Leveraging the Canadian Surface Combatant for Ballistic Missile Defence
By Lieutenant-Commander Damien Ciotti*
Winner of the 2024 CNMT Essay Competition
While Canada contributes personnel to the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Mission as a part of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), Canada currently lacks the ability to intercept ballistic missile threats. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has, however, selected systems for the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC)1 which will enable Canada to conduct independent detection of ballistic missiles, and conduct intercept missions.2 Through the CSC, the RCN can deliver on Canada’s NORAD modernization goals by significantly increasing the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capability of assets declared to NORAD. The combination of a command and control (C2) system with a ballistic missile detection sensor in the CSC project creates the possibility of a seaborne platform with an intercept capability. Paired with the appropriate interceptor, this suite would build Canadian missile defence coverage over a significant portion of Canada which is currently vulnerable to ballistic missile attack.
In a world where threats of ballistic missile attack are rapidly expanding, there is both a national requirement for defence, and a further requirement for seaborne ballistic missile defence (BMD). This article contends that leveraging the capabilities of the CSC is crucial for shaping a shift in Canadian policy towards conducting BMD operations. Focused development of BMD competencies in the CSC will strengthen Canada’s security in North America through improved integrated air defence delivered via NORAD, and contribute to global peace and security by delivering a deterrent to hostile actors who threaten ballistic missile attacks.
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has the institutional intention to capitalize on the enhanced capabilities of projects like the F-35 fighter jet, NORAD modernization and the CSC in the coming decade to bolster Canadian participation in missile defence operations. These operations will require improved air defence capabilities across the CAF. NORAD modernization prioritizes improving IAMD but focuses on air-centric aspects and delivery of the F-35.3 However, there is an opportunity to incorporate a maritime element while adding defence capability, crucially expanding Canada’s integrated air defence capability and facilitating response from varied and dispersed platforms.
This article examines both past and present Canadian BMD policies, providing an analysis through a comparative approach, evaluating the organization, equipment and deployment strategies of the US Navy’s (USN) BMD capabilities. The article advocates for the RCN to utilize BMD capabilities obtained through the CSC project. Specifically, the RCN should employ these capabilities to detect and counter ballistic missiles in support of NORAD and other strategic missions. The comparison is centred on the equipment involved from the USN and in the CSC project which would enable this mission set.
What is BMD?
Ballistic missile defence can be described as “a system, weapon, or technology, involved in the detection, tracking, interception and destruction of attacking missiles.”4 The concept emerged during the Cold War, focused on countering intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. It marked a strategic shift from the deterrence-by-punishment doctrine, exemplified by Mutually Assured Destruction. Instead, BMD exercised deterrence by denial, emphasizing the ability to intercept and neutralize hostile missiles before they reach allied territories.
BMD systems have evolved beyond the Cold War paradigm, adapting to emerging threats. This maturation enables engagement not only of long-range nuclear missiles but also shorter-range, non-nuclear missiles.5 This adaptability is crucial in addressing a diverse range of post-Cold War missile threats, including from regional conflicts, and advanced technologies that have proliferated among state and non-state actors, such as the Houthis in Yemen who have used ballistic missiles to attack civilian merchant shipping in the Red Sea.6
Canadian Policy
Historically, Canada has had a complex relationship with missile defence initiatives, particularly those advanced by the United States. In the late 1950s, Canada acquired two squadrons of the CIM-10 Bomarc surface-to-air missile for the newly integrated North American air defence system.7 Designed to intercept and destroy incoming enemy aircraft, Bomarc became part of the joint defence arrangement symbolized by NORAD. Meant to be equipped with nuclear warheads, the presence of Bomarcs on Canadian soil triggered a public debate on the implications and potential consequences for Canadian security and sovereignty, contributing to the eventual downfall of the John Diefenbaker government.
The US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), presented by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, proposed a missile defence system to safeguard the United States and its allies from potential Soviet nuclear missile attacks.8 Referred to as ‘Star Wars’ in the media for its ambitious goals, SDI envisioned using ground- and space-based technologies to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney declined Canadian participation, citing sovereignty concerns and complaining that Canada “would not be able to call the shots.”9 The Canadian public strongly opposed both the Bomarc missile deployment and the SDI, with opposition raising concerns over national security, sovereignty and the potential escalation of the arms race. This widespread dissent reflected fears that Canada’s involvement in these missile defence programs would entangle the country in US military strategies and increase its vulnerability in a nuclear conflict during the Cold War.
While the SDI never materialized, its elements laid the groundwork for subsequent US programs. In the early 2000s, the issue gained prominence in Canada as the United States proposed a much-reduced missile defence program to counter rogue states with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). However, in 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin decided against joining the US BMD program.10 The decision was related to concerns about effectiveness, compatibility with Canada’s defence priorities, and a desire to maintain diplomatic independence. While vocal public opposition remained, polls conducted at the time indicated that public opinion had shifted significantly, and that surveys revealed a nearly even split in opinion, with 52% of Canadians opposing participation in the US BMD system and 46% supporting it.11 However, the opposition was notably more passionate, and drove a strong and vocal resistance against the initiative.
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Notes
* Opinions expressed or implied in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Armed Forces.
1. Note that since this article was written, the RCN has decided on a name for the class – the River-class. For simplicity, the article will continue to refer to the CSC.
2. David Dunlop, “A Potential Political Brawl over BMD Capabilities on Canada’s CSC Type 26 Frigates?” Broadsides, Canadian Naval Review, 27 November 2023.
3. Government of Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), “Domestic and Continental Defence,” 31 August 2023.
4. Katherine Ziesing, “Ballistic Missile Defence 101: An Introduction,” Australian Defence Magazine, 4 June 2015.
5. Ibid.
6. William Mauldin and Thomas Grove, “US, UK Warships Shoot Down Houthi Barrage in Red Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2024.
7. John Boyco, “Bomarc Missile Crisis,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, 7 February 2006.
8. United States, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The Office of Electronic Information, “Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 1983,” 1 May 2008.
9. Frank Harvey, et al., “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence,” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2014.
10. Ibid.
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