By Alec Rembowski, 13 June 2025
The war in Ukraine is proving to be the testing grounds for revolutionary new technologies and techniques for conducting warfare moving into the second quarter of the 21st century. Through the war in Ukraine, we have witnessed a revolution of drone warfare on both sides of the conflict. Now states all over the globe are pondering how to harness the potential that drones can provide in their own militaries and how to defend against such a dangerous threat. However, is Canada ready to address this threat?
On June 1st Ukraine launched Operation Spider Web, a covert drone attack against Russian targets near Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur. The attack involved 117 mini drones remotely launching from the roofs of containers mounted on the backs of transport trucks, without the knowledge of the drivers, then striking Russian aircraft on their airfields. According to Ukrainian sources 41 Russian aircraft were either damaged or destroyed, costing approximately $5 billion dollars in damages. The Ukrainian operation demonstrated that a country could leverage drone technologies to conduct kinetic attacks remotely destroying military infrastructure far beyond ranges ever thought possible. It is now time for the Canadian government to start considering that similar actions could be taken against its military bases and civilian targets in Canada.
To circumvent Western sanctions in response to its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia established a shadow fleet consisting of Russian ghost ships that have been used to smuggle Russian oil to overseas markets. Lately these ships have been used to sabotage subsea fiber-optic cables that connect the world’s internet services. The Bell Canada subsea fiber-optic cable connecting Cape Breton to Newfoundland was cut twice in 2024. The second incident, which occurred on 24 December 2024, is believed to have been conducted by a Russian ghost ship.
With the Russian shadow fleet smuggling their domestic oil and sabotaging subsea fiber-optic cables, it is not hard to imagine that a Russian ghost ship could enter the Halifax Harbour to target CFB Halifax to degrade Canada’s maritime domain capabilities. Similar to the Ukrainian attack in Russia, drones could fly out of shipping containers to deliver a kinetic attack across Halifax. CFB Halifax would be a very appealing target for a drone strike of this nature as the entirety of the navy’s Canadian Fleet Atlantic is based there, while all the Air Force’s Atlantic maritime helicopter force is based out of 12 Wing Shearwater. By attacking Halifax, the adversary also could damage Irving Shipbuilding, denying the RCN the capability to build replacement combat capable vessels and facilities where the damaged ships could get repaired. As demonstrated with Exercise Cutlass Fury 2025, CFB Halifax frequently hosts military vessels from other navies -- most importantly allied aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. An adversary may aim to exploit opportunities to damage allied capital ships while they are in port, such as the attack on USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. Ukraine has also demonstrated the vulnerabilities of port security as it has frequently attempted to undermine Russia’s maritime presence in the war by attacking their naval base at Sevastopol. This has forced significant portions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate deeper in Russian territory. Alternatively drone technologies will be used as improvised explosive devises in terrorist attacks in the future. Canadian security agencies need to be prepared for drones being employed to create mass casualty events.
Canada currently has no ground-based defences against drone attacks. In February 2024, the Department of National Defence announced that it had purchased several pieces of counter Unmanned Aerial Systems specifically to address Canada’s lack of drone defence in Latvia. However, none of that technology was intended to be incorporated into Canada’s domestic security. The Canadian Army has not had an air defence unit in Halifax since the 1st (Halifax) Medium Anti-Aircraft Regiment was turned into a field artillery unit in 1960.
Addressing the drone threat is not the responsibility of any one service in isolation as it is a force protection problem. The RCAF is investigating establishing its own unit designed to defend air force bases in Canada like the RAF Regiment in the United Kingdom. An air defence mandate may be incorporated into this proposed unit’s mandate. Perhaps the RCN needs to look at addressing this threat in a similar manor as the RCAF is. Perhaps it is time to investigate if the RCN needs to consider developing a ground-based air defence capability to protect RCN critical infrastructure like CFB Halifax. But no matter who provides the ground-based protection, Canada needs to play catch up.
Image: Canadian and International ships participating in Exercise Cutlass Fury sail out of the Halifax harbour on their way to Exercise Cutlass Fury 2023 on 10 September 2023 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Credit: Corporal Alexandre Arsenault, Canadian Armed Forces
2 thoughts on “How can the RCN address the drone threat on CFB Halifax?”
While the article raises valid points about emerging drone threats, it relies heavily on speculation and misinformation:
There is no verified evidence linking the December 2024 Bell Canada cable disruptions to “Russian ghost ships.” Subsea cables are frequently damaged by fishing gear or anchors—not hostile actors. Canada’s Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) and allied intelligence partners actively monitor suspicious vessel activity in our waters.
The term “ghost ships” is a misnomer. Russia’s shadow fleet used to evade oil sanctions operates far from Canadian shores. These vessels are tracked by international AIS monitoring and naval ISR assets. Suggesting they could stealthily deploy drones in Halifax Harbour ignores Canada’s robust port surveillance and security frameworks.
On drone defence, Canada is not unprepared. The CAF has already begun procurement and testing of counter-UAS systems (including RF jammers, EO/IR sensors, and directed energy tech). These are scalable for use at key bases, including CFB Halifax.
RCN force protection measures, already in place for foreign port visits, include portable drone detection and electronic warfare capabilities. The focus is on joint layered defence across DND, Public Safety, and local law enforcement—not service-specific duplication.
Canada is not “playing catch-up”—it is quietly modernizing based on real intelligence and threat assessments, not alarmist hypotheticals.
Thank you for your comments. You raise some interesting points, I would be interested to hear which point you thought were valid pertaining to the emerging drone threat.
Pertaining to the Bell Canada disruptions, my comment that the second incident was believed to be a Russian ghost ship was drawn from a CBC article, but I am very aware that often these incidents are caused by unintentional commercial maritime activities.
Regarding Canadian ISR and organizations like MSOC, this piece was in no way aimed to discredit the work of those organizations. However, I am unconvinced that Canadian intelligence networks are incapable of facing a strategic surprise by Canada’s adversaries. While Russia’s shadow fleet is currently being used to evade oil sanctions, I would refrain from dismissing that Russia or any of Canada’s adversaries couldn’t change SOPs/TTPs in order to force a change in the current security environment. As Ukraine demonstrated in its mini-drone attacks in early June. One such relevant case was the sinking of HMCS Esquimalt on the 16th of April 1945 just outside of Halifax. When German submarines abandoned the Wolf Packs in favour of hunting near coastal waters. While a kinetic attack against Halifax would be unlikely we need to ask these types of questions to mitigate the risk of a strategic surprise to prevent these types of catastrophes if such events were to take place. Therefore, I remain unconvinced that we can just say our ISR resources and organizations are robust and leave it at that.
Pertaining to the dismissal of a surprise attack such as a ship moving into Halifax and deploying drones to strike targets in the city. This idea was conveyed in interviews with CAF SMEs for a DND funded research project. It was not thought of organically by the author. But perhaps a more grounded potential example would have been more convincing, such as an adversary agent using a drone to conduct malicious ISR on CAF facilities and infrastructure in Halifax. This was another potential threat identified as part of this DND research project. What could Canada do to prevent such actions?
I believe that openly discussing the range of drone threats against Halifax at least gets the conversation started as to what could be possible from adversary states and what could be done to defend against such actions. In other words, a hypothesis that can serve as a starting point for future investigation.