By Peter M. Sanderson, 2 October 2024
The Issuing of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) Request for Information (RFI) came as a surprise but was welcomed by the CAF. The 2035 date is interesting for a government watching its spending; the last planes of the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) will have been delivered 3 years earlier and the destroyer portion of the CSC will have been up and running for many years so government can now take on new commitments. Spoiler alert, looking at chart #1 you will see when TKMS will finally be free to build its 2,500 t Type-212CD for foreign buyers – its small size and stealthy hull certainly give it an advantage in the shallow Arctic seas. See chart #2 for the projected service life disposition of the Victoria-class SSK
The 2025 CUSMA negotiations. One of the reasons the Biden White House and its ambassador have been so patient with Canada’s defence spending “slow reveal,” was that they knew we were just months from these negotiations. And it matters not who wins in November, we will be dealing with the US Trade Representativewho wants a rematch with our ‘supply managed’ sector for starters. With no good will to put on the table, our economy will be damaged and we will suffer some real arm twisting before anteing up! In 1939 Canada joined the USA to create Fortress North America and, while the two countries may have split as the United States fought its ‘forever wars,’ we still have a duty to defend the North. The world is at war, in Minute Men tradition, America rings the alarm bell, a Canadian saunters onto the village green carrying a rusty musket sans powder & ball. Canada doesn’t even have the self-interest to guard our Arctic Archipelago’s trillions of dollars of oil, gas, precious metals and rare earths.
Order 4 Korean Subs ASAP. See chart #3. ‘Perfect is the enemy of good.’ Yes, a fleet of one sub type is preferable but politics has intervened. The last 3,750 t Ahn Changho-class sub cost 900M USD, so if we order 4 boats in 4 years from Hanwha Ocean, that 3.6B falls in the middle of the other Arctic defence purchases - 5.9B P-8A Poseidon and the 2.5B MQ-9B Sky Guardian. Yes, at that price they will come with indigenous sensors. But ‘forget about it,’ remember our objectives. New boats sooner mean: we will be seen defending the US republic; trades retention*and new recruits* queuing up to be submariners; ‘purpose built’ boats for male and female crews*; and a 10 year head start on patrolling and learning our neighbourhood – the Arctic Archipelago. When the other boats finally arrive, these bigger boats should be based at Esquimalt for Pacific taskings. * Specific CDS/CAF goals
30 thoughts on “CPSP RFI: There May be Complications”
Very interesting suggestion, Peter.
I agree, getting new subs as soon as possible to replace the Victoriaclass should be a priority for Canada and the RCN – even if in the future a different sub type is introduced into the fleet. If Canada thinks we can get by keeping our barely functioning subs ‘in service’ until 2035-ish, this is just not fathomable nor justifiable. Having something that properly operates is much better than essentially having nothing at all (which the Victoria-class are just a minor step above). Also, in the future such subs can all be allocated to assignments outside of the Arctic when a better suited sub is purchased: to my understanding, Canada’s future sub fleet will not be exclusively for Arctic patrol purposes and will perform other roles.
A quick search shows the Dosan Ahn Changho-class KSS-III submarine comes in two batches – the second being bigger, having lithium-ion batteries, more K-VLS tubes, and air-independent propulsion (this type of propulsion also being offered by the SAAB sub). Are you suggesting the Batch I or Batch II in your proposal?
What I would like to know is, would it be possible to lease these subs from Korea for X number of years while Canada works towards identifying a sub that will meet its needs long term? Looks like the plan is for Korea to build 27 such submarines – perhaps they will be willing to part with four for a decade or so?
Thanks,
GD
212CD is actually slightly larger than the current Victoria-class.
212CD specs are 73m LOA x 10m beam 2,800t submerged
Victoria specs are 70m LOA x 7.2m Beam and 2,450t submerged
I am also not sure if your chart takes into account the expansion at TKMS either. Looking at it with no expansion in use 2039 is the earliest a Canadian boat could be commissioned at that same build rate if the Germans go for the 6 confirmed units.
What is clear is the Canadian boats currently are at or very near end of life so this should have been done a decade ago.
TKMS will presumably be offering Canada the same Type 212CDE variant as what was offered to the Netherlands, which adds a hull insert to bring the length from 73m to somewhere past 80m and with an additional few hundred tons of displacement. This will allow it to better compete with some of the larger boats on offer abroad.
Most likely, the 212 series are very good boats and have even bested SSNs.
TKMS had 2029 as the delivery date for the first 212CD/E derivative to the Dutch Navy if they had been selected.
They have the capacity to increase production if the business requires it
Agreed that Hanwha Ocean’s offer may ultimately be best in terms of price and delivery dates. However, can someone speak about the issue of the weapons/fire-control interface? I assume that whatever design we choose, we’ll specify the requirement to fire our Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes. Or is that negotiable? Would we consider a solution where the boat and its (non-US) weapons come in a package, or will we require a change-out of an indigenous fire-control system in favour of something that can fire the Mk48/Tomahawk/NSM? Recall that when we acquired the Upholders, one of the first things we did was rip out the OEM’s combat systems because we had no intention of using the Spearfish HWT.
Hanwa has pitched us on a high-tech Li-ion-based AIP submarine fit for mixed-gender crews. Great. But what of the engineering changes required to Canadianize the combat system? How much risk are we/they willing to bear? Recall that the Aussies had an unpleasant experience with their Collins-class subs, whose original (Rockwell) combat system performed below requirement for many, many years (and to great public embarrassment) before finally being sorted out with the help of the US Navy. Will the latter be on hand to assist, or are there restrictions in transferring that kind of technology to the RoK?
(Thyssen, I think, has succeeded in integrating different combat systems and weapons into its submarines.)
As noted above, earlier batches of the KSS III also have vertical launch tubes for short-range SLBMs. As there is not requirement in Canada for that, what is to be done with the empty space? Another design change?
I cannot envision what the author suggests at the end of his piece: a Canadian SSK fleet composed of multiple designs from multiple suppliers. Is there any NATO navy of our size and budget that would consider shouldering the logistical challenges of operating such a fleet? We’ll be lucky to afford and to fully crew 6 boats. A single supplier is preferable.
RCN will very likely retain the current fit for weapons considering they just invested in the MK48 ADCAP Mod 7. It’s mainly a matter of fire control hardware being installed which can be done in a Canadian yard.
Hi GD and Blair. Paragraph One. Chart #2 had two purposes: to remember and honour ‘Best-in-Class’ Upholders subs and their builders and to show the ‘reasonable citizen’ the brutal cold hard numbers – this project is not doable! Paragraph Two. We are a little yappy dog that is allowed to hang out with the Big Dog. He expects us to watch his back and when we too busy yapping, he will turn around and give us a nip to help us focus. Paragraph Three. The Batch 1 price was all I had to show the ‘reasonable citizen’ that the cost of 12 subs should be in the 12 billion ball park; then I started adding up, new piers and barracks for both coasts, a new high tech school c/w barracks, new munitions stocks and inflation, I could only get 50B. What is the other 50B for? Do we have a ‘boondoggle’ that neither serves our security partner, our taxpayers nor the men and women of RCN?
Considering the main arm of the submarine fleet is the MK48 non ADCAP mod 4 is being moved over to the MK48 ADCAP Mod 7 and we’re already acquiring these the stock pile figures for munitions can be discounted as we’re already there in terms of funding.
In terms of platform price, current figures put the KSIII at $900m USD or $1.2bn CAD (2021 figures) so x 12 is $14.4bn CAD, this isn’t pocket change and with inflation that figure has already gone up and is probably closer to $16bn total now. The cost also doesn’t factor in other sundries or modifications needed for Canadian use. Personally I’d say it’s around the $20bn CAD mark for 12.
Type 212CD was priced in 2021 at €1.35bn or $2.01bn CAD per boat again x by 12 gives you $24.12bn CAD. Again this doesn’t account for modifications, inflation cost over runs and other sundries. It also doesn’t factor in training and trainers!
With numbers like these I personally think the MPs would have a collective stroke! Hence it is my firm opinion we will likely see only 6 be completed and that’s if we are lucky.
With upgrades going on to accept the new type 26 River-class destroyers, it would be wise to maybe sort out the modifications for new submarines sooner rather than later. We don’t want to end up like the Spanish.
According to what I’ve read, the Dosan Ahn Changho-class KSS-III submarine will also be available in a larger Batch 3 version which will apparently be larger at 4000 tn surfaced and likely 4500 tn submerged which will give it more reserve buoyancy for surfacing through ice; more lethal with more VL batteries and into the 4000 + tn area. There’s a mixed bag of good and bad when it comes to a larger conventional AIP diesel electric submarine above 2500 tn. It’s how the weight to power ratio impacts survivability. A larger boat may be able to carry more supplies and weapons for lengthy Arctic patrols and the comforts of home and hotel energy needed to survive, however its survivability, once discovered, it has lost its stealth advantage and the boat’s persistence upon being challenged, will be in serious jeopardy in an ice-capped Arctic environment and would likely not survive an encounter with a Russian SSN. Things to keep in mind if we are thinking conventional AIP vs nuclear-powered boats.
The current requirements for the Canadian Submarine project doesn’t include surfacing through the ice. The submarine will be utilized at the ice edge and the extent of under the ice operations will be very limited.
Hi Ted. You are absolutely correct! Unless the government’s requirement for a strengthened under-ice steel requirement is explored, any one of the AIP/LIB submarines that may be considered (that includes the French, Japanese or Spanish builds) will not have the kind of “heavy ice break-through” that some may be dreaming of. Nuclear subs are the only units capable of doing that tricky procedure thus far, and we all know what the government thinks of SSNs!! Sorry to burst anybody’s bubble, but those are just the plain hard facts of life. With whatever boat Canada decides to procure, it will have the same near-ice capabilities as the Victoria class has now and nothing more. Have A Great Navy Day!!
It does concern me that Canada wants a submarine that can travel under some ice yet not have the ability to punch through.
This is either the single most stupid thing I have ever heard or quite frankly the most dangerous. I think both on reflection.
If you are operating under ice you must have the means to reach the surface therefore you need to be able to punch through. Why? Simple — if something goes wrong and you need to vent the boat or get her on the roof quick in an emergency that emergency isn’t going to wait 2 or 3 days until you clear the ice sheet.
You want to know what happens when you don’t take this ability seriously? Ask the Russians, they lost quite a few men under ice some very recently. A friend of mine was CO of HMS Tireless in 2007 he was under the ice had an emergency he had to punch through quickly for a medivac sadly we lost two men on her.
If the RCN is going to do this half baked and lack luster, then you’re better off not doing it at all, because quite frankly we will be asking for trouble. Having been under ice myself both on a AIP boat and SSN it is not something you go into half baked.
You seem pretty knowledgeable about submarines. When has a conventional submarine surfaced through the Arctic ice? not the Baltic, the Arctic?
Totally agree Blair! With a change in government coming soon, Canada may decide to “bite the bullet” and attempt to acquire a fleet of, say, 8-10 SSNs with a strengthened hull and under-ice capability. One can only hope anyway. Cheers!
@Ted Barnes the last conventional submarine to surface under the ice in the Arctic region was this year in 2024 during NATO operation Dynamic Mongoose the submarine in question was the Portuguese type 209PN (214) Tridente.
She surfaced North of Iceland and east of Greenland far up before submerging again to come through the Denmark Strait.
The other 2 I know about were both type 212A boats, one which i was on surfaced in the Gulf of Finland under the ice. This was a test run for a later experiment by sister boat which went North of Jan Myen and operated up there with technical help from Cdr David Croft RN (now commander HMS Anson).
We have had Dutch boats from time to time operate near / under some of the ice shelf and the Norwegian Ulas operate that way as well mainly in the Fjords. The Russian Northern Fleet Kilos also when they are making way will do some training in the White sea and some areas in the Kara sea. We have seen those first hand which surprised us a lot because it means if their kilos can do it so can the Polish Orzel and chinese kilos.
My concern isn’t so much with the type of boat but the crews. I want them to operate safely and in the event of incidents have a way out I really never want to see a headline in CBC saying “Canadian sub lost under ice as it’s unable to surface all hands lost” or something like that.
I am very aware of the risks faced with submarine operations, I have been around when it has gone wrong and how it affects people, I’m also aware of the limited ability of rescue.
My only goal here is to ensure we limit it so the chances of it happening so the risk is much reduced.
I just want our submariners and indeed all of our armed forces to stop getting the short end of short-sighted deals that puts them at needless risk because politicians don’t want to spend a few extra dollars on ensuring their safety and well being.
@David Dunlop would it surprise you to learn the outer casing on our Trafalgar & Astute classes under the anechoic coating, is largely fiberglass? The fin is steel reinforced to effect the punch and once the cracking has happened you don’t need that much pressure to bring the boat through.
The boats themselves even the virginias and 688s are rated to punch through 2ft (0.6m) thick ice which is plenty but we will always look for Polynas to bring her through.
We won’t get SSNs but we shouldn’t discount AIP boats nor the ability to punch through either, if you’re under ice and need to get off the boat in a hurry, up is the only way.
Hello Blair again. You are most likely right that Canada will never acquire SSNs for the RCN. I am also aware of that the US and British SSNs have re-enforced steel in their fins to help ‘punch through’ that thick ice as you say, and also knew about fiberglass stationed around and under the anechoic tiles. However I don’t believe the Portuguese, German or Dutch Type 209/212s have the kind of steel re-enforced fins to do what the US or British SSNs can accomplish as far as ice thickness goes. If I am wrong, can you substantiate? If a future AIP/LIB Canadian sub is that far north on patrol, I would hope it has the same abilities to break through thick ice as the US and British SSNs have. If not, best leave it up to them and keep our future crews safe from harm. What if Canada decides to establish a year-round sub base up there, Iqualuit say? Would we just leave them there to rust during Arctic winter months and only ‘come out to play’ during relatively ice-free conditions in the Summer? I think not. What say you?
Blair Shaw, the Portuguese operated under ice in the ‘Marginal Ice Zone’ which is an area of ice up to 80% coverage and not pack ice and have open areas to surface. It took them 4 days to transit that area. The purposed requirements for the new Canadian submarine include the MIZ and limited areas under-pack ice. The others were similarly in the MIZ or very thin ice, again not pack ice.
Canada has been very clear in how it will use the submarines in the Arctic and that is to patrol outside the entrance and exits of the NW passage in conjunction with other assets. It certainly won’t be all the time.
@David Dunlop
Good evening David
Reason I mentioned the fiberglass is because not a lot of people know about it or don’t realise it.
With regards to fin reinforcement, you’re partially correct, the German Dutch Portuguese etc don’t have fully reinforced fins like the SSNs, they do have strengthened fins (Specifically the Dutch and German boats). This is mainly due to operating areas — as we already are well aware German boats operate in the Baltic which freezes over in places and the Dutch do go up north quite a bit into the North Cape, Jan Myen etc areas.
The Norwegian Ulas do have fully ice-strengthened fins because of where they operate in the Fjords and like the Dutch venture out into the ice in the Arctic.
If you read the book “In Deepest Secrecy: Dutch Submarine Espionage Operations from 1968 to 1991” by Jaime Karremann, he covers Dutch ops in the ice with the older T & Potvis class boats. Both were not ice rated but the follow-on classes did have some reinforcement after previous experiences.
With the current plan to operate near or in the ice edge we would only need the same type of reinforcement as the Dutch. I don’t think we will go high north i.e., mid-Arctic so we don’t need the fully ice reinforced fins but strengthening should be par for the course as even on the ice edge you’re going to encounter pack ice and growlers.
I see the merits of establishing a northern base, however can it be kept ice free in winter? That’s another challenge but also it makes the transits somewhat predictable.
Therefore I agree it’s not worth doing, leave it to the US & UK to operate up there in winter.
@Ted Barnes
I missed your reply earlier, While yes the Trident operated in that particular area, it is still a major feat for a SSK. I will also point out that these boats are fully capable of extended submerged endurance, 4 days fully submerged isn’t anything to these boats as they use fuel cells with diesels as backups.
Trident and her sister can routinely be found operating in the Deep Atlantic and into the Med. They are also not much smaller than the current Victoria’s and are larger by a good chunk than the 212A. (They are based off the 214.)
So with the above in mind and the extended fuel tanks for LOx and Hydrogen, she would be able to remain submerged longer than the 212A meaning longer on station plus deeper ice penetration too. I’m not sure if they have the MIDAS system installed on them though hence why they didn’t go too deep into the Arctic. (MIDAS is used for Mine and Ice detection and avoidance.)
Trident transited an area which is, as you said 80% covered, so while we call it marginal the Arctic Ocean is not entirely covered either there area areas of open water high up.
The boat would have also come through areas where there is Polyna enabling it to surface if required. It should be noted the entire Arctic Ocean regardless of latitude or longitude has areas where there is Polyna or thin ice.
SSNs and indeed SSBNs including the Russians actively seek out Polyna and surface in them rather than trying to smash their way through, although if that’s the only way forward then they have some capability to do that.
Currently UK and USN SSN’s can break through roughly 2ft thick ice. Russian boats, more specifically their SSBNs, are hardened to punch through much thicker ice.
Patrolling outside the NWP entrances is a decent idea but you’re still leaving the vast coast line in the north open so one would assume that gap will have to be filled by UK and US SSNs, simply due to the Russians being able to do a straight run north under ice.
As for the 212A escapade into the Arctic, it’s not been disclosed how far they got. The 212A is capable of more than 3 weeks entirely submerged which they proved during a transit from Germany to Portugal a few years ago, so the reality is with a logistics stop in Norway they would be able to get very deep into the Arctic for sure if they needed to.
Hello to all. Canada in the past has searched to find possible Canadian Arctic RCN bases/ports for our ships/submarines.
Here is A Little Story:
In the Summer of 1972, HMCS Protecteur-AOR 509 from Halifax, was tasked to explore the possibility of establishing a future Naval Base for the RCN in Mankinson Inlet on the Eastern shore of Ellsmere Island at approx. 77.26N-79.65W. HMCS Protecteur was an RCN AOR and as such, did not have any measurable hardened protection for ice protection, so there were some risks for her. The expedition was escorted to the inlet by CCGS Louis St. Laurent. As the St. Laurent had other duties after we arrived, she then proceeded out the inlet and headed south. Protecteur was to more exactly take and record depth soundings in the western arm of the inlet. CCGS Labrador had taken some preliminary soundings 6 years earlier. This, at the time was the second time an RCN ship had ever gone that far north to date. This was a combined Oceanographic Civilian-Naval mission with over 100 scientists, engineers & researchers aboard as well as ship’s crew. The ship had two operational Sea King Helicopters, as well as 4 x LCDVs and several RHIBs aboard for taking depth soundings and ferrying personnel ashore. This is a very deep inlet with very little ice or ice flows at that time of year. It must be noted that this mission was accomplished during the summer months of July-August 1972. The soundings were done by both ships crew and civilian engineers. The range of depths were anywhere from 100 to well over 300 meters almost right up to the shoreline. The scenery surrounding the inlet was magnificent! Every day the when the tide was out, it created a natural almost fresh-water lake which the civilians on board delighted in catching enough Arctic Char to feed the whole crew for at least a few days! Protecteur spent over two weeks inside the inlet, gathering as much info as possible and then proceeded early to transit out the inlet heading back toward Halifax. However, while transiting out, two very large ice flows with very heavy packed ice rapidly closed in on the ship from both the NE & SE into the Inlet. To complicate the situation, shallow fog was quickly entering the inlet and the ship was soon in a zero-visibility situation. The boys in the Ops Room (CIC) were busy giving Command directions for possible “leads”. Both Helos were quickly launched to help “guide” Protecteur slowly out of the thick flows. With no ice-breaking to assist her, the Commanding Officer was tempted to return to the safe protection of Mankinson Inlet. Protecteur’s helo’s surely did a Yeoman’s job guiding her safely through the flows that day until we finally reached safe open water after several tense hours. In hindsight, the ship was within a few short hours of having to spend an Arctic winter in Mankinson inlet! Don’t know how global warming has affected the Inlet now, but the RCN, as far as I know, has never attempted another mission to that part of Canada since. How do I know all of this? I was part of that crew! The moral of this story is: the Canadian far north can be a beautiful but formidable place to establish a Naval Base for RCN ships & submarines and should not be considered lightly.
An off the cuff suggestion here.
What about establishing a small base at Churchill with a permanently stationed Breaker there?
Yes we would have to reinvest in the rail connection however it would open up the area to reinvestment as well in terms of shipping to the area direct to the prairies.
Agreed. Platforms alone can only go so far. They need to be integrated into a cohesive infrastructure.
Canada can’t claim ownership and sovereignty over a territory without occupying it permanently or even semi-permanently.
Regards
Confused by your comment, Ted. If the Canadian subs “will be utilized at the ice edge” how will these subs get past Alaska in the dead of winter? Polar ice extends beyond Canadian waters, so going under the ice will be necessary in order to patrol our northern borders. Not saying the subs will need to surface through the ice, but they will certainly need to travel under it. Am I missing something here?
Our extent of under the ice capabilities historically were the O Boats which had apparently travelled several days under the ice until brownouts and limits of their endurance forced them to open water. The issue is that a conventional submarine could need to surface in an emergency i.e., a fire. Conventional submarines do not have the power to surface through the ice, ergo why only nuke boats do this. So to travel under the ice there is risk involved in case there isn’t a open water to get to in case of an emergency.
This is directly from the statement of requirements document.
CPS will operate in and near ice, and potentially under ice for short periods. There is no intent to
modify the submarine to be routinely through ice capable. What are the structural or equipment changes
needed for this operating environment (i.e. upward looking sonar, ice deflectors for masts, hull valve
covering, HVAC, etc.)? Identify any specific materials or systems required to operate in extreme cold
temperatures that would result in design changes.
The Statement of Requirements is to provide a submarine with the capability for the ice edge and limited under the ice which is most likely a set number of miles and more than likely not a lot. Will we be sending these submarines in the dead of winter? Doubtful because of the risk of ice collision. What I envision is a submarine force patrolling at times in the Arctic somewhere in the vicinity of entrances and exits to the NW passage and utilizing remote sensors, AUV’s and anti-submarine aircraft. We certainly will be sending submarines to the western Arctic however probably not in winter or where the ice coverage is significant. While capable there are limits.
It’s concerning as you want a system like MIDAS which is not only sail-mounted upward-looking but also forward looking. It’s a very high frequency sonar and yes it’s expensive. However we also use upward-facing cameras and beacon locators (when working with ice camps).
Working the ice edge in winter will mean limited ability to travel into the north during winter so at best you’re only operating up there about 4-6 months per year then.
That is why we need nuclear powered subs, anything worth doing is worth doing right.
@David Dunlop
I wish the forum would allow pictures to be posted I have a nice shot of the recent Portuguese boat in the ice field surfaced in the pack ice.
Blair if you’re on facebook, send it to the group Royal Canadian Navy Today and Yesterday and it will get put up. Really interested in seeing it myself.
A few thoughts…. An interview in the latest CDR Magazine by Adm Topshee (head of the Canadian Navy) suggests “it will have to be a submarine in production, not a design or concept.” So that may limit the choices being floated for a final choice. Also important to look at crew requirements for the new subs. The Japanese Tagei’s have a crew of 70… When crewing 12 boats, that ends up being 840 new … with Canada having 215 trained submariners now (per Admiral Topshee). So it seems one of the designs with 30-35 crew might be preferred. This would require only about 400 crew or only doubling crew as compared to expanding by a factor of 4x. Also import to consider total patrol range and AIP fuel carried … the more the better. The Spanish S80 only has a listed range of 5000 N Miles which may put them out of the running. While the Korean Subs are very nice boats they only carry 20 days of AIP fuel which may be a concern. Finally how quickly can they be built, which may be the most important requirement of all of them. End of the day, I see the Koreans, Japanese and Germans as the main contender, maybe the French but not sure they have the yard capability after winning the Dutch competition and promising delivery in 10 years.