By Dr. Ann Griffiths, 8 February 2026
[This is an excerpt of an article in Vol. 21, No. 3 of Canadian Naval Review. For the full article, click on the link below.]
[Note: Editorials represent the opinion of the author, not CNR, the Editorial Board or sponsors.]
[Note: Since this Editorial was written, the RCN has sent a ship – HMCS Yellowknife – to participate in Op Caribbe, pointedly noting “Operation Caribbe is a separate and distinct operation working with the United States Coast Guard to fulfill its law enforcement mandate to interdict illicit trafficking vessels and is unrelated to other US operations in the region.”]
It was difficult to decide what to write in this Editorial. Unlike past years, recently there have been too many changes relating to defence to discuss in one Editorial. A firehose of funding for defence has been opened in Canada, so should I discuss that? Should I discuss the new government agencies to streamline (hopefully) defence procurement and the adoption of new technology? The plan to procure new submarines, or the absorption of the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of National Defence? The new joint forces command? Should I focus on events in the United States – i.e., the implication of the new US National Security Strategy for Canada (if any), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate program, the US strikes on boats in the Caribbean and the implications for Canadian naval operations? All of these things are important, or have the potential to be important, for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Here I will make a few comments, and mention a few concerns, about some of these topics.
As noted, the government has increased the budget for defence on a scale that hasn’t been seen since the 1950s. (Note that the massive increase in funding announced in the fall budget does not include funding for new submarines.) While details are still scant, the money is to support, among other things, equipment, recruitment, training, infrastructure, cyberdefence and a Canadian military industrial capability. Prime Minister Mark Carney has not only promised to meet the old NATO defence spending requirement of 2% of Gross Domestic Product within this fiscal year, but also to meet the new 5% target. Furthermore, it has vowed to make procurement more efficient by creating a Defence Procurement Agency, led by a Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, to oversee and (hopefully) untangle the painful processes that currently slow down military procurement. Also in the process of being developed is the Defence Investment Agency to be informed by the forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy.
These are great. But I have some concerns. First, DND has not been able to spend the money it received before this big influx of funding. How will it manage this vast increase of funds? Second, this certainly isn’t the government’s first attempt to make the defence procurement process more efficient. Will this one succeed? We can hope that it will but, as the saying goes, hope isn’t a strategy.
Third, increasing Canada’s defence industrial base and developing cutting-edge technology is a great plan – although it’s unfortunate that we didn’t do this in the past. In the works is the Regional Defence Investment Initiative to split funding among Canada’s seven regional development agencies.1 But several things about this worry me. It seems inefficient, particularly if each region must be allocated a specific amount of money. What happens if all the defence industry and technology start-ups are in one region but the funds must be spread to all regions? Encouraging industry development through regional agencies may reproduce the problems of the past by encouraging regions to promote projects that compete with or overlap other projects in other regions or leading to regional boondoggles. Competition among regions is something we don’t want to exacerbate.
Fourth, and this relates to the third point, another concern is that the government, like past governments, has made no secret of the fact that this increase of funds to DND is also about creating jobs. If unemployed Canadian steel and auto-workers can be retrained to work in the defence industry, I’m all for it. But the National Shipbuilding Strategy has for years illustrated that the government seems to care more about creating ‘good middle-class jobs’ than actually getting ships in the hands of the navy quickly and for a good price.
Fifth, I wonder how deep the commitment of Canadians is to building up what we could call ‘the military-industrial complex.’ Many Canadians are uncomfortable with developing and selling military (or even law enforcement) equipment – see the recent fuss about Canadian-made vehicles being sold to ICE in the United States. In light of this, how committed is the government to continuing to fund the military at such high levels? …. Even if we assume all the stars are aligned, none of these projects will produce fruit for years – by that time, will public opinion have changed? Will the government have changed, or will it have changed priorities?
And finally, the absence of a detailed defence policy is a problem. In its absence, it is not clear what the plan is. What will this beefed-up military do? Why does it need to be beefed up? What are we defending against? What will the Canadian Armed Forces, or more specifically here the RCN, do and what roles will it be assigned? Canada is fortunate to be bordered by three oceans and a (formerly) friendly power. Can the government provide a reason for this spending other than to meet NATO guidelines? ….
……
Read the full Editorial at https://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol21num3/cnr_vol21_3_Griffiths.pdf
Image: The Chinese hospital ship Silk Road Ark is seen during a three-day visit to Kingston, Jamaica, in December 2025. Credit: Chinese Embassy in Jamaica account on X
