By Dan Middlemiss, 1 December 2024
Defence Double-Talk
Dan Middlemiss
The latest example of ‘open and transparent’ information to Canadians came a couple of days ago when the Commander of Canada’s Navy, Vice Admiral Angus Topshee, tried to reassure Canadians that he was certain the Canadian Armed Forces could stop Russia or China from sailing through the Northwest Passage without permission.[1]
As has been the case of late, public reassurances of this type, by senior politicians, military leaders and bureaucrats, can usually be traced to attempts to deflect, obfuscate, or otherwise compensate for some bad news about dire shortcomings in government policy.
Sure enough, DND just released its latest evaluation of Canada’s Arctic capabilities, and this report (completed 31 October 2024) paints a very different picture of our military’s prowess in this vital region.[2]
Some highlights:
– There is minimal consensus on the future Arctic security threats in the Canadian Armed Forces
– Canadian security and defence policy does not reflect the seriousness of increasingly severe climate impacts across the country
– The lack of clear objectives leads to a fragmented approach to defence in the Arctic
– Planned operations do not accurately reflect the Canadian Armed Forces’ unplanned manoeuvrability requirements in the Arctic
– CAF infrastructure in the Arctic region is limited and deteriorating; however, exact status is unknown
– In the Arctic, the CAF faces issues with sensing/surveillance technology and equipment in terms of its limited number of assets with collection capabilities and the ability to share collected information with internal and external partners
Russia and China doubtless tremble with fear...
Notes
[1]. Chris Lambie, “Canada's top sailor says he's sure we could stop Russia or
China from trespassing in Arctic”, the National Post, 25 November 2024. Accessed at: https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-arctic-russia-china
[2]. ADM(RS), Evaluation of Arctic Operations, 1258-3-067, 31 October 2024. Accessed at: https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2024/reports-pubs-audit-eval/report-1258-3-067-en.pdf
16 thoughts on “Defence Double-Talk”
I doubt highly we could stop a Russian submarine or indeed breaker going through if they wanted to.
The Northwest Passage is contested as a international waterway, hence the Polar Star incident, but the reality is if it was a SSN transiting we have no hope of stopping it.
Blair,
I agree, and I doubt that Canada would even know that an SSN was transiting the Arctic.
An available, but still sub-optimal, immediate solution for the RCN would be to bypass the money pit morass that is the River-class destroyer program – too little, far too costly, and far, far too late – and immediately sign a deal, with no need for a time-consuming competition, for 10-12 South Korean KS-III submarines.
As Richard Shimooka notes, the South Korean KS-III submarine “…has not only the performance and interoperability requirements sought by the RCN, but most importantly, it has an in-service design, and Hanwha Ocean has the ability to deliver submarines rapidly.” [Richard Shimooka, “Three things Canada can do to meet its NATO defence spending commitment within three years, thehub,ca, 3 December 2024. Accessed at:
https://thehub.ca/2024/12/03/richard-shimooka-three-things-canada-can-do-to-meet-its-nato-defence-spending-commitment-within-three-years/%5D
Readers may recall that Richard Shimooka completed a study in December 2021 that argued there was ‘No Other Option’ to the ongoing Canadian Surface Combatant program. Now, it appears that, when viewed through the lens of what Canada and the Navy urgently need, especially with Trump 2.0 looming ominously, there IS, indeed, an option – buy submarines!
The problem with just doing that in a business term means the company (Hanwa) will basically rinse you, knowing that you’re the preferred and only customer.
The need for competition is to improve the system and that it does what it says on the tin. Right now the political situation in South Korea is shaky. Do we want to risk sinking money into that when there are other options on the table and some technically better and proven too?
Blair,
Normally, I would tend to agree with your argument that open competition usually results in a better deal for Ottawa.
However, in the context of the RCN’s urgently needed requirements, I agree with Richard Shimooka – how can we expect a dysfunctional defence procurement system to produce ‘better’ results, especially when it has largely been this system that has got Canada and the Navy into the present mess. Note that Canada did not hold a full-blown competition for the CP-140 replacement, the aerial tanker replacement, or for the MQ-9B drones.
Given that the buzz around inner navy circles is that the RCN wants to be ready for war by 2027 – NOT 2037, or 2047 – decisive and immediate action is what is needed, not more dithering and delay to check process risk boxes.
Further, if you check more closely, I think you will find that field of truly ‘available’ submarines is really limited to South Korea or Spain, not the tempting but still ‘paper’ designs of Germany or Sweden.
Finally, I think the Navy’s fact-finding tours abroad following the responses to the RFI have left both the navy and Ottawa with a fairly good idea of available capabilities, costs, and delivery timelines. If our government is happy with ‘getting rinsed’ for a $5.5 billion per copy, second tier frigate that will not be available in serious numbers until 2040 or so, then I don’t see the problem for submarines that could be delivered much sooner, and which will be a real difference-maker militarily.
I am fascinated that folks in this Forum do not seem to give any credence to the rapidly deteriorating global security environment or the need to take immediate steps to get real capabilities to the CAF.
While I agree on the time frame, the fact of the matter is we have 2.5 years to be ready which to be frank is unachievable.
With regards to the 212CD and A26 while this is as you say is a ‘paper design’ it’s more an evolution and scaling up of an existing class of boat already in service with nearly 2 decades proven usage for the 212CD and, like the A26, they are currently being built.
The Korean boats are based from the German designs and yes the Koreans could deliver quite rapidly but not before 2027. They can’t even do that for their own domestic navy let alone a foreign export and one that Canada will want to Canadianize once it reaches Canada.
The problem we face is due to lack of proper planning. The frigate replacement program should have started before the last Halifax commissioned, as noted in one Niobe paper I read (will grab it shortly). With submarines the Victoria’s were meant to be stop gap so planning should have been started when these were being taken into the fleet.
The competition element needs to focus on capabilities, you don’t want to buy a platform that can’t do the job you require it to do, it would be like bringing a hammer to dig a trench.
The fact we are even here discussing that we need immediate solutions to a problem is because the poor planning and decisions of successive governments over the last 2-3 decades. The adage is you pay now or pay later with lots of interest and I do see potential that we’re about to pay with lots of interest.
Overall with regards to being prepared for war by 2027, it is a pipe dream, it’s unrealistic.
Hi Blair,
I could not agree with you more. Because of poor planning and a failure of strategic vision in the past, Canada and the Navy are unprepared for what appears to be coming in the near future. Moreover, there seems to be little we can do now to rectify this state of affairs.
But let me offer a couple of caveats.
First, while we should not rely on luck as a basis of planning, we may indeed get lucky and discover that we actually have a few more years to get prepared. If that is the case, then the ongoing future fleet mix study may provide us with some procurement options that may not seem feasible right now. The year 2027 may be looming, but it is not a sure thing that conflict will necessarily erupt then.
In fact, there is a growing realization in Western naval thinking, that the US Navy’s doctrine of a swift and decisive counter to any Chinese or Russian naval gambit abroad may be totally unfeasible in practice because of glaring munitions shortages and general logistical and industrial unpreparedness. So the prospect of a much more protracted maritime conflict might give Canada and other allies some added time to bring capabilities to bear.
Finally, whatever naval procurement options Canada ultimately selects, I would caution against seeking perfection in capabilities and platforms – too often this quest is the enemy of the ‘good enough’. We need hulls in the water and ready to go capabilities, rather than the best that we can conceive. And whatever we opt for, please let us have no more talk of Canadianization which is only a recipe for endless delivery delays and extra costs.
Dan, unfortunately Blair is spot on with this one. Zero chance at all, none, nada of Canada being able to stop anything nuclear (SSN/Ice breakers) or otherwise coming into our own ‘sovereign’ territories be it the Northwest Passage or Hudson Bay or any other part of our Arctic Ocean! In this case, unfortunately Vice-Admiral Topshee is either hopelessly optimistic or ill-informed of the facts-of-life in Canada’s Arctic in 2024! At this point we could not even stop a kayak coming into Canada without permission! What does that say about our preparedness in the Arctic now? The Russians and Chinese must be shaking in their boots with laughter at Canada’s top Navy Commander’s statements!!
Two or three or more deck-docked UUV’s mounted on the Upholder-class boats, systems under development by multiple Western countries, would achieve much of what the Korean coastal boats could without the danger of crews freezing to death with so little energy available for hotel and system demands, and reach an IOC in 2025 at 1% of the cost of the Wikipedia strategy.
However, it’s a moot point given that nothing that funds hard power will see the light of day under the current government.
Added weight would reduce speed plus increase power requirements for propulsion. It wouldn’t be a massive amount but it would be noticeable. Our SSNs when they have the DDS mounted have a similar issue.
What the RCN/CAF can and cannot do is highly contextual. The proper answer to the question posed to the CRCN is “It depends…”
What if the Russian or Chinese ship was entering the Northwest Passage from the west? How much warning would there be? And would there be an RCN vessel already at sea that could sail west-northwest, through the Aleutians, up through the Bering Strait, eastward into the Beaufort Sea, and only then confront the would-be trespasser? That’s a long trip.
I think we’d need warning so far in advance as to make the effort meaningless.
You would be reliant on RCAF aircraft to try and drive the intruder out which isn’t optimal.
Bill,
I agree, timing is everything.
So, with the PLAN rehearsing an invasion of Taiwan recently, and with Russia perhaps looking to pick off another European state – perhaps with the tacit blessing of Trump 2.0 – let us suppose that the warning time for the West has effectively begun.
How long before Canada has a meaningful number of modern warships with which to respond? Perhaps 15-20 years if all goes well? That response time should placate any worries our allies have.
Reply to Dan Middlemiss of 9 Dec 24.
Good morning Dan,
Does your rejection of Canadianization mean that you feel that we must accept whatever manufacturers choose to provide in terms of weapons, sensors, communications suite, environmental capability limits (temperature range, sea state, etc), performance limitations (speed, range, ammunition loads, food, and water, habitability, etc), etc?
Ubique,
Les
Hello Les,
You raise some very good points that both DND and our Navy must consider. Sticking to the matter of submarines, VAdm Topshee has made it crystal clear that the RCN will largely have to adapt itself to whatever boats meet its high-level mandatory requirements AND the most timely delivery schedules possible under the circumstances.
What some countries, notably Australia, are seeking in their accelerated naval re-capitalization efforts are strategic partnerships with the state they are dealing with. Such partnerships can cover a variety of key items, some of which you have mentioned. In the case of submarines, these might include: independent submarine maintenance through technology transfer and the creation of in-service support facilities in the procuring country; long-term training of personnel for operations and maintenance, and local workforce development; and finally, assured access to weapons, munitions, sensor, and other vital equipment.
Some may object that Canada has traditionally relied on the US for weapon systems and munitions, usually through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. But will Canada always be able to access the FMS for missiles, torpedoes etc? Perhaps the answer might be less than clear or assured under a ‘what-have-you-done-for-us-lately’ Trump 2.0 administration. Canada may well find itself at the end of a lengthening queue of states who have the same needs. Furthermore, as procurement insiders acknowledge, once a country has an FMS agreement in place, that country is then wholly dependent on the costing, delivery schedules etc established by the United States. And as I have suggested earlier, the USN has its own urgently needed weapons and munitions needs now and for many years to come. So, I suggest it is pretty clear which navy will get priority for the equipment you mention.
Good morning Dan,
You raise very good points.
We can hope that the navy and procurement staffs are smart, resolute, and convincing enough to avoid us being saddled with a dog’s breakfast of incompatible sensors and weapons, and ships that are not designed for Canada’s conditions and requirements. We would not want another HMCS Warrior that had to sit out winter weather!
Ubique,
Les
@Dan
One thing I have learnt working in Logistics Transport and supply chain management at sea and on land in the last 20 years, is that you can’t rely on luck, you must stack the deck in your favour and proper planning prevents p*** poor performance.
We have stacked the deck in such a way that we now have to scramble and find a solution to a problem that could have been solved a decade ago.
The RCN as a whole is basically a one trick pony we have a fleet of Ocean going frigates with a supply ship. The reality is that what we can offer to allies or even to our own defence is limited in depth and scope.
The AOPVs while ok for what they are intended for. The main issue with them is they are not front line fighting ships. Asterix has limitations too as do the Kingstons. What I’m getting at is we don’t have a varied force something we had back in the 50/60 & 70’s.
Can we do better? I think we can. While I posted about the Albion class the other week, I agree with the commentors that largely we would be unable to support such a role due to crewing requirements, both those ships are large and beyond what we actually need.
However something akin to the Absalon class or the Qatari Al Fulk would certainly be a step off the bottom, and what you can do is cut the number of River class down to 12 and have 2 of those types in place.
With regards to 2027, the projection is that the USN & MSC will be at its lowest ebb and China will be in a decent position and, while it’s no certainty and I seriously hope we don’t end up in a war, it just seems the likely inflection point.
Even with a few more years’ grace we would still be struggling. The Halifaxs are having issues as we speak and now we are having to keep them around a lot longer than they were planned for.
Guess who made that same mistake? The Royal Navy with the Type 23 frigate. Those were designed for 18 year life span, and the youngest is already well over 20. We have a lot of problems with them now and all that was due to improper planning and putting things off.
“In fact, there is a growing realization in Western naval thinking, that the US Navy’s doctrine of a swift and decisive counter to any Chinese or Russian naval gambit abroad may be totally unfeasible in practice because of glaring munitions shortages and general logistical and industrial unpreparedness. So the prospect of a much more protracted maritime conflict might give Canada and other allies some added time to bring capabilities to bear.”
Given in the West we love long protracted procurement and bureaucracy, I strongly fear those years will be wasted.
“Finally, whatever naval procurement options Canada ultimately selects, I would caution against seeking perfection in capabilities and platforms – too often this quest is the enemy of the ‘good enough’. We need hulls in the water and ready to go capabilities, rather than the best that we can conceive. And whatever we opt for, please let us have no more talk of Canadianization which is only a recipe for endless delivery delays and extra costs.”
I would agree with the above.