By Moderator, 21 March 2026
If Canada had to list its three closest friends, the list would probably be the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. It’s possible that the United States won’t make the list for much longer, but the UK and Australia are middle powers from which Canada can learn. It’s interesting, therefore, to look at the view from these countries about the situation in the Middle East. There are some interesting articles examining possible naval responses, scenarios and repercussions. I will mention two of them here.
US President Donald Trump has, in his ill-advised war with Iran, made demands on other countries to sort out the mess in the Strait of Hormuz. The initial reaction from countries he has asked has been lukewarm at best, but the UK seems to be wavering a bit now. There’s an interesting article in Naval Lookout, “If called upon, what assets could the Royal Navy send to the Gulf?” (https://www.navylookout.com/if-called-upon-what-assets-could-the-royal-navy-send-to-the-gulf/). What is the answer to this question? The article outlines the RN’s current naval assets. Based on this, whatever the British Prime Minister decides, he’ll be constrained by the state of the navy -- the surface fleet is a shadow of its former self and any naval assets deployed into the Gulf would be at risk because of inadequate air defence. The article concludes “[i]n addition to the SSN likely already in the region, at best the RN probably could send one frigate, one destroyer, some armed helicopters and a limited autonomous minehunting capability to the Gulf. A couple of warships would not offer a sustained presence or allow contingency for damage, breakdowns, or crew rest. Only in a broad coalition with the navies of many other nations could there be the number of escorts to achieve any kind of strategic effect.”
In terms of Australia, another interesting article -- Jennifer Parker, “Crisis in Middle East exposes Australia’s maritime vulnerability” -- has examined the state and focus of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in light of the US/Israel war on Iran. The war has made clear the dependence Australia has on energy imports via the sea, and the fact that it needs to take its dependence on maritime trade more seriously. Contrary to what a recent Defence Strategic Review recommended, the navy, rather than a coast guard, still takes care of most border protection and enforcement activities. The author argues that “A properly structured coastguard should carry this burden so the navy can focus on protecting trade and operating forward.” And more attention needs to be paid to increasing the capabilities of the navy – including frigates, destroyers and submarines. As the author notes, “The Hunter frigate program, the planned acquisition of Mogami-class frigates and AUKUS all point in the right direction. But they are not moving fast enough.” Now that Australia is increasingly concerned about imports coming from (or through) the Middle East, “Capability gaps that directly affect the protection of trade must be addressed urgently. Naval logistics, mine warfare and hydrography all require urgent investment. The latter two are areas where Australia can build sovereign capacity relatively quickly, but only if government is prepared to prioritise them.” See Jennifer Parker, “Crisis in Middle East exposes Australia’s maritime vulnerability,” https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/crisis-in-middle-east-exposes-australias-maritime-vulnerability/
Image: A US M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) conducts a live-fire mission during Operation Epic Fury in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. (U.S. Army Photo)
