By Jeff G. Gilmour, 31 October 2026
The Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) Defence Challenges document, managed by DND, outlined five core policy challenges in 2019, in response to the 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE). These policy challenges were:
- Canada Strong - focussing on the Arctic and continental defence, sovereignty, critical infrastructure protection, NORAD;
- Supporting Our People - CAF recruitment, retention, quality of life, personnel management;
- Strengthening the Industrial Base - delivering a cohesive Defence Industrial Strategy, enhancing sovereign procurement capabilities, maintaining supply chain resilience and supporting indigenous reconciliation;
- Navigating Strategic Competition - defending the rules-based international order, countering below-threshold conflicts and solidifying Indo-Pacific and European partnerships;
- Accelerating Technologies - integrating cyber, space, autonomous systems, AI and quantum technology.
In 2024, two important documents were released by Ottawa:
- The defence policy Our North, Strong and Free, and the
- Arctic Foreign Policy.
The Defence Policy of 2024 faced significant criticism from defence experts centred on a lack of urgency, unrealistic execution timelines and a failure to address a deep personnel crisis. Two key themes were the failure to meet the 2% of GDP benchmark and missing capital acquisition expectations. Military experts slammed the policy for operating on ‘peacetime processes and mentalities’ despite a deteriorating global security environment. Commentators describe the update as ‘all flash, no bang,’ arguing it was merely a restatement of traditional approaches rather than an urgent pivot toward war-fighting readiness.
Since 2019, many of the issues identified in the five core challenges of MINDS have been addressed, although many are still outstanding. Canada is at a crossroads of a series of geopolitical trends that now threaten sovereignty and security. Geography no longer offers the protection it once did. A critic of earlier defence policies has argued that previous policies lack a clear grand strategy.[1]
The Arctic Foreign Policy was criticized for some of the same concerns, based on a rapidly changing geophysical landscape. It was said that the document lacked clear objectives, challenges or ability to provide concrete deliverables.[2] As well, the threat assessment was vague and generic, and didn’t discuss the threat in the region from both China and Russia. It also failed to describe the military build-up of Russia’s forces along the Northern Sea Route.
One of the major deficiencies in both of these documents is their failure to mention potential combat conditions against potential foreign enemies. It has been reported in the media that a national defence strategic document is due to be released before the end of the year. Why do we need such a document? As reported in a recent conference on Canadian Seapower:
Over the past several years, global maritime competition has accelerated while Canada’s local challenges have only grown more complex. The Navy and Coast Guard now face an operating environment where conflict is no longer a worst-case scenario but an evolving reality. Canada therefore stands at an inflection point. The country must undertake a generational recapitalization to create maritime forces capable of deterrence, presence and war-fighting. The stakes surrounding this transformation are profound.…[3]
It is assumed that the national document would identify the threats and risks to this country. In addition, it would prescribe what the government considers to be defence and security priorities to be addressed by the three services and the Coast Guard.
In turn, each of the services and CCG would respond to address the priorities outlined in the national document. This would include force structure, equipment, personnel, operational timelines and various tactical considerations. For example, at the recent Seapower Conference at the University of Calgary, it was noted that the RCN had already drafted a proposed naval strategic document entitled “Clear for Action.” Captain (N) Rob Watt, the Director of Naval Strategy, noted this document emphasizes innovation and deterrence in an increasingly warlike world. As he said, “We need to defend ourselves in a more violent world, to deter by punishment if necessary.”[4]
As a result of the government announcing significant resources this past year for the Canadian Armed Forces and the CCG, they have pressed forward in acquiring or proposing a long laundry list of military equipment. For example, the RCN has stated it wants to acquire 15 destroyers, 12 submarines and possibly 16 corvettes.
Without knowing what the ‘priorities’ are in the national document, and before knowing what missions and responsibilities are under the new priorities outlined in the federal defence plan, it would seem that acquiring new equipment is premature. In any case, it appears the RCN has already drafted its initial plan in response, I assume, to reviewing the recently proposed national plan. The RCN Plan will likely have to be adjusted on the basis of last minute changes to the national document.
[1] See Rear-Admiral (ret’d) Brian Santarpia, “Canada’s need for a Grand Strategy,” Canadian Seapower Event Report, Calgary, 26-27 September 2026.
[2] See Wesley War, “Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” The Globe and Mail, 14 December 2024.
[3] Canadian Seapower Conference 2026 - University of Calgary, 15-16 October 2026 (Conference Program).
[4] For a discussion of this, see Bill Kaufmann, “Canada’s naval strategy takes aggressive tact,” Calgary Herald, 26 October 2026.
Image: Cover page of the 2024 Defence Policy Update, "Our North, Strong and Free". Credit: National Defence
