By Dan Middlemiss, 28 September 2025
I was dismayed when I read Vice-Admiral Topshee’s recent interview in which he noted that the government was considering a direct government-to-government contracting process for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP).[1]
Admiral Topshee stated that a “strategic partnership” with either the South Korean or German government might bring more benefits to Canada as a whole than by simply dealing with either of the two contending bidders for the CPSP deal.
Topshee provided a couple of examples of such ‘benefits’:
First, "What if we want to insist on German and Norwegian investment in a certain technology? What if there's some sort of LNG (liquefied natural gas) deal as part of this?";
Second, Topshee suggested the prospect of injecting more Canadian content into later batches of subs: Maybe, "for five through eight, we'd really like to see the incorporation of Canadian technology, not only into the design for our submarines but also in the ones for Norway and Germany, or South Korea," he said. "Is that something those countries would be willing to consider?" And for the final four, Canada might be able to arrange a significant further "Canadianization of the boats where Canadian companies play an even greater role in the building of these subs," the commander said.”
These comments led me to think that some PMO staffer had sat the Admiral down to explain the political facts of life to him. Obviously, procuring submarines had little to do with getting badly needed boats to the Navy, but rather everything to do with domestic economic and political considerations.
Soon after, I was even more flabbergasted to learn that Admiral Topshee had broached the idea that the government might decide to split the sub procurement between the two bidding companies.[2] Why, I wondered, would Ottawa embrace a split contract – two different fleets, training, and supply and maintenance chains – when the government had repeatedly denigrated the notion of a split fleet of jet fighters?
The immediate and vociferous denunciation of the split fleet notion by several experts [3] immediately led PM Carney himself to seemingly quash the idea of a split fleet procurement.[4]
In retrospect, I now think that the Admiral knew exactly what he was doing when he went public with these possibilities – he was trying spike the guns of those procurement bean-counters in Ottawa who like to believe that political and economic expediency should trump military necessity in Canada’s major defence procurements. Note that the Admiral was very careful to stress that, ultimately, it would be up to the government to decide, but it also appears that he was trying to sideline some possibilities that had been bandied about in the procurement bureaucracy for some time. Well done, sir!
One caveat: winning a battle of bureaucratic procurement gamesmanship comes with a big potential downside. Ultimately, the bean-counters and politicos control the procurement purse strings, so there may be a ‘cost’ in terms of delays, reduced numbers, and yet more tampering in the longer term.
Notes
1. Steven Chase, “Canada weighing direct government contract for sub purchase, head of navy says,” The Globe and Mail, 19 September 2025.
2. Kyle Duggan, “Navy commander says Canada could end up with subs from two different suppliers,” www.ctvnews.ca, Canadian Press, 23 September 2023.
3. Kyle Duggan, “Splitting Canada’s submarine fleet could endanger procurement project, experts warn,” www.thecanadianpressnews.ca, 23 September 2025.
4. Kyle Duggan, “Canada won’t split its submarine contract between suppliers: Carney,” Canadian Press, 23 September 2025.
A photo of a KSS-III Batch I on the left and a rendering of the Type 212 CD on the right. Credit: Republic of Korea Navy, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
