By Alexander Sikora, 9 April 2023
Earlier this week, the Royal Canadian Navy issueed a release of information regarding their desire to procure up to 12 submarines at a cost of approximately $60 billion.[1] Given the slow pace of Canadian procurement, the RCN is rightfully attempting to bring attention to this matter given that there is no approved program of record, and due to the fact that the current Victoria-class submarines will be decommissioned at some point in the 2030s. Therefore, in order to prevent gaps in submarine capability, the program needs to begin as soon as possible. Given the deficits faced by the Government, a $60 billion submarine procurement project may seem untenable based on the spiralling costs of the Canadian Surface Combatant program. Not to mention, the RCN currently faces a personnel shortage which brings into question whether recruitment would be able to achieve the needed personnel numbers by the time these 12 theoretical submarines would be in service. That being said, as any good negotiator would tell you, “Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars.” Ultimately, the number of submarines may likely drop, however given the strategic importance of a submarine capability, some is better than none.
There are many submarine procurement options out there, and the purpose of this post is not to discuss them or how the procurement should be structured in order to prevent cost overruns. It is however worth noting that in terms of conventional submarine capabilities the Royal Netherlands Navy’s Walrus-class replacement program shares similar would-be requirements with Naval Group’s diesel-electric variant Barracuda-class, ThyssenKrupp’s Type 212CD, and Saab’s A26 Oceanic (Extended Range) submarines in the running.[2] It is expected that the RNN will make a final decision in late 2023 or early 2024, with the first two (out of four) submarines being delivered in the 2034 to 2037 timeframe.[3] This is the same approximate timeframe in which the Victoria-class will be decommissioned. The time to begin this procurement is now, otherwise the RCN will face a submarine capability gap. Will the Canadian Government continue to drag its feet? Only time will tell. An increase in pressure from Canada’s allies to increase defence spending from the current 1.29% of GDP would certainly help move along such a big ticket item.[4]
References:
[2] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/12/17/dutch-walrus-submarine-program-shuffles-forward-but-not-by-much/
[3] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/netherlands-to-extend-the-life-of-walrus-class-submarines/
[4] https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-canada-defence-spending-1.6804733
59 thoughts on “Canadian Patrol Submarine Discussion Ramps Up”
A couple of points:
The $60 billion figure was offered to the reporter by industry. It does not appear to be a figure that the RCN or the CSPS office is proposing either as an estimate or a budget. There have been some loose interpretations of the article along the lines of “Canada ready to spend $60b on twelve subs” and that is not supported by the article. That said, I don’t disagree with the figure, as it’s in the ballpark of how much the Australians were ready to pay for their now-cancelled Attack class.
The 12-boat figure is likely just the upper end recommendation by the CSPS office. To turn the phrase on its head, essentially it’s “aim for the stars and if you don’t make it, at least you might hit the moon.” The list of options identified by CSPS will no doubt include ones with fewer hulls.
I would say looking at everything and affordability, 6 boats 3 on each coast for rotational purposes would be the sweet spot.
The type 212CD E would be a good acquisition given it’s based from the 212 family which is proven and highly successful. It also allows for limited under ice capability due to submerged endurance capability so could patrol the Arctic too.
The cost of the boat is within the price range of Canada and as the CD is about to go into production we could have them pretty quickly too.
Bingo…Blair, exactly this best “Bang for your money Canada” …the 212CD with its AIP system, a crew of only 28 sailors would encourage AND motivate a new generational of younger sailors/staff to join in this new venture in protecting the Territorial waters integrity/sovereignty of our Nation…(especially in the Arctic where communist China is being permitted to “explore”(?) in our waters)…The Arctic; where at least two Submarines to operate from a deep sea under water Bunker/port (with many F-35 to support their presence there)…so 8 Subs instead of 6 would hit its mark better I think? How much are Trudeau’s friends in NS making ($$$) in building these torpedo-magnet “frigates”?
That’s all we need: a contrived figure of $60B to animate the “discussion”. Recall how the once-mooted figure of $26B for CSC entered the public discourse, and how each upward estimate was contrasted with the original estimate? No effort by DND or by government to point out that the $26B figure was an estimate about an estimate – something dreamed up before the RCN had defined its requirements or had reached out to industry.
I even recall Rona Ambrose being asked about that figure and whether it was fixed or flexible. Her reply that it was fixed only served to show that the then-Minister for PWSGS knew nothing about defence inflation.
Hello Tim. The Australians’ “ballpark” figure for the 12 Barracuda Block 1A submarines offered by France was up to around $90B AUD at the last of it before Australia finally came to its senses and “dumped” the French! The AUKUS-SSN program will however cost them just a “tad” more at between $90-100B AUD and life-time costs of about $306B AUD.
Let’s have a split fleet of 4 AIP and 4 nuclear from France. Build most in France before being Canadian built. We are going to need nuclear subs in the arctic regardless. Train on the diesel subs before going to the nuclear subs. All American weapons on board. The nuclear subs use low grade uranium instead of high grade like US and British subs. We already have a nuclear industry unlike Australia. It’s time to increase our defense budget. If we don’t China and Russia will be telling Canada what they want to do or eventually lose land up there. We will have no say who uses our back yard.
French nuclear submarines require a lot of heavy maintenance especially refuelling which is incredibly costly. Suffren if she stays in the marine nationale for 30 years will need at minimum 3 refuels due to the low enriched state of the uranium. In contrast, Astute & Virginia because they use highly enriched uranium require no refuel for their life span.
Each refuel is incredibly expensive and I cannot see Canada forking out for it plus there’s no infrastructure to support SSNs in Canada either so that’s an added cost.
AIP boats like the 212 can (and have) operated under ice in a limited capacity.
You also can’t simply switch out crews at the drop of a hat. It take years to train on SSNs as a back ender especially.
Developing sub building capability will also be massively expensive. That $60bn would be gone in a flash – just ask Brazil how long it took them and how much that cost and I’d wait to see how the Australia bill comes out.
Overall by the time you paid for infrastructure, labour, training and built the thing, you’re going to have maybe 3 boats at the end of it and no change and probably a cost over run.
The 212CD E looks like the best prospect for the RCN right now. It’s AIP as large as the current Victoria class (E version larger still), long submerged endurance (weeks) and capable of accepting MK48 harpoon Exocet NSM and tomahawk
Hello Blair. Can you substantiate your assertions that German Type 212CD-E AIP boats have gone to the Arctic and how far north have they been? Most “long range” modern AIP subs that are exported today are about twice as heavy as our Victoria class (around 2400 tonnes)
Type 212A has done under ice ops in the Baltic (I was on U33 when she did this in the gulf of Finland). They have also been north of Jan Myen, they didn’t publish how far. They did this to test if it was capable of multi year under ice navigation and it was the U33 that did this with the help of RN Captain David Croft (Now CO of HMS Anson).
Traditional Conventional boats have done some very limited under ice ops too as far back as the 60s. I’d recommend the book “In Deepest Secrecy; Dutch submarine espionage operations from 1968 to 1991.” In that book they detail the Dutch efforts to operate under ice with modified British T class and their Potvis class. I’m also aware that the walrus class has done some expeditionary work around that region as well but to what capacity and how far I’m not sure.
Note the reason why I suggested the book is because the Dutch are looking at the type 212CD E themselves and being a larger design of the 212A with much increased fuel capacity stands to reason their operational range is greater (20 meters longer and 3.2 meters wider than a 212A with a LOA of 73m and a beam of 10m). Type 212CD is to be built for Norway and Germany starting this year with offers to Poland and the Netherlands
AIP boats come in different sizes and capabilities and some yes are larger and heavier than the Victorias
Type 212A is 1850t submerged
Type 212CD is 2500t submerged
Gotland 1600ton submerged
Dolphin 2400 ton submerged
S81 3400ton submerged
The 212CD & S80 are much larger than the others too.
Recently a 212A did a 3 week submerged transit from Germany to Portugal.
A 3 week completely submerged endurance gives the boat a limited capability to operate under ice hence why U33 did these tests to prove the theory and with the CD E version being much larger you will see a range increase.
Hello Blair. The Type 121CD-E AIP submarine for both the Netherlands and German navies seems like a decent boat and will also be able to “modualize” for future proofing and does have LFP batteries to keep it down for longer perionds of time. There are however other alternatives that Canada may also be considering like the Japanese Taipei LIB subs or their “follow-on” versions. Weight may also be a factor as the Japanese LIB boats (which they excel in this technology) are over 4000 tonnes submerged which will help for ice break-throughs in the high Arctic.
@David Dunlop
The Japanese have some great boats. I had the privilege to go onboard their soryu boat the Zuiryu in Yokosuka a few years ago and, yes they are great boats. They have fantastic range but limited submerged endurance (it’s more limited than a 212 on full AIP close but no cigar).
I have some concerns with a Japanese bid and it stems largely from the failed Australian bid.
1 they have no export experience with submarines.
2. Japanese submarines tend to have shorter service lives (less than 25 years in many cases). Canada realistically needs 30/35 year boats.
3 how well would these boats integrate into a NATO fleet? The Japanese boats are far different than what anyone in nato has one of the key things we can do is have similar platforms with similar systems so that we can all operate together in unison that might be a tall order to put into a teigei class.
4 they have no under ice capability which would require a lot of rework.
5 the price per boat plus modifications and you’re looking at a rough estimate $1.5bn CAD using Japanese published figures and adding in % for modification
6 as I discussed with Les Mader before, Lithium batteries have known problems namely they keep catching fire and overheating this has plagued the soryu class no end.
7 while the Swedes love to state they have quiet boats, and they do to a point, the fact is the wealthier engine has so many moving parts that a decent sonar and hood operator will still pick it out (we had more trouble with the Ula than the Gotlands) and AIP boats like 212 are harder to find as they have less moving parts thus the number of possible transients are less.
The 212 CDE option for me is the safe bet because the technology is already tested, already in use in many cases, the R&D has been done, the design finalized, it’s in production now there is also capacity to take on more orders (not so in Japan at present).
TKMS has many decades of export experience plus a proven record globally.
The other major thing for me is that the 212 and variants have many operators globally so spares are plentiful and costs are on the mark.
Does the 212CDE have some limitations? Yes it does. Punching through ice maybe an issue while it has a decent range the tiegei has better range more suited to long duration patrols it’s also larger than a 212CDE
So there are many pros and cons for both but ultimately my side falls with 212CDE.
Hi David & Blair. The excellent discussion has been about subs for the Atlantic and Pacific; what about the third ocean? THE ARCTIC. There may be way more oil, gas and minerals up there then we can even imagine. Gov’t is building a patrol fleet to transit for 6 months of the year. What about the rest of the year? SMALL MODULAR REACTOR (SMR) Our current Gov’t, because of NET Zero, is into these “low-enriched-uranium (LEU) SMR ie: first to come on-line 2028/29, will be Point Lepreau, New Brunswick. We a all concerned about the “Peace Movement” going into the street if we bring up “Nuke Subs” but gentlemen, we could be “on the side of the angles” on this one. SUFFREN CLASS’s reactor is not a nasty HEU type like US/UK but a LEU using 5% 235U with the steam turbine driving an electric generator powering a motor for propulsion – a safer system. Building these boats here would be a mug’s game, France does not have “deep pockets,” they want 6 and we need 6; a 12 boat run will get unit costs down – our costs will be more predictable than what Oz is getting into. Over 30 years, they will have to be cut open to be “refueled” twice (French have managed with 4 SSBN, and 6 Rubis class SSN) Building cost per boat 10.4 B euros. We should start discussing the TYPE OF SUB Canada really needs to get the job done. As a public school kid in the 50s I was told the “top of the map” was ours; in our new NON-RULE-BASED WORLD that may no longer be true.
France has a very different doctrine to Canada which is focused more towards Atlantic operations with limited operations globally. The marine nationale isn’t a particularly well balanced fleet in terms of funding with a focus more towards the surface fleet and SSBN force. Sadly the SSN force gets the left overs
The Rubis class is actually a poor performer when it comes to SSNs. Indeed it’s the worst SSN NATO has. To give you an idea of if a Rubis went up against a trafalgar (and I’ve done this both ways around), the Rubis would be taken out easily. We are able to hear the Rubis coming even at slow speed long before it even had a handle on us. Our detection range on the T boats exceeded by a good margin the rubis abilities to detect us.
The Rubis is a noisy and slow boat. Indeed there’s a couple of SSKs out there that could out run her. They can also put dive her and overall even the older Soviet Victor III and Akula class would easily take down a Rubis. The Rubis was simply a quick cheap and easy way to gain a SSN and as a result it’s a poor performer (even with the amerthyst upgrade).
What happened with Rubis was they took the agosta 90B and put a reactor into it. The result is a boat that vibrates at top speed due to hull form (same issue USS Nautilus had) plus a shallow diving limit. The CAS-48 reactor in the Rubis is small it produces around 48mw which is massively less than its peers and it is due in large part to the LEU used as fuel. The other side of that is Rubis has to be refueled every 5-7 years (operational tempo depending) and to my knowledge Rubis herself has undergone at least 3 refuels in her life time.
The suffren class is a decent boat however it lacks the ability to navigate under ice and also the ability to punch through (although both could be resolved). Like the Rubis the LEU reactor on the suffren will require refuel around every 7 years so if she stays in service as long as the Rubis with a lower operational tempo you’re looking at least 5 reactor refuels in its life time.
As a note steam turbine generator and electric motors (turbo electric drive) is not new. We had them way back on our V&C SSNs (1970s) — indeed the Russians and Chinese also use the same set up as direct drive increases transients. The reactor refuels take around 2 years to undertake and is extremely expensive because when you shut down a reactor you have to leave the pile to cool that in itself takes months to do. We are talking hundreds of millions per refuel.
The one other key thing Canada doesn’t have is the facilities to do such work nor the support infrastructure for nuclear submarines which would cost tens of billions to create (look at Australia’s current plan). So unless the Canadian gov wants to spend probably around $120bn upwards in creating the infrastructure and facilities as well as the boats, I honestly think it’s a non starter.
The other option is outsourcing. Using your example of France, they have one facility that can do the work and that looks after their entire nuclear fleet including the carrier. Simply put they are at 100% capacity when you factor in platform rotations so they wouldn’t have the capability to maintain a Canadian fleet as well. Plus they wouldn’t allow you to go to the US or UK either due to their secrecy requirements. Also building another 6 for a foreign country, and again there’s only one yard that does this, would delay their future SSBN program something which likely would be unacceptable to France.
I do take some issue with the comment regarding HEU being the nasty side of nuclear power because with regards to SMRs while it is great stuff that this new technology will be online, the problem is waste. It’s already known that SMRs produce about 5 times more waste than a normal HEU reactor
If you look at the astute or virginias which use HEU (some Russian boats also use HEU) you will see that they can go their entire life span without refuelling. So if we had 6 boats that’s only 6 lots of waste to handle, whereas if we went to the SMR with LEU that’s 30 lots of waste to handle. Therefore I’d argue that LEU and SMR types are more nasty than HEU types
SMRs like all reactors want to operate in a state of stability. You simply cannot switch on and off a reactor like a lift switch. The SMR has to be base load and once it is on it has to stay on. If you kept turning a reactor on and off, you risk poisoning the reactor with xenon and krypton gas and that is very hard to get rid of in a reactor on land let alone under water. It usually entails days of shut down before you can bring the reactor back up. I’d also point out that it takes many hours for a reactor to come online — it’s not instant. The SMRs will have the same issue. If you want to see what happens when you try and go from shut down to almost full power immediately, look no further than Chernobyl.
With regards to the type of submarine Canada needs, then yes there is a massive argument for SSNs, however we have to consider public opinion (largely against) plus political will to spend (largely against) so that in and of itself kills the program. Don’t be afraid of conventional submarines especially full AIP boats as they are incredibly capable platforms. Germany’s U33 (type 212A) has worked under ice — although to my knowledge hasn’t punched through but it’s capable of operating for at least 3 weeks submerged (that’s all they admit to btw). With the follow on being much larger that will increase substantially.
The Japanese and Korean boats don’t have that capability as they use a more traditional conventional set up but their submerged endurance is decent enough and the use of lithium batteries (although very hazardous) is coming on well. The Japanese use a closed cycle system (from kockams Sweden) so they can stay under a little longer than other types. But again neither the Japanese or Koreans have any experience under ice or what’s required for such an operation. Germany has run tests (I was on one) which proved the navigation concept. So full AIP boats would indeed be able to operate in a limited capacity in the Arctic year round
6 is the bare minimum for Canada. It’s the 1:3 rule so in reality only 2 boats will ever be at sea at any one time in each fleet.
1:4 so 8 boats gives you a good margin for redundancy.
Hello PETER. There are also Small Micro Modular Reactors (SMMRs) coming on stream as well which can be miniaturized to produce up to 300kw(e) to fit on each SSN. I have always contended and In My Opinion (IMO) Canada would need to acquire up to 10 Canadian SSNs (5 East/5 West). 3 operational per coast with 1 in ramp-up/ramp-down mode & 1 in Extended Work Period (EWP) ie: reactor “swap-out”. 1 of these operational SSNs on each coast would be allocated for Arctic mission deployments on a rotational basis at a base to be created somewhere around Baffin Island (possibly Iqaluit). Canada does not now have the expertise to build our own SSNs, so they would probably have to be built in France using German “submarine” steel as they produce the best steel in the world. We can debate at length on LEU verses HEU, however the LEUs of the French Sufferin Class would have to be replaced every 7-10 years. As Canada would want to keep these boats operational for close to 40 yrs, the LEU reactors would have to be changed up to at least 4 times. The CAD costs to build them; the infrastructure & operate these submarines over a 35-40 yr period, would be upwards of $360-400B CAD over the life span of the program. Although I would personally like to see this “Canada Class” SSN fleet, I believe Canada will eventually acquire 12 modern AIP/LIB SSK submarines. TKMS of Germany has the expertise to build either the Type 216 or 212 CD boats for Canada, and IMO I believe the Type 216 boat in particular, are excellent boats and would fit in very well for Canada’s future Navy using AIP/LIB technologies.
Good morning Peter,
A couple of thoughts on your post.
Fully agree that we need more submarines soonest and that the new ones must be able to act as deterrence forces in the Arctic, including under the ice.
I will leave it to others who are better informed than me to discuss the merits of different SSN designs. However, I remember well the successful PR campaign against Canada buying SSNs in the late 1980s. We must be careful that the wish for nuclear submarines does not lead to us getting nothing.
The ‘Rule of Four-for-One’ argues for buying any submarines in multiples of four. Thus, an increased SSN/SSK force should consist of 8 or 12 vessels.
Clearly, your comment about three oceans was meant to generate a reaction. It worked. To my mind, the discussion of submarines for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets discusses their home ports, not where they will operate. The interconnectedness of the seas means that ships and submarines can sail wherever they are needed, especially those that can transit the Arctic Ocean to reach their destination. As witness, HMCS Montreal, an Atlantic fleet ship, is currently deployed in the Pacific.
I wonder what, if anything, the updated defence policy will say about the navy and buying new/additional vessels. We can hope!!
Reply to Blair Shaw. Hello Blair. Agree with most of what you have said especially using HEU reactors and not shutting down reactors at sea. The CAD costs to build them; the infrastructure & operate these submarines over a 35-40 yr period, would be upwards of $360-400B CAD over the life span of the program as you have said. However, no matter which way Canada goes with a modern 12 fleet AIP/LIB sub program (requested by the Parliamentary National Defence Committee), the costs for the life-span of the program will be around $350-400B CAD. If (and that’s a BIG if) Canada decided to go nuclear, we would need 10 Canadian SSNs: 3 operational per coast (1 operational boat would be designated for Arctic missions at a yet not built base) 1 would be in ramp-up/ramp-down mode per coast and 1 in Extended Work Period (EWP) per coast. I agree that SMRs/SMMRs would be much better off using HEU reactors as well, but of course, I am only dreaming here. Realistically, I believe Canada will eventually acquire 12 modern AIP/LIB SSK submarines. TKMS of Germany has the expertise to build either the Type 216 or 212 CD boats for Canada, and I believe the Type 216 boats in particular are excellent boats and would fit in very well for Canada’s future Navy by using AIP/LIB technologies.
We should be thinking of the replacement for the CSC now and start drawing up plans as soon as the CSC plans are finalized. We should also be looking at the replacement for the JSS as well. Designs for replacing the Orca training boats and the MCDV’s should be finalized by now (they aren’t of course) and get one of the smaller yards to start building them. This is what a continuous design and build national ship building program should look like.
Hello Donald. I can see you’re a forward thinking man, unlike our political masters. Yes, by the time our RCN fleet becomes a reality, they will already be obsolete! What are the government plans to replace what we have today or will have? The answer my friend “is blowing in the wind”, “the answer is blowing in the wind”! My answer is the Canadian government can’t think past today let alone 20-30 years down the road. There probably are one or two bureaucrats up there that are thinking your way, but too afraid of losing their jobs to speak their own mind. The problem is that governments love to get in their own way, rather than think out of the box. My guess is that we will be where we were 20 years ago with aging CSC Frigates, JSS “AOR’s” that can’t go to sea anymore, so the RCN will have to contract out, “orphaned” submarines that are rusting out and cannot do the job required of them, AOPS “ice-breakers” that can’t break an ice cube in the Arctic and MCDV replacements that won’t “cut-the-mustard” and still no more sailors to carry the load. Sound familiar?
You paint such a picture of doom and gloom that perhaps we should just save our money and cancel the navy!! Especially, since the government is poised to spend a massive fortune to give the admirals their very expensive CSCs!
Depressing hypothetical commentaries do not usually contribute to advancing the desired solutions. Practical, achievable options are far more useful.
Commentaries that make the concerned reader want to end it all may make the writer feel good but are little helpful.
Hello Les. Believe me, I am certainly not advocating Canada retire the RCN or any other branch of the CAF. Far from it. I am very much a pro Canadian Military ex sailor and am very optimistic for the CAF’s future. We need a strong military with the “right” equipment for the CAF to do the jobs expected of them by our governments-of-the-day and all Canadian citizens. Like 15 at least CSC Frigates that are fully equipped with full complement crews; JSS AORs that do the job they are supposed to do; at least 12 modern AIP (or LIB) submarines that can patrol wherever they are needed (my own opinion is an 8-10 SSN fleet); an effective Strategic Sealift/HADR capability; F35As for our depleted Air Force; new Army equipment (including an AAW capability) for our depleted batallions. Most of all, the Canadian government needs to go on an ambitious military recruitment campaign that hasn’t been seen since WW II to fill the over 16,000 vacant military personnel slots! All of these options (requirements) are both practical and achievable but must happen ASAP. Time is a-wasting and not on our side and will contribute to a “doom-and gloom” scenario!! My opinion only, of course. Have A Great Navy Day!!
Hello David,
I share your desire to see the CAF properly equipped and with the required personnel. While I may not agree with your exact wishlist for ships, I agree fully with most of it. We also need proper oceangoing minesweepers and some shape of an ability to have a sustained presence force in the Arctic during the annual navigation season. See CNR 17.3 pp 20-24 for more detail on my thoughts.
My biggest concern is how these needs are articulated. I believe that most Canadians know little or nothing about the CSC and JSS projects, other than perhaps that they are late and the eyewatering price tags that have been publicly thrown around for the CSC ($70B, $80B, $370B!). Stating that in the nearish future these ships will be aging or unable to sail leads to the obvious conclusion that they are not value for money; therefore, we should not buy them. Also, stating that the AOPS cannot break an ice cube is incorrect. It’s Polar 4 bow has demonstrably done far more than that. So why give those who wish DND and the CAF ill false information to use as more ammunition to take down what we are able to obtain? If we tell everyone that DND, the CAF, and their components are garbage people may well believe us and draw the obvious conclusion to cut defence spending because it will never be used properly.
Thus, I think that we must not emphasize publicly, in our passion and frustration, on the eternal Internet, the negatives about the CAF, RCN, and their policies, processes, and procurement. Such publicly shared sentiments risk creating the opposite effect of what we seek.
My thoughts.
PS. Can you lay out for me the logic for why 15 CSCs are required? The DND statement about being able to deploy two task groups of up to four CSCs is too vague.
Hello Les Mader-re your post on 02 May 2023. You are absolutely right Les. Most Canadians know very little about the needs of our Navy and probably don’t care other than the shocking price tags for the ships/subs we need. That’s not to say that they don’t believe the RCN deserves the best equipment possible to defend this country’s sovereignty. They just don’t have the appreciation of what it takes to get there. What ever ships/subs Canada decides to acquire now or in the future will be what we need to accomplish missions required by the government and the Canadian people. I made those comments about where we are now WRT ships/subs with “tongue-in-cheek” for effect only and were not made to “take down” anything and certainly were not made to cut spending. What I comment on is my opinion only and not meant to be negative on our brave men and women in the CAF but as you say, meant to discuss (and be critical) of our government’s policies, processes and procurement strategies WRT the CAF, which is my right (and my responsibility) to do so. If Canadians disagree with what I have to say, that’s perfectly fine as well. But no one should be told what and what not they should be saying and emphasizing on any public forum. As to your P.S., when the RCN had enough ships and sailors not that long ago to deploy at least two TGs with up to 4 Halifax class frigates (2 would be in ramp down/ramp up mode) and 2 Iroquois class destroyers (one in EWP mode) along with one CPF attached to NATO Standing Naval Force (from either the East or West Coast Navy); one TG per coast for a total of 16 Frigates/AAW ships along with an SSK (if available). That did not include our 2 Protecteur class and HMCS Provider AORs as well. The Canadian TG is a concept that has been adopted by most western NATO allies and is still widely used today. What we have today is a skeleton of what we had before. The build of 15 CSC Frigates would be a bare minimum of what is required divided 8 East/7 West. What this really means is that we will have at some point in the future an East/West fleet which is 1 ship less than what we had before the CSC frigates were envisioned/designed but the CSC frigate capabilities are much more than what the Halifax class have today. Have A Great Navy Day!
I think everyone agrees that these vessels are needed for Arctic Sovereignty as the climate warms and starts to open the North West Passage. The Great Game is afoot and this purchase is part of the chessboard. So where are the Northerners? Two of the problems are the range requirement, and another is public acceptance of the cost. Both might be addressed if there was a good discussion of where to base these submarines on the table. The time added for Arctic patrols that must start in Halifax or St John’s NFLD are inherently part of the debate and the justification of cost. The need for infrastructure in the North brings up the subject of a permanent deep water port near the passage and a railroad for logistics and doing business. If such port was initially constructed to support a submarine base but extended to other developments then the NWT government would likely get behind the purchase.
The problems with the Northern territories is the remote nature of them plus the lack of infrastructure, then couple in the fact no one serving probably wants to be stationed there either.
The other critical factor is population density in that when the general election comes round their votes don’t really matter anyways as it’s BC, QC & ON that realistically combined choose who the next government is going to be.
The lack of infrastructure is not the problem, it is the lack of will to build it. As for no one wanting to serve there, well I have strong memories of the Mackenzie River, the San Sault rapids , Inuvik and Tuk. These are not places to be avoided. This country can produce the best in people because of the challenges of the climate and the distances. As for the North not mattering, it matters if you want uranium, diamonds , gold, fish, clean water and much more. The Panama canal in the 19th century and the Suez canal in the early 20th century affected global trading patterns and invited their seizures by the Great Powers. An open North West passage will be even more disruptive. Governance by domestic Opinion Poll is an illusion that will disappears with a crisis, it operates at the same level as “excuse me while I consult with the Delphi”. We need an armed force that reflects the country and can live on it and can function in the waters around it.
Hello Rhod, nice to hear from you. I’m afraid the “lack of infrastructure is not the problem” as you say, is most definitely a major part of the problem. Canada cannot seem to get its act together…..again. Canada cannot even think of procuring future military equipment if it is not thinking seriously about “infrastructure” as well. Yes, the country can produce the best in people but only if it “has” the people to produce the “best”. That sir, “is” the most outstanding problem the CAF has today. The military will always be here but will not function if we don’t fix the recruitment problems first. Canada has to step up to the plate now; commit to the 2%+ of GDP by acquiring modern equipment for the RCN/Air Force/Army to adequately carry out future missions required by all Canadians; build up our reg/reserve force strength and get on with the business at hand. If and only if we did that, we would not be seen by our allies in NATO as a country that cannot be trusted in times of crises!
Hello David, we agree infrastructure is part of the cost of building an armed force , and I think you would agree that it is also part of building a country. The start of the port of Halifax by Cornwallis and the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad by a young country are the two precedents. Railroads are proving themselves, again, to be the decisive factor for logistics in the Ukraine – this is old. Interestingly communications systems like Starlink are now strategic and tactical assets required for everything including the control of remote weaponry – this is new. So Infrastructure is an investment, not the cost of an expiring asset but part of the foundation. The gate of obstruction can be forced open with other interested parties.
Human Resources is interesting, in my opinion if you want to understand this country get in a canoe. Portaging a canoe and pack can be metamorphic. Many immigrants are fascinated by Canadian wilderness but are unable to connect with it. Appeal to that and you will find your recruits. I have often thought that if the government (i.e. Defence Dept.) could find recruits if it re-opened up the fur trading routes from Lake Athabaska to Montreal to both sexes after leaving high school as an incentive to join and for selection. The level of mental and physical fitness after six months would be second to none. The paralysis of Government might be lifted by public opinion, and that will happen if the public believe that there is some connection with them a practical level – i.e., their children and the type of people they become.
A forward thinking government would expand the new Deepwater port in Iqaluit to include infrastructure to support an Arctic squadron made up of Danish, Canadian and US units at least for the summer navigation season.
Interesting concept Ted and something that could work. I think also perhaps a squadron or a complement of both AIP/LIB and SSN submarines from various NATO countries (something like SNFL – call it Standing Submarine Force Atlantic-SSFL) at some specific location or base at Iqaluit or the new refueling station up there would be appropriate as well. What say you?
Would this mean that we as a country are abandoning our strategy of “defence against help?”
Agree fully on the value of an ice-free or – near free – port in the Arctic or on its periphery. However, it would be better if we were the ones using it. We need to be careful about a standing NATO Arctic force. It might encourage Canadians to shirk even more our defence responsibilities and lead friendly states to decide that they have a say on what happens in Canada’s Arctic since “they are the ones defending it!”.
Better solution is to make the Arctic defence investments that have been discussed in the CNR and elsewhere. A pipe dream perhaps!!!
A “defence against help” strategy as you say Les is not something that is written in stone of any defence or foreign policy document like Strong, Secure, Engaged. Nor should it be. These NATO partner Arctic forces would be constructed so as to give Canada more of a say in what goes on in our own territories with Canada at the helm. Let’s face it. Canada has never lived up to our own Arctic defence requirements and never will if you believe our own PM’s recent statements. We are just not ready to defend this great country because the present government does not believe we have to or need to. Our government “talks a good talk” but will never “walk the walk”. We will always be a “second class” NATO partner that is frowned upon by our allies unless we have a big shake-up in La-La-Land. The time to “step-up-to-the-plate” is rapidly coming to an end unless we drastically change our ways very soon by increasing our defence spending investments to at least 2% of GDP. We will lose our own Arctic territories to other state actors so, “lets get on with the business at hand and get with the program”!
Reply to David Dunlop of 3 May 23
I agree that you are fully entitled to express your views publicly.
My point was that over-the-top public criticisms of the CAF and DND that are said “tongue in cheek” can take on a life of their own when those who are uninformed or ill-intentioned suddenly shape these comments in ways such as “a senior defence strategist today confirmed that the first of Canada’s new very very expensive surface warships will be out of date before the last one is built!” Witness Jack Layton’s denunciation of the AOPS before steel had even been cut for how such an attitude works.
What we say publicly can come back against us in ways we do not want. So, we need to be careful how we say it, while fully exercising our right to speak.
This month Canada is sending members of the Canadian Patrol Submarine replacement project to Japan and South Korea to look at the Korean KSS-III and presumably the Sōryū-class. It is felt that the combination of lithium Ion batteries and AIP will be useful patrolling the ice edge in the Arctic.
Reply to David Dunlop of 13 May 23
Good morning David,
I agree that we need to do much more to protect our Arctic sovereignty. That is why I suggested in CNR 17.3 that we consider giving up some of the admirals’ precious CSCs to help pay for a more balanced fleet that includes Arctic patrol, presence, and deterrence forces.
Our defence effort in the Arctic in the past was commensurate with an adversary’s minimal ability to make militarily-significant moves in its frozen vastness.
Climate change has led to the need for a new paradigm. Thus, the focus of my articles and those of Col Brian Wentzell and Jose Cañadas Mendez was on how to meet this need. Time will tell if this and later governments will step up to meet the requirement.
I think that what is required of interested citizens like us is to keep making reasoned arguments here and elsewhere that offer practical solutions and the logic for why they should be implemented.
Hello Les. Although I have written for CNR magazine in past issues, I do not have access to all issues including 17.3. Be that as it may, I cannot agree that Canada should give up even one of its “precious” 15 CSC Frigates to accommodate an attempt to give Arctic sovereignty a more “significant” presence as you say. The RCN’s need for at least 15 CSC Frigates IMO, is a bare minimum. Anything less would be catastrophic for the RCN & Canada. I agree with you that a new paradigm is needed for Arctic sovereignty, however ‘time will tell’ as you say is quickly coming to an end. The need is now and not with future governments. A much more “reasoned & practical” argument would be for Canada to quickly increase its military spending to “at least” 2% of GDP as required by NATO and agreed to by most of our allies. That is the greatest need and not debatable. If we just did that one thing, much of what Canada needs to adequately equip the CAF now and in the future would very easily attainable with no negative effects on Canada social systems now or in the future. Canada cannot defend our own Arctic sovereignty if we do not have the people to defend it with. A lot of money, yes, but what price can you put on a free, strong and sovereign Canada?
Hello David,
I fully agree that Canada needs to do much more in order to have a capable army, navy and air force that are able to perform with the best of the best during expeditionary operations while also having the capability to defend Canadian sovereignty, especially in the north.
A question that arises with regard to money is what would we buy with an increase to 2%. This number is a somewhat artificial construct as it does not measure capability. If we tripled the pay of all CAF personnel we would get closer to 2% without any improvement in performance! I suspect that some countries which are bigger spenders than us have such artificialities in their number.
What is needed in my opinion is a reasoned argument for what is required more to have the forces that we need, with costings. Such an increased level of capability might cost 2% or not. However, it would be far more explainable to Canadians.
Defence of the Arctic will likely be an easier sell to Canadians than buying expensive CSCs for expeditionary operations. As well, such operations require more than two AORs. Interestingly, the admirals seem to ignore this need. Are they blinkered and focused on the shiny things? Or, are they making the right arguments but losing out to other factors, such as the NSS’ emphasis on steady work for shipyards over actually delivering ships? Whatever is the reason, at the present time, our expeditionary naval capability is unbalanced.
At the end of the day, those of us who care about such issues need to do our part to convince Canadians of the need for the necessary military forces and the funds that they cost. This is where reasoned and convincing arguments in numerous fora outside of the Broadsides Forum come in.
Hello Les. Canada already has “the best of the best” in our brave men and women of the CAF (although we need at least 16,000 more of them). Equipment does not make the military, it is the people who are in it that do that. Allied militaries throughout the world recognize Canada’s contributions because of our people. They are some of the best-trained men and women in the world with other nations being very envious of our men and women in uniform (although in my opinion, we don’t pay them enough). The 2% of GDP benchmark is just a starting point but IMO anywhere from 2.5 to 3% of GDP should be Canada’s goal ASAP. There is no need to “explain or sell” to Canadians what they already know and understand. We are just not pulling our weight enough to contribute to world peace and order with our NATO partners, and they see that as well. As I said, if we could only do that one thing, most, if not all, of what Canada “needs” to accomplish its missions required by the government and Canadians would be attainable. If our GDP issues were resolved, we would be able to properly increase our military personnel strength; quickly move forward with “at least” 15 CSC frigates and acquire a true AAW ship capability; properly equipt the Army with modern, more effective systems (including a medium to long range AAW missile capability), MALE/HALE Arctic surveillance drones along with UAVs (armed & otherwise); “spaced-based” surveillance systems; replace our Polaris 150 and ASW A/C (possibly the Posiden P8) and acquire more heavy lift Aircraft (possibly a C5 Galaxy capability) for our Air Force; a revitalized NORAD defence system; invest in XLUUVs for our Navy; at least 8 to 12 modern effective submarines (either AIP/LIB or even an SSN capability); a dedicated Strategic Sealift capability to quickly move our Army in times of crises or for HA/DR missions (which are becoming more common in todays environment); and yes I agree Les that we definately need “at least” one more JSS to fuel our Navy. All of this would be easily accomplished but only if we have enough military personnel to do it. Yes, an eye-wateringly expensive list but required now more than ever. It is the Canadian government that has put Canada and its military behind the “eight-ball” with our allies and will be a heavy load for our military to dig out of, but with the personnel Canada has now (or should have), this would be very possible. At the end of the day, it will be up to all Canadians to decide if it is worth the cost.
Good morning David,
I have no problem with your (partial) list of what the CAF needs. Where we disagree is that I do not believe that most Canadians understand or care about such issues (certainly not enough to pay the bills).
Therefore, I believe that education is necessary, especially when there are competing air, land and sea views of what to buy and outside agencies (see recent news on Bombardier) pushing their own personal (ie selfish) agenda.
In such confusion the public will likely not know what is true and thus could rightly believe that we better be very careful where we spend our finite cash.
We should never give up any CSC vessels and still go ahead with 12 SSNs and build them here by joining AUKUS 1 and call it CANAUSUK.
Hi David,
With regard to CNR 17.3, given that 19.1 is about to be released, 17.3 may now be available on-line in the Archives & Index section with unlimited access.
Fyi/fyc
Les
Hi Les. Don’t sell the Canadian people so short. Most “care and understand” more that you know about such matters. Yes education is a key element to Canadians and we should be more pro-active towards what our military actually needs to protect our own sovereignty. The Bombardier 6500 ASW and surveillance A/C is another option for Canadia but IMO does not meet the criteria or have the ASW “legs” that the Aurora has now (over 12-14 hr missions) or the Argus had (still holds the world record for longest flight mission of over 17 hrs). Can the Bombardier 6500 do that? I don’t believe so. When you say “confusion” I think you mean “secrecy” by the government when spending the “finite” tax dollar.
Hi David,
We can agree to disagree about Canadians’ interest in, and understanding of, defence matters. I fully agree though that education is key to improving whatever level of interest and understanding that they have.
Wrt Bombardier playing the nationalist card, I share your doubts about the capabilities of its submission.
We clearly disagree about the government’s approach to the defence policy review consultation. I replied to your 18 May 23 post on the topic in the Broadsides Australian defence policy discussion. I won’t repeat my thoughts here. I look forward to any comments that you have on my ideas in this discussion string or the other one.
Finally, the USSR is proof that government resources (money) are always finite. Excessive defence spending helped undermine the Soviet government’s legitimacy because it meant that it could not meet the population’s basic needs and aspirations. Governments must always seek the correct balance for how much they spend and where.
Hello Les. I have finally read your article in CNR 17.3-“Future RCN Structure” with great interest and agree with most of what you have said on China, Russia and what the RCN has or will have and where we need to go for the future. There are however some thoughts I have WRT your future RCN force structure Table. The use of 4 CSC “Destroyers” is a good option. In order for this to work properly, the first thing that needs to be done is to extend this “destroyer”by at least 20 meters midships to accommodate changes in design. I have listed below what changes and additional ships IMO that need to be acquired. These changes are predicated on at least a 2% increase to GDP in defence as requested for all NATO members with an increase of at least 16,000 CAF members as well. The 2% increase of GDP will be seriously discussed this July in a NATO meeting and later enshrined in their constitution as a permanent “baseline” for all members (including Canada). Here are my changes to your Table 1:
Ship Type-CSC “Destroyer”
Quantity-4
Distribution-2 Atlantic/2 Pacific
Remarks-Lengthened by 20-30 meters to accommodate 4 x 2 Electric motors; with 4 x more powerful Diesel Generators (DGs)-32 MK 41 VLS system Midships with 4 x NSMs systems with 32 MK VLS system Forward (Vice 24); 10,000 + tonnes; Max speed 28-30 Kts.
——————————————————————————————————————————
Ship Type-CSC Frigate
Quantity-12
Distribution-6 Atlantic/6 Pacific
Remarks-General Purpose
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
Ship Type-Suppy Ship (AORs)
Quantity-4 x JSS
Distribution-2 Atlantic/2 Pacific
Remarks-Expeditionary TG Ops and coastal operations; Limited Non-combatant evacuation possible
———————————————————————————————————————————-
Ship Type-Submarines
Quantity-12
Distribution-6 Atlantic/6 Pacific
Remarks-AIP/LIB-Expeditionary, Coastal operations and Arctic operations-With a possible Arctic Naval base established, at least 1 boat from each coast could operate there on a non-permanent basis
—————————————————————————————————————————————
Ship Type-AOPS
Quantity-8
Distribution-4 Atlantic/4 Pacific
Remarks-Improved Armament; Limited Amphibious use; Mine Hinting “Mother ship”; XLUUV Capability
—————————————————————————————————————————————
Ship Type-Dedicated Sealift/Arctic Amphibious Ship Capability (LHD)
Quantity-4
Distribution-2 Atlantic/2 Pacific
Remarks-Battalion sized (450-600 pers)-Polar Class 4 construction; Non-Combatant evacuation; Full Hospital; HA/DR Capability
————————————————————————————————————————————-
Ship Type-OPVs (approx 120+ meters in length)
Quantity-12
Distribution-6 Atlantic/6 Pacific
Remarks-Expeditionary; Mine Warfare and Coastal Operations; Limited MK 41 VLS system; 76mm gun forward; (Replacements for the 12 MCDVs) Approx. 2000 tonnes
Good morning David,
Thank you for your detailed comments on my article in CNR 17.3. In the context that you have set I have no real problems with your thoughts on my Table 1. The navy that you propose would be very capable and able to meet both Canada’s ‘distant defence’ and coastal (Arctic) defence missions.
I have a quibble about splitting the AOPS fleet equally between the two fleets, due to the greater ease of access to the Arctic from the eastern side. However, I can also see some benefits to an equal split.
I would be curious to know how my article on the LPA in 18.2 might affect your views on Arctic-capable LHDs and what your reaction is to the value that I see for LSI(A)s in the real world (see 18.3).
I would also be curious to know what you would see as the RCN’s future structure if we do not go to 2% defence spending.
Ubique. Best wishes
Imagine if we did get such a fleet. We would be a credible force and reliable ally, especially in the Indo-Pacific. I would like to see what Canada’s response to the 2% GDP spending at the upcoming NATO summit, especially with Justin Trudeau’s previous comments on ‘never’ meeting the 2%. Maybe a change of government will help realize this proposal…
Hello Les & Justin. The alternate Table that I created is cast in “mud” and could very easily change as far as numbers per coast are concerned. As I said before, I have provided CNR with several articles over the years, however I have not been a full subscriber to the magazine and can only access back-issued articles that are not for subscribers only. I can therefore not access the CNR 18.2 article on your Arctic capable LSI (A)s at this time. If Canada does not adopt “at least” a 2% of GDP for its defence, I foresee some dire straights for our military over the next decade or so. We may even be expelled by the NATO organization if we do not live up to their standards. Your Table 1 as well may also be stripped to the bone. Here is what might happen:
1. CSC “Destroyer” – Will never happen!
2. CSC Type 26 Frigate program – 15 at best, and maybe scaled back to at least 12 or possibly less
3. Supply Ship/JSS – Just the 2 JSS + MV Asterix (no 3-4 JSS)
4. Submarines -The only bright spot I see would be here with up to 12 AIP/LIB boats
5. AOPS – Just the six being built by Irving, with possibly an XLUUV capability (good plan?)
6. Dedicated Sealift/Arctic Amphibious Ship Capability (LHD) Quantity-4 – Will never happen!
7. Replacements for the 12 MCDVs – No OPV replacement. The government will drag their feet on this one and still be floundering about with no decision coming for years (decades) to come.
Not a very pleasant prospect with no head-way made on the 16,000 missing CAF personnel as well. We cannot go down this road again! For Justin, love your optimistic attitude. Wish we had more like you (16,000 more!). You are absolutely correct. Perhaps a change of government would do the CAF a world of good!
Hi David,
Would you believe if Ottawa decided to go with let’s say purchase the “best Bang for our tax money” and go for at least 8 or 9 new German 212CD E Subs for example which only need about 33 Sailors to operate (again best Subs for Canada in less cost to operate with these magnificent Subs). Would that not motivate and excite new younger generation of future Sailors/Staff to join in our Canadian Navy? To ask this question is to answer it…;-)
Reply to Justin Leon of 24 May 23
I would not hold my breath. I did not notice Harper spending the required money.
In fact, his government’s ‘penny wise dollar foolish’ approach created the JSS mess. We can also thank him for the NSS, which is more focused on steady work for shipyards instead of delivering ships in a timely fashion.
Finally, his ‘smoke and mirrors’ approach to ‘balancing the budget’ led to PR stunts like selling assets to claim that the budget was balanced.
I suspect that a government change will lead to ringing promises and loud declarations of respect and support for the members of the CAF that are accompanied by cuts to the defence budget.
Time will tell.
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/05/vard-unveils-new-vigilance-opv-design/
This was presented at CANSEC.
Thank you for this Justin.
I always wonder how much real engineering and project planning is behind such (sometimes glitzy) PR fluff!
There’s a youtube video of it as well (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1B2jfmJTSc). it appears it would support a UAV but not a helicopter.
Hi Justin,
The Vard website contains an educational discussion on the process of ship design and the benefits of learning from preceding designs. It seems to discuss the lessons learned from employing the Irish P50 patrol ships in designing the subsequent P60 vessels.
The discussion gets right into minutiae such as wave shapes and heights. Worth reading by those who wish to understand better the technical aspects of ship design and the capabilities that Vard seems to have.
Looks like a versatile and “future proofed” OPV Justin. Would the flight deck be strong enough to at least land a Cyclone helo? I would also prefer it have a little more substantial gun system forward (57mm (possibly re-use the Halifax class systems as that class retires) or 62mm) and also have a CIADS VLS system as well midships. The use of Gargoyle 176 helo drones would be good but I didn’t see where the drones would be “housed”. What radar systems and CCMS system would it have? If it is to work with the future CSC Type 26, it must be compatible with it. An interesting concept though, however there are other OPVs out there as well.
Hello Justin. Although the “Vard “Vigilance” class looks like a good option for Canada, I believe the VARD 7-115 Next Generation OPV (NGOPV) would be a better option for Canada and the RCN for compatability with the Type 26 CSC Frigate. See below:
https://vardmarine.com/gallery/vard-7-115/
Hello again Justin. There is also another option from SERCO Canada called the ATLAS 120 Light Frigate that is a Canadian company and would be built right here in Canada. See below:
https://www.serco.com/media/9740/atlas-120-light-frigate.pdf?1685563690
Reply to David Dunlop of 25 May 23
Hello David,
Thank you for your thoughts. I look forward to your comments on my contributions to CNRs 18.1, 18.2, and 18.3 as they become available on-line.
My doubts about the defence benefits of a new government are found in a post of 25 May 23.
Maybe Canada should do what Oz is doing? Canada should approach Britain about their new generation SSN, same boat as AUKUS. No need for Canada to be involved in the Virginia BS, just approach UK re the new generation SSN, and maybe a mixed fleet and buy 212s in the meanwhile.
Alan, Love your thougths here…yes sir! a mix of 4 new 212Cd-E or S and asap 4 new British Subs like the one the Aussie are getting …all this ASAP. THAT would be the difference of helping keep Canada in staying Canada.
The reality about the Canadian views on getting Nuclear propulsion subs…means nothing, It’s all B.S. they don’t care if we get any Subs or not, let alone if Nuclear propulsion or not. They are clueless to our defence because the media don’t go in details in showing our serious short comings about the defence of our Territorial Sovereignty, especially the younger generation who a lot are new immigrants. The truth of the matter is that uncle Sam doesn’t want its northern neighbour to harbour new Subs…period! THEY want to control our waters and keep an eye on this “Asian communist locus” enemy spreading up north…