By Jeff G. Gilmour, 30 December 2024
Canada’s new Arctic Foreign Policy was released in Ottawa on 6 December 2024. The policy has four pillars: asserting Canada’s sovereignty; advancing Canada’s interests through pragmatic diplomacy; leadership on Arctic governance and multilateral challenges; and adopting a more inclusive approach to Arctic diplomacy.
This post intends to explore the implications of the first pillar under the paragraph entitled “Leveraging diplomacy to support national defence and security”. It notes “The Government of Canada will continue to take a comprehensive approach to Arctic security by prioritizing the security, interests and priorities of the Arctic region and northerners, as well as Canadians more broadly. Canada’s foreign and defence policies are closely intertwined and complementary…. Canada is making investment to ensure that the CAF has the capabilities required to operate in an evolving geopolitical context…. Strengthened military capabilities will bolster the CAF’s ability in the Arctic and create opportunities for strengthened collaboration with allies and partners…. Canada will maintain strong defence capabilities in its internal Arctic waters, including in the Northwest Passage.”
The Arctic policy paper then refers to the defence policy announced by the Prime Minister in April 2024 which promises to spread $18.4 billion for the CAF over 20 years. For the Arctic specifically, this proposal includes $1.4 million for a specialized maritime sensor array for ocean surveillance, $307 million for an early warning system and $218 million for “northern operational support hubs.”[1] There is also mention of two polar icebreakers being built in Canada for the Canadian Coast Guard.
Although the new policy recognizes a changing geopolitical environment in Canada’s Arctic, due to the presence of Russia and China, some critics argue that the paper lacks clear objectives or challenges and provides no concrete deliverables.[2] Other pundits suggest that no money is clearly identified in the document but the policy promises five years of new funding.[3] What specific plans or steps are to be taken to “strengthen our military or defence capabilities in the Arctic” in a realistic, timely fashion?
In his analysis, Wesley Wark mentions that China and Russia are referred to in the policy but the general threat assessment is both vague and generic. Although the Arctic is referenced as a “geographic vector” for emerging weapons systems, the term is not defined. Reference in the document is made to “emerging threats” that must be kept in check, but what are these threats? He concludes that there is a lack in the outline of the threat environment in the policy itself.
Canada’s three northern premiers stated that new infrastructure investment can be tied to defence spending in the territories. Although “support hubs” are referred to in the Arctic policy, the location of the ‘hubs’ is yet to be determined.[4] There are also few details from Ottawa on how money would be spent towards infrastructure in the North.[5]
As with other policy documents coming out of Ottawa, one wonders whether there is any true commitment from the federal government to establish adequate funding and specific timelines for the specific goals and objectives identified in the new Arctic Foreign Policy. What specific steps can be taken to increase the military presence in Canada’s Arctic now - instead of waiting 20 years to address the potential threat of Russia and China in the Arctic and the Northwest Passage. Certainly our NATO allies are unlikely to applaud kicking the proverbial acquisition targets and funding promises decades down the road. It takes years to acquire the necessary capital for the military equipment in the Arctic. Significant political decisions must be made by the federal government to fulfill the broad objectives defined in the Arctic Foreign Policy of 2024 to prevent it from becoming a paper tiger with few teeth to confront our potential adversaries in the North.
[1] R. Fife and S. Chase, “Ottawa unveils new Arctic policy,” The Globe and Mail, 7 December 2024.
[2] W. Wark, “Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” 14 December 2024, National Security and Intelligence Newsletter.
[3] Fife and Chase, “Ottawa unveils new Arctic policy.”
[4] N. Murray, Canadian Press, “Premiers push Ottawa to build northern infrastructure after Arctic foreign policy, 15 December 2024.
[5] E. Trantor, CBC, “Canada to open consulates, appoint Arctic ambassador under new foreign policy,” 6 December 2024.
17 thoughts on “Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy – Is it a Paper Tiger or Not?”
Minister Joly is the reason why Canada has a weak foreign policy. She is naïve about how the world actually works. Canada’s new Arctic Policy is weak. We need military alliances with Nordic countries and strengthen the ones we already have such as NORAD and NATO. We are collectively stronger together. You can flap your gums all you like on “northern operational hubs” but if you’re not actually willing to follow up, then well not worth the paper it’s written on.
In my opinion we should focus on
1. Improving our existing agreements and treaties such as NORAD and NATO with more spending.
2. Create multinational Arctic task group home ported in Iqaluit at our new CFS Iqaluit naval station to be built.
3. Immediately buy 12 submarines to monitor our ice edge
4. More polar satellite coverage including communications
5. Approve 2 more ice breakers
6. Ensure new Aurora replacement can operate the NSM missile.
7. Expand naval fueling station
8. Create further fueling stations in Churchill and western Arctic
9. Expand the Canadian Rangers with updated equipment.
10. Continue improving runways and supporting infrastructure in the Arctic to operate CF 35 etc.
11. Sensor net in the approaches of the NW passage
12. Improve food security for Northern residents
13. Establish a training base and station a regiment in the Arctic somewhere. Rotate regiments.
14. Improve SAR in Iqaluit with satellite bases that expand outward in the summer and collapse to Iqaluit in the winter.
I agree with the points made by Ted Barnes.
However, we should not be too hard on Minister Joly. The Foreign Affairs department consists of people whose job is to talk and process paperwork. Naturally their solution to any problem is more talk and more paperwork.
Canada needs to take real actions in the north, and that means assigning the job to departments that sometimes do real physical things. The less talk, and the more action, the better. It is internally focussed departments such as fisheries, transport and industry, as well as defence, that should take the lead on northern sovereignty.
I would go as far as creating a separate department for the North that liaise with all those departments and if we were serious we would cut through all the red tape and just do it.
I completely agree with everything you just posted, just wanted to point out the P-8 Orion that is replacing the Aurora class is now capable of firing LRASM/JASSMER which is just as stealthy and capable as the NSM but with a much further range. So we’d just have to commit to acquiring enough to arm all the P-8s with spares.
Thank you for that information. Hopefully that capability is realized.
Good afternoon Ted,
I found your reply interesting and would like to comment on various aspects of it. First though, I must say that I do not have enough information on which to judge your opinion of Minister Joly. I guess that time will tell how correct you are.
That said, I support strongly your various suggestions for improving Canada’s position in the Arctic, with one request for clarification and one exception.
The request for clarification relates to your idea to “[c]reate a multinational Arctic task group home ported in Iqaluit at our new CFS Iqaluit naval station to be built.”
– What do you see as being the ship composition of this task group?
– Who would participate in it and with what?
– Who would command it?
– How would the task group be supported? Home porting implies that Iqaluit has a dockyard.
– Would not allowing the USA to participate risk giving it even more control of our sovereignty protection than it already has through NORAD (see CNR 20.2 page 19 for a brief discussion of this command-and-control issue)?
The exception relates to the provision of regular army units to Arctic operations. I am not sure what you mean when you say “[e]stablish a training base and station a regiment in the Arctic somewhere. Rotate regiments.” What do you mean by a regiment? A multi-battalion, brigade-like formation, such as found in some armies, or a battalion-sized unit of some unspecified composition?
Basing a regiment in the Arctic would also require the deployment of ships and aircraft to support it, since wherever it is located in peacetime will certainly not be where it is required during a crisis. This equipment would be a massive investment. This approach would also create morale, maintenance, and training problems that would require further funds to address.
I would suggest that another option is the creation of southern-based army brigade that contains airborne and marine infantry units that can be moved to the Arctic during a crisis by the planes and ships that would be procured to transport and support them. This approach would still have an equipment cost for ships and aircraft but should reduce somewhat the morale, training, and operating costs. Both airborne and marine infantry forces are required, as they complement each other. The airborne infantry are rapidly deployable strategically (in the absence of an anti-air threat) but are nearly immobile once on the ground. Marine infantry require a significant investment in ice-capable, amphibious ships to get them (close to) where they are needed. As well, these ships cannot deploy long distances quickly. However, once they have arrived, they can provide a robust support capability, including embarked aircraft, to the deployed marine infantry, and to any nearby airborne infantry as well.
Having a brigade of infantry devoted to this mission would provide the ability to generate a response that can be tailored and augmented to deal with many of the Arctic crises that Canada is likely to face. If this brigade contains three infantry battalions (one per regular infantry regiment) it would have at least nine infantry companies – either airborne or marine infantry – that it could rotate through near-continuous training exercises, thus achieving a significant peacetime sovereignty presence in the Arctic while retaining a strong ability to react to one or more crises with fresh troops. These benefits would be obtained while allowing families to remain in southern home garrisons which contain the necessary maintenance, support, and training facilities.
Finally, these battalions would also be available for other (non-Arctic) missions.
An expanded overview of the above idea is found at pages 70-75 at the attached link.
Ubique,
Les
Canadian Army Journal 19.2
To your questions
Task group would be at the minimum comprised of a 1xCSC, 1xAOPS, 1xAOR. With the US, Denmark, Norway representing us as well with warships. Perhaps even the British. US sending a AB, frigates from Denmark and Norway and a Type 26 from Britain. That of course would change as units rotate in and out during the navigation season. At times there might be a call for amphibs or a carrier.
Command could rotate through the different countries.
The plan could utilize the deep water port of Iqaluit that would need to be massively expanded to include accommodations, fuel tanks, workshops. No dry docking facilities.
The base would be built to house whatever the powers to be see as appropriate being that battalion, brigade etc. The base could be staffed by elements from all the different regiments and spread it around. Rotation of 6 months. Yes it would be expensive. No amphibious capability required. Keep it simple with a airborne capability and as times goes on gain the amphibious capability and expand.
Good morning Ted,
Thank you for your thoughts.
I am having difficulty understanding your concept of operations for the land and naval forces.
I am not sure what the land force will do while sitting up north for 6 months and how it will deploy throughout the Arctic. Not all of it can be airborne, so how will the remainder move around? C-17s co-located with them? What are the troops doing during the downtimes during the 6 month rotation?
I notice that the naval task group only has one ice-capable warship. What is the group’s envisioned area of operations? North Atlantic? GIUK gap? Arctic Ocean? Eastern approaches to the Northwest Passage?
Ubique,
Les
We have to start somewhere and we may need to start small first although for economical purposes we may need to build larger than we need for surges and expansions. First order of business would be select a site for the facility. It would need to be close to an existing settlement, with a airfield that would need to be expanded to accommodate transport aircraft. I would envision transport aircraft being stationed although a further buy of aircraft may need to be done and our allies could help in that case. Churchill comes to mind as it’s connected with rail and it’s at a port. If we decided to build further North, then a self-contained facility to account for the Arctic conditions with that risk and expenses increase. Further expansion would to have an quasi ability to land personnel, cargo and vehicles. This could be accomplished with ice-strengthened civilian ships much the same as what’s being used for the sealift. Eventually a true amphibious capability may be required.
It would be up to the Canadian Army what the troops do during their tour of duty. It may very well be a shorter tour and any facility will need to be comfortable. I would imagine a mixture of training exercises and standby would be the order of business to build on the skills needed to defend the Arctic. As well Arctic vehicles would need to be procured.
Don’t read too much in my naval task force makeup. I would imagine it maybe only a few ships normally with larger assets joining and leaving for exercises including the landing of troops. We need ships to be able to travel during the ice free summer period during May to Sept that’s it, I would envision. We have in the past had exercises in the Arctic and this will allow a continuous presence during the shipping season. We have AOPS to travel through ice and Denmark has ice-capable warships as well. AO would be up to the government with input from NATO, NORAD and 2nd Fleet.
The link above did not survive the transfer in. Here is a second attempt at providing it.
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2021/mdn-dnd/D12-11-19-2-eng.
Ubique,
Les
Sorry Les. This didn’t survive the transfer in as well. Cheers!
Hi David,
Thank you for the confirmation. Not sure why the link does not work from this website.
I had to drop the full-length link into Google and then follow the steps to Canadian Army Journal 19.2. Using these steps it worked exactly as intended.
Ubique,
Les
To Les. I just down-loaded the most recent Army Journal and was able to view it that way. Cheers!
Hello Jeff. I have taken a brief glance at Canada’s ‘new’ Arctic Foreign Policy and have come to the conclusion that it is long on ‘policy’ but very short on ‘substance,’ and does not seem to complement the most recent Our North Strong and Free Defence Policy and does not seem to have the teeth to back up this policy. So, in this instance, in my opinion, A Paper Tiger indeed! I agree with much of what you have said as other Forum Members have acknowledged. To other Forum Members who have commented on your article, I say this:
For Ted Barnes-I agree with most of what you have said Ted. In my opinion though, Minister Joly is only stating what most politicians want. More political ‘fluff.’
-Improving NORAD/NATO agreements would help, but only if Canada backs that up with at least a 2% increase in defence spending (2-3% would be a better target) to be implemented sooner rather than later;
-A multinational Arctic Task Group (similar to the NATO Standing Groups) from Nordic countries only would be most welcomed, commanded by each country on a yearly rotation basis to include Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and the USN. Each country would contribute Destroyers, Frigates, AORs, Minesweepers, Submarines and/or Aircraft. If you are going to do that however, CFS Iqaluit must be enlarged substantially and turned into CFB Iqaluit, a major task;
-As a minimum, up to 12 Submarines—check!;
-Modern satellite communications coverage—check!;
-When you say two more ice breakers, do you mean Polar Class 2? If so—check that as well!;
-As Kevin has said in his comment, the Poseidon P8 MPA can now carry the LRASM/JASSMER missiles so no need to fit NSM;
-Expanding the Naval Fueling Station at Iqaluit needs to happen, along with improved SAR capabilities as well if your multinational task group is created;
-The Nanisivik Naval Fueling Station at Frobisher Bay is scheduled to be in full operation this year for the AOPS ships and could be available for other Naval units. A Naval Fueling Station at Churchill would also be welcomed. A Western Arctic Naval Fueling Station Port may also be a good option, but where? Perhaps in MacKenzie Bay or Prince Albert Sound Areas?
-Improved airports in the Arctic with larger runways to support the F 35s-check!
-A Sensor Netting System somewhere in the Northwest Passage approaches is a great idea. Check!
-In order to establish an Army training base and establish Marine Regiments/Battalions, I strongly believe you eventually will need to develop an Amphibious Sealift Capability along with 2/3 ice-capable LHDs/LHAs supported by an improved Naval Base in Iqaluit.
In conclusion Jeff, this would be a mammoth project for the CAF and would involve more Personnel, Infrastructure, Equipment and Ships and most of all, staggering costs ($$) however, a 2-3% GDP increase from Canada would cover most of the costs. Perhaps other Nordic countries could contribute as well.
Reply to Ted Barnes of 5 Jan 25.
Good morning Ted,
My limited knowledge tells me that the Arctic waters are never ‘ice free’ during the annual navigation season; one must always assume that ice could appear that might interfere with intended courses and plans.
Consequently, ice-capable ships are essential to have full operational freedom of action.
Are you aware of information that contradicts this belief?
Ubique,
Les
Yes Les, you are absolutely correct. Ice floes even during the summer months of July/August can form quickly without warning and be very tricky due to currents (depending on where or how high up in the Arctic you are). I know this from experience. During the early 1970’s, I was part of the crew of the first HMCS Protecteur on a scientific expedition with about 50 Canadian scientists looking for a possible naval base site in Mankinson Inlet up in Baffin Island. To make a long story short, Protecteur almost had to spend the whole winter up there after becoming quickly surrounded by two fast current ice-flows coming in from the NE and SE. After that, the RCN never returned to that Inlet (that I know of). Cheers!
Hi David,
Thank you for the first-hand info.
It is completely consistent with what I have learned elsewhere.
Ubique,
Les