By Jeff G. Gilmour, 29 November 2024
It was interesting to note recently that Minister Joly was in Washington in late November to meet with her political counterparts, stating that the Canadian government was in the throes of drafting, yet again, a new Arctic Strategy. This we can only assume is a result of Russian and Chinese interest in our Arctic Ocean and Northwest Passage, and perhaps not-so-subtle pressure from US national security agencies to start getting serious about protecting our own sovereignty and the northern US border.
Unlike Russia’s substantial military build-up along their Northern Sea Route, Canada has for decades done virtually nothing to enhance its defence and security position in its three northern territories. Previous Arctic documents drafted, primarily by Global Affairs, have outlined very broad goals with no clearly defined objectives, limited budgets and impractical timelines. In short, there is a lack of any articulation or clarity as to ways, means or ends. This has been regarded as sufficiently ‘checking the box’ by senior decision makers who have consistently failed to appreciate the growing threat to Canada’s sovereignty and security.
Over the years there has been a myriad number of conferences, articles and discussions on Canada's lack of Arctic defence commitments but little action taken by governments to remedy this problem as a significant priority. It has been all talk by various political parties but limited action taken to actually doing something in the region.
To illustrate this issue, this is what governments under both Liberals and Conservatives have accomplished to date in Canada's North, despite decades of lip-service paid to the need for significant investment in military infrastructure and force structure north of 60 degrees.
- We have built last year our first and only deep-water port in the Arctic at Iqaluit in Nunavut;
- After years of delay the dock at the old Nanasivik Mine site has been repaired for use by the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. The facility can only be used during the summer months;
- Forward Operating Locations (FOL) hangars are situated at Inuvik, Rankin and Iqaluit for use on deployment by Canada's fighter aircraft but are only used periodically;
-Limited increased funding for the Arctic Rangers to compensate for the maintenance or repair of personal equipment lost or damaged in military activities;
-A promise to assist in the upgrade of the North Warning System. However, documents provided by the Department of National Defence provide no definitive timeline for the completion of its Northern Approaches Surveillance System (NASS) and a projected completion date of 2033 for the Polar Over the Horizon Radar (P-OTHR);
- Search and Rescue operations for a significant portion of the Arctic will be out of CFB Trenton, Ontario.
Instead of empty commitments to increase the defence and security of our North, it is time this embarrassing situation be addressed by Ottawa. If not, we can only hope the Trump administration puts significant pressure on our politicians to take the appropriate action. Indeed, as the threat to the Arctic continues to evolve, the main threat to Canadian sovereignty may not be from adversarial states, but by allies who feel they have no choice but to unilaterally take the necessary military initiatives in the face of Canadian inaction.
One thought on “Canada in the Arctic”
Acquire the early mothballed ships ESD-1 and ESD-2 from the Americans and modify them with a reinforced ice-breaking bow (through their original builders NASSCO). Operate one with the Canadian Coast Guard and one with the RCN (HMS Canada 7 and HMS Canada 8). Obviously the entire central section would be covered over and a simple landing deck would be installed capable of landing not just helicopters but aircraft like the Twin Otter (primary Arctic air mobility platform) as well. The elephant in the room clearly would be cost discipline needed to not have it turn in to a multi-billion dollar fiasco. It would not be armed beyond allowance for light guns like a pair of 25mm guns on the A/OPS, although that could be updated with containerized systems if the need arose since there would be lots of space. Since the ships would have a luxury of space their configuration and outfit could be rapidly altered through containerized equipment.
One would be primarily tasked as a mobile support base and supply ship for the Coast Guard and other government scientific agencies operating in the Arctic Archipelago, the other an expeditionary support base for the Navy that could be sent to the Arctic, the Western Pacific, or other expeditionary/peace-monitoring activities elsewhere in the world.
Future aircraft like CCA and other types of UAVs could use these ships for re-fuelling, the overriding issue with operating in the Arctic is logistical, although it’s doubtful and not economical to turn them in to any kind of rudimentary light aircraft carrier.
The Americans might be happy to sell them, they are of an earlier iteration of the ESB that they could build a couple more of without these two still on the register.
Although a compromise approach at many technical levels, there is NOTHING you can get into service as quickly and presumably as cost effectively as this proposal.