By Jeff G. Gilmour, 16 March 2025
The purpose of this post is to argue that there seems to be no reality associated with the projected budget costs for various military projects proposed for the Department of National Defence (DND).
As noted in the government budget of 2024, the department was included in the overall 3% government cutbacks. There was also note of $1.52 billion in lapsed funding in 2022-23 and a further $1.1 billion dollars in “adjustments to spending on capital equipment and infrastructure projects.”
Many federal politicians are now stating that they can reduce the time for this country to reach the 2% of GDP for defence spending from the earlier announced date of 2032. On October 2024 the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) noted it will cost us $81.9 billion to achieve this target by 2032-33.
Aside from the government possibly wanting to achieve this goal, our federal governments have over the years proposed a number of significant military projects costing billions of dollars. The following is a broad list of some of these projects.
First, one of the first major shipbuilding programs announced in the 2010 National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) was the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), according to which 15 destroyers were to be constructed, designated recently as the River-class. The intention is to build these warships at the Irving Halifax shipyard. The first of the ships is expected in the 2030s and the last in 2050. The cost for this program has escalated over the years:
2019 - federal government estimated cost - $60 billion
2022 - PBO estimated cost - $84 billion
2025 – 3-year extrapolated cost - $102 billion
As shown in recent shipbuilding costs, these figures are likely conservative.
In addition to the concern of costs to build these ships in the first place, many critics argue that surface fleets are now at great risk from drones and missiles, as we can see from what has happened to the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the war in Ukraine.
Second, DND announced it is looking at replacing the four Victoria-class submarines with 15 diesel-electrical submarines purchased from other allied countries, for example Sweden, Germany or South Korea. The costs associated with such a purchase would be in the billions of dollars. It is likely that crewing 15 boats would be a problem as well for the RCN.
Third, the projected costs for the fleet renewal program were identified in the NSS for both the ships of the RCN and the Canadian Coast Guard. Based on the number of ships to be built, even though the costs of some projects were not identified, the total costs at that time came to around $115 billion.1 Since these earlier cost projections, the cost of the six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) ships increased to $4.98 billion, and the costs of the two Joint Support Ships (JSS) being built at Seaspan shipyard in Vancouver increased to $3.4 billion, an increase of approximately one billion dollars.
Fourth, in June 2022 former Defence Minister Anita Anand announced Canada’s $36.6 billion plan to modernize NORAD over two decades, from 2028 until 2042. The plan includes 19 areas of upgrades designed to improve Canadian defence capabilities in the North.
Fifth, it must be remembered that the RCN is not the only branch of the Canadian Armed Forces that needs funds for recapitalization. The following contracts have already been executed recently for the RCAF:
$19 billion for the purchase of 88 F-35 aircraft from Lockheed Martin;
$3.6 billion for the purchase of 9 Polaris aircraft from Airbus;
$2.4 billion for the purchase of 11 MQ-9B Reaper drones from General Atomic in 2023.
Based on the number of proposed major military projects by various governments and the identified significant costs, I believe serious discussions must take place in order to justify proceeding ahead with such projects. Decisions must take place soon before contacts are entered into with third parties. I maintain that these military projects, based on their significant projected costs, are unrealistic and delusional.
1. Jeff G. Gilmour “The Future Prospects for the National Shipbuilding Strategy,” Canadian Naval Review, Vol.18, No. 2 (2022), p. 11.
15 thoughts on “Military Procurement in Canada: A Budget Reality Check ”
So first of all you might correct a few of the facts you present. I’m making a assumption that you are talking about the CSC with the three year extrapolated cost of $102 Billion. I assume you are taking into consideration the $20.2B figure for the first three ships and applying that figure to the remainder of 12 CSC. That is not entirely correct. The $20.2B not only covers the first three ships at their operational point but many other items. The extra costs include new jetties and infrastructure upgrades on both coasts to support the River Class while alongside as the existing jetties can’t support the large CSC and shore services. Additionally it covers the land-based test facility in Hartlen Point NS, which means most of the combat suite for a complete ship which is normally the majority of the expense for a warship will be housed in that building. Additionally it takes into account maintenance, training, operational costs including initial spare parts, ammunition, etc., into account. So additional batches won’t be $20.2B as a lot of those costs are one time costs and over the course of the project the costs should drop as building best practices mature. That being said, they are expensive. However to start over, cancel or delay the project is just not feasible at this point so we must move on and let the project unfold and make economies where and if we can.
Yes drones are a concern, however serious navies are finding ways and weapons systems to counter such things so will we. Anti-drone technology will be incorporated into the CSC, JSS, Corvettes etc.
Canada has asked for 12 submarines, not 15. Yes crewing for all our purchases, sailors, pilots, etc., will be an issue so along with our purchases plans need to include a wholesale increase to our personnel numbers as a consideration.
You failed to consider the Kingston Class replacement, that will additionally take up resources including personnel.
The irony of all of this is that if successive governments including the current one had replaced our defence equipment at even a little more than a snail’s pace we wouldn’t be where we are right now and probably not fearing our southern neighbour so much. Although the rhetoric is finally lighting a fire to actually get what Canada needs in defence, the new leader may end up cancelling and retendering certain purchases out of political theatre.
Canada is a rich country and certainly can afford the orders it has placed and intend to place as long as the spending like a drunken sailor on things that actually don’t help Canada is reined in. In fact we should be placing more orders and perhaps overhaul the glacial pace of our procurement system while we’re at it. I also read some of your previous articles quoting “sources” like Alan Williams who everyone knows is a friend to the NSS:). So in conclusion, while these project costs look to be unrealistic and delusional, they are very necessary and far too late in many cases to change.
Hello Ted. I was just about to reply to Jeff’s article with just about what you have said so well, but you have saved me the trouble. To “Jeff”…..DITTO!! My only other critique would be ‘up to’ 12 modern submarines (Perhaps From France – less the nuclear part?). The Barracuda Block 1A – the same one Australia rejected because of their nuclear option but perhaps a better deal could be had than what France offered the ‘Aussies.’
Hi, Dave there was a reason why France just visited with one of their nukes in Shearwater last week that caused a stir in Halifax. Indicators right now we’ll probably be going with the Korean KSS II as they have reportedly offered to let us jump the line on a current build to allow the crews in to train on a platform sooner.
Sorry, Ted, I am not buying your kool-aid. You have often provided this Forum with interesting details on various navy programs and for that I for one am most grateful, but at some point we have to ask the extent to which you are a so-called DND ‘influencer’ monitoring this Forum to ‘correct’ any negative comments about these programs. Some of your previous contributions would have required you to be within the innermost decision-making circles of one or more of the following organizations: Irving Shipbuilding, DND CSC Program Office, DND’s senior decision boards, the Federal Cabinet itself. You must have a very well located water cooler! So, where do your ‘facts’ come from?
Let us review your rebuttal in this case. First, the actual government website where the CSC announcement was posted [https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/03/government-of-canada-announces-contract-award-for-the-construction-of-the-river-class-destroyers-for-the-royal-canadian-navy.html] notes that the projected cost for the first three River-class destroyers is $22.2 billion, excluding taxes), not $20.2 billion as you claim. But what’s a couple of billion to this government!
Second, according to the website announcement:
“Following extensive analysis, the Government of Canada has now established the cost to build and deliver the first three ships at $22.2 billion (excluding taxes). This estimate includes the costs that will be paid to ISI through the implementation contract, as well as costs associated with the delivery of equipment, systems and ammunition that Canada will be acquiring to bring the first three ships into service.”
So, this sum still could include some or all of the one-time cost items you mention, but one would think that a background technical briefing would have clarified that these costs were included but, according to the reporters who were there, it did not. Some accounts of the technical briefing note that the $22.2 billion figure could increase after the inevitable production ‘challenges,’ delays, and cost overruns are encountered at Irving.
Third, and most puzzling of all, for a government trying to stand up to the US administration’s sovereignty and economic threats, and with increased defence spending being popular with every Canadian provincial premier, and all major political parties, why did the current government attempt to bury the good news on the next to last day of the Trudeau administration instead of shouting it to the roof tops? Avoidance of a sticker-shock backlash springs to mind as a credible explanation. After all, at $7.4 billion per warship, Canadians could buy a lot of groceries and ‘Elbows Up’ t-shirts!
Finally, if the real production costs do end up at near this $7.4 billion per ship, does anyone really believe that Canada will be buying any more than three of these outlandishly priced warships?
Dan, the biggest issue I have is that for the last decade is the misinformation and how legitimate information is presented in order to make the CSC look bad in the media. You see it from David Pugliese, Alan Williams etc., and others including some on these forums. They all seem to have an axe to grind with this project and claim they’re doing it for the tax payer. The recent issues with the US on tariffs have brought out all the regulars as they see it as an opportunity to further degenerate and call into question some of the most important capital acquisitions in the government of Canada history on the eve of starting significant construction in kind.
Canada is the only country it seems that costs its warships with everything including the kitchen sink in its price. All that does is rile up the uninformed that post articles about how bad the CSC is.
You know Dan, I have been accused of being a ‘insider’ a few times but this is the first time I have been accused of being an ‘influencer’ so I must be doing something right. The truth of the matter is that I have worked on DND projects in the past and I have been at briefings on the CSC and these briefings are what any DND employee or sailor gets. Yes these briefing discuss information that the general public or people on this page don’t always see. Plenty of people out there say a lot of things just need to be able to know who the valid opinions are and know what you’re talking about.
I find the Canada.ca website very sparse with information on the project at times.
“Following extensive analysis, the Government of Canada has now established the cost to build and deliver the first three ships at $22.2 billion (excluding taxes). This estimate includes the costs that will be paid to ISI through the implementation contract, as well as costs associated with the delivery of equipment, systems and ammunition that Canada will be acquiring to bring the first three ships into service.”
If you actually read everything, everything is pretty much there as I stated.
“With an initial value of $8 billion (including taxes) intended to fund the first 6 years of construction, this contract supports the construction and delivery of the initial three ships as well as the development and delivery of necessary training, spares, and maintenance products required to operate and support the ships in service.”
Furthermore is goes on to mention about the land-based texting facility at Hartlen Point, all included in the initial 6 years which the $22.2B covers and a significant portion of it one time costs. I personally think DND doesn’t owe anyone a background technical briefing when the items that the costs cover is there for all to see. Even if they did, it would just serve to inspire a whole raft of negative articles from the usual suspects.
As for the releasing of the information and why didn’t they publicize it more, well nobody said they were smart. As for the beyond the initial 6 years and future orders I will say that anything can happen between now and then. Irving has an agreement to bring in BAE personnel and personnel from the Hunter Class project to advise them on lessons learned and to economise the build, so the actual cost should drop in future batches.
Have a great Navy Day.
As one of the few, mainstream and respected journalists covering the preliminary build order for three River-class destroyers (RCD), Murray Brewster has discovered some even more concerning details concerning the government’s announcement. [Murray Brewster, “Why is the naval destroyer program wrapped in secrecy? The F-35 saga offers insights, CBC News, 18 March 2025. Accessed at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/naval-destroyer-contract-cost-secrecy-1.7486101%5D
Not only is DND refusing to release further details about the RCD costs, but contrary to the government website’s 8 March 2025 contention that “extensive analysis” had “now established the cost to build and deliver the first three ships at $22.2 billion (excluding taxes),” Brewster argues that DND is claiming that “At this point we have not specifically attributed a ‘per-ship’ cost for the delivery of Batch 1 ships, we have only attributed the cost to deliver all three ships.”
Worse still, Brewster contends that the vague and seemingly contradictory DND claims regarding the RCD costs, possibly could be explained by the following astonishing fact:
“Part of the reluctance may relate to the fact that the final design for the warships is not completed, and not expected to be finished — and approved — until 2028. The federal government is essentially designing and building at the same time, using the British Type 26 hull design as the basis and completing the design as combat systems are added.”
I say that this near simultaneous design-and-build plan (called concurrency in defence circles) – if it proves to be the case – is astonishing, because I can think of no major naval shipbuilding program in any Western state where this fluid, near continuous design-while-building approach has resulted in anything but increased program costs owing to continuous design modifications and schedule delays. Moreover, given that BAE-Lockheed-Martin won the frigate/destroyer competition in February 2019, by 2028 it will have taken the parties an inordinate length of time to arrive at a final design for the RCD. Another testimony to the dysfunctional nature of defence procurement in Canada.
Truly, Canada’s NSS (National Shipbuilding Subsidies!) is intended to ensure that our shipbuilders continue to fleece the public purse. Meanwhile, both the Navy and Canadian security are but distant and at best secondary concerns. For its part in this sordid tale, the RCN deserves its inevitable fate – irrelevance via a RCD program that is far too little and too late, and obscenely over-priced.
Wow, read the article from Murray Brewster and not surprisingly had a quote from no other than Alan Williams a known opponent of the River Class destroyer project. I would image it’s a matter of time before we see similar articles from Robert Smol and David Pugliese. Murray Brewster is not wrong that the design is still being worked on but not to the extent of what is being inferred. As we saw last year, the 24 CAMM was being dropped and the RIM-116 was being acquired in its place so yes some minor design work was being done and it is actually normal that some minor design changes due to the threat environment changing (Red Sea) and new updated technology being installed and sometimes right up to the end of the build, these costs are actually entirely predictable. As of last year any further change requests were being denied as the window to have the first steel cut was rapidly approaching.
Your contention that the shipbuilders are fleecing the public purse is certainly a bold statement from you and very disingenuous when it was the government itself over the decade that decided to go with a larger platform after signing the combatant package and the literally thousands of change requests from the client that makes the River Class Destroyer very different from its counterparts. Nice try though.
Ted, you note that there will be ‘extra costs’ beyond the usual construction, ammunition, and spares costs associated with the building of the first three RCD warships. You state:
“The $20.2B [sic, actually $22.2B] not only covers the first three ships at their operational point but many other items. The extra costs include new jetties and infrastructure upgrades on both coasts to support the River Class while alongside as the existing jetties can’t support the large CSC and shore services. Additionally it covers the land-based test facility in Hartlen Point NS, which means most of the combat suite for a complete ship which is normally the majority of the expense for a warship will be housed in that building. Additionally it takes into account maintenance, training, operational costs including initial spare parts, ammunition, etc., into account.”
Some supporters of the RCD program always mention these ‘extra costs’ because they want to create the impression that the official price-tag for these vessels would actually be reduced considerably if only DND was not saddled with adding these other one-time expenditures into the final price equation. The preferred narrative is: nothing to see here, everything is reasonable and above board. Costs are well in line with comparable warships.
But are these ‘extra costs’ really as enormous as some folks would have us believe? The land-based test facility at Hartlen Point is slated to cost a total of $129 million. The jetty extension projects are expensive – the ongoing construction at CFB Esquimalt will cost roughly $1 billion. But note that this project has been underway for many years now, well before the RCD project came along, and the current cost for this is $55.9 million. At least part of the Esquimalt jetty upgrades have already been paid for in public monies provided to our shipbuilders, such as the $100 million charged to the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) program, while another $103 million has been charged to non-RCD purposes such as environmental remediation. Recall also the $463 million paid to Irving to upgrade its infrastructure because the Navy wanted a larger warship.
Usually costs for the Program Office are also included as ‘extras.’ But, hey, if DND and the Navy really want to slash the per unit sticker-shock associated with the RCD program, why not include the costs of operating and maintaining the 12 Halifax-class frigates, because these costs really are tied directly to the fact that the government has dragged out the RCD for so long that the existing frigates will have to somehow make do for at least another 15 years. And while we are at it, why not include the many billions paid to Irving for the 8 AOPS? After all, this program was launched first so that Irving could re-learn how to build large and impotent ships.
Surely, creative DND minds could find ways to include the costs of procuring our Joint Support Ships, F-35 fighters, P-8 Multi-mission aircraft, and even the MQ-9B drones as well. They all can provide some direct or indirect support for the RCD ship program.
Finally, we should note that while these one-time ‘extra costs’ should be applied to the entire 15-ship RCD program, those who mention these costs seem to imply that they will be added to each batch of the new destroyers, not to the program as a whole on a one-shot basis.
To sum up, these ‘extra costs’ likely will amount to much less than $3 billion in total, a small percentage of the total estimated costs of well over $100 billion for the RCD program. I will leave it to others to decide whether or not three warships at over $6+ billion each represent a good value deal for Canada.
As mentioned before, even with the extra costs the hulls are still expensive. I don’t think anyone disputes that. The issue is the constant embellishment of the costs trying to give the ‘impression’ that they are much more expensive than they are. An undeniable fact is that we are terrible in stating the actual sail-away build costs and often the public suffers ‘sticker shock’ and rails against the ship, the capability and tries to derail a procurement. Building anything in Canada with a broken procurement system over a decade with a pandemic, inflation, a constant stream of change orders is going to cost extra money and is honestly the price of doing business in Canada and quite a bit of it is 100% the Crown’s fault. The Crown decided that the AOPV project be prioritized over the CSC which drove up costs. Irving did everything that the government of Canada told them to do, some of it may be on Irving but not to the extent that you are insinuating.
You are correct that the land-based testing facility is $129M, however that doesn’t include the actual emitters and combat equipment indicative of a River Class. This equipment is easily the most expensive costs of a warship and will be installed in the facility. Much of what you’re stating is someone off the street looking in and actively looking for wrongdoing, making comparisons to other Type 26 programs. In many of these cases it’s like comparing apples and oranges.
The costs of the jetty infrastructure are not the jetty infrastructure as you noted costed under the AOPV program. The jetty infrastructure is most of the jetties in Esquimalt and Halifax that in their current state will be hard-pressed to accommodate and support the River Class due to their size and complexity. This also includes major upgrades to the docking facilities which in their current state cannot support the River class due to its size.
To sum up, the rest of what you’re saying is honestly sarcastic and surprising BUT I do agree we are not getting good value. If we wanted good value, we would build offshore but that’s not the purpose of the NSS which is to develop and revitalize the shipbuilding industry in Canada and maintain a strategic capability. The government knows that building in Canada was always going to be more expensive and apparently is willing to live with that, myself included. As noted by the government, it’s too late to cancel and pivot. “Large and impotent ships”, LOL. I’ve been in that large and “impotent” class of ships and it’s been the best sailing capability-wise of my career.
Have a great Navy day!
Ted, I think we agree on one part of the problem that I was trying to underscore in my comments. The main reason the public, and yes, even the so-called experts, tend to get lost regarding DND programs like the River-class destroyers (RCD), is that DND seemingly refuses to publish or report any meaningful and up-to-date costing material.
So what happens? People do enter into sticker-shock and rightly so.
Defenders of the RCN and other major CAF procurement programs then say any costs cited represent “constant embellishment…trying to give the impression that they are much more expensive than they are.” (Your words) Really? How do YOU know? What are YOUR sources other than in-house briefings and water-cooler chatter? Are you actually trying to suggest that the RCD production costs are only slightly higher than those, say of the USN Constellation-class? (And yes I know that there are some who constantly try to suggest that the officially stated cost projections for these USN ships leave out all sorts of costs. I have posted several rebuttals to these conspiratorial claims, and there are plenty more reputable and independent costing agencies in the US than there are in Canada).
I have tried to provide, based on the sparse material provided in DND’s Main Estimates for 2024-2025 and other procurement data provided by Procurement Canada, a reasonable ballpark figure for each RCD and that works out to over $6 billion per warship. Other independent agencies, such as the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) have provided similar estimates (albeit several years old now) and DND has broadly approved the PBO’s estimate in its online website.
[https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/nddn-main-estimates-2024-2025/procurement.html] If you believe that this is “embellishment” and that the RCD ships are much cheaper per unit than the PBO’s and my figures, on what evidentiary basis are you resting your claim? What else is missing in the government’s stated projection that three RCD ships will cost $22.2 billion? (And by the way, before we start doing cartwheels over the contract announcement, let us not forget that the amount is actually $8 billion as a down payment…things can change, especially with this government which is good at promising but not so much on delivering.)
You rightly argue that my $129 million figure for the Hartlen Point Test facility omits some expensive equipment. I omitted this equipment because the Department provided no actual costing for it. And while there will be substantial costs for these emitters etc, they will only be one-time costs, and they will be measured in the tens of millions dollars, NOT tens of billions dollars. So who is doing the embellishing here?
Finally, as noted above, I took the $100 million charged to the AOPS program for the CFB Esquimalt jetty recapitalization program directly from the DND Main Estimates for 2024-2025. The amount is there in black and white.
And while we are at it, regarding the too small jetties at Esquimalt, please note that DND’s own Audit of the Jetty Project reveals that the requirement is for up to 4 RCD warships at a time, not just one ship. As for the Halifax jetty situation, an Arleigh Burke destroyer or a Littoral Combat Ship have no trouble finding docking space there, and the Burkes are larger warships than the RCD will be,
So, again, you seem to be throwing a lot of misdirection out, tell us what YOU believe the correct costing figure to be and why. Just curious, in all the Navy briefings you have attended, has nobody ever provided a rough RCD costing figure? If you have received say, a ballpark figure, could you reveal any figures however broad they might be?
They “seemingly” refuse to publish the up-to-date costing. To be perfectly honest I no idea their motivation but like you and others I can offer some speculation based on my experience. The amount of heat and light the entire NSS and each project has been scrutinized the death over the last decade has been substantial. Cost overruns, delays etc has been a veritable field day for journalists and anyone else with or without an axe to grind. We know how balanced these articles often are.
From the beginning of the NSS it was the intent to provide cost effective, timely delivery of ships for Canada. I personally think that was a great thing to shoot for. After the start it was clear that it wasn’t going to be cost effective or timely but as mentioned before this was never just about providing the good value you mention in your criticisms, it’s was also about providing jobs, taxes and more importantly revitalizing a critical and strategic capability in Canada especially in these uncertain times. Having an organic shipbuilding capability to build ships in house is probably a good idea. It doesn’t take an expert to quickly realize that costs were always going to be high for the RCD as there was a gap of 6 years between settling on a design and first steel cut, and we all know what happened in between with Covid, inflation etc. The GOC prioritizing the AOPV’s to develop a skilled workforce before construction of the RCD added expense as well.
Yes people are going to have sticker shock especially when figures like 200B for lifetime costs get mentioned and the average person doesn’t know that but suspiciously it never gets mentioned that those costs are over the entire life of the ships including disposal which would be costed and needed anyways. All they see is the ships are going to cost 200B. I could go on and on with this on how it seems there never is a positive article on the NSS and how people often don’t see the big picture.
I never said that the production costs of the RCD are slightly higher than the Constellation Class costs unless you’re trying to have me say that. We’ve all known for quite some time that that program was going to compared to the RCD and how cheap and great it was. We all saw how PBO’s report of the Constellation Class as a comparison or alternative to the RCD was way off the mark. We know now how that program has been delayed and fell off the rails. Even the most experienced shipbuilders in the world have issues and sometime disastrous ones.
What we do now in Esquimalt and Halifax is often due to jetty size constraints we “nest” ships together outboard each other. While that is a solution, it’s not a good solution as ships must often move around as the lack of operable jetty cranes means if a ship needs to be alongside the jetty to carry out crane work, then all maintenance stops, voiding gas frees and causes delays and increases costs. Certain trials and activities require a ship to be nested alone. What’s trying to be done is enough jetty space to accommodate the larger ships without nesting. Did your jetty “report” for Esquimalt consider the addition of one JSS, 6 submarines, 2 AOPS, 6 or 7 RCD and Corvettes? Did your jetty report talk about enough jetty space for RAS pulls which means no other ships in the vicinity? Did your report account for foreign ships visiting, space for decommissioned ships or future additions to the fleet? Finally did your jetty report mention the condition and quantity of shore power connections that the RCN needs that are in excess of what the RCD requires or the simple fact that the Arleigh Burke Class you mention can’t hook up to shore power there because the connections that the jetties have are unsuitable and need refurbishment? I wager not. So please continue to accuse me of misdirection. Many of these additional costs to the uninformed seem small, but it certainly adds up, but yes keep believing that each RCD will be 7B each.
I rightly do not have any costing to give you and if I did, I certainly wouldn’t say it here. All I can say on the matter is the cost estimates inferred by the OP here continue not to take into account everything for the first batch of ships and the sail away costs are lower than what’s being stated. It seems now that the same distractors of the F 35 purchase have gotten on the scent of the RCD and its wide use of American supplied systems so you very well may get your wish. My conclusion is this, the price is the price – we need these ships, we need them yesterday, they are expensive, but we need to look at the overall picture of the consequences of not having them.
Hello Ted. I have been reviewing both your and Dan’s playful & honest discussions with a certain amount of glee and head-nodding. Well done to you both! The recent port visit of the French Sufferin Class nuclear sub was eye-opening to say the least and perhaps a harbinger of things to come. Although the Korean KSSII/III may be a better option no doubt, the French Barracuda Block 1A for Canada is interesting. On Jeff’s original post, I had a thought. What if the “lapsed funding & adjustment spending” funds did not go back into “general revenues” as they always seem to do for the CAF & RCN in particular with this government but were instead put into a “protected” capital equipment fund for all CAF capital equipment purchases and “over-runs”? Simply putting them back into the government coffers to “draw down the National Debt or to make future future political hay seems to me to be counter-productive right now. Having that extra billions of cash in the RCN’s back pocket would be comforting say for the CSC/RCD program or other projects for the future (I.E Kingston Class replacements etc.). Just a thought!
If we were serious, we would have a capital fund for defence purchases that a set dollar amount goes into every year. The fund would be overseen by a defence procurement board that is tasked with finding the best procurements for Canada even if it was sole sourced.
To Ted. Yes, that would be ideal but, that would also mean increasing the DND budget quickly. Just changing that policy, I believe, would be a better & faster way to do this rather than going to at least 2% of GDP even before the end of this year. By just amending the government policy for driving these unused funds to create this capital investment fund for your ‘defence procurement board,’ tasked to finding the best procurements for the CAF & RCN in particular, for Canada even to sole source military equipment, would do just as well. But either would do. Cheers!
It’s akin to watching a football team that punts, punts, and punts again. Once a game of every decade or two they kick a field goal, but always a losing effort with an ever-declining audience both domestic and international.
Yesterday, the new prime minister punted again by re-announcing the OTH-B radar project previously announced by Anita Anand in her brief tenancy in the defence portfolio.
There is no rational long-term strategy, in part because there is no sound insight in Ottawa among the politicians or the NDHQ bubble, the real strategy in play is to wishfully think problems will go away in the future so the programs can be cancelled, severely scaled back, or a cheap substitute magically and unrealistically pencilled in to address the vacant capacity like a lot of the populist experts with their narrow drone concepts, and the money re-directed to buying political points elsewhere.
The strategy is the same as that which underpinned two world wars in the previous century. In the summer, I am going to be scouting out future living locations out west – I was never fearful during the Reagan era, I am now. I have important patents to acquire to benefit the commonwealth during the reformation.