By Dr. Ann Griffiths, 15 August 2024
Lessons from Australian Naval Procurement
Dr. Ann Griffiths
I don’t know about you, but I get a bit envious when I look at Australia’s naval capabilities, procurement process, openness of discussion about naval matters, and general popular support for the navy. While Canada crawls at a snail’s pace toward the replacement of the Halifax-class frigates with the River-class destroyers and endlessly explores the possibility of submarines, the Australians can move quickly (in some cases). The AUKUS submarine program is not exactly proceeding smoothly, nor did the earlier plan to procure the French Shortfin Barracudas, but the plans relating to the surface fleet are unfolding at warp speed.
Showing a certain amount of flexibility and willingness to adjust plans, the Australian government reacted to concerns raised in the 2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review about the plans to acquire nine Hunter-class frigates. The government commissioned an independent review of the structure of the RAN’s future surface fleet. Based on the Surface Fleet Review, in February 2024, the government agreed to reduce the number of Hunter-class frigates from nine to six and build six large optionally crewed surface vessels to support the crewed warships. It also announced a program to acquire 11 general purpose frigates, to supplement the larger Hunter-class frigates. The general purpose frigates are intended to be smaller (displacement of between 3,000 and 5,000 tonnes), less expensive and less capable than the Hunter-class frigates and existing Hobart-class destroyers. (Unlike Canada’s AOPS, however, they will be warships!) The plan is to use them to escort other vessels, provide air defence and conduct attacks against surface targets.
Four possible designs were identified by an independent panel – Spanish ALFA3000, South Korean Daegu class FFX Batch II or Batch III, German MEKO A-200 and Japanese Mogami 30FFM. The government will select a design in 2025, construction will begin in 2026, with the first ship to enter service by 2030. To speed up the process, the first three ships will be built overseas, with the remainder being constructed in Western Australia.
Wow, recommendation, decision, build – in five years. Of course these timelines will likely slip somewhat, but nonetheless, that’s impressive.
17 thoughts on “Australian Naval Procurement”
It always seems that Australia’s Naval Plans for the RAN continually out-perform anything that Canada can do or agree on for our RCN fleet requirements and much sooner than the “snails paced” procedures especially with the 15 CSC River class Destroyers, the Victoria class replacements (still nothing on that front), and the replacement of the Kingston class MCDVs (just getting off the ground now). Australia does it better and FASTER! Why is that??
While people love to make the comparison between Canada and Australia on naval procurement there are many reasons why one is very different from the other. First of all Australia is on an Island and strong allies are pretty far away compared to Canada and the US. Let’s face it we freeload off the security they provide. Second of all in Australia procurement is streamlined and for the most part with very little political influence in compared with a weak Canadian government and procurement that takes normally three times the cost and time to precure even the simplest of projects and allows contractors free rein with no penalties. Thirdly the Australian public had always in my opinion had the greatest positive attitude and support towards the military. All one needs to do is look at ANZAC day and Remembrance day. Canada supports the military but also want their dental plans, daycare and all other types of social programs and a sizable amount of the public doesn’t want money spent on defence. Unless we directly get attacked or have a fundamental change of procurement or attitudes we’ll never change.
Hello Ted. I somewhat agree with most of what you have said, but I believe the ‘Aussies’ have got their procurement policy right (which I have read – see below) and not in the ‘tail-chasing’ policies that Canada currently has to deliver major defence equipment in a timely manner. Their procurement policy is much more proactive and puts the responsibility on political bureaucrats and industry to quickly come up with ways to accomplish RAN’s future goals which are cast in stone within specific time periods which seem to work much better for them. The Australian public attitudes towards their own defence is certainly something that all Canadians should aspire to as well.
https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-12/External%20DPPM.pdf
Honestly I just see a disaster there. But one thing Australians do on defence is make decisions and then change them again and again. They are not afraid to change direction.
3 Hobarts
6 Hunters
6 LOCV
11 small frigates
It’s certainly ambitious even if it sacrifices some ASW capability.
Because both political bureaucrats and industry have to be proactive with the RAN to quickly address their ‘needs,’ the RAN can quickly make changes based on what industry and political bureaucrats say to quickly accept any changes. The RAN procurement policy enables them to have a better relationship with all concerned. We need that kind of direction change for Canada’s military equipment policies. What disasters are you referring to Ted? If you are saying that it would not work here in Canada “as it stands now”, you are most likely right. So I see major changes that need to be made to get the right equipment to the CAF in a much more timely manner with cutting out so much red tape with an up-dated procurement policy that addresses the CAF’s future requirements now and in the future.
4 small micro fleets of combatants. It’s an interesting solution to getting more hulls in the water and more vls as well
Hi Wayne,
You make a valuable point. However, are the Aussies showing courage or incoherence?
For example, they spent a great deal of effort and much treasure building an amphibious capability. Now, it does not seem to fit into their new strategy. Certainly, I have seen no mention of its future role.
They avoided the obvious solution of giving their LPDs an F35 capability. Thus, their amphibious forces risk becoming irrelevant and consigned to reduced (inadequate??) funding.
Perhaps someone can educate the Forum on where this capability is headed.
Ubique,
Les
Correction.
The Canberra-class ships are LHDs not LPDs.
This typo does not change the thrust of my point, particularly since they already have the ‘ski jump’ needed for F35 operations.
Ubique,
Les
Amphibious assault is a bit of a vanity project. Presumably they would be used in a joint operation with the US.
Hi Wayne,
As I understand it, the amphibious capability was actually intended for stability operations in Oceania. Thus, fixed wing naval air was not required at the time.
However, Australia feels it now faces a new strategic reality.
Ubique,
Les
Hi Les
Seems like a bit of overkill if that’s the case. Should have just built more Bay Class. Just goes to show that there’s lots of mistakes to be made in Defence procurement.
@LesMader
The Canberra class cannot support full F35B operations. They can be used in ferry mode or emergency but that is about it (same with what we did with HMS Ocean and harriers)
The reason behind this is that it would cost too much and require effectively a redesign of the ship to delete the Ski jump, so they just left it in place.
The problem is the ski jump is not reinforced and won’t be able to handle a loaded F35B taking off. Equally the deck plating isn’t sufficient to handle the weight of the jet and the jet blast either.
So in reality this would require a major refit to achieve. It’s not impossible, it’s just very expensive and time consuming.
In my opinion they should do it and buy 16 F35B but that’s just my opinion.
Good afternoon Blair,
After watching the attached video, I have come to support fully your view that the RAN should give its LHAs the ability to operate F-35Bs. Whether the aircraft are Australian or belong to an allied air force/navy the strategic flexibility and capability thus gained when defending Australia and its sea approaches would be massive.
A purchase of 16 F-35Bs as you suggest would also give Australia the ability to support its amphibious forces during landing operations, both during Australian Operations Other Than War or wartime operations in defence of the island strings leading South towards Australia’s Northern coast.
While the necessary modifications to the LHAs would not be inexpensive, the cost would be nothing compared the eye-watering amounts that Australia claims to be willing to spend to purchase a few SSNs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QIA4bn4Pvc
Ubique,
Les
Hi Les,
I too have difficulty seeing the Australian approach as a successful one. For instance, by blowing up their French submarine contract, they have replaced an arrangement that was about to begin construction with one that will not deliver a submarine until at least 2040. I realize they are getting a few Virginia class subs to tide them over, but that does not improve their security – it is impossible to imagine a war involving Australia and not the United States, so the Virginia class subs would have been used for their defence anyway.
As for the frigates, the change from 9 to 6 Hunter class vessels represents a reduction in capability and probably an increase in cost per hull. Even if you count the 11 general purpose frigates – which they haven’t yet decided on – that looks like a smaller total force than our fifteen destroyers. (However – as you mentioned, they do have other classes of ships). In addition, the planned commissioning date for the Hunter (2034) is later than the likely commisioning date for HMCS Fraser. (I know there will be scepticism about this; but given Irving’s current build rate – months per tonne of ship – if they cut steel in July 2025, they would deliver to the navy in February 2029. Even allowing for delays due to first in class issues and renovations at the shipyard, the Fraser should be available long before 2034.)
At long last, Canada’s two principal shipbuilders are meeting their announced delivery schedules. More importantly, they are now meeting their interim targets for each ship, which shows they have developed the competence to perform reliably going forward. (Unfortunately, delivering at the stated price is still a problem!). Australia’s repeated changes of plan look a lot like the procurement disaster that Canada – I think – if finally growing out of. They seem to have the bigger and better navy for the present but I would take our current build strategy over theirs any day.
Changing plans is not a sign of weakness and if you look at the numbers they will end up with more platforms than they originally planned. Procurement programs do take years to materialize into a finished program, and things change during that time so the need to be flexible is absolute.
Take the Royal Navy for example – the Type 26 is supposed to be a dedicated 13 ship ASW platform, as the needs changed so did the program. We will now get 8 Type 26s with 5 Type 31s. Yes this is a cut to our ASW capability but it makes the fleet more flexible with missions as the Type 31 can do ASW as well, and if we go for a second batch Type 31 or indeed the Type 32 this will also increase the escort fleet.
@Les Mader
The Spanish Juan Carlos design is from the outset meant to be a LPD with limited capability to operate F35B or Harriers, for that reason the flight decks of the Juan Carlos are fully reinforced. This is not so with the Canberra class at all they cannot operate F35B or Harriers. Their decks are not reinforced and the lifts are not capable of carrying such aircraft either, they could in an emergency ferry them but they wouldn’t be able to take off with a full load.
This is something similar with what we did with HMS Ocean, while she was a LPH she could ferry Harriers but they couldn’t operate full time from her deck like a carrier.
The reason the Australians kept the ski jump was because it would have cost a lot of money to basically redesign the platform and re-work the internals and do all the COG / COB calculations which by the time you have done that you may have just gone for a clean sheet design.
Australia also doesn’t really need a dedicated carrier. They are more looking at home waters and have been for a number of years, they are also focused on the HA/DR role which the Canberra are perfect for.
I wrote this a couple of years ago its a little out of date but the core of what they want to do largely remains the same.
https://www.navygeneralboard.com/the-future-royal-australian-navy/
One lesson from the recent Paris 2024 Olympic games is that the world’s gravity center has turned towards the Pacific Ocean, even in the sports arena: all four first ranked nations (AU, CN, JP, US) are coastal to it. Even the fifth country in the list, France, owns a bunch of islands in it. Strategic competition is underway, and Australia cannot afford to fall behind on naval strength.
By reducing the number of Hunter frigates from 9 to 6, the RAN has simply followed in the footsteps of the RN, which also had to reduce the number from 13 to 8, in view of the exorbitant cost of the program. At the moment, the RCN have no choice but to continue the CSC program as it is at least until the first unit is launched. Otherwise, the risk of the project being derailed and having to restart from scratch might be high. However, given the eye-watering costs, I would be surprised if the RCN did not ultimately reduce the number of River-Class destroyers to 10-12 ships in the future. Let’s say for instance 6 ASW/multipurpose and 4-6 AAW units. To be clear, I am not advocating for it, I just foresee the future according to previous events related to the same ship type.
Both the RN and the RAN will end up with three combatant ship-classes (plus the carriers and/or amphibious): some AAW destroyers (6x Type 45, 3x Hobart), some ASW frigates (8x Type 26, 6x Hunters) as well as some multipurpose frigates or ‘second-tier’ vessels: 5x Type 31, 11x (to be decided), for a total of 19-20 (manned) surface combatants. I will later address the optionally-manned ones.
While having one unique platform is great in terms of standardization and life-long service, a second combatant platform (admittedly, AOPS and MCDV are not) would also represent some advantages, like:
– increasing the number of surface combatants (at lower cost)
– alleviating the burden of the destroyers in some scenarios or deployments
– reduced crewing requirements while also supporting force generation (training)
While other navies are capable to deal with different types of combatants, why would not the RCN be able to handle two platforms? At the end of the day, in wartime the country would have to fight with whatever it is available, and a damaged ship may take months, or even years, to be repaired or replaced. A simpler, cost-effective and short-time delivery ship-class would make it easier to increase production in wartime as well. Having an adequate stock and mix of warships might prove to be essential for success.
There are two more arguments in favor of a second platform (Tier 2). One is the timeline for the delivery of the River-class. If I am right, nine vessels would be delivered by 2040 and the rest by 2050, meaning that during that decade the actual number of combatants would be below fifteen, since the HALs will (most probably) have been decommissioned by 2040.
The second argument relates to the boom and bust cycle. Delivering pretty much the same vessels for twenty years would maintain the bulk of the workforce, but I am not sure it would maintain enough engineering capabilities as to design new ships, make changes, confront new technical challenges and ramp-up production, since shipyards would have become accustomed to producing at a monotonous pace with little variation.
Finally, regarding the optionally crewed vessels, I remember Vice-Admiral Topshee reflecting on some short of ‘arsenal ships’ (wording is not his own) in order to complement (the small magazines of) the future CSC fleet (1). The Aussies announced their program to acquire six such ships (LOCV?) earlier this year, in February, along with the other outcomes of their Surface Fleet Review. Coincidentally or not, the RAN is planning as many LOCV as Hunters. I would like to think that someone in the RCN is already in contact with their counterpart in the RAN for a common approach and requirements definition. I wish this time the RCN does not lose the train (too).
(1) Naval Association of Canada Speaker’s evening, Dec. 4th, 2023.
Transcript of interview with Commander RCN, Vice-Adm. Angus Topshee.
https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CRCN-Transcript-4-Dec-2023-NAC-Speakers-Evening-v11-Jan2024.pdf
“Maybe it is, like I said, a high-end Corvette or a frigate of some sort that really can be an adjunct in battle to the CSC. We’re not sure. We really want to make sure we take the time to try to find that requirement as best we can. And maybe the answer is not a single platform. Maybe the answer is a couple of different things.” (page 13/30)
“… 24 vertical launch cells is not enough (…). But the solution may not be adding more cells to that ship. The solution might be (…) small ships that are effectively built around the idea of a 24, 36, or 48 cell, vertical launch system. (…) they can respond to the orders from the CSC or another combatant to engage when required.” (page 14/30)
“… when I think in terms of fleet mix, I still see a need for (greater missile carrying capability) platforms.” (page 24/30)
We could use a bit of the Australian switcheroo with respect to our CC-295 and CH-148 at least.