By Peter M. Sanderson, 2 March 2025
TKMS Type-212CD: Canada is under pressure for not meeting the 2% NATO defence spending goal but also for not having modern reliable equipment in general. Steve Chase reported in The Global and Mail that the Norwegian-German consortium have agreed to give Canada “early access to a boat” in 2035 so as to meet the target date for acquiring new boats. TKMS has even hired Canadian lobbyists. Looking at Chart #3, if every third boat is henceforth an RCN sub, our twelfth boat would arrive in the 2050s. Now look at Chart #1, the Victoria-class has the latest sensors, the boats can be certified safe but their reliability cannot be guaranteed - they are unreliable now.
Saab Damen C71 Expeditionary Blekinge-class: Everyone understands the advantage when allies all drive the same tank, fly the same fighter or sail the same sub with common sensors but we are under an expediential threat. When you look at Chart #2 you realize two things. First, Kockums is a two boat yard! Second, there are two Blekinge class boats actually under construction. If these boats meet expectations, then buy them.
I am not being rash. Here’s why: (1) Timing. Kockums has an open queue 2027-2037, they can build the remaining 10 boats before a second Type-212CD would be available; (2) Automation. Both the Korean and German boats require a crew of 50 in contrast to the Blekinge-class which can be handled by a M/F crew of just over 30; (3) Bow Multi-Mission Portal. Kockums invented it (with a nod to Jules Verne); (4) AIP. Kockums invented the original Sterling AIP – the one that makes the Kockums’ Gotland sub a “hole-in-the–water,” plus they have improved it to 40 days submerged; (5) the United States will no longer take ‘our word’ – cash purchases are required. The US President only has four years to complete Fortress North America, and being elderly, he may remember proud Canadian warriors from the days of Mackenzie King, Saint Laurent, Diefenbaker and Pearson -- when we were a Middle Power -- with a 19M population versus 41M today.
Image: A graphic of a Saab C71-series submarine. Credit: Saab.
14 thoughts on “CPSP RFI: Distressed Sale? TKMS makes a move”
Hello Peter,
While I think this willingness to think on the fly and pitch new ideas is commendable, I do have concerns regarding some of the ideas floated in your post.
With all due respect to the Germans, they seem to have a full plate of submarine orders already and even have additional vessels coming on top of that. I am somewhat skeptical that Germany can accommodate 12 submarines from a Canadian order, and it is increasingly obvious to me that Germany is greedily trying to paw away this deal from South Korea with whatever promises it can make to Canada. It seems very dubious that Germany and Norway will accept the kind of alternating delivery delays that bringing effectively double the current order book in will require, so I largely find their offering to be questionable.
Regarding the Swedish, I feel they are suffering from inexperience within their design and industrial elements that will hold them back significantly. Sweden is proposing a significantly enlarged vessel designed for Baltic operations. There are likely significant issues with the maturity of this design and potentially even the feasibility for Arctic and Oceanic use, regardless of what the Saab marketing department says. The claims that a 3,300t and 80m long submarine can be operated effectively by a base crew of 30 people is somewhat outlandish, given how the baseline A26 is looking at around 26 people itself while being much smaller. Given the issues Saab has had with the baseline A26 and the lack of recent experience with building modern submarines, I find their claims that they can properly fulfill our order within the required timeline to be questionable.
If you are advocating to purchase and operate both German and Swedish submarines, I think that is a poor idea. The Canadian submarine fleet of the future will be stretched already as it is regarding personnel and logistics, throwing in multiple different classes of vessels with mutually different systems is a nightmare in waiting.
It seems to me like the South Koreans with their KSS-III are the front runner for this contest and the only partner seemingly with a proven, large oceanic design that can be feasibly built to a timeline that works for Canada.
Have a good day,
Jimmy.
Jimmy – can we have your views on the suitability of the S-80+ from Navantia? I believe the Armada has an order for only 4 boats – the last to be delivered in 2029 – which may open the door to a larger RCN order once these are delivered. Boats 3 and 4 will come equipped with an AIP system, which should smooth the way for the RCN’s AIP ambitions. Moreover, the boat looks like it will accept NATO-pattern weapons from the get-go.
I admit that I know nothing about the ability of the shipyard in Cartagena to handle any overlap in Armada and RCN orders.
My equally imperfect knowledge of KSS-III is that it sports RoK sensors, electronics, and fire control systems and Republic of Korea (RoK) weapons. It has vertical launch tubes for short-range ballistic missiles of RoK origin. How do these factor into Canada’s decision-making? Is Hanwha Ocean offering the RCN something different?
Put another way, will Hanwha offer the most timely solution, but at a cost of inter-operability with NATO allies?
Hello Bill,
My view on the suitability of the S-80+ from Navantia for the RCN is rather dim overall. Navantia has proven time and time again that they are an unreliable partner who puts out sub-par work to its various customers. Both of Australia’s Navantia built replenishment vessels are currently out of service due to mechanical defects, and have had issues in the past. These sorts of issues have also crept up in the Canberra-class amphibious vessels as well regarding their mechanical reliability at times, alongside the fact that the process in which Australia worked with Navantia to produce the Hobart class was also marred with incompetency and issues coming from the Spanish side.
The Norwegians are currently undertaking legal action against Navantia for deficiencies within the frigate Helge Ingstad that could have exacerbated her loss, specifically regarding issues around the sealings of the propeller shafts allowing water to travel through the ship. S-80+ herself is likely the worst example of Spanish incompetency on full display, with Navantia themselves somehow mismanaging the design to the point where 100t of extra weight was added. General Dynamics Electric Boat from the US had to be brought in to fix the issue, which resulted in lengthening to the design which also made it incapable of fitting within required Spanish naval infrastructure. The S-80+ design has been languishing in the construction process for various reasons for many, many years, and the original design is rather old by this point. Their AIP system is long overdue and I have doubts if it is up to par with other nations’ offerings in the end.
Taking all of the above into consideration and looking at how vital this program is for Canada, I do not trust the Spanish to deliver us reasonably capable submarines, built to an acceptable standard on a suitable timeline. The Spanish have failed multiple export competitions, to the point where their design was rejected entirely. I am very skeptical of the ability of such a submarine to operate for extended periods within the Canadian Arctic, as required by the CPSP itself.
Canada seems to be looking to take on whatever design and its equipment wins wholesale, so interoperability won’t be as large of a concern if South Korean offerings comes with things such as license production of weapon systems in the larger deal. It seems Canada will be getting whatever Korea has, with the potential for swapping out the SLBM’s for their version of the Tomahawk. I do not think interoperability with NATO can save what looks like a fundamentally flawed design from a questionably competent potential partner.
Cheers,
Jimmy
Thanks. One wonders of the CPSP is able to assess the builder’s track record when judging the suitability of its offering. I may be wrong, when ‘high-level mandatory requirements’ are articulated, they do not include anything to the effect that the OEM must not be a muppet. That ‘requirement’ must be inserted (asserted?) by someone other than the project team.
With regard to Korean (RoK) vice RCN requirements, perhaps Hanwha has something in mind for an export version of the Batch 2 boats. By that I mean something in place of the vertical launch tubes, as per the DSME-3000 version offered to India. (If anyone reading this is attending the CANSEC 2025 defence trade show in Ottawa in June, perhaps an answer to that question can be gleaned from the Hanwha reps on site.)
Good afternoon Jimmy,
Thank you for providing a valuable look-in on the state of at least one part of the international shipbuilding scene.
I have often thought that the Broadsides Forum’s discussions about the NSS frequently wandered down the mendacious path of criticizing all of Canada’s shipyards as being: incompetent, unable to produce useful ships in a timely and cost-effective manner, and existing only to live on unwarranted government handouts. At the same time, it was implied that every other shipyard in the world – even those in Switzerland and Liechtenstein – is a paragon of efficiency, performance, and cost effectiveness. Thus, logically, we should abandon the NSS and let other countries build our ships.
Your comment brings a essential element of reality to such fever dreams.
Ubique,
Les
I second Jimmy’s statement above.
Spain is just not reliable or a suitable partner.
Jimmy – Your concerns of both the German & Swedish sides are well founded. However, TKMS is already expanding one yard and gearing up a second to build submarines, therefore the production run for them will double and they can handle 3 in build 1 fitting out presently.
So this area isn’t of a concern as much, what is of concern is would Germany and Norway accept a overlapping schedule? My gut says yes they would purely on the basis they will both make capital out of it.
Sweden A26 design is brand new although uses heritage components, the current A26 is 6-8 years behind schedule something the author hasn’t pointed out, they also lack in export expertise and the last lot they did assist with the Collins-class turned out to be a Royal headache for the RAN.
South Korea realistically could get boats in the water by early 2030 if we order now, but you must question the quality of the boats and after-sales care because South Korea also has limited experience in exporting submarines (but more than Sweden).
The next principal obstacle is the Canadian government. Will we get 12 boats, I highly doubt it, will the process be efficient, unlikely. Is this cynical, absolutely but I have seen the Canadian gov procurement process up close and it is utterly shambolic.
Overall I would say the KSIII & Type 212CD are the front runners currently.
Hello Blair,
I have also heard the claims from TKMS regarding their upcoming additional shipyard infrastructure however, I remain unconvinced by their claims. There has been much rumination between the Germans and Norwegians just to figure out how to alternate the current schedule to fit both of their requirements. They both have additional boat orders planned to enter the production line in excess of what I mentioned above. They have offered Canada some initial unknown number of boats by further delaying their own schedule, but details have been sparse and Norway has said recently that they will not be having any delays to their order. Is Germany willing to take a substantial delay while this new potential yard and production line spins up? Especially with how the geopolitical situation in Europe is currently developing? Colour me suspicious of these attempts to woo us. How fast is this additional capability going to spin up? Can it realistically fulfill our timeline? I also have espionage concerns within Germany from Russia or other actors, given the issues their surface fleet has had recently. Many questions to ask.
TKMS has also been courting Poland, Singapore and Morocco with the potential for orders in addition to Canada with our very substantial potential order. With such a substantial order, I feel Canada would be ill-advised to sign onto a crowded shipbuilder who very well might treat us as second fiddle. There is value in a partnership between Germany, Norway and Canada however, Canada ultimately needs to pick the option that best suits ourselves and not our allies. The Korean option seems to be a much more equal and realistic partnership, although they have a reputation for promising the world as well to customers. I am more inclined to buy the Korean pitch, given how they aren’t overextending themselves with multiple customers at one time. South Korean export quality and export experience does not especially bother me at this time, as they have had issues in the past but have seemingly made major improvements. Their current boats for the Korean Navy seem to have been working fine, and they do have export experience for submarines and a wide variety of other systems.
The German design is likely more technologically advanced than the Korean offering and the joint partnership with two NATO allies is quite valuable. My concerns largely lay with the Germans realistically being able to undertake our order on the required timeline, and treating us respectfully as their most valued partner. The Koreans seem to be hungry for this contract and willing to do quite a bit, while giving us their undivided attention as a shipbuilding partner. Both would be great options, but I am leaning heavily towards the KSS-III at this point.
The Koreans have supposedly offered us to jump the line and get us in a submarine currently in production within 5 years so we have something to train on. KSS-III has supposedly been selected for some time now and this will probably seal the deal. Hopefully we’ll hear something official soon.
Good Evening Jimmy
Currently the tooling for the second yard and expansion of the first is under way as we speak. The production operation of TKMS is limited to submarine orders unlike the Koreans who slip commercial ships into the mix between gaps in the schedule to keep yards going.
So I am quite hopeful they will be able to fulfill Canadian orders as planned, and yes Germany would be able to afford to offset their own acquisition to make it happen mainly because the hull lives of the existing fleet is actually quite low.
I do like the Korean offer, their design lineage is actually derived from Type 214 boats on which the KSIII is based. In terms of technology the Koreans are well up there and I would put them on par with Europe & USA (along with Japan). They do field high-end equipment.
Yes their time lines will likely be quicker than Germany but I also feel the after care for the boats won’t be of as good quality as what the Germans will offer.
With this new package the Koreans are offering it is very tempting indeed. However buyer beware in many aspects, as the saying goes “Noli equi dentes inspicere donati.”
With respect to the author, there are many key points being missed here in his submission which are vital to know before making any bid.
1. Kokums while they build two at a time will likely get an order for another batch from the Swedish government to replace other submarines coming out of service as they operate 3 boats presently (1 mothballed).
They have tended to build 2 at a time, and therefore domestically the Swedish boats will be the priority, there is also a major delay in the A26 program (6-8 years) so don’t think this is efficiency because it really isn’t.
You should also note the same yard also does maintenance and upgrades to existing boats of the Swedish navy which also eats into space and scheduling, not to mention possible plans for an expansion in the submarine arm as indicated by Sweden.
2. TKMS has already stated last year that they plan an expansion of the yard so they can build more boats faster so that time line should shrink somewhat.
3. Have no idea why you mentioned M/F crew as an advantage because the German Submarines do offer the same thing, and women have been serving on submarines since 2014 so moot point.
4. Blekinge-class is much smaller than a Type 212 and the post 45 day endurance is no better than what we have now with the Victoria except that she can remain submerged for most of that time.
In contrast the 212CD minimum specs are 45 days also however her larger size allows for more stores so even with a bigger crew you’re looking at 75+ days un-replenished (given the smaller 212A can do 12 weeks un-replenished).
5. Blekinge-class are unproven and indeed only a few of their systems and subsystems have been proven and used before and thus these are brand new. The only recent export of Swedish submarines was the Collins class which turned out to be more of a headache than anything when built, and the Swedes were lacking a lot in after-sales care.
The Type 212CD is a enlarged refinement of the very successful Type 212A family which are operated by many allied navies inside and outside of NATO and thus have proven linage and systems and aftercare for the boats is very good and the manufacturer has a lot of experience of exporting submarines.
6. First Type 212CD was laid down in 2023 which is for the Norwegian Navy. The fact is TKMS can have 3 boats in build at any time and with the yard expansion that will likely increase to 4 maybe even 5 and there will be 2 yards producing them not 1.
7. Crew size is not indicative of automation (or lack of). Most western navies actually over crew their submarines, on the Trafalgars we often carried 120-130 and those boats were highly automated the Astutes more so.
The fact is when you took out the surplus crew on the Trafalgars we could get away with around 75-80 crew.
Do not fall into the trap of less crew is a good thing because when the proverbial hits the fan those extra people onboard are the difference between saving the boat and not. (Just asked the Soviets).
8. While nice to have, the multi-mission portal is irrelevant – the RCN does not require such an attachment. I also doubt we have the trained people to actually use it. The RCN have been specific and stated ocean-going patrol, and this multi mission portal is primarily focused around littoral operations.
If you want to go down that route then there’s no reason you cannot put a DDS on the back of either the Blekinge or 212CD; you get the same result however; I don’t see the use for it in the RCN and just to add the Type 212A already has a lock out chamber in its fin for divers.
9. No! Saab and Kokums did not invent the Sterling engine they refined, adapted and modernized it using existing technology to fit into submarines, the principle of the engine remains the same as it did in 1816. Indeed the first Sterling engine was patented in 1816 by Scottish engineer Robert Sterling, there are also other variations of the engine also patented around the same time.
Kokums developed it from there and the Sterling engine which is very useful is not the main driving force behind the submarine it is a generator system which is used to charge banks of batteries.
10. “The one that makes them a hole in the water” I would strongly advise you not to get caught up in the propaganda of sales and marketing. Having gone against Swedish boats they do have a very big tell and a unique acoustic signature. In fact if you catch one, most sonar ops will be able to classify it in minutes because unlike the fuel cell system on the 212A the Sterling Engine does have moving parts whereas; the fuel cell system does not.
Most people think that all the sonar ops are listening for is the sound of the screw (or propulsor) – it really isn’t, in order to classify a contact you are looking for its engineering spaces as well.
A good sonar op will be able to tell the difference between a ship running on a MTU or Suzler plant for example. They will even be able to tell you its stroke ratio and type and size engine in use and how many.
Because the Sterling engine has moving parts, it does have a signature therefore it’s detectable, the fuel cell system uses two chemicals (Hydrogen & Oxygen) going through a anode membrane to generate power, thus it has no moving parts.
11. Few countries operate Swedish designed submarines, indeed Singapore, & Australia are the only 2. In contrast German designed and built submarines are operated in over 20 states many of which are allied to Canada.
To conclude, the Blekinge class while a decent design is in my opinion not suitable for the RCN, the boat is designed for littoral operations and the design shows this. As the Canadian government has stated, it is looking for an ocean-going submarine capable of operating near ice.
While the Blekinge could do limited ocean work, it should be noted this is not what it is optimized for. Indeed the submarines it replaces are unable to operate effectively in the open ocean due to transit times being a worry (hence when the USN leased one they used a heavy lift ship to get it to the base).
We also tend to get hung up on automation and that is a very dangerous game to play. Reduction in crew sizes, while offering noticeable benefits in operational cost and so forth, you leave out a 3 critical aspects namely safety, fatigue and maintenance.
There is a big reason why submarines like the Ula, Gotland, Type 212A do “short duration missions” usually less than 45 days, and that is because there isn’t the crew available for rotation or to fill in when some one is sick so the crew work load increases causing fatigue. This is almost suicidal in a submarine.
In contrast if you look at submarines that are over-crewed such as the Trafalgars which have done 200+ days underway, the crew are not strained at the end. Indeed to point out the safety factor when travelling surfaced in rough seas, and my time on HMS Triumph proved this, you can lose 50% of the crew confined to bunks due to sickness. (and yes I get the differences between SSNs & SSKs).
I would also urge caution with the Blekinge. It’s already 8 years late, has had serious issues. The yard they build them has no plans currently to expand, they also are looking at new orders and increased submarines for the Swedish navy, then factor in they maintain & upgrade the current fleet. So with respect to the author, that gap he sees in the scheduling lineup doe not actually exist in reality.
Sources:
(1) https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/04/sweden-looking-at-more-surface-combatants-and-submarines/#:~:text=More%20submarines%20?,indicate%20a%20change%20in%20requirements.
(2) https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/buoyed-by-orders-german-submarine-builder-tkms-to-expand-shipyards/ar-AA1w9Y4b
(3)https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/news/2024/09/government-of-canada-announces-progress-on-the-canadian-patrol-submarine-procurement.html
(4) https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-26867025#:~:text=The%20German%20Navy%20has%20recently,of%20her%20fellow%20crew%20members.
(5) https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/radical-new-stealth-submarine-type-212cd-will-be-much-larger/
(6) https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/saab-lays-keel-of-first-a26-blekinge-class-submarine/
(7) https://fchea.org/learning-center/fuel-cell-basics/
Excellent synopsis Blair. Thank your for contributing this comment.
Effectively all of these small diesel-electric submarines, regardless of the minimally useful AIP features tacked on, assume the patrol area starts at the harbour entrance. In Canada’s case, that is off by upwards of 5000nm. Nor do they account for a fraction of the total energy required to operate effectively under the Arctic ice with any meaningful objective.
Canada has one of the leading aluminum industries in the world largely centered in Quebec with its abundant hydro-electric capacity (PRC spies have been caught attempting to steal its industrial secrets). Aluminum fuel cells, even in their limited current development, offer energy levels up to ten times greater than shock intolerant runaway melt-down prone lithium batteries or explosive hydrogen fuel cells, and are economically equal to diesel fuel by the vast majority of cost assessments.
An investment in Canada, instead of the typically lazy approach of government, would provide efficient 9000 series aluminum (-sodium/zinc) fuel cell alloys, which along with OEA40 (oxygen enriched air 40%, a common scuba tank term) for half the fuel cell aluminum and atmospheric air drawn when required to top up the reserves, will provide the required range for an effective Canadian submarine force.
A half dozen 5000t SSA’s (Hecla class? attack submarines) and fifteen 500t SSQ’s (Houndshark class? unmanned unarmed ISR boats semi-autonomously controlled by AI type mission decision making for up to a year at a time or three days of support to a surface group), and one 500t SST (blackwater operations, discussion withheld), would provide the submarine force required, alternatives like the parent article here only serve the career surfers and provide a low level of cost efficiency and woefully inadequate level of cost effectiveness.
As the century comes to an end, assuming a global war does not start in the Indo-Pacific in the next decade, economically viable sources of hydrocarbon fuels will start to dry up (including the massive natural gas deposits under the Arctic Ocean), the early investment in aluminum fuel cells would restore Canada to energy dominance in the world.
Saab appears to have significant problems delivering two A26/Blekinge-class submarines to the Swedish Navy. The program had already incurred a five year delay, & now adds another five years on top. Delivery slips from ca 2028 to later than 2031.
https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/Av9mO3/svenska-superubatarna-hms-blekinge-och-hms-skane-forsenade-igen