By Dan Middlemiss, 22 September 2023
Andrew Tillet has reported in Australian Financial Review widespread expectations that the review of the Australian navy’s surface fleet conducted by the government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will recommend the number of Hunter-class frigates ordered be reduced by at least three ships.[1]
The surface ship review, headed by retired US Admiral William Hilarides, is expected to be handed to Defence Minister Richard Marles by the end of September. The review followed the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), which called for a navy made up of “a larger number of smaller surface vessels” well armed with missiles. The surface ship review may urge the government to acquire smaller ‘tier 2’ warships such as corvettes or light frigates, as well as larger missile-laden destroyers.
US Studies Centre Professor Peter Dean, the co-lead of the DSR Secretariat, said going ahead with the Hunter-class frigates would make it difficult to free up funds for other vessels, including smaller warships, amphibious ships and supply ships. He added that continuing with the Hunter frigates would build pressure on the defence department’s budget squeeze given that a recent Australian National Audit Office report indicated that “the project has not yet reached its most difficult phase and costs will only spiral further.”
A BAE Systems spokesman would not speculate on future government decisions on naval capability but maintained that the Hunter program was making strong progress.
As a follow-up, the Australian parliament’s Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit took the unusual step of demanding a defence company to appear and provide evidence about the frigates. Under questioning for over an hour, BAE Systems Australia CEO Ben Hudson assured the committee that progress on the Hunter-class warships was progressing well despite initial problems. Despite repeated questioning, Mr Hudson declined to publicly reveal the current projected ‘top weight’ of the Hunter-class frigate, or its parent design, Britain’s new Type 26 warship.[2]
Notes
[1]. Andrew Tillet, “Late and overweight frigates worth $45b may face cuts,” Australian Financial Review, 7 September 2023. Note this source is paywalled.
[2]. Andrew Greene, “Parliament scrutinises weighty problems on $45 billion warship project,” ABC News, www.abc.net.au, 8 September 2023.
25 thoughts on “Aussie Hunter-class Frigate Program Facing Cuts?”
My only question Dan, is why would Australia conduct a review headed by an American retired US Admiral? An independent outsider recommending to the Australian government to decrease their Type 26 Frigate size in order to save money for other programs? Could they not do this review using an independent Australian outsider with no ties to the Canberra government? “BAE Systems, not speculating on future government decisions on naval capability maintaining the Hunter program was making “strong progress”, is typical of any defence company. To have this reported by the AFR with no other media outlets having reported this (as far as I can tell), does not confer any confidence in the Australian Financial Review. What is the Australian government saying? If, and I repeat if, the Hunter class will be reduced by at least 3 ships, what does that say about the 15 CSC Type 26 Frigates as well? Will Canada do the same? So many questions with no answers! Cheers!
Good morning David.
Some very good questions.
I must admit that I am waiting for the usual crowd to start in with lines such as “if Australia is reducing its Type 26 frigate purchase then Canada must automatically do the same as the Australian decision clearly proves that the Type 26 is garbage.”
Such comments will likely not consider that Australia’s strategic situation and its resulting strategy are very different from Canada’s. However, mob mentality never lets itself be influenced by facts!
Hoping that I am wrong.
Ubique.
Les
Excellent responses Les! The Type 26 Frigate is a great ASW asset for any country to have no matter what others say or do. Yes, time will tell what the nay-sayers or procrastinators will have to say about this. You are absolutely correct. Two very different governments with totally different ideas with regard to the Hunter class and the CSC Type 26 Frigate.
Hello David,
Regarding your first question as to why Australia would conduct a review headed by a retired US admiral, I would say that this has become a fairly standard practice in Australia. The problem, of course, occurs when such reviews – along with expert independent panels appointed to advise a government on strategic policy as well as on specific warship procurement programs – create the perception of a conflict of interest. In Australia, there are suggestions that such a conflict of interest did happen when one or more of the appointees were revealed to be formerly employed by a shipbuilder which is bidding on a current contract. Australia hired two former employees of BAE Systems to serve on an expert advisory committee to oversee the frigate competition process. Later, the Defence Department hired a senior, former BAE Systems executive to lead the department’s negotiations with BAE on the frigate contract. In addition, the Defence Department established a separate advisory committee, The Surface Ships Advisory Committee (SSAC), to conduct “an independent critical peer review” of the RAN’s surface ship programs (including costs, schedule, and performance of the Hunter-class program) for the recent Defence Strategic Review. Again, two former senior BAE Systems executives were appointed to the SSAC. The SSAC subsequently recommended that Defence ‘stay the course’ with the frigate program.
Mere coincidences or cozy deals? I’ll let you be the judge. BTW, on 5 September 2023, the Hunter frigate program was referred by an Australian Senator to Australia’s Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate charges that the frigate selection process had been skewed to produce a predetermined outcome in favour of BAE.
Now admittedly, the Senator is from the opposition Green Party, but the ANAO report released in May 2023, provides a significant set of factual findings for those who argue that the ‘fix was in’ for the Type-26 to win a rigged frigate selection competition:
– the Defence Department ignored the primary government procurement rule of assessing value for money;
– government agencies whose role is to oversee the public interest did not act to ensure the Defence Department assessed value for money;
– BAE’s ship design was not in the top two of the three companies short-listed;
– key decision-making records had vanished, including documents showing why the secretary of the department included BAE in the final shortlist of three;
– the main reason for selecting BAE’s design was its anti-submarine capability, but the department could not produce documents pertaining to that assessment or 22 other high level requirements; and
– the Defence Department made milestone payments to BAE even though BAE had missed the milestones.
With respect to the credibility of The Australian Financial Review and its reporter, Andrew Tillett, I can say that Mr. Tillett is a frequent reporter on defence issues in Australia and appears to be very knowledgeable. Why no other media outlets picked up on his report, I do not the answer. It is fair to say, nevertheless, that the suggestion that Australia is actively considering reductions to the currently 9-ship Hunter frigate program has been widely reported. For comparison, we in Canada only have a single full-time journalist reporting on defence issues, David Pugliese. Agree with his opinions or not, he does base his articles on factual matter acquired through the Canadian Access to Information process. Canada used to have several more journalists regularly covering the defence beat, but I know that one or two of these reporters now have a great deal of difficulty in persuading their own media outlets that defence stories deserve coverage. A sad state of affairs.
One final comment, Canada, too, has hired consultants to advise on aspects of the National Shipbuilding Strategy. For example, in 2016 Steve Brunton, a former Royal Navy rear admiral, was brought in to provide independent expert advice on shipbuilding. In fact, Brunton was also appointed to the 2017 Australian expert panel to oversee that country’s frigate tender process. However, Brunton was reported by Ian Mack to have recused himself from the Canadian frigate selection process because he was previously involved with the UK MoD as director of ship acquisition, including the procurement of the BAE Type-26 frigate (interestingly, Mack himself was appointed to the 2017 Australian expert panel). Small world!
Hello, Dan. Surely the Australian government could have found a ‘qualified’ review panel head within their own country who was truly bipartisan with no links to past or present BAE or Australian Defence Force (ADF) experts to lead an independent review panel without having to rely on foreign experts whose very existence on such a panel would cast doubt on their independent analysis. Even though the Surface Ship Advisory Committee (SSAC) eventually recommended to the Australian government and ADF to “stay the course” with the Hunter class Type 26 Frigate program, the fact that the SSAC included former BAE System executives that were also appointed, speaks volumes with regard to their affiliations and not what the ADF or RAN needed. Yes, “me thinks” there was “Something Rotten In Denmark” here (nothing disparaging to Denmark or the Danish Navy)!
Could the Australian government not have appointed a sitting or retired Australian Supreme Court Justice with his or her own independent review panel to over-see and review all aspects of the Hunter class program with binding recommendations to government as was recently done with the CAF sexual misconduct fiasco here in Canada? The fact that retired USN & Canadian Admirals were part of this review process, again speaks volumes to this “cozy deal” as you say. The fact that key decision making documents have now “conveniently” vanished in favour of a BAE decision for the Hunter class Type 26 Frigate to begin with is also very suspect.
Yes, Canada’s CSC Frigate program also needs more accountability as well. The fact that a Retired Canadian Admiral (Ian Mack) was appointed ($$) to the 2017 Australian expert panel is disappointing but not unexpected. Yes, small world indeed!!
This Just in!
Jennifer Parker, “With delay of fleet review, RAN must be prepared to fight with what it has now”, The Strategist (27 Sep 2023). See: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/with-delay-of-fleet-review-ran-must-be-prepared-to-fight-with-what-it-has-now/
The Jennifer Parker article expresses serious doubt whether the ANZAC frigates can continue in service until the early 2030s, even with major repairs. This creates the impression that the ANZACs have been more poorly maintained than the Halifax class, which have received regular and fairly comprehensive maintanance and are now planned to continue until at least 2040. Many commentators on military preparedness seem to have a negative bias toward their own nation that isn’t entirely justified, and there seem to be a lot of plans that involve ripping up everyone else’s previous work – which is not an effective way to build a fleet.
If the doubts expressed about the condition of Australia’s current surface combatants are fair, how is the situation helped by cancelling the Hunter class? Australian criticisms of the Hunter class seem to be contradictory; on the one hand there are calls for them to be replaced with a large number of corvettes; on the other hand we are told that what they really need is destroyers. Then there are calls to build Constellation-class frigates instead! The one thing all these plans have in common is that they exchange a build program that is ready to begin for one delayed by several years. Which doesn’t make a lot of sense if Australia is really facing an imminent threat with worn-out ships.
Are the ANZAC frigates really so badly off as suggested in the article?
Michael,
I am certainly not in a position to provide a definitive evaluation of the readiness and combat effectiveness of either Australia’s Anzac-class frigates nor that of Canada’s Halifax-class frigates. However, both the Sustainment Report Parker refers to, and two readiness studies conducted in Canada in 2017 (one internal to DND and the other by a Parliamentary Committee) seem to suggest that these frigates are reaching the end of their real operational effectiveness. I believe these ships have served Canada well and will continue to soldier on, but few would argue that they are suitable for medium-to-high intensity combat situations today let alone two decades from now.
I am not sure what you mean by saying that “The one thing all these plans have in common is that they exchange a build program that is ready to begin for one delayed by several years.” If you are referring to the Constellation-class frigates in the latter instance, this USN procurement program began later than either of Australian and Canadian ship replacement programs, has construction currently well underway with the recent authorization of funding for the fourth ship in the class, has encountered no substantive delays, and may well be accelerated in tempo according to recent USN testimony.
Thank you for the link Dan.
The article is very interesting. The link also leads to other, equally interesting, naval articles. I have now added the ‘parent’ website to my favorites.
Ubique.
Les
Les,
Yes, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is a terrific research organization. Its subject-matter experts cover broad geostrategic topics, as well as all of Australia’s military services on a regular basis. The research is both detailed and top-notch, especially in the longer studies in The Strategist. What makes ASPI exceptional, in my view, is that it has access to several excellent defence economists who provide in-depth analyses of Australia’s defence budgets, defence industry issues, as well as individual military procurement projects. In addition, because Australia sometimes procures similar military equipment to that of Canada – the Type-26 is a case in point – albeit often for different intended purposes – the ASPI studies frequently touch on policy and procurement issues that are of interest to Canadians
I tend not to look too hard at countries like Australia for their ship procurement as they have different defence priorities than us given their location in the world. If they think smaller warships are what they want then that is based on their own different defence priorities. To say that what they are doing will lead to us doing something similar is apples and oranges. Weight is a factor for them and from what I have been told that has been solved and mostly caused by their choice of radar. Canada is talking to the UK and AUS about all of this. We choose to cut the number of VLS among other things to save on weight.
We know Canada will build at least 3 CSC in the first flight and is at least a decade or more away before we will see an operational ship and what it can actually do under real conditions. It may turn out to be totally a floating lemon. Additionally a lot can happen between now and then with government changes, recruiting efforts, financial policy, defence policy and world security among many factors before any authorization of future flights of ships to be built.
Ted,
You are quite right about some key differences between Canada’s and Australia’s geostrategic and political situations, but there are other similarities between the two states. Financial constraints on defence spending loom large in both, and the two Type-26 variants both have ASW as a key priority mission.
You state that weight is a factor for the Hunter-class, but not so much now for our CSC. But how much different are they really? The latest official estimate (23 February) for the Hunters is 8,200 tonnes, while the CSC is 8,080 tonnes, both for lightship tonnages.
But weight is important in another respect as well, namely future weight growth margins so that these warships can be upgraded with new technology as it becomes available. In Australia, we have learned that the Hunter-class has only a tiny 3.3% growth potential when the preferred range is 10-15%. But what about the situation for our CSC? My sources indicate that future growth margins are very small as well. Whether that is true when the build contract is signed remains to be seen, but there has been no significant public discussion about this factor in Canada to date.
I agree that Ottawa will probably go ahead with the first batch of 3 CSC ships, but after that, all bets are off. I think the current, extensive public discussion in Australia about the future of surface combatants generally, about the best ASW platforms (surface ships versus submarines), about the relative importance of various naval missions, and about the country’s real defence needs and priorities could be instructive for Canada. Take a look, for example, at Matthew Knott, “Floating ‘turkey’s’: Is Australia spending $50bn on dud ships?”, Sydney Morning Herald (6 October 2023). [Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/floating-turkeys-is-australia-spending-50bn-on-dud-ships-20231002-p5e94l.html%5D
My main point is that now is the time to be discussing these and related issues, and Australia is to be commended for doing just that. Alas, in Canada, there is almost zero serious public discussion about a Plan B, or even a Plan C for Canada’s naval requirements in the event that current navy plans are not well received in Cabinet.
The biggest concern for the CSC project was the reports of the Hunter Class weight gain but also one of stability as you may have seen some of those reports and of course that was picked up on by the mainstream media here. CSC has addressed those and there is plenty of margin for weight gain as future proofing. All these issues on weight are carefully managed and modeled. Your lightship for the CSC is off by the way.
Like stated before by the RCN there is no plan B and I can reliably confirm that, like I have said before, in the next 10 years a lot can happen with the CSC and the NSS in general. In 10 years will our economy be such that we can continue the build? who knows but to say we’re for sure only getting three with a plan B or C possibly is a guess for everybody including myself. AUS doesn’t have issues with spending on the nuclear submarine option so it’s convenient for them to go with a smaller ship mix. For us it’s not politically acceptable and at this point even in my opinion conventional options are in doubt.
Hello Dan. I have read both Matthew Knotts & Peter Deans “eye-opening” articles on the Australian Hunter class Type 26 program with great interest and they both seem to be eerily similar to Canadas CSC Type 26 “Albatross” program status. Australia’s Hunter class Frigate program does seem to be in a world-of-hurt with the outcomes not yet realized. Will the Australian government down-size the Hunter class by 3 or even 6 Frigates? The next few months will tell. Peter Deans article seems to cast doubt on the effectiveness of an ASW frigate trying to do effective AAW operations. Even with 32 MK 41 VLS Cells, they are too light for any AAW mission. He also indicates that only modern submarines can defeat any hostile sub-surface threats and the AUKUS-SSN seems to be the answer. Although the CSC Type 26 Frigate will be a great ASW platform, if properly armed, it is not a serious AAW platform and ill-equipped to do so in my opinion.
This is what I believe Canada should do with the CSC Type 26 Frigate program now and not wait any longer:
-1. re-establish a 32 Cell EXls MK 41 VLS system forward vice 24 Cells
-2. Increase the CIAD Sea Ceptor system from 24 to 48 missiles midships
-3. Increase the NSM launchers from 8 to 16 Cells midships (as the USN Constellation Class Frigates already have)
-4. Build only 12 CSC Type 26 Frigates and save that money to piggy-back on the UK Type 83 Destroyer program for 3 or 4 units
with at least 96+ AAW missile silos for a “true” AAW capability. The savings from the last 3 CSC Frigates not built, could bring in
around $15B CAD to work with.
As yet, we do not know what submarine Canada will select to replace the Victoria Class SSKs, but these must be mainly Hunter-Killer submarines with a minimum of 12 units being built. The propulsion type of these new submarines, I believe is still debatable.
David, as soon as these articles appeared about the Hunter Class Frigate including the one mentioned here I figured the “sky is falling” crowd would start posting about the imminent reduction of ships of the CSC program even though the government has not posted anything to the contrary. Of course as you know this is not AUS and their defence priorities are very different from ours such as their position in the world, their current fleet mix and they have nuclear submarines being built. Of course we have nothing on the horizon for us except a few officers so far in Ottawa looking into possible replacements. I would be more concerned with that project being cut all together. These subs will probably won’t be ice capable as no one will have the gumption to operate a conventional submarine underneath the ice, ice edge most likely not under the ice proper.
I noticed that you changed your name for the project from “Cadillacs” to “Albatross” apparently jumping on the Pugliese bandwagon and buying into the number reduction hysteria. By “Albatross” you are referring to your belief that the CSC project is nothing but an Albatross around the necks of the government taking all our scarce defence dollars right?
Your first three recommendations on first inspection have the appearance of being sound but fail to take into account that each of them will add significant weight to the ship and by reducing the VLS to 24 vice 32 was in fact was a measure to save on weight. We can have discussions all day what constitutes enough missiles, our Navy seems to think that is enough. I will tell you that CAMM is changing and I’ll leave it at that. Your fourth recommendation is not effective as cutting ships from the program will save some money but also increase the cost of the rest on the other hand. You’re talking about something over 10 years down the road which anything could happen in regards to scope of the program.
So I would recommend that you take that 15B in theoretical savings and don’t spend it all in one place because it’s not going to be spent on a type 83. You mention 12 min submarines and we know where that figure came from David Pugliese from “insider” sources. There’s all kinds of practical reasons why we won’t be getting 12 replacements, such as crew and cost. From what I have seen it’s 6 or possibly 8 if we’re lucky, they may not even be AIP just lithium battery tech and sure as hell won’t be nuclear if built.
As I have said before given the timelines to have these ships built, politics, economy, the security situation in the world a lot could happen and possibly nothing will happen. If there was a defence review or the leader of the opposition bringing complaints about the cost then I would pay more attention to a reduction and don’t get me wrong may very well happen but not yet.
Ted, the use of the word “Albatross” was a bit of a tongue-in-cheek statement for effect only, however it may still fit the CSC Frigate program just as well. Yes, Australia’s Defence priorities are different from Canada’s however the way they have “geared-up” their Hunter class program vice Canada’s CSC Type 26 Frigate program still remain eerily similar. The reduction in the number of CSC Frigates no matter what I say or propose, is still a distinct possibility. We should know more of course by the end of this year. The CSC Frigate, Ted, will be an excellent ASW vessel, perhaps even better than the BAE Type 26 ASW Frigate. It will have some AAW defensive & offensive capabilities as well with hopefully some room for “future proofing”. My question here is: If both the Hunter & CSC Frigate classes are so overweight, why has the Australian government not reduced their MK 41 VLS silos as Canada has? Surely they as well would want to save as much weight as possible. The use of 24 CIAD Sea Ceptor missiles midships is under-whelming to say the least. You would run out of these missiles very quickly during any prolonged AAW action. The CSC Frigate definitely needs another set of 2 x 4 NSMs as well. The USN understands that as well which is why their Constellation class have 4 x 4 systems midships. If you know something about CAAMs, Ted, perhaps you could elaborate (as much as possible). If you have seen the latest graphics on the UK Type 83 Destroyers replacing the Type 45s, it looks very much like the BAE Type 26 Frigate only much larger and probably much heavier. I strongly believe that the Canadian government will acquire all 15 CSC Frigates in some form, however if they choose to not build the last 3 CSC ships, that money saved could be used to acquire and build 3 to 4 CSC Type 83 destroyers here in Canada and bring back the “true” AAW capability Canada lost with the Iroquois class demise. By that time, the BAE Type 83 destroyer program would be well underway.
Hello David, I am personally skeptical of how the Hunter program is being treated in much of the Australian media. It comes off to me as a concerted push to discredit the Hunter program and push the narrative towards parties’ various alternatives. This has been ongoing for quite some time over the past few years but the intensity has picked up recently. Don’t get me wrong, there are definitely issues to critique the program over, especially regarding potential corruption, unrealistic modifications and design immaturity, however, it does not deserve to be called a “turkey” or paraded as some kind of white elephant. I am especially not supportive of trying to transfer the issues from Australia’s program onto our own, the CSC is certainly not an ‘Albatross’ project at this point.
I have not read Deans article as it is paywalled however, I have read Knotts article and I am very unimpressed. There is a clear bias against the Hunter program with no seeming want to provide an opposing view point for the reader. The people brought onto the article to give their opinions are also lacking in my opinion.
Hugh White is a politician and not an expert in equipment or procurement. He has been out of government office since the early 2000’s and frankly, his opinion holds little value to me. I shouldn’t have to explain why quoting a “prominent defence analyst” anonymously is problematic. David Shackleton is an officer who has been out of service for over 20 years now and regularly has an axe to grind with the Hunter program, specifically asking for it to be replaced by nonsensical ideas like American Burke destroyers with CEAFAR radar suites added. Shackleton has been obsessed with large capable destroyers for decades even when it is not practical.
Peter Deans personal criticism of the Hunter class as being “over-engineered, over-specialized, anti-submarine warfare frigate that is no longer meeting the needs of the strategic environment” is a strange claim to make as well. Hunter is specifically not an overspecialized design considering the extensive AAW sensor suite and fair number of VLS for such a duty. It was designed to do both ASW and AAW, anti-submarine warfare is still an important part of Australia’s requirements for a navy against China and surface ships are a vital node in this network. Aircraft and submarines alone cannot effectively do such a role, otherwise ASW vessels would be entirely irrelevant by now.
The whole spiel about the vulnerability of surface ships to anti-shipping missiles while using Moskva and the Ukraine conflict as examples show the lack of knowledge by the author on the subject. Moskva was a ship designed in the late 1960’s, built in the 1970’s and commissioned into the Soviet Navy in the early 1980’s. By its very nature, this ship and generally Soviet ships from this era are poorly protected against sea skimming anti-ship missiles. Moskva had not been meaningfully modernized since her commissioning and rumor says that her material condition upon her sinking was abhorrent. Trying to spin this case into a case that all surface ships, especially modern cutting edge designs specifically made with these threats in mind, are somehow vulnerable and useless is nonsensical. The fact that White says that surface ships have no place in the Royal Australian Navy should discount all credibility he thinks he might have on this subject. Satellites are not a reliable way to track ships considering their orbits, how large the oceans are and how fast ships can move. Drone and uncrewed vessel attacks are also somewhat overblown threats, warships have been designed to counter aerial and fast boat threats for decades and the Russian Navy’s ability to largely counter Ukraine’s uncrewed vessel attacks shows this fact.
At this point, cutting the Hunter class is going to be difficult and not especially good at saving finances. Cutting the class past 6 ships will make the procurement largely useless, as the more ships you cut, the more orphaned the class becomes. Cost for the program is partially spread across the fleet, cutting the number of ships loses out on the economy of scale and pushes up the unit cost. This will also further stress the RAN’s logistics if they are going to be operating another partial class of major warships. It makes little sense to bother setting up your shipyard to build 3-4 ships then stopping. Pivoting to another frigate design is going to take time and money, something Australia doesn’t really have in abundance. The Pacific is dangerous enough of an environment that any frigate you procure will need to be similarly capable to the Hunter, so where is the cost savings really? It is a false savings in the end in my opinion. Corvettes or sloops are a pointless idea as Australia’s operational distances here are too great to make them worthwhile and they cannot hold the required armaments, they are a bad compromise.
Personally, I think Australia should stay the course with the entire 9 ships or at most cut the class to 6. Australia should then procure something like a modified Type 31 to enlarge their fleet numbers as a supplement to the Hunter class. This won’t be a savings in cost, effort or manpower but Australia needs to seriously prepare for a potential conflict with China. More ships in an attritional conflict helps pad the fleet and let them be in more places at once, however these ships need to be properly outfitted to defend themselves. Australia needs a proper AAW design as well but I do not think they are in a place to procure one nor are there very good options available.
As for CSC, I think many of my points above carry over. CSC is not a specialist AAW ship however with its SPY-7, sections of the AEGIS system and 24 cells, it is more than capable of both defending itself and projecting defence outwards to surrounding allies. The design is very much not an AAW slouch.
Replacing the 24 Mark 41 strike length cells on CSC with 32 ExLS would remove CSC’s ability to use Tomahawk, SM-2 and ESSM. This would effectively neuter the design of any air defence and strike capability, making it worse in weapons range than the Halifax class. The additional NSM launchers and ExLS cells amidships would interfere with each other space wise alongside potentially adding more topweight into the design. Cutting 3 of the CSC’s off the end of the program is not a wise move in my opinion as this is when Irving will be at maximum yard efficiency and building ships cheaply and quickly. We know effectively nothing about the Type 83 design at the moment, it is unwise to cut off our own program to bet on another country’s program which effectively is a complete unknown at the moment. We do not know what that design will look like, if it will have issues and even if it will survive to be procured. The RN is no stranger to cuts in procurement. Part of the reason why we didn’t have a split ASW and AAW CSC procurement is that we wanted to simplify logistics and training, procuring another class of ships breaks this goal. As I said with Australia, we do not have a good answer of what the CSC’s cost is without all of the program add-ons attached so we very well might not actually be saving $15B by cutting a trio of three ships.
Unless some bombshell comes out regarding CSC prior to construction starting, I think we should be pushing ahead for the full 15 ship class. It seems the best idea for Canada, our surface ships are more important than submarines. If we need to abandon the CSC in the future as the design is unworkable, so be it but there is little to point towards that being the case at all. As far as I am aware, we should be getting an updated cost figure soon for the CSC on a ship to ship basis, which will be divorced from the overall program. That should provide us a more accurate figure on the cost.
Hello Jimmy. As with the Canadian media with respect to the CSC Type 26 Frigate, I too am skeptical and leary of most Canadian “so called’ media experts. I used the term “Albatross” with tongue-in-cheek. The CSC Type 26 ASW Frigates will be “game-changers” for Canada (if they all get built). Surface ships do matter and will matter for the future. No matter what Australia decides with the Hunter Class, they too will have a very capable fleet for their future requirements. I agree with much of what you have said. What the 24 MK 41 VLS cells will look like for the CSC Type 26 Frigate will most likely be a combination of Standard and Extended Length Silos. As I said to Ted Barnes, the CSC Frigate will be a formidable ship for both ASW with some AAW defensive and offensive capabilities. Ted seems to believe that there are “changes afoot” with the CIADS (CAAM) VLS Silos midships, but would not elaborate. Yes, we should get a clearer picture by the end of this year for the CSC Type 26 Frigate program costs. Can’t wait for that bit of news.
The “changes afoot” to CAMM may be the ongoing developments of the missile’s range. An extended-range version – CAMM-ER – was co-developed with Italy and is capable of reaching targets at 45km. A larger CAMM-MR version with a range of over 100km is being co-developed with Poland to equip that country’s Miecznik-class frigates. Why the ‘MR’ version will have a longer range than the ‘ER’ version is a mystery, but the point to be made here is that the RCN may ultimately have different options with which to practice extended-range AAW. Of course, this assumes that ‘MR’ will fit into the CSC’s mid-ship ExLS.
Re-Barnacle Bill’s comments on CAAM – Interesting developments with regard to the CSC Frigates CIAD VLS silos. Did not know that. We will see what Canada decides with this system. Both CAAM-ER and/or CAAM-MR could be good options for the CSC Frigate. Thanks for that BB!
RE David and Bill: I do not think the changes to ExLS will include switching out CAMM for CAMM-ER or CAMM-MR. CAMM was chosen because it replaced systems like RAM, SeaRAM or Phalanx as a close in weapons system. CAMM is light and fairly small, allowing it to reasonable fit into the ExLS cells aft of the funnel on CSC to respond to closer in threats. ESSM Block II is more capable than CAMM and potentially CAMM-ER as well however, having CAMM-ER and ESSM Block II on the same warship would be a pointless redundancy. The two missile systems (CAMM-ER and ESSM Block II) are broadly similar. If anything changes, I’d expect CAMM and the ExLS cells to be replaced in favor of the original 32 Mark 41 strike length cells or the ExLS will be replaced with self defence length Mark 41 to fire more ESSM Block II.
Hello Jimmy. Absolutely correct Jimmy. CAAM was definitely chosen to replace either SeaRam or Phalanx as a CIWS system (and to save space/future-proof the waist areas). However what Bill is saying is that there are changes “A-foot” coming to the Sea Ceptor system which may very well include an upgrade to the AAW capability with perhaps the first 3 or 4 CSC Type 26 Frigates to improve their AAW capability. The government and RCN have already indicated that the MK 41 VLS cells will be no more than 24 vice 32 cells to save weight as has been expressed. It would be nice if they decided to go back to a 32 cell format forward however that may not happen. If CAAM-ER or CAAM-MR Sea Ceptor cells are selected for longer AAW ranges, that would certainly help with the AAW warfare capability midships. Could these ExLS cells midships also carry more ESSM Block II ExLS missiles or TLAM cruise missiles as well? Possibly. However what I would like to see is another 24 Sea Ceptor cells (for a total of 48 missiles) midships with either standard or possibly a combination of standard and ExLS CAAM/CAAM-ER or CAAM-MR missiles “and” re-instate the 32 MK 41 Cells forward for both TLAM and future-proofing for Hypersonic missiles forward as well, along with standard/ExLS ESSMs. My opinion. Cheers!
Hello David. The government, as far as I am aware, has not made any statements regarding the finality of VLS on the CSC design. We have not seen a new render in quite some time or an updated fact sheet, so the current layout is not set in stone yet. Even then, renders are not always up to date nor reflect what is ongoing behind closed doors at this very moment.
Feel free to take this with a pinch of salt but I have heard previously from somebody in the know that one of the options previously being explored was to replace the 6 ExLS cells housing CAMM with 8 Mark 41 self defence length/modified cells to carry ESSM Block II instead. The RCN was never very supportive of CAMM and from what I understand, it was forced upon them by the government as the missile was already integrated into the design and removing it would have been another change which cost them at the time. The RCN would rather have SeaRAM (as was on early CSC models a few years ago) considering that CAMM is partially redundant due to ESSM Block II, it complicates RCN supply lines and is more costly than RAM. The argument for adding Mark 41 cells in place of the ExLS cells is to shift the ESSM Block II out of the strike length 24 Mark 41 VLS forward, allowing that to entirely be used for SM-2 Block IIIC and Tomahawk missiles. This would effectively return the CSC to a 32 cell armament, albeit with only 24 of those being strike length.
As I stated previously, CAMM-ER and CAMM-MR are redundant to the CSC. CAMM-ER does the same role as ESSM Block II while CAMM-MR looks to be less capable than SM-2 Block IIIC, same role only worse. ESSM Block II does not fit into ExLS cells, so neither will CAMM-ER or CAMM-MR as those extended range missiles are a similar size or larger. ExLS cannot fit Tomahawk or SM-2 Block IIIC either, they are small footprint and relatively lightweight cells.
As far as I am aware, ExLS can only fit RAM, CAMM, Nulka and Hellfire missiles. They cannot fit any larger missiles in the standalone cells which is what CSC is fitted with.
Interesting argument Jimmy. To be quite honest, I am not a reliable expert on the CAAM Sea Ceptor vs ESSM Block II but that would make a lot of sense and leave the forward 24 MK 41 VLS silos entirely for SM-2 Block IIIC and Tomahawk missiles. How would that work for “future-proofing” the CSC Frigate WRT possible Hypersonic missiles forward and what about weight issues midships with ESSM Block II as I presume the MK 41 VLS silos would be somewhat heavier vs CAAM? What would that do to the port/stb’d waist areas? Would that involve re-instating SeaRam there or possibly a “future” DEW Laser defence system there? My thoughts anyway. Cheers!
Re My last comment Jimmy. We could just leave the Port/Stb’d waists as is and use them as a “Lido Deck” for crew sunbathing in warmer climates. That would keep all away from the Air Force personnel during ‘Flying Stations”. The crew would certainly appreciate that (an excellent morale booster as well!) Ha! Cheers!