By David Morse, 13 December 2024
As the government ponders new levels of defence funding, there will be many questions about the intent and purpose - the strategy - behind any new capabilities or tasks or partnerships. It will not be the first time that these questions have been asked and not the first time that ambitious announcements have failed to produce a tangible product - the ambition for a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines in the 1980s; the swing towards a joint capability in the Joint Support Ship in the 2000s; the saga of the Sea King replacement by the EH 101; one could go on. For a time in the early 2000s a serious debate over the structure and mission for the navy, in particular, was triggered in papers such as the attached by Peter Haydon - "Canadian Naval Future". Although the paper is dated in some ways - i.e., the Pacific theatre is only superficially mentioned, the Middle East challenges and the denial of the Red Sea to commercial traffic could not be anticipated - the paper was prescient in explaining the rationale for a navy and the Canadian Navy in particular.
Recent equipment decisions such as the purchase of P8 maritime patrol aircraft, crewed AEW aircraft and long-range surveillance UAVs have been announced without a strategy that integrates the air and sea components of an overall strategy. Is it time to re-examine these issues?
One thought on “What Use a Navy”
To be honest, it is almost like the tail wagging the dog, we seem to dream up these ideas and can’t follow through, or have no clue how to implement or integrate them. I call it defense illiteracy.
Let’s take one example here – the River class Destroyer which will have a grand total of 24VLS and yet we have seen how drone swarms can be effective against ships.
Now I know some in this forum will chime in and say well the MK41 VLS can use a multitude of weapons and the ESSM can be quad packed, yes it can but who is carrying 96 ESSMs? And if we are going to carry 96 ESSMs, one has to question the entire point of A) having an Aegis system in the first place and B) why bother with the expensive MK41 VLS.
At best you’re going to have only about half that number because you need more munition types to round out defense in depth. The ESSM has no ABM capability either and so are we just going for the Rolls Royce option so we can have the badge?
Over all it does appear to me that the entirety of the CAF is rather disjointed and no one knows what the other is doing because there’s no communication and clearly no leadership (Politically) with even half an idea of how to form a strategy, build a plan and deliver on that plan.