I agree with much of Ken Hansen’s analysis. While we have indeed done badly at maintaining leading edge capabilities after purchase (note, however, exceptions of Halifax-class, CP-140, and CF-18 mid-life […]
The F-35 purchase and NSPS elicit the same question for me: “What is the government’s concept for the employment of Canadian military force in a future conflict?” The F-35 contract suggests […]
The question of cost factors over the F35 purchase were swirling before the election, but the connection between that project and the National Ship Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was not made […]
[Moderator’s Note. This commentary was originally published on Tuesday, 15 March 2011 on David Pugliese’s Defence Watch. It is reproduced here with the permission of Mr. Pugliese.] Long-time Defence Watch […]
*Moderator’s Note: This article was posted on Defence Iq on 21 March. The first paragraph is reproduced here, along with a link the remainder of the article, with the permission […]
*Moderator’s Note: This article was original published in The Nova Scotian on 07 February 2011. Many have seen the news on increased piracy in the Horn of Africa and that […]
The following quote from Secretary Gates should make many in DND quite uncomfortable, particularly those who have turned their backs on a meaningful Canadian amphibious capability in favour of sending Leopard […]
Certain Canadian politicians and labour leaders have been making a fuss recently over the idea that Canada might build a new class of warships to a British design – as […]
*Moderator’s Note: This article was original published in The Nova Scotian on 10 January 2011. I have decided to focus my first article of the New Year on prosperity and […]
Peter Haydon noted the “Boom and Bust” characteristic of Canadian naval shipbuilding and the consequence to Canadian ship design capability. Could another replacement strategy be better? In an earlier post […]
[*Originally appeared in Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2011).] “Cheap for us and nasty for the Germans.” Winston Churchill, 1940. In this centenary year there is much […]
The initial rumour out of Britain that Canada and UK were discussing new frigate plans [see also here] was quickly denied by the Canadian government, but subsequent public statements by […]
There has been considerable press coverage of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report – Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border – and […]
The Ports and Ships website is reporting that the Danish Shipowners’ Association has officially requested the Danish government to “lower the threshold” for placing armed security guards onboard Danish vessels. […]
*This article by Sam Bateman was released on 26 January as Report No. 6/2011 by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. Mr. Bateman is a Senior Fellow […]
Reports, all unsubstantiated so far, continue to surface about the possibility of Canada acquiring a ship or ships capable of amphibious operations. (See: “Big Honkin’ Ships” by Chris MacLean in […]
I recently came across the Australian Strategic Policy Institute [ASPI] Special Report Issue 31, dated 31 May 2010 and entitled Naval gazing: The future of Australia’s naval shipbuilding and repair […]
*Moderator’s Note: An article entitled was released on 6 December by Strategic Forecasts [STRATFOR]. STRATFOR analyst Ben West examines the reasons why Somali pirates have increasingly looked to the Indian […]
*Moderator’s Note: This article is an executive summary of a monograph by CFPS Resident Research Fellow David Griffiths that was published this summer by the US Naval War College Press. […]
An article entitled “Piracy sidelines Third of Taiwan’s Indian Ocean tuna fleet” (no longer available form on-line source), released on 26 November by AFP details the plight of fishermen operating […]
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