By Barnacle Bill, 11 November 2023
I came across this article. It's called "BAE Offers Evolved Up-Armed Hunter for Australia," published by Naval News on 7 November: https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/indo-pacific-2023/2023/11/bae-offers-evolved-up-armed-hunter-for-australia/
I have commented before about my concerns about the paltry missile load for a ship of the CSC’s size. (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has recently expressed the same concern regarding the Hunter class. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australian-maritime-strategy)
Perhaps this ‘response’ by BAE systems is worth considering. By that I mean, if the current or future Government of Canada decides to truncate the CSC program on cost grounds, it may be advisable to create a sub-class of the CSC to make up for the firepower lost by the decision to buy fewer ships. This sub-class would be 3-4 hulls strong, and would be a true anti-air warfare vessel for an era of great-power competition, with the additional VLS tubes installed in place of the flex space, per the article. Alternatively, if the midship cells are strike-length, the ship would then have a credible long-range precision-strike capability – something clearly lacking in the existing CSC design.
Naturally, this is all theoretical and would have to be assessed on whether the added weight would prejudice stability, speed, etc. Nevertheless, it could take the parent T26 design in an unexpected but welcome direction – i.e., toward that of a ‘family’ of ships.
27 thoughts on “Upgrading the CSC Missile Load”
Hello BB,
Like yourself, I was initially intrigued by this proposal by BAE. Having a ‘family’ of Type-26 warships harkens back to the original UK plan to have two distinct classes of surface combatants, a concept that was also embraced by Canada.
However, your caveat at the end of your post is one that I fully endorse. In Australia’s case, this proposal sounds like a desperation move to ward off an impending reduction of Hunter-class ships for the RAN.
BAE’s reported claims that:
“It would also involve ‘minor’ changes to the ship’s propulsion and power systems to accommodate for the increased top weight of the high-mounted VLS cells.
The proposed modifications would have a ‘minimal’ impact on cost and a ‘negligible’ impact on schedule so long as build of the modified design commenced with Batch II, rather than Batch I ships…”
Such assurances should be taken with a grain or two of salt, because fairly significant ship design changes of this type inevitably would involve more than a few minor modifications. Power and fresh and saltwater water supply and purge requirements would be altered, and there is also the fact that there would be major extra costs in providing the extra missiles for all those additional missile cells.
In Canada’s case, there is also the question of how exactly the RCN intends to employ the CSCs. Sending one or two of these warships to augment USN Carrier Battle Groups would not be a significant add-on for the USN because it already has its Arleigh Burkes and Ticonderogos, to say nothing of the carriers and their fighter aircraft themselves. And for the real offensive punch, the USN has its nuclear powered submarines.
So, in the case of independent RCN missions, the upgraded CSCs would be basically defending themselves while they did…what? Bit much in the way of expensive overkill for counter-piracy, counter-narcotics missions, and ditto for other humanitarian and disaster relief missions.
Finally, I shudder to think what would happen to the CSC costs and delivery schedules if such a upgrade were to be approved at this stage.
In the end, I am sympathetic to the view expressed by many in this Forum that if Canada had really wanted an Arleigh Burke class of warship, then maybe the navy should have simply procured those in the first place. Too late now, I fear
Hello Dan. Agree with much of what you have said. This could very well be BAE “panicking” over the BAE Type 26 Hunter class’s future. This BAE Hunter class “mini-destroyer” seems to be exactly what the Arleigh Burke Flt III will look like, only “crammed” into a Frigate style space with very little thought put into it by BAE. As you said, TOO LITTLE-TOO LATE!
Hello Dan,
Indeed, this may be a ‘Hail Mary’ pass from BAE Systems. One wonders why the company did not put forward this concept before all the ruckus about the Hunter class’s suitability came to the fore. In any event, it shouldn’t take too many reputable naval engineers to calculate the effect of the second, fully-loaded VLS on the ship’s performance.
For the sake of argument, let’s recall that the Royal Danish Navy’s Iver Huitfeldt-class has a 32-round VLS mounted high mid-ships, along with 16 anti-ship weapons. To be sure, the overall displacement of that vessel is much lower than CSC/Hunter. But if the weight of a high-mounted 64-round launcher is a bridge too far for CSC, could a more modest 32-round VLS be an acceptable trade-off for losing the flex deck while retaining stability?
My intent was to merely to scope out possible permutations of the CSC program, whose ultimate fate is still to be decided. It may indeed be the case that building a Batch II modified design may eliminate any cost savings that the GoC thinks it can realize by cutting hull numbers. But these being warships with a 40-year lifespan, I would still lean toward maximizing the number of embarked weapons so long as the ship can confidently bear the load, however that is measured.
Hello again Bill,
I apologize if my comment was taken as a criticism of the core idea behind your suggestion. I like your concept and I, too, am mystified as to how such a paltry missile cell count was incorporated into the CSC design – based on what we know about the design thus far.
If Canada’s CSC frigate design as it stands is already at the very bottom end of existing frigates in terms of missile load out, I worry how even a up-celled Batch II variant will compare with its peers in the late 2040s.
I also share your concern that any potential cost savings in your Batch II design concept may be more than offset by the cost of the VLS cell modifications themselves. This may have the unintended effect of reducing the number of CSC ships even further. At some point, the size of the eventual CSC fleet reaches a minimum threshold for operational sustainment.
Therefore, I have to ask – even at this fairly late stage – are there any innovative and yet still cost-effective ways of getting more bang for the buck in the Navy’s overall fleet capabilities down the road?
Hello Barnicle Bill. BAEs Tier 1 update for a Type 26 “Missile Frigate” seems to be a mini-destroyer with some “teeth” in it. 64 strike-length MK 41 VLS silos midships with the existing 32 MK 41 VLS silo forward for a total of 96 silos per ship with a combination of various air and surface missiles up to a max of perhaps 128 missiles with room to “future-proof” I would imagine for possible SM3/SM6 and Hypersonic missiles as well. I would also assume this BAE variant would have more power O/P to accommodate DEW Laser systems for the future and that BAE has thought about weight increases for the Hunter class and incorporated more powerful DGs and motors to compensate for the heavier ship as a result of all of this? What about the massive engineering required to make the ship more balanced weight-wise and not decrease its speed significantly?
The loss of the Mission Bay and the Handling System would be a major concession though. What happens to the ships HA/DR and “future-proofing” capabilities? Gone I would suspect. Where would you place the ships UAV drones and what would happen to the CIADS CAAM systems as with the CSC Frigate as is? I like the idea of “doubling-up” on the NSMs as with the Constellation class as well. Will the ship also lose the 5” gun forward? I could envision at least 4 of these “CSC Missile ships” being built with total ship displacements of well over 10,000 tonnes minimum each, with costs of over $5B CAD per ship (thus far). Will this BAE system Tier 1 variant still have the unique ASW capabilities or will the remaining 12 CSC Frigate capabilities remain the same (if they ever get built)? I like this concept by BAE. I just don’t know if BAE has thought all this through or how much extra this will cost Australia (not to mention our own CSC program).
The RCN knows that 24 VLS is not enough for present and future threats for ships working alone however currently that is what will be built for the first flight in 2025. In a naval task group where up to 3 or 4 CSC present it would be sufficient but obviously more missiles the better that is the present doctrine but the space-based threat from China with its guided ballistic missiles will facilitate smaller spread-out task forces. Even the US is changing with the possibility of cheaply built escort carriers instead of risking their large carrier assets close to China. The first three CSC will be built with 24 VLS and subsequent flights of ships will have a greater amount, of course with the more you put in you need to take something out such as the mentioned mission bay and even other capabilities, that is the intent right now. This is not a cost thing yet but a matter of weight. The ship will have strike length with Tomahawks, ASROC and CAMM may be different. Over time most of the CSC’s will have different capabilities as newer technology, and different threats emerge.
Interesting that you talk of the ASROC Missile system for the CSC Frigate MK 41 ExLS silos. I know both Japan & the US still operate them but was unaware that Canada was bringing them back (post Restigouche class). The Japanese Type 07 ASROC has a range of about 30 Kms (19 Mi.) I believe. Can you verify this? Cheers!
Hello Ted,
Does the government know that there will be multiple flights/batches of the CSC? If this is the RCN’s intent, has it been approved by the CAF leadership and recommended to the MND? If yes, this comes as a major surprise – at least to those of us with access to only open sources.
Even without multiple batches, the CSC program will be challenged to deliver 15 hulls – merely on cost grounds. Multiple rounds of design modifications in which capabilities are added and deleted will surely increase project complexity and costs further.
To be sure, any ships delivered under the program will receive capability enhancements at certain points in their lifespans. (Such upgrades may or may not resemble HCM or USUW.) But if the plan is to pursue multiple batches from the get-go, this will involve multiple visits to Treasury Board to gain approval, and multiple multi-billion-dollar contracts with ISI. I foresee ‘contract fatigue’ setting in in government circles before that happens. Perhaps a future government will feel that, after contracting for hull number eight or nine, the RCN has been ‘taken care of’ (to paraphrase Dr. Middlemiss’s account of the CPF project) and the program need not advance any further.
Anything else you can share about the RCN’s plans/ambitions? Is there really an intention to, say, build a task group C2/AAW platform, or something like it? Best we all know now rather than later…
I was part of a three hour briefing on the CSC a few weeks ago. There will be multiple flights of ships that, dependent on technology advances, will bring updates, the ship is designed with this in mind. The ships are too far along in the design process to change the 24 VLS but recognize it’s not enough. If subsequent flights are changed to accommodate more missiles then capabilities will probably have to be sacrificed, the Commander of the RCN has stated that other options are being looked at such as additional ships to carry MK 41 launchers if you can believe that. You would have to know the future to know what ships being built in 15 to 20 years will look like or if they will keep building them. Some things to consider, torpedo inceptors perhaps. Tomahawks definitely. Naval Air brought back perhaps. Because of AEGIS a significant part of the ship out of bounds to non AEGIS certified personnel. Over 2 years at the AEGIS school to train personnel. Americans to help in Canada with AEGIS instruction. If we don’t spend the money, keep qualification up, Americans could pull our AEGIS certification.
The CSC will probably undergo a few changes over the build. Adding VLS for additional air defence and strike capabilities might make sense. Whether it is an extra 24 or 32 or 64 more cells is up for debate. I wouldnt sacrifice the 5″ though but am surprised it is worth 64 cells
Hello Wayne. I am not saying that the Leonardo gun will be sacrificed for “Batch II” CSC Frigates. In my opinion, the 5″ gun is still a valid weapons system for the CSC. But it may have to be scratched forward in order to balance the weight issues if the 32 MK 41 VLS Exls silos are re-instated for a Batch II CSC Frigate if we are to visualize a CSC “Mini-Destroyer” as part of “future-proofing”. Whether it is 24, 32 or 64 MK 41 VLS ExLS Cells Midships, then perhaps CIADs midships will also have to be sacrificed as well. I am still concerned though that if the MMB & Handling System are taken out for Batch II CSC Frigates, that will have a definite impact on HA/DR capabilities as well as placement of drone capabilities (V 200 UAVs etc). Don’t know if the hangar area could handle both the Cyclone helo and 20 ft UAV containers. My question then becomes, what do you replace CIADs with? Perhaps Sea Ram Port/Stb’d in the Waist Areas or something else there? It all depends on weight issues for the CSC Frigate in the end I think. It may be very hard for the CSC Frigate to keep up with the Battle Groups for “Plane Guard” duties otherwise.
No I don’t think the gun will go either. Plus I think the numbers are off and may be 32 cells not 64. Still a lot though. It would be nice to pick up some extra cells. I don’t know if we need all 15 prospective frigates to have the full range of capabilities
Hello Wayne. Agree totally with your assessment. Batch I (First 3 CSCs built) would have the standard lASW oad-out (24 MK 41 ExLS load-out. Batch II CSCs would have the “arsenal ship” ASuW load-out midships (32, 48 or 64 MK 41 ExLS load-out-losing the MMB as a minimum) and Batch III-onwards to again have the basic ASW load-out. All 3 Batches would also have the capability for BMD. Sound reasonable to you? Cheers!
Probably need to move the big adjustments to the third batch from an engineering standpoint but yeah I agree. The truth is the CSC is going to be the most capable ship the RCN ever had and it is also true that it is unlikely that we will get our wish for more firepower. We may have huge issues manning more than 12 CSC as well.
this has a good breakdown of the idea
https://www.navylookout.com/adding-firepower-to-the-type-26-frigate/
So apparently now the Commander of the RCN has said the 24 VLS will stand and no capabilities will be cut. The RCN now is looking as arsenal ships that would sail with a task group with missile loads. I’m pretty sure that won’t happen but it is a solution.
Who says naval developments elsewhere will not affect the CSC? Now the buzz is about the resurrection of the concept of the arsenal ship.
A short while ago this arsenal ship idea was discussed in the context of Australia (Malcolm Davis, “Enhancing the RAN surface fleet: the return of the arsenal ship?”, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au, 15 November 2023).
South Korea is also moving ahead on the conceptual design of a Joint Firepower Ship. However, in this concept, the extra missile cells will be for each of these 3 warships to carry more than 80 of a new ship-to-surface ballistic missiles for a preemptive strike against North Korea in the case of an imminent missile attack. (Eunhyuk, “South Korea’s DSME to Design Arsenal Ship for ROK Navy”, http://www.navalnews.com, 14 April 2023).
Some of us may also recall the US Navy exploring the arsenal ship concept in the 1990s. Huge warships would carry some 500 missiles each in VLS cells. However, the sheer cost of the missiles per ship, and the added cost of other well armed warships needed to defend these highly vulnerable missile carrying platforms, led to the abandonment of the idea. The concept was briefly revived by Huntington Ingalls in 2013 via its proposal for a Flight II variant of the LPD-17, armed with up to 288 VLS cells for ballistic missile defence and precision strike missions.
As an aside, we might remember that a senior Lockheed Martin official stated late in 2022 that Ottawa had requested a ballistic missile capability for the CSC, a capability Lockheed Martin was planning to fill via its Aegis Weapons System, its SPY-7 radar, and the CMS 330 combat management system. In other accounts of this news gathering, there was no mention of this requested capability, and so, given the Liberal Party’s aversion to discussing ballistic missile defence, it is a good bet that this, and related capabilities, will also be excluded from the initial batch of CSCs. (Vivienne Machi, “Canada’s multibillion-dollar combat ship plan nears key decision”, defensenews.com, 21 October 2022).
Many commentators have observed that the SSGN and SLBN submarines operated by many states, constitute the ultimate, and least vulnerable, version of arsenal ships today.
Yes the “arsenal” ship is being looked at as a way to boost the lack of sufficient VLS for the CSC and when I say “arsenal” not anything near 500 missiles. At a recent briefing of CSC capabilities BMD is still there along with Tomahawk as a offensive capability for the first flight of three.
Your comment that “…BMD is still there…” could well be the epitaph for the CSC, perhaps including the initial batch of three ships.
I know this probably means “fitted for but not with”, but most commentators will likely agree that in the context of the CAF, that effectively mean “never-going-to-happen”. Remember the CP-140 and its “fitted for” nuclear weapons capability?
For the RCN to be trying to sneak a BMD capability into the CSC is totally tone-deaf to the political realities (allergies?) about anything ‘nuclear’ in the entire Canadian postwar history. While I support such a capability for Canada, trying to end-run the political system by incorporating this capability in the CSC is foolhardy to the point of insanity on the part of the RCN/DND.
News about this will get out and this will immediately cause a split between the federal Liberals and its Quebec caucus. Further, the idea of anything ‘nuclear’ is toxic to the federal NDP, and I doubt that even the Conservatives will want to re-open this issue at this fraught moment in Canadian politics.
It would require a serious investment of political capital to sell the idea of a BMD-anything to the federal cabinet and to the people of Canada as a whole. I doubt that this has been done in the first instance, and I have heard nary a peep about this concept in the public sphere.
This could be the end of the navy’s impossible dream for the CSC.
Well the CSC does have the Spy-7 which has that capability. The only thing the RCN will need to have is the SM-3 and it’s a good bet we will have those at some point. The rest of the software and permissions will be there. It’s not just a simple fitted for and not with, the RCN is not trying to sneak anything and remember by the time the ship is operational that government and certainly not that leader will be in power. We’re not shooting nukes but shooting them down and other ballistic threats to Canada. As of 2022 it was being reviewed, haven’t seen anything yea or nay on it as of yet.
Hello Dan. You talk about BMD as if it were some sort of “Nuclear disease” or something. Nothing of the sort I contend. It is just another defensive capability for incoming ballistic missiles from “others”. Let’s not let this capability die just yet. Especially with a national election coming in another two years. With the possibility of hypersonic missiles fast becoming a reality, we may need BMD now more than ever and the CSC is the perfect platform for this BMD capability!
For Retired RCN…. Yes you are absolutely correct. The SM3s and the SM6s were specifically built and are being fitted on the AB Flt IIIs specifically for BMD which the MK 41 ExLS silos can easily handle. Again fitted for, but at present, not with, for the CSC Type 26 Frigates Batch IIs. Let’s also not forget about a hypersonic missile capability for the CSC Frigates to counter those threats as well. In my opinion it is definitely not “if” this capability will happen for the CSC Frigates, as some sceptics believe….but “when”. BMD is most assuredly NOT dead, far from it!
Helloo Retired RCN. You are obviously a Retired RCN as I am, yet, you seem to know more than you want to, but can’t say what you want reguarding the future Batch II CSC Frigates. BMD “fitted for, but not with”? for Batch I? I was under the impression that BMD was scratched by the Liberals some years ago.If this “Arsenal CSC Frigate” is still out there, then I would assume that LM has “flogged” this Design Phase change for Batch II to the powers-to-be as BAE has to the Australian government recently. For me, I see this as a positive change however losing the MMB especially for HA/DR for the Batch II CSC Frigates midships would be a trade-off of course. Can you say if the Batch II ‘s will have the 32 Cell reinstated (or perhaps more) MK 41 ExLS forward? Will the Batch IIs retain the Leonardo 5″ gun forward or will that be scratched as well for even more VLS cells forward (perhaps another 64 Cells as per the ones midships for a total of 128 Cells? I would suspect that the Leonardo 5″ gun would then have to go for weight distribution issues. In any case, I believe that the Batch II CSC Frigates would have to include at least 3 of these “Arsenal Ships” with the remaining 9 CSC ships to retain the same ASW configuration as with Batch I? How am I doing so far? Cheers!
All CSC will have that capability with AEGIS. 24 VLS for the first 3 ships no deviation in design. RCN looking into having other ships possibly uncrewed as MK 41 carriers as unlikely as that seems. No appetite as of now to cut capabilities from the design. It very well may increase carried VLS for further flights and deleting things such as the mission bay however we are decade away from that and anything can happen.
Retired RCN and David,
Yes, I do know that the AEGIS system combined with Spy-7 provides that BMD capability (after all, that is what this particular radar was originally intended for). All I am saying is that nowhere in all the talk about the CSC’s many capabilities have we ever heard a public reference to ‘possible BMD missions’. NEVER!
So, I hope that the senior Navy staff have multiple assurances IN WRITING from the topmost ranks of the Cabinet (and from the PMO which really runs the Cabinet) that this potential capability is fully authorized by them. The RCN could get badly burned on this later on, not least because this government will not hesitate to throw people under the bus for any political unpleasantness that could arise from this.
And David, yes, I think in some circles having anything to do with US-led BMD is a’disease’. Some just do not want anything to do with the US military, others view BMD as de-stabilizing (it is to those states without it), while still others are opposed to anything to do with nuclear and anti-nuclear power, including weapons. I could provide literally hundreds of articles that have discussed this anti-BMD phenomenon in Canada from the 1960s onwards. It is real and remains a potent force.
So, it is not me you have to convince regarding BMD, but the very real and still active factions in Canada who oppose the idea. And do not think for a moment that any change of government in Ottawa will change this dynamic. BMD will require a real and sustained political sales effort and I am not convinced that a new government will want to tackle this. None has done so in the past
For Dan Middlemiss: I believe this is one CSC future capability that cabinet (ie: PMO) does not want to talk about publicly but you can bet your bottom ‘loonie’ that it is seriously being discussed privately. There are most likely secret documents floating around that do discuss the future of CSC Frigates and a BMD capability. BMD is not just for nuclear weapons but also for non-nuclear ballistic missiles, which is why there is still talk going on. As I have also said before, that is why we need this capability using SM3s/SM6s or Hypersonic missiles to counter all BMD threats in the future. Yes, we have ‘factions’ in Canada that oppose anything military that they don’t fully understand with those who are in the “yes” corner, and that’s OK. But let’s not concede defeat before this capability has a fair shake. Never say NEVER Dan. It may come back to bite all of us in the end.
Happy New Year,
As a related but separate post to the issue of the CSC’s missile load, I bring to the attention of readers recent events in the waters of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, where a US-led coalition (Operation ‘Prosperity Guardian’) is attempting to protect shipping lanes from a non-state group called the Houthis.
The Yemen-based group has been harassing ships in the southern Red Sea since shortly after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. Originally it claimed to be attacking ships bound for Israel, sailing to its ports, or those under Israeli ownership. However, many of the attacks have targeted vessels that do not meet any of these criteria. Perceiving this inconsistency, some shipping companies have decided to sail their merchantmen around the southern tip of Africa rather than through the Suez Canal.
The Houthis are an Islamist organization backed by Iran which contested power with the government of Yemen in a terrible civil war, and which now controls much of the west of the country. Iran calls the group a member of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ to Israel, the other members being Hamas (Gaza), and Hezbollah which is based in Lebanon but acts independently from the Lebanese state. All three of these groups receive political and military support from Iran, although Tehran mostly leaves them to run their own operations.
This article from the BBC illustrates both the lengths to which the Houthis (and their sponsor) have gone to create disorder at sea, including direct attacks on commercial shipping in the southern Red Sea, and the lengths to which allied navies have had to go to thwart those efforts. (Canada has sent no ships to the coalition, which is not covered by a UN Security Council resolution, although the RCN has apparently placed a handful of officers at the coalition’s disposal.)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67932725
We see that Houthis attacks involve the launching of a large quantity of drones and anti-ship missiles. (Naval News reported the first use of an unmanned surface vessel on or around 4 January.) Allied ships seem to be dealing effectively with those salvos using on-board missiles and guns, as well as aircraft.
The article does not address a matter that navies operating in the littorals will have to deal with – namely the challenge posed by relatively cheap weapons fired in quantity which, over time, may empty the magazines of the few ships so deployed. Just as the Ukrainians are deeply concerned about their ongoing ability to access air-defence systems and ammunition to parry attacks by Russian missiles and drones (some of which are Iran-supplied), the situation off Yemen’s coast points to the challenge posed by technologically-empowered non-state actors that, acting as the proxy of a regional power, have the ability to present allies with operational dilemmas – in this case a potentially unfavourable loss-exchange ratio that sees allies expending pricey munitions on, in some cases at least, relatively cheap air vehicles. (I am somewhat less concerned about the ability to medium-calibre guns firing proximity-fused shells to cost-effectively counter drones and USVs.)
My goal in raising this issue is not to decry the RCN’s absence from Op Prosperity Guardian, let alone to remind anyone of the inherent flexibility of navies. Rather, it is to remind readers of the increasing power of non-state armed groups in the region – ones who increasingly display the military capabilities of state actors. If the sponsoring state cannot be proactively thwarted in its attempts to supply advanced weaponry to its proxies, and if said proxies’ launch sites cannot be attacked, it may fall to allies and/or ad hoc coalitions to act defensively to protect licit maritime trade and general good order at sea. In such a case, the quantity of on-board munitions (of various types) will have to be carefully considered. But so will the aggregate cost of the load-out.
Understood that the situation over there is most likely to be resolved through political means. Also understood that a strong maritime defence will rely equally on appropriate rules of engagement, alert sensors, strong forward logistics, and good command and control within a coalition.
Further understood that the design and capabilities of the CSC should be fixed sooner rather than later. But as there is no certainty that Canadian foreign/defence policy will not require the RCN to operate in coastal waters where simple but lethal technologies are found, let us hope that whatever challenges the RCN is facing in crewing the fleet, these will be overcome. Let us also hope that whatever iterations of the CSC eventually come into service, there is enough flexibility, magazine capacity, reserve electrical power, etc. to (cost-)effectively deal with maritime dangers that are qualitatively (and quantitatively) different from those of, say, 20 years ago.
Very well said Barnacle.
Such proxy battles will continue to be a significant part of world conflict interactions, especially when they afford plausible deniability to the country calling the shots.
Therefore, Canada’s ships must be well prepared to react to rapidly changing circumstances. This argues for expeditionary ships that have quality rather than being cheap and useless vessels. The same imperative applies to the ships that we send into the distant reaches of our Arctic archipelago.
Ubique,
Les