" This article offers serious food for thought on a far wider scale than the UK alone, begging questions such as, 'Has military procurement become so expensive that the world leaders will not be able to maintain existing levels of global engagement?' 'Will we have to allow the international thugs and bullies to go unpunished and their actions unchecked?' 'Is national security becoming so expensive that we must accept a higher degree of risk?' And there are many, many more questions that could be asked. Of all those questions, the one that may the most important is, simply, 'Is the growing cost of traditional defense policies forcing changes in the international system?' It would be easy to imagine a world where the more powerful states adopt semi-isolationist philosophies -- echoes of America First if you wish.
One option for solving the present defense fiscal woes would be to return to the original concepts embodied in 1945 in creating the United Nations that the UN would take the lead in dealing with instability in the world. At the time, a dedicated UN military force was envisaged. I'll leave that thought for others to contemplate. All I will say is that in light of the UN's inability to stop the slaughter in Syria, the thought of a UN-controlled military force is the stuff of nightmares.
Flippancy aside, it is long past time to re-think national security policies in light of rising costs.
Given that one of a government's principle requirements is the safety of its citizens, the question that has to be answered is, 'Does national security begin at the borders and boundaries or does it begin at the point of origin of the possible threats to security?' The answer to that political question determines whether the state adopts an internationalist or fortress mentality.
Adopting the former option requires a very flexible military structure even if future responses to threats are undertaken collectively with other states. In turn, this leads to the very complex issue of burden sharing, which as we all know, was a continual problem for Canada throughout the 1949-89 Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the previous reluctance to accept a fair share of the military cost of collective security was abandoned, but at considerable cost.
From a purely, Canadian perspective, the government needs to determine just what it wants the military to be able to do then hold it's nose and foot the bill for the appropriate equipment. It is time, actually, it's long past time, to stop playing politics with defense procurement and provide the Canadian Forces the equipment they need to carry out the government's bidding with the minimum risk."
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The Type 26 is still a paper airplane of sorts. Yes, the first metal has been cut but the first ship is years away from the sea and sorting out its bugs. The competing foreign designs are at sea and are proving their strengths and weaknesses. And we know the Halifax Class well and have the experience of ownership. To me, as a Canadian taxpayer and a follower of military and naval affairs, I believe Canada is best served by adopting a mature design that best meets our needs. Whether that is a revised CPF or a foreign design is one for the experts to decide. They must make their recommendations to the politicians very soon. By Brian Wentzell