By Dan Middlemiss, 11 July 2024
At the NATO Summit in Washington, MND Bill Blair announced early plans to proceed with a project to replace the navy’s current submarine fleet.[1]
Some key points made by MND Blair and senior government officials include:
- up to 12 boats
- conventionally powered
- under-ice capable
- to be procured outside the NSS
- but Ottawa is seeking a Canadian sustainment component
- an RFI could be issued in the fall 2024
- no details about costs, numbers, or delivery schedules
The announcement does not move the project much beyond the ‘explore options’ caveat in the recent Defence Policy Update. Moreover, the initiative appears to be a political move to counter external criticism of Canada's ‘shameful’ defence spending status in NATO.
David Perry, a respected Canadian defence expert, “estimated that the full cost of acquiring up to 12 submarines would be up to $120-billion, and that it would take up to 15 years for the first of the new submarines to be operational.”
There was no indication of how the RCN will find crews for these boats.
It will be interesting to see the extent to which Ottawa will be able to resist industry efforts to ‘Canadianize’ and add ‘Canadian content’ to whatever design is ultimately selected.
Notes
1. Murray Brewster, “Canada confirms plan to replace submarine fleet at NATO summit,” CBC News, 10 July 2024. (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/submarine-blair-trudeau-nato-1.7259718). See also, Adrian Morrow and Steven Chase, “Canada makes submarine procurement announcement after days of defence-spending criticism from NATO allies,” The Globe and Mail, 10 July 2024. (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/us-politics/article-canada-makes-defence-announcements-after-days-of-criticism-from-nato/)
36 thoughts on “Canadian Patrol Submarine Plans Announced”
The whole announcement was nothing more than lip service. Trudeau indicated earlier this year Canada would never see 2% of GDP, now we can in 8 years. Maybe Canadians should realize there’s a lot more riding on the table than just 2%, billions of dollars in trade is as well, and our government can’t see the big picture past their noses and climate change. We’ll be lucky to be in the G7 in another couple of years. What an embarrassment this is!
Same question I raised in another discussion, are you saying that climate change is not an existential threat?
Ubique,
Les
Canada can not fix the issues of China, Russia, USA and Europe by itself. Canadians are suffering while the world around them doesn’t care. We contribute 1% of the total, while a lot of other countries couldn’t care less about it. Do you think taxing Canadians to the point they can’t eat, heat their homes, can’t afford to buy a house is the answer? No matter what Canada does will the threat go away? If it’s not collectively done together we are wasting our time. Even if we all drove battery powered cars, Canada doesn’t have enough generation or infrastructure to deliver that power.
My question if our government is worried about CO2 why aren’t we building nuclear powered subs, ships, etc? Why aren’t nuclear power stations not being built in more places? The list goes on and on.
Good morning A Canadian,
You are correct that we cannot fix climate change by ourselves. However, if we do nothing we will never have the moral authority needed to be able to get anyone else to care enough to act before it is too late.
Since the Arctic is warming far faster than other parts of the planet we will likely suffer more from climate change than some other countries. Thus, it is in our interest to lead other countries to take action.
Additionally, the money saved by Canadians by not taking action on the climate now will be meaningless if the worst effects of climate change come to pass.
I am sure that the infrastructure for electric cars will be developed once the need (and profits) are there.
Finally, I agree fully that we need more nuclear power. It is not me that needs to be convinced but those who have an emotional/mental blind spot with regard to it.
Ubique,
Les
“A Canadian”. We actually contribute 1.37+% of GDP to our defence. It’s not that as a group here, we don’t care about all starving Canadians or their social needs. We all do. But if you take a closer look at the state of Canada’s national defence issues now, you would see how far we have gone down-hill in the past several years. A 2% of GDP (minimum) is what is required to keep all Canadians safe from “The Big Bad Wolf (s)”.
Canada just does not have the technology to build our own nuclear submarines and/or ships. Nuclear subs are a very unique and special piece of kit and we do not have that kind of expertise here in Canada. We cannot buy nuclear subs from the US/UK or France as the US holds all the cards and are very particular these days as to whom they give that technology to. So it’s either AIP or LIB submarines and we need more than just 4 of them! Take a look at the Small Modular Reactors that are now being considered by Canada. Cheers!
Just a point here:
The USA has no say, influence, and very little shared equipment (mainly SSBNs) therefore what the UK does with its boats whom it shares the tech with is solely the UKs deal and its the same with France.
As I’ve noted many times in the past SMRs are untried and untested in submarines they also come with their own issues such as more waste than a regular reactor so should we go this route ? I don’t think so.
I think you may have missed the point of what “A Canadian” was saying. He wants 2% of gdp yesterday and not in 8 years time. He is just sick and tired of government lip service and so is NATO. He thinks we may get booted from G7 as we are not pulling our weight on so many fronts.
Canada’s budget is determined by cost and dollar expense … fixed cost budgets and active increase to price… expense to both industry and the consumer…. internal debt is internal lower price pst and build faster… development and jobs. Reduce fixed cost, lower budgets not price… life becomes more expensive… supply continues to increase with wage demand and the increase on supply. THAT’S not federal, that’s provincial… the federal gov’t is investing into provinces and provinces are not allowing for it… increased work increased expense… wage demand and prices increase… inflation… to reduce inflation internal debt… you drop price and produce… you never cut budgets.. jobs… taxable earnings ..
Up to 12 doesn’t mean 12. Probably when all is said and done it’ll be 6 to 8. The Canadian Patrol Submarine Replacement Project was stood up for some time is now gathering available options. Like mentioned smoke and mirrors. It is also a forgone conclusion that there will be some Canadian content in the form of weapon systems moved from the Upholders to whatever we buy. Most likely torpedoes. Waste not want not.
In my opinion, you never cut cost, you reduce expense… and develop. 12 means 12. The plan goes back to the 80s and originally was proposed using nuclear subs. There was controversy AND the USA halting the purchase and sale of nuclear subs — under a 1950s agreement means Canada does not get nuclear subs. Note that the only party to ever reduce the defense budget below 1% is Conservatives.
Hello Dan,
The cost of being in Afghanistan was not included in the defense budget. Add that in and where are we at.
Dan. This is indeed good news for Canada and the RCN. There are several countries that could build a Canadian Expeditionary 12 boat Submarine fleet. These include Germany, South Korea, Japan, France & Spain. which can or do build AIP & LIB submarines for export. They all have pros and cons but if an RFI is to be introduced by Ottawa this Fall, I believe at least three and possibly four of these Countries have will be chosen to submit bids. They include Germany’s (Type 216 HDW/212 CD AIP class); Japan’s (Taipei SS 29 LIB class); South Korea’s (ROK KSS III class) & France’s Barracuda Block 1A AIP class (same class that was first selected by Australia to replace their Collin’s class). Spain’s SS 80 class and France’s Barracuda class Block 1A will have honourable mention, but I believe in the end would be disqualified. The three front runners would be Germany, Japan & South Korea in no particular order. Each one of them are conventionally powered and have some degree of under-ice capability. Agree with your assessment that they all should be built outside of the NSS. The requirement to “Canadianize” these boats may be a sticking point and may increase the “all-in”” price in excess of the final price tag of $120B CAD for 12 boats ($10B CAD per boat-about double the price of 2 x CSC River class Destroyers) which is jaw-dropping to say the least, but probably something that Canada could handle in the end if we get above 2% of GDP. The over-arching “devil in the details” is submariner personnel strength which must increase soon. Have A Great Navy Day!
David, 120B seems like a lot even for whole lifecycle costs. What are we looking at? 1B a sub bare bones acquisition? Times it by 3 or 4 for O/M/S. 4×12=$48B
Hello Wayne. Yes, I was talking about life cycle costs and $120B CAD for 12 subs, no matter which sub wins the Request for Information (RFI), is not out-of-line. Even if 8 AIP/LIB subs finally get built, final costs could be over $90-100B CAD. These figures are not out of line when you take a look at the 15 CSC River class life cycle costs.
David,
I do not have issue with Canada contributing more money to defence at all, in fact it’s too low. My issue is environment climate change shouldn’t be front and center of a defence meeting on the 75th anniversary of NATO. Climate change is a UN agenda not NATO‘s.
The purchase price will be between $1.0 to $1.3 billion each depending on which sub we pick by my window shopping at this summer’s prices. Remember life cycle costs two years ago were estimated by the RCN to be at $60 billion.
Overall David I do think the 212CD-E or the KSIII is our best option, my hat lands on the 212CD-E though.
Japan’s offering is risky — yes they are good at domestic builds, yes their industry and timelines are superb but they have never exported a submarine or built one for someone else so there’s risk with that.
The Spanish S81 has a lot of problems as of right now, the French Barracuda was turned down because the French couldn’t deliver what they promised and other issues afoot
Out of all the boats though only the 212A & derivatives (212CD-E is its next gen) has done under ice operations with the most recent taking place in 2024 by the Portuguese navy Tridente.
I believe the 212CD has been described as a double hull with the inner hull being smaller much like the 212A and the much larger outer hull being of a much thinner steel for the Stealth shaping. In my opinion this would make the interior too small to carry the amount of batteries, AIP equipment required for the endurance we need and the thinner outer skin hull definitely wouldn’t qualify as being capable of surfacing through ice if necessary without catastrophic damage. In my opinion the Taigei and KSSIII blk II are the only realistic options, leaning toward the Taigei as they have been implementing newer technologies like possible pump jet, space like carbon monoxide scrubbers for air, floating deck structure for sound reduction and fiberoptic sonar. Not to mention they have found eliminating the AIP system in favour of more Lithium Batteries was more efficient than pairing with AIP for many reasons.
The outer casings usually get bashed about; our T boats which do under-ice operations their outer casing is actually a very strong fiberglass with an anechoeic coating on the outside. The gap between the casing and pressure hull is around 2ft on the Trafalgars, it won’t be much different to the 212CD either, and the casing shape bares no relevance to internal volume as that figure is derived from pressure hull dimensions and the CD version of the 212 is much much larger than what went before.
I’d also point out that even having much more powerful diesel engines only really decreases charge time, as you noted, which is great for open ocean deployment, but if your option also requires under-ice operations (which Taigei has never done and is unknown if the design is even capable of it) then you have a serious problem because, to put it simply, you cannot snorkel under ice, you would have to punch through.
A lot of the stuff the Taigei has onboard is not entirely new stuff, the carbon monoxide scrubbers are already in use on many boats around the world, and they all pretty much work in the exact same way. Floating decks are not new, we had them on the V & C boats.
The real issue with pump jets is that they are not as efficient as a traditional screw. Yes they are quieter hence why they are used but your trade off with a pump jet is that your boat is slower top end. To give you an idea on the T boats with pump jet (Trafalgar had a 9 blade screw) the large heavier 688s could outrun us even though we had more power back aft and the 688 had the conventional 7 blade screw.
The Taigeis & Soryu are great boats for long-range trans-Pacific taskings but being solely diesel electric essentially that would limit their under-ice capability, something a pure AIP like the 212CD simply would not have to deal with.
While Lithium-ion batteries are great stores of energy, they do deplete over time and were measuring here in days to a week or a little more depending on your hotel load and also transit conditions, this means you must come up, the AIP boat doesn’t have that issue.
As mentioned before the 212A which is a small submarine managed over 3 weeks fully submerged without having to take in air or run diesels or anything it was fully contained. This is a submerged endurance curve that I honestly think the Taigei would struggle to match.
Also forgot to mention among the many Taigei advancements are a higher power diesel generator power and low profile, stealthier high efficiency snorkel system, that combined cut charging time by two-thirds meaning according to them a 6 to 8 hr full charge is done in 1 to 2 hrs, seriously reducing the surface time in which they could be detected. Not having AIP and more batteries means after that 1 to 2 hr charge they would be back to 100% mission endurance without needing AIP tanks refilled and without the speed or depth limitations those tanks require and little effect on underwater endurance.
Hello Kevin. The Taigei SS 29 LIB Submarine has always been my own personal choice for the all those reasons you have mentioned. Not sure if the class has a double hull though with a strengthened outer steel hull. Lengthened under-ice endurance is a prime requirement for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP). The Japanese have always and continue to be world-leaders in LIB Technology. The costs of acquiring 8-12 of these subs may be out-of-reach for a replacement for the Victoria class however. In US $$ 639M (In 2018 prices-about $880M CAD) for an 8-12 submarine fleet that would be at least $7.5-10.5B CAD take away costs (in 2018 prices). That was 6 years ago. In 2024 prices that would be around $12-15B CAD just for the take away costs to build them to Canadian standards. That does not include life cycle and infrastructure costs; anywhere from $60-80B CAD to operate these boats for up to 40 years (around $6.5-7.5B CAD per boat). Not an insurmountable sum, but, not cheap either. Are they worth it? I think so. Cheers!
Taigei class also dives to about 2000 feet — that will beat all torpedoes. It is noted as the most advanced non-nuclear sub in the world. Cost is $950 million per boat (sub) US dollars.
12 is very ambitious, hopefully at least 6.
The deal with Norway and Germany suggests the U212CD is a favourite but timeline requirements favour SK with Hanwha and Hyundai both of which have partnered up with Babcock. I don’t think any SSK has been strengthened for breaking through ice and find it hard to believe they would wander too far in from the edge. 6×50=300 not too big a commitment from a personnel standpoint
Most boats will look for polyna to come through on. The tridente just recently did a transit between Iceland and Greenland. It’s a type 209PN (more 214).
There are SSKs out there that are ice strengthened. The Kilo class does have a reinforced sail, you mainly find it’s the Russian boats though.
I also agree 12 is over ambitious, 6 would be realistic.
Really who cares about lifecycle costs when they will have to be paid anyways. Part and parcel of buying any platform.
The Commander RCN has recently said he wants no AIP and believes LIB tech will make up for no AIP. The RCN wants to be able to push far under the ice, significantly farther, as I was told but not complete transits. The RCN wants 8 submarines minimum.
LIB gives you speed, AIP gives you endurance, he would be foolish not to consider AIP like the 212A set up considering their submerged endurance is far greater than that of the Soryu which is much larger than the 212A.
Type 212A transited from Germany to Portugal around Scotland and Ireland in 3 weeks fully submerged — a Soryu could not do that. And that’s the big thing about being under ice, if your LIB batteries run low, you best start praying there a polyna nearby.
Blair quite aware of AIP but this is something the CRCN has openly discussed in town halls. Talked to some of my submariner friends and any design picked will need to operate under the ice, no long transits.
Under-ice operations require long transits in the area, many times you may travel for days without the ability to come up due to the ice covering. As I said, if your batteries run low you best start praying there is a polyna nearby.
The 212CD-E variation enables long submerged endurance and that’s what you need up north hence why it’s been the main domain for SSNs SSBNs etc.
The Japan Taigei class dives to just over 2000 feet and they were using the Swedish Gotland API technology and regardless of which AIP technology you use it can’t operate past a very limited depth. It works well in the swallow waters of the Baltic Sea but not at great depths. That is why the Japanese dropped it in favour of more LIB arrays.
Hello,
With the Victoria class in hand, why did we not reverse-engineer a boat and build one from scratch to develop a sub industrial base? Do such purchases come with contractual agreements that we will not reverse-engineer or build copies?
Put differently, do these boats ever become full property of the buyer, or is there still the equivalent of an end-user agreement and intellectual property?
If we do acquire and reverse-engineer, and make our own copy like some “adversary” nations out there, what penalties would ensue?
Regards
Canada owns the Victorias even though they are second hand. If you license build a copy of a boat like South Korea and many others have done then they become the property of that state.
All south Korea has done is modified a German type 214 submarine to build their own.
To build a submarine infrastructure that means we can build boats is expensive even for non-nuclear boats and you need enough on the line to keep the work force up to speed. (This is why Australia is having issues.)
Building submarines is very niche and requires very specialist workforce and this takes decades to get right and unfortunately we don’t have decades to wait in Canada.
Thank you Blair.
We got the Victoria in 98, so that’s two lost decades there.
My conceen is that the discussion is focused purely on purchasing new subs. It is not on building a sufficiently strong industrial and shipbuilding infrastructure that would permit, among other things, to build subs in the future. I would hate to see these same discussions in 3-4 decades when the River-class and new sub will be obsolete and we cannot replace them out of our own means.
South Korea did not start its shipbuilding with the immediate goal of building a sub. It built the capacity and capability to build everything else first.
While in much reduced scope, that is the trajectory I hope to see for Canada as well in the future.
Regards
Submarine production has never been properly attempted in Canada throughout its history as a country. It is a very niche and difficult capability to develop and maintain. It is pure wishful thinking to consider Canada building its own submarines through the late 1990’s and 2000’s with what was ongoing, especially considering how the Navy fell to the wayside compared to the Army. The discussion is focused purely on purchasing new submarines because it is not practical in any manner to attempt to domestically build submarines in Canada, now or in the future.
Infrastructure and techniques required to build submarines is largely unable to be carried over or reused from yards that work on surface vessels, meaning that Davie, Irving or Seaspan would need to see an entire supply line and manufacturing line effectively be raised from nowhere. There is not the demand in Canada or abroad to build submarines domestically, it would take billions of dollars, immense work and a considerable time period to bring even one yard up to the ability to build submarines, not even building them well or with experience. Canada will be very unlikely to lose the ability to build surface ships as the various organizations under the Canadian Govt always need vessels of some type, the same cannot be said for submarines.
The RCN needs submarines quickly, efficiently and for a reasonable cost. Building them in Canada will provide the exact opposite and will make the cost of the River-class destroyer program look like a trip to McDonalds in comparison.
Canada did build submarines for the RN in Montreal in WW 1 starting in 1916 but all those skilled workers are dead now and their offspring went on to different careers. Sorry I guess that information wasn’t that helpful. I will have to go back to my drawing board.
Overview
The Canadian Patrol Submarine nascent project/program, regardless of its current status as political rhetoric to assuage critics of the current government’s defence spending, offers the opportunity to exploit some of Canada’s industrial capacity to produce a truly capable chemically powered submarine that is not only safe and resilient but has the performance to meet near strategic and strategic range requirements. Under ice capability is requirement #1 because it is the domestic security theater, but the requirements extend globally on a lesser scale as part of Canada’s contribution to the collective security of freer and more prosperous people around the world.
How to produce a viable long ranged submarine powered by affordable chemical energy? To be short and to a conclusive degree, hydrogen EXPLODES! The RFS Kursk and a long line of HTP torpedo carrying RN submarines (technically not free hydrogen, but it’s part of the same molecule type) that had catastrophic explosions powerful enough to be detected on global seismographs, an AIP submarine exploding in the Bedford Basin would make the 1917 disaster seem tame in comparison, and this does not address the dangers of shock damage to vessels in combat that has never taken place yet.
Lithium ion power, despite owning three electric bicycles that I use regularly and have put around 10,000km on, is not much safer in a combat or underwater environment. Slightly damaged, the cells will promptly melt down with huge releases of heat that will cause the complete loss of the vessel. I do not drive my bicycles in water but I assume the batteries have remained sealed for good reason, although it might make for an interesting YouTube video of the intense fire of it in the middle of Etobicoke Creek.
Solid state batteries may hold promise, but this technology is not ready for scaling to size and may not be for decades, it makes no sense to design for them any more than holding out for zero point modules to do the job.
The safest and most economical choice is a material for which Canada has a world leading industry centered in Quebec and nation-wide — aluminum, or more specifically, aluminum fuel cell alloys using air and oxygen enriched air (OEA40 etc.). I have been crunching the numbers on this since the 1980’s, but in the interest of impartiality I direct you to the readily accessible Wikipedia page on the aluminum-air battery https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aluminium%E2%80%93air_battery, which provides some basic calculations on performance of this under-developed technology. These numbers pertain to straight metallic aluminum, not aluminum alloys with crystalline structures optimized for fuel cell use.
Lithium-ion batteries are only viable for extended range use if you are prepared to travel at exceedingly slow speeds; the on-going necessity of spending much of the time running near the surface on diesels compromises mission success by continuously revealing the boats’ area of operation, losing the submarines’ single most important tactical advantage. With 8 times the energy available over half of which would be underwater at depth, and the ability to quickly gulp extra fresh air without being detected, the aluminum fuel cell submarine would possess the range and stealth critical for mission success over entire regions of ocean. Nuclear submarines enjoy this advantage expanded to global reach, but at roughly four times the cost and twice the displacement.
In the case of plain aluminum fuel, a nominal 700 long tons would yield a total of 1300 Wh x 700,000 kg = 910,000 kWh. The same 700t of fuel nominally would have a maximum power output 200 Watts x 700,000 kg = 140,000 kW. In practice for a variety of practical reasons the amount of ready power would not be so high, and in operational practice a set of 7-15 flo-flo cell arrays located along the bottom of the central hull would be used by progressively consuming the majority of fuel in one array after another in order to allow efficient underway replenishment of expended or largely expended fuel arrays, there would remain enough power for an efficient hull to reach 40 knots and beyond and still retain potential electrostatic pulse power to energize hydrostatic torpedo defences in addition to the protective value of the ventrally located fuel cells underneath the primary inhabited pressure hull.
If by the same shaft power of a Virginia class nuclear submarine of around 30MW were applied to a sail-less efficient streamlined hull of 5000t, the boat would reach speeds in the 40 knot range, making them faster than any submarines in the world and fast enough to outrun most air-launched anti-submarine torpedoes. Of course, at this point the issue of the oxygen supply has not been addressed, but 30MW for 30 hours or 1200nm at 40 knots. At 500kW and 10 knots, the operating time is 1800 hours or 18,000nm, bearing in mind that there are cumulative losses and extra power demands in all real world functioning systems, and again, the oxygen required has not been factored in here yet.
That the amount of fuel energy required is well beyond the basic need is a fortunate matter since carrying enough oxygen to react with the aluminum is more difficult than providing enough aluminum fuel for a viable mission endurance. Since it is possible to draw more oxygen from the air by periodically coming to a full stop at depth and sending up an air line with a centrifugal pre-compressor operating several feet below the surface, it would be a practical enough to cut the on-board oxygen supply in half. For 350t of aluminum fuel, around 310t of oxygen is required resulting in the Al2O3 weakly soluble end product. It would not be advisable to carry less oxygen on board since as fuel is consumed the weight of that oxygen adds to the displacement of the submarine, although in an emergency the spent fuel oxide could be dumped with no significant danger to the environment, certainly less than the hazards of a lost submarine on the ocean bottom, aluminum oxide is biologically inactive and represents one of the more common molecular solids on the planet. The buoyancy of the submarine would need to allow for the oxygen drawn from the air while at sea without any form of fuel replenishment activity on patrol, unlike the typically diesel-electric boat that gets lighter as a few hundred tons of fuel oil is consumed. The primary factors driving the retention of the spent fuel are the economics of reducing it back into fuel and the limited but significant environmental hazard of indiscriminate dumping of it at sea, but emergency or necessity can be factored in through compromises like discharge bladders and the like.
The single greatest determinant of a submarine’s displacement is the volume required of the pressure hull, and in the absence of a human crew and relatively fragile components like propulsion machinery and some types of weapons, the size of the vessel can be dramatically decreased in size. Pressure hulls also are expensive to manufacture given the nature of the steels employed and the skill level of shipyard workers to properly fabricate them. In the absence of a human crew, and with the greater reliability of primary electrical components controlling the vessel, an unmanned drone submarine would have extraordinary endurance and cost relatively little to produce. If a quarter of the energy of an SSA (Submarine, Aluminum powered or Regional/Tactical Attack) were available to such a SSQ of one tenth the displacement, it could transit thousands of nautical miles and conduct low energy surveillance operations over a whole region of ocean for many months and possibly for over a year. Four SSQ’s could be carried in the well deck of an LSD in a large navy, or towed across the ocean underwater by unpowered or powered tethers one or two at a time by equipped support ships for release near a patrol area. An SSQ would not need to be armed, and consequently, the dangers of autonomous control are alleviated, it only needs to track down contacts and pass the information to human controllers, much like a hound tracking down the fox or the waterfowl for the weapon armed hunters.
Development
In order to work up and set a definable specification for the manned attack submarine, a properly scaled prototype is required. This prototype small submarine effectively meets the requirements of a small ISR drone submarine with strategic range and endurance because it does not need to support a human crew. The development of the ‘SSQ’ would be the primary cost element along with a robust shore establishment to oversee the operations of the ISR fleet and provide strategic direction to it which would be ashore where it would be cost effectively maintained near a major population center.
In the early stages of program development, the SSQ could be outfitted with a small four crew detachable pilot vessel, allowing the trial boats to put to sea on short range missions to evolve and proof the boats’ ability to hunt down contacts with human oversight. Similarly, the existing Victoria-class boats could have one of the diesels replaced by aluminum fuel cells internally with external saddle type air tanks/bladders, in order to put the technology under extended testing and improve the performance of the class prior to their replacements by service grade vessels. The earliest experimental and test submarines do not need be as much as 500t, but it would be both an effective size model for SSQ and a scaled model for the SSA, with generous margins that all manner of electronic sensor systems could be fitted out to the trial vessels. The SSQ also would be a practical platform for experimentation with other allied nations much like a micro-AUKUS arrangement.
Having developed the SSQ with its elevated level of extended endurance patterned around electrically driven active components, the follow on manned attack submarine would not require a large crew, and consequently, a large pressure hull. If the combat system were designed around 12 foot silos containing a nominally battery of 19 strike length weapons or sized combinations of battery powered mini-submarines of up to 25t, then the same manufacturing capacity could be used for a single deck interconnected manned compartment between the 2-4 silos of the vessel and above the fuel cell arrays that would aid in protecting the submariners manning the boat. An arsenal of smaller weapons based around a ~400mm x 4m tactical cell/tube size would increase magazine/expendables depth to around 40-50 in total, ensuring the boats’ do not have to withdraw prematurely in order to re-arm with all available munition types. Fabricating and welding high yield steels is not a minor consideration, and yet here it would largely become variations of similar structures of similar dimensions, there would be ample time to train people and develop the facility before construction begins and presumably proceeds in a timely process.
The role of AI is obviously important in the operation of the SSQ fleet of small ISR submarines, and the current generation of massive parallel processed correlative computing does not fully qualify as artificial intelligence, but that day of effectively autonomous operation if not far off. Human oversight always would be present since the prosecution of targets would be left to the ashore establishment and the manned attack submarines with long range weapons aboard and all other matters of strategic consideration in the deployment of the unmanned ISR fleet while at the same time ensuring the tactical pursuit of information is in the hands of intelligent technologies without the interference of personal shortcomings of human behavior little less the onerous demands of sustaining people in underwater vessels far from support bases.
It would be possibly to begin ramping up deployable systems inside of ten years and complete the process in twenty, with some systems and components potentially seeing use by and in support of the current four Victoria-class boats to reinforce the fleet prior to the planned program’s implementation.
Deployment
Following the maturation of the aluminum fuel cell components and the development of intelligent control and hull production capacities, a fleet of 15 ‘Houndshark’ SSQ’s and the ashore control establishment would be pursued with the production of 6 ‘Hecla-class’ manned SSA’s (Hecla, Fury, Erebus, Terror, Enterprise, and Resolute). The larger number of far more economical SSQ’s allows for a smaller and more manageable personnel base of submariners unlike a fleet of 12 manned diesel-electrics, a number based on minimum strategic coverage but not likeable attainable by a nation with poor financial support for its armed forces and a number greater than the total number of submarines it has ever operated in its entire history. Since the vessels would be primarily developed and supported in the province of Quebec around its aluminum industry and to spread out naval facilities from the traditional coastal locations, a fleet HQ in or around Quebec City which could assume control of the Naval Reserves and form the Arctic and Naval Reserve Fleet as an addition to the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. This fleet size would allow for the deployment of 7-10 ISR drone SSQ’s and 2-4 manned attack SSA’s at most given moments in time, or 2-3 SSQ’s and 1-2 SSA’s to any given fleet, an adequate but certainly not excessive level of deployment. Total numbers of submarines could be substantially increased if strategic demand required a larger number of hunter and killer submarines, a ramp up being much easier with smaller major assemblies that could be produced at far greater numbers of locations, and Canada would assume something of a world lead in this branch of naval technology.