety of missiles are just another threat to be adapted to and handled, entirely inside the capability of surface vessels to deal with. CSC specifically is entirely able to deal with swarming drone attacks and many missile attacks now and into the future with upgrades.
“SSN’s are well suited to unseen patrolling and wartime strike duties however, they are very poor peacetime ships and wartime units for a variety of roles.”
I agree with what you have said except this point which I quote because a SSN is in no way a poor peacetime asset. The majority of intelligence that is gathered for various operations in peacetime be it counter narcotics, anti piracy, arms embargoes and a plethora of more, are gathered by SSNs
Currently they are the only asset that could for long periods patrol Canada’s northern border all year around. No other platform can do this (type 212A managed under-ice navigation in the Baltic & Arctic for limited periods of time).
They have their uses and they are incredibly good at what they do however I do think SSNs are too rich for Canada’s budget.
Hello Blair,
My point regarding SSN’s being a poor peacetime asset is that they are no replacement for surface vessels. From my quote there, they are well suited to patrolling and by extension surveillance however, they are very lacking for a variety of other duties. A SSN is a poor ship to send when you want a clear presence in an area, they are entirely unsuited to humanitarian missions, they cannot physically participate in anti-piracy, counter narcotics, arms embargoes, etc. My main point is that as a reply to the initial article, SSN’s are not a substitute for a surface fleet, not so much that they are a poor vessel in general as they are not.
Cheers.
Hello Jimmy,
Thank you for making this point so clearly.
Having a niche navy, as with niche armies, pretty well guarantees that you won’t have whatever capability is required by the crisis actually being faced.
A broad range of military capabilities is required to cater for whatever the future brings. The trick is to find the correct balance and quantity without going bankrupt.
Ubique,
Les
Thanks for clarifying. I agree with what you say there.
Hello,
The pace of development and evolution of standoff munitions around the world shows the expeditionary force model to be approaching obsolescence. Determined adversaries can make our activities a lot more costly, or in some cases interdict them, on their own shores. We should get used to the fact that, collectively, western/North-American nations will no longer be able to act cheaply with impunity on the other side of the globe.
It therefore looks like surface combatants will be relegated to limited police action against non-state groups from now on, and with a defensive focus on our shores, rather than an expeditionary one.
I agree with Michael Peirson here “assuming we maintain our core industrial skill set”.
I am very concerned that we are not maintaining this core skill set, and are even losing it. I refer you to summaries like this one https://c2cjournal.ca/2022/11/canadas-stem-education-gap-the-need-for-more-science-based-professionals/ of Canada’s STEM trend. Real high tech requires math, physics, and heavy engineering, not just IT and computer programming. Add to that the trend that the majority of STEM graduates in Canadian post-secondary institutions are foreign students.
At the same time, manufacturing accounts for ~10% of our GDP; only 20% of that is in metals and machine manufacturing, while 4% is in electronics and computers.
Compare the Canadian STEM charts and industry profile to those of our competing states; that “core industrial skill set” is a phantasm.
All in all, we are selling relatively low value-added product and “procuring” high value-added systems and platforms. This is very important because we can’t just magically throw non-existent money at it to solve the problem. This is no way to build and maintain a strong, sovereign, country.
Regards
From time to time questions come up on here especially gloom and doom on the current CSC and the prospect of nuclear submarines for the RCN. I don’t think anybody truly knows what’s going to happen in the future in regards to how many CSC will be built as the program spans several decades and we know a lot can happen over that period of time. The probability is that we will be getting at least three as most of the long lead items are ordered and being built. The test module will be started this year and steel for the actual builds will start to be cut soon after. The actual contract sometime in 2025. That in itself is a fairly good indicator the project is progressing. I think others have answered why surface warships are not going away any time soon and to suggest so is ludicrous.
We all know nuclear submarines are the way to go for Canada but we are in the minority. We know the reasons why this will not happen and hoping for it won’t make it happen. Infrastructure alone specifically for nuclear submarines is eye wateringly expensive and when I say expensive, I mean hundreds of billions expensive. They would probably have to be based in locations on the east and west coasts because of security and civilian outrage. You are certainly not basing nuclear submarines in Esquimalt.
I personally think we will have 15 CSC because that is the plan and I have no indicators or proof of future cancellations. We will have a lower VLS amount with the first batch with future flights having greater numbers and that is because that’s the plan. While hypersonic missiles are a worry they can and it has been proven that they can be intercepted.
Based on actual facts, we will be getting 2 Protecteur Class. We will be getting 6 to 8 conventional submarines because that is the current plan however not part of the future strategic plan or funded, nuclear submarines are not even being looked at. Kingston Class replacement not planned or funded currently but I would say we’ll get at least 8 ships with the capability roughly of the River class at some later date.
Hello Ted. “Gloom and Doom” as you say is all that most CNR forum members have to go by with this secretive government. The prospect of Canadian SSNs being built may not be as far-fetched as you believe. Yes, the build of SSNs and infrastructure will be “eye-watering” to say the least. The Australian government has said as much – well over $320B AUD dollars according to their PM. But that cost estimate is not just for “take-away costs” but for the operational lifetime of the program (at least 40 years – about $10B AUD for each SSN boat per year). The costs then, seem to be much more manageable for a Canadian SSN program as well. Reducing the number of CSC Frigates built down to 12 ships from 15, as I have stated, may be the way to go for Canada, using the estimated savings of roughly $15B CAD as a “start-up fund” for an 8 submarine SSN fleet and infrastructure program seeming more reasonable. The Canadian government has stated that “up to” 12 Conventional AIP LIB submarines would be required at costs for infrastructure of roughly the same costs as a Canadian SSN fleet. No matter which sub will finally be selected, the costs are “staggering but manageable”. Yes, an 8-10 Kingston class replacement will also be required along with, in my own opinion another Protector class AOR along with at least 2 (possibly 3) submarine tenders (one each per coast – Atlantic, Pacific & Arctic – Davie Shipyard’s G-LAAM proposal would do nicely!). Why would a Canadian SSN fleet not be welcomed in Esquimalt harbour Ted? Too much “clean energy” for them “left coasters”? Perhaps a fleet further up the left side of Vancouver Island may be more suitable? No problem for the Dartmouth side of Halifax harbour though. For any of this to happen however, more sailors will be required! As I said, an ambitious fleet, but well worth the effort. Fleet plans are always meant to be flexible and change. Only another government may help this fleet come into being.
People who have the need know and people who don’t need to know don’t – it’s as simple as that. This wouldn’t be an issue before social media as this is an outlet for people to say what they want and rage about things that is frankly none of their concern. We all know it’s not just about the cost but the political implications. Canada politically has always stood against nuclear for the military since our last foray into nuclear acquisition and we all know how that ended and probably the only time we could have done it and it’s doubtful that this will ever change. Any comments to the contrary from the sitting government that has always maintained its stance against such acquisitions is suspect and with the probable government change in a year and half and their stance on getting Canada’s finances in order leads me to believe that a nuclear submarine program no matter how much sense it is will not happen.
Having multiple discussions with actual submariners who share an office with me believe, and they would be more than likely to know, that nuclear acquisition is not only not being looked at and the conventional replacement currently under way will only have 6 to 8 boats and that’s not funded or in the future strategic plan as of yet. I can be reasonably sure when I say that we won’t be acquiring any submarine tenders or extra AORs either.
As for my comments about separate bases for nuclear submarines that I contend would be needed, it’s like this. At times we have “visitors” who dock in Shearwater for the weekend, we stand up both base security ashore and waterborne. That is a far cry from having a permanent presence of nuclear submarines in Halifax and Esquimalt when we can’t even paint alongside and have fire exercises before 8 in the morning because the action alarms would disturb the neighbors. That is why most bases for nuclear submarines are separate.
Until the CPC say something about our military, and they have been pretty quiet about that, then I think we will be lucky to keep our current acquisition plans as is. Remember we are in the hole from irresponsible spending by the current government and can’t see extra money being spent in that manner.
If we were serious, then a cost effective option would be a underwater listening net in the Arctic and invest in AUV’s for under the ice patrolling with a conventional submarine ice edge back up. Way cheaper and more politically acceptable.
The PM mentioned nuclear-powered boats during the press conference at which the updated defence policy was released. My interpretation of his speculations as to the suitability of SSNs for Canada is that he was, per usual habit, issuing a non-committal answer to a complex question. But there may be another possibility. We have learned from the analysis of the foreign interference issue that the PM does not in fact read all his written briefings; he prefers oral briefings. It could be that he was not briefed in detail on his government’s new defence policy, or that he skim-read the synopsis of the policy and skipped over the part where conventional boats were deemed to be the better choice (pg. 24 of the hard copy or pdf version). Either way, he spoke out of turn. The CDS was surprised by the rhetorical flourish from his boss, but the issue (if there was one) seems to have died.
You seem to be saying that the Canadian electorate (who are the ultimate authority), do not need to know how or why their tax dollars are either spent or not spent? I strongly disagree – “It’s as simple as that”! The Canadian Naval Review (CNR) Forum is not just a social media outlet to say and rage about military subjects and concerns that are indeed their right (and I believe their obligation as competent military experts) to do so. To say that it is “none of their concern” for any CNR Form member to express their opinion that is a duty, that all Forum members take very seriously, and should be able to freely express without others attempting to put a gag order on them. Canadian Politicians, Political Parties & Policies all have something in common. They can and will change eventually by the Canadian people. Twice before, Canada attempted to acquire SSN submarine technology – once when the Canadian Submarine Service was realized, and once again when Canada (with the majority of Canadians approving at the time) attempting to acquire the U.K. Trafalgar class SSN fleet for its Oberon class (O Boat) replacements. Both times the acquisitions were finally cancelled because of the government of the day having cost concerns with acquiring the US/UK nuclear technology. It would be wise to remember that policies can and will change – it’s as simple as that!
Don’t give me this “Canadian electorate” bunk, and how tax dollars are spent. Sensitive things, such as some aspects of defence, are in the government’s purview to what information is released and it doesn’t owe the public any explanation. Like social media, this forum has from time to time hosted rants from different individuals and there is nothing wrong with the stated opinion but don’t be surprised by rebuttals for things repeatably stated over and over here and answered by SME’s will be taken to task.
Ted. You say that “The test module will be started this year (2024) and steel for the actual builds will start to be cut soon after. The actual contract sometime in 2025. That in itself is a fairly good indicator the project is progressing”. Well, the NSS is definitely not doing its job then, because the first of the CSC Frigates should have already been in the water by now! Why not just sign the contract now and GET ON WITH IT!
Hi David.
David Pugliese recently reported that construction of one CSC module is scheduled to begin in June, which matches what Irving and National Defence have been saying for some time.
https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/initial-construction-to-begin-in-june-on-new-canadian-warships
“But under the current existing deal, low-rate production activities on the ships are covered and building a small section allows for construction techniques to be further refined. “Full-rate production is expected to begin under an implementation contract in 2025,” Sadiku noted.”
What exactly they can learn by doing this that they would not learn equally well and equally quickly in the ordinary course of construction is not stated. I’m inclined to think the move is more about generating headlines that make the project difficult to cancel than any benefit to the construction process. Maybe that’s too cynical.
Still, Ted has repeatedly pointed out that the government and Irving were committed to building a test module this year, and it seems he was right to trust the government’s word. I don’t understand the delay with the contract, but the AOPS seem to be progressing at a rate of 13-14 months per ship per stage of construction, so in the ordinary course of events Irving should be ready to cut steel on the CSC in the second half of 2025. Not delightful, but basically in line with the revised revised revised schedule.
In positive news, HMCS Max Bernays was commissioned yesterday. Canada apparently has at least two Harry DeWolf class vessels manned at the same time (even though the admiral said they only had enough crew for one).
Michael – most large scale projects often build a test section or block to refine the techniques you require for setting up the machines, jigs, techniques you require for a build. AOPS used different steel for instance so the CSC will need to do the same. That way there is less delays and wastage if for instance you don’t do the test module and end up having to redo the work because something wasn’t setup correctly or some sort of thing cropped up unexpectedly as they sometimes do. Sometimes the test module ends up going into an actual ship so in my opinion makes perfect sense. What I gather as well is after the test module steel for some sections will be cut and stored at Irving’s production facility in Dartmouth for future production. You are correct that the government’s going shamelessly use this to promote the build in a positive way; much the same as the media use anything wrong to promote the CSC in a negative way.
I wasn’t trusting the government’s word as I am well aware of the production schedules for these ships and know enough people in the actual build to have good SA on what’s going on. As for Harry DeWolf Class ships we actually have three fully crewed, not one. The largest shortage is trained martechs which is being solved quickly.
“But under the current existing deal, low-rate production activities on the ships are covered and building a small section allows for construction techniques to be further refined. “Full-rate production is expected to begin under an implementation contract in 2025,” Sadiku noted.”
What exactly they can learn by doing this that they would not learn equally well and equally quickly in the ordinary course of construction is not stated.
You don’t want to go charging off and start smashing out sections before you refine the process. We don’t build prototypes so if you get it wrong it’s more expensive to find out later that to do it bit by bit and review the work and procedure so that you can speed up later otherwise it becomes a very expensive mess very quickly.
Going slowly to start allows the process to be refined so that if something does go wrong you can contain it to that hull. The Soviets and Chinese found this out the hard way with many of their ships and submarines over the years.
RE: Ted Barnes, 7 May 2024, 4:33. Ted, you obviously are hard at work on the Canadian Submarine Project as a bureaucratic supervisor of some sort for the government. In my opinion ordinary Canadians do not require ‘sensitive’ information of on-going projects but they do deserve ‘release friendly’ information as to where their hard-earned money is being spent on defence, but so far, there has been complete silence from the government. As a very tried & true “SME” on most things RCN for the last 41 1/2 yrs, I think I have enough experience and an obligation to express my thoughts to all CNR Forum members. Government “SMEs” owe all Canadians nothing less. The RCN experts involved with this project are the true heroes but remember Ted, most informed & knowledgeable Canadians have very, very long memories. As a knowledgeable and objective forum member, you too have the right to ‘rant’ – but let’s hope this submarine project gets off on the right foot.
If someone can show me how a submarine replacement project – even one aiming to buy 4-6 boats – can co-exist financially (or politically) with the fighter replacement project, CSC, NOARD renewal, and so many other desirables – I would be much obliged. Anything that is currently unfunded is going to have an extremely hard time gaining entry into the capital plan over the next decade. In the meantime our Victorias are fast approaching their ‘best before’ dates.
The fact that the F-35 and the CSC are being bought concurrently causes me no end of worry. Recall that the CF-18 buy mainly took place between 1982 and 1988, after which acquisition costs gave way to O&M. Spending on the Halifax frigate project was highest from 1987 to 1997. The two programs overlapped, to be sure, but they were also deconflicted.
Skip ahead a generation and we’ve contrived to super-impose the two most expensive projects of our generation on top of each other. The most expensive fighter plane we’ve ever bought (adjusted for inflation) and a ship replacement that is clearly not subject to the disciplines imposed on the Halifax-class project are surely going to crowd out any other mega-project that is not currently funded – even assuming that a combination of federal debt charges, inflation, etc., do not force a scale-down of CF-35 and CSC numbers (they might).
A replacement of our SSKs is desirable. A timely replacement even more so. But is it achievable?