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Editorial

Standing into Danger: Trouble in Asian Waters

The brittle and problematic nature of the Indo-Pacific region reflects a dramatic realignment in the global balance of naval power. The old, frontline navies, like the Royal Navy (RN) and the US Navy, have fallen on hard times, diminished in numerical terms and undermined by conditions of austerity. In 1962 the RN had 152 frigates and destroyers; now it has 19. Similarly, in the last quarter century the world’s most powerful navy, the US Navy, has been cut in two, quantitatively. One can point to the remarkable qualitative improvements of the 286 or so USN warships today, but the service, weakened by sequestration, is struggling to meet its global commitments.

Across the Pacific, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has grown enormously in size and sophistication. Indeed, a short while ago The Economist newspaper published a graph showing the PLAN surpassing the USN in overall numbers. This may be true in statistical terms but it was, of course, a cartoon. The PLAN has only one carrier compared to 11 in the USN and the comparison fails to address the huge aggregation of maritime experience that sets the USN apart from all other navies.

Nonetheless, the growth of the PLAN is a phenomenon of enormous consequence. The Chinese have become converts to American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan and not only see a great navy as a hallmark of a great nation but global naval power as their national due. What makes the Indo-Pacific region particularly interesting is the fact that it boasts an unprecedented correlation of naval power with a powerful Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), a powerful PLAN and a powerful Indian Navy (IN). Thus, the much-vaunted shift in the global centre of economic gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific has been matched by an equally profound shift in naval power. What is more, states, large and small, have been increasing the size of their fleets. Some observers have argued that we are witnessing a naval arms race; that this is not merely a question of modernization but of an action-reaction phenomenon that entails states matching the acquisitions of their neighbours.

Of particular note is the fact that almost all of the regional states are getting into the submarine game. The Royal Australian Navy is hoping to expand its submarine fleet from six to 12, the Vietnamese are acquiring six conventional Kilo-class submarines from the Russians, the Malaysians have acquired Scorpènes from the French, and the Singaporeans (with a population roughly equal to that of Metro Toronto) have acquired Swedish boats. There are upwards of 200 boats operating in the two oceans in environments where increasingly silent submarines are excruciatingly difficult to find. In addition, bigger navies, like the IN and the PLAN, have an inventory of nuclear-powered boats and both navies possess ballistic missile submarines.

All of this, of course, has not been lost on the USN, and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 called for a deployment of USN assets in favour of the Indo-Pacific region with six of the navy’s 11 carriers and 60% of its submarine force operating in those two oceans. Not surprisingly, the Chinese have taken a rather jaundiced view of powerful American maritime forces operating close to the Asian shore. Part of that presence is attributable to a reassessment of the strategic balance and part to what was originally called the American ‘pivot’ to the Pacific. That term has been amended to ‘rebalance’ since the United States has always been present in the region, despite military sidebars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What Washington has attempted to do over the last half decade is to mount a major diplomatic, military and economic campaign to reassure its Asian allies that the United States is serious about its commitments to the region and that it will be there for the long haul.

To a large degree the rebalancing strategy is a reflection of the troubled trans-Pacific relationship between Washington and Beijing. The Chinese have tended to
adopt a triumphantist point of view, arguing that Washington’s current travails are illustrative of a regime that has entered a period of inexorable decline. For their part, the Americans are concerned about China’s end game and are worried by the assertive nature of Chinese foreign policy, particularly at sea where, among other things, it has tended to advance aberrant interpretations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Complicating matters inordinately is a Chinese sensitivity born of a sense of victimization. The Chinese feel that they were humiliated in the past by foreign powers and that these same powers are continuing to undercut China’s legitimate ambitions. Indeed, when Beijing looks out at the Indo-Pacific region it perceives a form of containment with a loose array of maritime powers – the United States, Japan, India, Australia and Singapore – collaborating in what looks like a concert of navies hostile to China. This is overstating the case, but the fact remains that these states have much in common and are concerned about Chinese designs in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

For many years Beijing was adept at promoting rhetoric about the harmonious, non-threatening rise of China. The maritime subset of the harmonious rise was “harmonious seas.” This slogan was associated with the PLAN’s impressive fleet review in Qingdao in 2009 but almost immediately thereafter the rhetoric and the reality began to diverge. The Chinese, who have ill-defined claims to upwards of 80% of the South China Sea, have come to appreciate the enormous importance of the sea lines of communication leading across that sea, along which tankers carrying oil and gas vital to China’s economy make their way, and of the need to press their natural resource claims there aggressively. This has put them on a collision course with a number of Southeast Asian states, principally Vietnam and the Philippines.

Farther to the north the Chinese and the Japanese have found themselves confronting one another over the ownership of the Senkaku (Japanese) or Diaoyu (Chinese) islets in the East China Sea. The islands are of little consequence to China’s economy make their way, and of the need to press their natural resource claims there aggressively. This has put them on a collision course with a number of Southeast Asian states, principally Vietnam and the Philippines.

Damage to ROKS Cheonan after being hit by a North Korean torpedo in March 2010 — clockwise from upper left: (1) “stack-damage”; (2) front portion (port side) of ship showing the break point; (3) front half of Cheonan as a large fragment is lifted from the sea; (4) water pressure marks on the hull bottom.

Ironically, the perceived aggressiveness of Chinese behaviour has had the effect of driving many fence-sitting states into Washington’s arms, thereby reinforcing the rebalancing phenomenon. For the most part, however, the Americans have sought to distance themselves from these disputes, arguing that what matters is peace and good order at sea and freedom of navigation. From the Chinese perspective the US naval presence is seen as inhibiting China’s freedom of action in the waters of the Western Pacific particularly when it comes to the remote possibility of a military campaign to regain control of Taiwan. What is necessary at a minimum, therefore, is the PLAN’s ability to exercise sea denial over an increasingly broad swath of the Western Pacific. Such control would keep USN carrier battle groups at arm’s length from Taiwan and the Chinese coast. One element of the sea denial strategy is the Dong Feng 21D, a ballistic missile which the Chinese allege has a manoeuvrable warhead capable of targeting US carriers. Some doubt this claim, others take it seriously. Certainly the loss of a huge American carrier, operating in Asian waters, would inflict a grievous psychological blow in the early stages of hostilities.

As we have seen, the Indo-Pacific region has become increasingly fraught and unpredictable. Offshore disputes give rise to an array of opportunities for fatal miscalculation. The sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy corvette, ROKS Cheonan, by a North Korean submarine in March 2010, the shooting of a Taiwanese fishing captain in a dispute with the Philippines, and Japanese claims that they would consider targeting Chinese aircraft overflying the Senkakus (a situation rendered more complex by the declaration of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that encompasses the islands) give one an appreciation of the fragility of the maritime environment. Add burgeoning naval ambitions, high levels of nationalism, misinterpretations of UNCLOS, and an insatiable appetite for energy, not to mention the emerging rivalry between the PLAN and the USN, and one is faced with sobering prospects. These prospects place a high premium on naval cooperation and international statesmanship for navies like the Royal Canadian Navy and others.

Dr. James Boutilier
Special Advisor, International Engagement
Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters
The Indian Navy: On a Collision Course with China?

Paul Pryce

In 1991, the government of India initiated its ‘Look East’ policy, a shift in strategic focus toward cultivating strong relations with Southeast Asian states and counterbalancing the regional influence of the People’s Republic of China. For many years, this policy remained largely symbolic and had few implications for the affairs of the navy. While vessels of the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard began carrying out joint patrols with Indonesian maritime forces in 2006 to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca, this was more part of an Indian commitment toward counter-piracy efforts in general than it was an indication of commitment to the Look East policy. Indian maritime forces have made similar contributions to NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden intercepting Somali pirates. Looking east or looking west, India is an important and well-established player in the global fight against piracy.

But considerable steps are now being taken to move the Look East policy from a political slogan to a demonstrable pillar of Indian foreign and defence policy. The country’s maritime forces have been tasked with spearheading this ‘Asian pivot.’ An apparent manifestation of this is the recent establishment of INS Baaz, a naval base in the southern part of the Andaman and Nicobar Island chain. Commissioned in July 2012, INS Baaz overlooks the Strait of Malacca across from the Aceh region of Indonesia. Primarily a naval airbase, Baaz is officially intended to monitor shipping through the Strait of Malacca, ensuring the security of this vital trade route. More than 50,000 vessels pass through this waterway each year carrying approximately 25% of the world’s goods, including one-third of global crude oil and over half of global liquefied natural gas. Given the sheer volume of trade that traverses the strait each year, a naval airbase like Baaz seems a useful resource in detecting pirates before they can strike.

Yet Chinese analysts have not regarded Baaz as a positive development in the region. Primarily a naval airbase, Baaz is officially intended to monitor shipping through the Strait of Malacca, ensuring the security of this vital trade route. More than 50,000 vessels pass through this waterway each year carrying approximately 25% of the world’s goods, including one-third of global crude oil and over half of global liquefied natural gas. Given the sheer volume of trade that traverses the strait each year, a naval airbase like Baaz seems a useful resource in detecting pirates before they can strike.

Yet Chinese analysts have not regarded Baaz as a positive development in the region. Many have interpreted the base as a provocative gesture, intended largely as a means by which India can deny China access to the Indian Ocean. The potential for India to blockade this chokepoint and interfere with China’s oil supply is also seen as a powerful deterrent to any Chinese encroachment on Indian interests. Zhang Ming, a prominent analyst for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), has postulated that India is no longer content to command the Indian Ocean and is seeking to exert its presence in the Pacific Ocean, particularly at the expense of China. Regardless of whether they perceive Baaz as a defensive or an offensive platform, the consensus within China’s defence establishment is that...
the naval base is not about countering piracy but about countering China.

Beyond Baaz, India has been investing heavily in the modernization of its maritime forces, embarking on an ambitious program of fleet replacement and fleet expansion. For the 2012-2013 fiscal year, the budget for the Indian Navy was increased by approximately 75%. This constitutes a total allocation of about $4.8 billion. Domestic shipbuilding is also on the rise, with many new vessels produced in India itself. This is a departure from the previous policy of purchasing Russian vessels and refitting them for use in the Indian Navy, as was the case in 2004 when the decommissioned Kiev-class aircraft carrier RFS Admiral Gorshkov was acquired for $1.5 billion and refitted as the INS Vikramaditya at an additional cost of $1.5 billion. No doubt the problems experienced by India in acquiring the ship, which reportedly entailed years of difficult negotiations and the possible use of blackmail to influence senior Indian officials, have inspired this shift toward reliable domestic shipbuilding.

An example of India’s new approach to procurement is the Kolkata-class destroyer. Designed and built by Mazagon Dock Limited in Mumbai, delivery of three destroyers is expected in the period 2014-2018. The first delivery was originally expected in 2013 but technical problems found during sea trials delayed the project by six months. No doubt of concern to Chinese naval planners, the Kolkata-class is expected to feature stealth characteristics and includes a significant degree of land-attack capabilities, allowing vessels of this class to support amphibious assaults or attack coastal positions. It should be noted though that the Kolkata-class is not intended for engagements in littoral waters; with a draft of 6.5 metres, the Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax-class frigate (4.9m) and Iroquois-class destroyer (4.7m) are able to operate in shallower waters than the Kolkata-class.

This is not to say that the Indian Navy is without forces that can be deployed to the littoral regions of the Strait of Malacca. The Kora-class corvette has a shallower draft (4.5m) and represents another success for Indian shipbuilding. Designed and built in India to replace the Petya II series of corvettes acquired from Russia, these ships were originally intended to sport a complement of surface-to-air missiles but were ultimately fitted solely with ship-to-ship weapons. Whereas the Kolkata-class destroyer can strike targets inland, the four Kora-class corvettes deployed by the Indian Navy could be quite...
effective at harassing PLAN vessels in the shallow waters of an island chain, like the Andaman and Nicobar Islands where INS Baaz is now perched. The island state of Mauritius has ordered two vessels of this class from the shipbuilder, another important first as no Indian shipbuilder has exported a warship before.

The expansion of the Indian Navy includes several other vessels, including: four Kamorta-class corvettes, which are particularly large for this classification at a displacement of 3,000 tons and expected for commissioning between 2014 and 2016; six Scorpène-class submarines, ordered from a French shipbuilder and expected between 2016 and 2021; and two Vikrant-class aircraft carriers, which are being built domestically and are expected in 2018 and 2025. All in all, this will bring the strength of the Indian Navy to 64 combat ships and a total of 133 vessels. This vastly exceeds the forces the Pakistani Navy has at its disposal, which consists of 11 frigates, eight submarines, two missile boats, and approximately 50 patrol boats or non-combat support vessels. This capability gap gives some credence to the Chinese concern that India is transforming a once defensive maritime force into an expeditionary one.

But if the disparity between the Indian and Pakistani navies is to be considered, it is also worthwhile noting the capability gap between PLAN and the Indian Navy. China currently has at its disposal more than 250 combat vessels, constituting a maritime force second only to the US Navy in size. PLAN has also embarked on a program of modernization and fleet expansion of its own. The Jiangkai II series of frigate features similar stealth characteristics to the Kolkata-class destroyer, but has been produced at a rate of two to three new ships a year since 2008. By the end of 2014, PLAN will be operating 20 Jiangkai II frigates, outnumbering India’s entire current fleet of four frigate classes. Another example of China’s ability to broaden the capability gap with India is the Jiangdao-class corvette. With a draft of 4.4m and a displacement of 1,440 tons, the Jiangdao-class is capable of holding its own in the littoral regions in a variety of roles. Within 18 months of beginning production, PLAN had eight active vessels of this

Maritime Capabilities 2013-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Class</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current (2013)</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-shore patrol</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projected by 2020</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combatants</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Off-shore patrol</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>31</td>
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For its part, India maintains that the Look East policy is purely diplomatic and constabulary in nature. In its 2013 Annual Report, India’s Ministry of Defence emphasized the importance of counter-piracy in engaging with Southeast Asian states, and further stated that, “as a responsible nation and a benign maritime neighbour, enforcement of international laws, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in the Indian Ocean region will continue to remain at the forefront of our international commitments.” China is not mentioned once in the document, though it is important to note that Pakistan is not explicitly referred to either, despite India’s clear security concerns about its western neighbour. That INS **Chakra**, the Indian Navy’s only current nuclear attack submarine, operates out of the eastern port of Vishakhapatnam also casts some doubt on India’s claims that the maritime arm of the Look East policy is purely counter-piracy and diplomacy. If INS **Arihant**, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine domestically built and designed, is also stationed in Vishakhapatnam after completing sea trials in 2014, this will clearly have implications for Chinese-Indian relations. It will reinforce Chinese perceptions that India is aggressively leaning toward the Pacific, prompting an equally aggressive assertion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. As INS **Arihant** is being built and tested at a facility in Vishakhapatnam, there is a strong likelihood that the submarine will indeed be based there alongside INS **Chakra**.

For all its progress in recent years, India’s shipbuilding industry simply cannot match China’s rate of production. Rather than viewing the Indian Navy as a lone challenge to China’s sea power, it is more likely that Chinese anxieties are actually directed toward India as part of a perceived multilateral effort to contain and constrain China. Small-scale joint exercises have been held intermittently between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army, usually oriented around an anti-terrorism theme. There have been no joint exercises between the two countries’ maritime forces, though. This is in stark contrast to the frequent joint exercises the Indian Navy has enjoyed with Japanese, American, French, British and Singaporean forces, as well as joint patrols of Indonesian and Thai waters. As such, the closest partners of the Indian Navy also include those countries which China has identified as its greatest maritime challengers from the earliest years of PLAN.

Chinese officials have certainly taken notice of this and speak of a double standard in US foreign policy, which they allege condemns China’s naval expansion while encouraging the rapid development of the Indian Navy. From this perspective, INS Baaz and India’s expanding fleet are not the prevailing threats to Chinese sea power; instead, the chief concern is that Indian maritime forces could operate jointly with American, Japanese and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) counterparts to cut off Chinese access to international waterways.

This photo shows a Chinese-built **Jiangkai II PLAN Type 054A Jiangkai**-class missile frigate of the type favoured by Pakistan.
Although there are some lingering questions about the intentions behind the Indian Navy’s fleet expansion, it is clear that India will have an important role in securing the waterways of Southeast Asia through the coming years. Whether the fleet expansion and the establishment of INS Baaz are intended to preserve India’s dominance of the Indian Ocean or as a means of projecting influence into the Pacific Ocean will become more apparent as new vessels are stationed throughout India’s collection of naval bases. If INS Arihant and a disproportionate number of new vessels are stationed in Vishakhapatnam and other eastern ports, this will strongly imply that India is pursuing a move into the Pacific and into an impending confrontation with China. However, if the deployment of newly commissioned vessels is carefully balanced between western ports like Mumbai and the east, this may serve to cool tensions between the two Asian powers.

Tensions with China could also be reduced by holding joint naval exercises. The frequency of exercises between the Royal Thai Navy and the Indian Navy has only helped to promote a positive image of India’s military among the ASEAN member states. Joint exercises with PLAN could promote some level of goodwill, inviting Chinese officials to view the Indian Navy as a potential collaborator rather than an emerging competitor. This is easier said than done – simply settling on a location for such exercises will be very difficult. Holding joint exercises in the South China Sea would be considered by China as an invitation for India to pursue an eastward expansion of maritime influence; at the same time, joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal or any other part of the Indian Ocean region would be considered by India as an endorsement of Chinese maritime presence west of the Strait of Malacca. Finding a suitable compromise will be more likely if a third party is involved, such as the maritime forces of one or more ASEAN member states. Avoiding a collision course between the Indian Navy and PLAN necessitates political leadership on the part of these small states and middle powers.

Notes

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Japanese awareness of the significance of strategic developments beyond its southern maritime periphery started well before World War II. Naval policy-makers in particular conceived of a “southern strategy” that would position Japan to take advantage of the commercial “riches” and “boundless treasure” of the “South Seas” in its modernisation drive.¹ The critical waterways stretching from the straits around Taiwan to the Bay of Bengal have long played an important role in Japan’s strategic imagination as the gateway for the flow of trade and resources upon which the resource-poor country depends. While the offensive dimensions of Japan’s pre-war security policy have been eliminated from its post-war security policy, many of the defensive maritime imperatives still remain.

This article describes Japan’s post-WW II strategic maritime orientation and recent developments in evolving maritime relations between Japan and critical ‘southern’ actors such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Myanmar and India. Such developments are notable because, until the mid-2000s, Japan had been reluctant to pursue exclusively bilateral defence relations outside of the context of the US-Japan alliance. Japan is now playing an increasingly active and autonomous role in the regional balance of power, and its new southern strategy forms a critical component of its evolving grand strategy.

**Japan’s Post-War Maritime Security Policy**

During World War II, the US Navy successfully interdicted Japanese logistical and commercial lines using its sub-surface fleet. American submarines starved Japan of its resources in what would become a war of attrition that Japan had little hope of winning, especially once the United States had reclaimed the Philippines and gained control over the Luzon Strait/South China Sea. Given this lesson, three overriding and interrelated security imperatives with a maritime focus have become salient in Japanese strategic planning since World War II. These priorities are: the protection of its sea lines of communications (SLOCs) from interdiction or obstruction; defending forward at sea by heading off sub-surface, surface and aerial threats within its vast maritime domain before these threats present themselves near the four ‘home’ islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu; and the defence of up to 6,800 distant ‘offshore’ islands. All of these priorities derive from Japan’s being a developed, intensively urbanized, trade-dependent, resource-poor, far-flung archipelagic state with a large maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and virtually no strategic depth. These factors make Japan highly vulnerable to changes in the maritime security domain, and also make defence of the home islands where most of the Japanese population resides extremely difficult.

Japanese military planners have long been aware that Japan would need to be able to deny adversaries control over points of maritime convergence south of its territorial waters if it wanted to reduce its strategic vulnerability. In Japan’s first post-war defence build-up plan (1958-60), submarines were identified as the most pressing threat and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was prioritized. After the 1973 oil crisis, military planning focused on southern chokepoints and whether Japan should “procure the wherewithal to defend sea lanes as far away as northern Indonesia.”² In the 1976 New Defence Program Outline, the ASW focus was strengthened again, and the Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) took on the role of bottling up Soviet submarines in the northwest Pacific.³ In the early 1980s, Japan explicitly committed itself to a more expansive maritime role within the US-Japan alliance...
when it chose to take up the defence of its SLOCs out to 1,000 nautical miles. Japan also reconfigured its interpretation of collective self-defence to allow the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to assist in the protection of US ships defending Japan from attack within this defensive perimeter.

Japan’s post-Cold War security policy evolution and hardware acquisitions can be understood in the context of the post-WW II maritime priorities. For example, while Japan’s Hyûga- and Izumo-class helicopter carriers have been controversial due to their aircraft carrier-like appearance, the MSDF acquired them due to their value as ASW assets first and foremost. Such carriers greatly enhance Japan’s ability to defend its SLOCs and its fleets from sub-surface threats in collaboration with Japan’s Sôryû submarines, which have enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and over 100 P-3C/P-1 anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft. Japan’s ability to defend forward at sea is also supplemented by this strengthened ASW focus, as well as by the MSDF’s Aegis Combat System (ACS)-equipped Kongô- and Atago-class destroyers which it had planned to acquire before the end of the Cold War. Along with the future acquisition of the F-35A, with its beyond-visual-range missiles, low observability and advanced sensors that can link with, and extend, ACS coverage, Japan will have acquired critical assets for the purposes of defending forward at sea. Japan will also extend its fleet of medium-sized diesel-electric submarines from 16 to 22, acquire additional helicopter carriers and ACS-equipped destroyers, and develop escort vessels with specialised ASW capabilities.

In terms of defending its offshore islands, including the Senkaku Islands, Japan has significantly increased the commitment of resources to the civilian Japan Coast Guard (JCG) over the last decade. Japan also emphasized in the 2010 National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) the need to upgrade its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to ensure that it can detect and respond to low- and high-intensity attacks on any of its over 6,800 islands. Japan’s Ôsumi-class tank landing ships, the formation of a Japanese amphibious unit modelled on the US Marines, among other amphibious capabilities, are also important components of offshore island defence, even if in other states the development of such capabilities usually indicates an offensive focus.

Maritime Security Beyond Japan

Many of the important SLOCs and strategic chokepoints for Japan’s security lie beyond its 1,000 nautical mile defensive perimeter, however. To address this, in the 1990s Japan started to support multilateral engagement on security issues in East Asia like piracy. Since 2006, Japan has been playing a more explicit bilateral security role in support of regional partners close to key strategic chokepoints and SLOCs. As many states look warily upon Chinese maritime activities and military strengthening, there appears to be increasing support for Japan’s defence forces to raise their profile in the Southeast Asia region in conjunction with other militaries. Japan has responded by increasing military cooperation and providing official development assistance (ODA) to increase the maritime capabilities of countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Vietnam and the Philippines have in particular garnered significant attention from Japanese security planners as two countries that not only share tense relations with China over maritime territorial disputes, but are also close to the geo-strategically important Luzon Strait/South China Sea channel.

Approximately 90% of all imported Japanese energy resources and raw materials pass through the Luzon Strait and South China Sea. Japanese defence planners worry about whether Japan is able to respond, independently or cooperatively, to any future attempt by China, equipped with an increasingly proficient blue-water navy, to pursue a guerre de course against Japanese commercial shipping by focusing on the Luzon Strait and Japanese approaches through the South China Sea (as the United States did in World War II). Japan also has an interest in ensuring Chinese maritime security forces are not able to undermine the territorial claims of Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and establish a strong maritime
foothold in the region that would give them strategic and tactical leverage. Japan is therefore interested in assisting these two countries in their attempts to convince China that it cannot intimidate them over territorial disputes and achieve its strategic objectives in the South China Sea at low cost.

Japan has therefore sought out Vietnam for greater bilateral military cooperation. In addition to formalizing a strategic partnership in 2010, Japan and Vietnam have instituted a regular sub-Cabinet level ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue between the top ranking Foreign and Defence Ministry officials, and signed a bilateral agreement to boost defence exchange and cooperation which has led to the exchange of high-level military contacts. In May 2013, the two sides conducted their first-ever talks focused exclusively on maritime security, with both political and military leaders in attendance. In September 2013, the Japanese Minister of Defence for the first time visited Cam Ranh Bay, a sheltered, deep-water port of strategic significance for monitoring and maritime surveillance, and projecting power into the South China Sea. Beyond symbolism, this visit presages the possibility that Japanese naval vessels may be welcome to use upgraded naval facilities when Cam Ranh Bay reopens in 2014 for surface vessels and submarines.

Japan is also seeking to play a role in supporting Vietnam's military capability-building as it seeks to transition from a personnel-heavy, land force to a more technologically-focused, maritime-oriented posture. For example, in August 2012, the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced it would start providing non-combat military equipment directly to Vietnam and the militaries of other countries in East Asia on an ongoing basis. There are expectations that this program will increase rapidly as Japanese Defence Ministry officials are wary of falling behind other countries in terms of the provision of military assistance as part of diplomacy and aid coordination. In late 2012, a former Japanese Defence Minister indicated that, with the relaxing of arms export restrictions, Japan was considering selling submarines to Vietnam, which would likely come along with ASW training – a weakness of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and a strength of Japan’s MSDF.

In May 2013, the Japanese government encouraged Vietnam to set up a civilian coast guard organization institutionally separate from the military to make it eligible to receive high-performance patrol vessels above 1,000 tons through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ODA program. Captains from Vietnam’s maritime police agency have already been invited to the Japanese Coast Guard Academy in Kure, Hiroshima, to participate in training programs.

While military level connections between the SDF and the Vietnamese military will likely grow, the JCG-Vietnam Coast Guard relationship will form the nexus of the maritime security relationship between Japan and Vietnam in the short term. Japan is not (yet) directly arming the Vietnamese military, but any capacity-building support allows resources to be redeployed by the Vietnamese military to other investments. In this sense, Japanese provision of non-combat but still essential security equipment supplements Vietnam’s acquisition of hardware from Russia, India and the United States.

In addition to Vietnam, Japan has also been working on its maritime ties to the Philippines. At the third Political Military Dialogue between the two countries in December 2007, the Japanese participants raised concern about the PLAN’s growing naval capabilities and revealed that China was planning to set up an administrative city on Hainan Island that would ‘administer’ the Spratly Islands. The increasing wariness of Japan and the Philippines of China’s actions in the South China Sea has since led to the formation of a strategic partnership (formalized in 2011) based on bilateral defence and Japanese military officials regularly visit the Philippines. In 2012, SDF field officers then started participating in annual US-Philippines ‘Balikatan’ military exercises.

These exercises are being expanded to include other states in anticipation of increased tensions in the South China Sea, and comprise humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) as well as conventional military exercises. This
initial cooperation proved valuable when the Japanese government showed its commitment to the Japan-Philippines relationship by launching the SDF’s largest ever overseas relief operation in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in late 2013. Operation Sankai, which involved the dispatch of over 1,000 SDF troops and multiple MSDF vessels, was even named after a local Leyte Island word for ‘friend,’ mimicking the United States which named its response to the 2011 triple disaster in Japan Operation Tomodachi. The friendly intentions of the SDF contrasted greatly with the last time the Japanese military conducted a major mission in the Philippines and on Leyte Island in particular.

Prior to these events, in late 2012 the Philippines’ Foreign Minister intriguingly declared that the Philippines would welcome a remilitarized Japan that had relaxed its constitutional restrictions on the military, saying that “[w]e are looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a significant balancing factor.”7 The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has in response backed the Philippine initiation of arbitral proceedings under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in its bid to challenge China’s 10-dash territorial claim to the South China Sea. In Abe’s July 2013 visit to the Philippines, both he and President Benigno Aquino III asserted that maritime security cooperation and the resolution of territorial disputes through the rule of law rather than intimidation and coercion was a pillar of the bilateral strategic partnership. The Philippines and Japan also agreed to work together to help maximize the impact of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

As the Philippines seeks to implement a ‘minimum credible defence posture,’ Japan will be content to let other states, such as the United States and South Korea, directly arm the military while Japan dedicates itself to maritime capability-building, particularly through the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG). Japan has been providing training to the PCG since the 1990s, but this has taken on more urgency over the last three years. In 2012, Japan most notably chose the middle of the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines to announce that it was considering providing up to 12 new patrol ships to the Philippines, which will be a significant boost to the PCG’s capabilities. PCG officers, along with officers from Malaysia and Indonesia – and in the future possibly Vietnam – have been attendees at the Japanese Coast Guard Academy under a program that was set up in April 2011.

The Philippines has, in turn, considered allowing the MSDF to establish a regular (but not permanent) presence in the country.8 In September 2013, Japan’s Minister in Charge of Ocean Policy and Territorial Issues made a symbolic visit to the Subic Bay base, which may be made open to Japan and the United States in the future, and proposed that the two countries should send a “strong message to the international community that no country should use force and change the status quo on its own.”9 This came on the back of the commitment of Japan and the Philippines to cooperate on the defence of remote islands given the territorial infractions of Chinese vessels now operating under the newly unified Chinese Coast Guard service.

Another geo-strategic entity of importance is the Indian Ocean up to and including the Bay of Bengal area, which includes the Andaman Sea and the Six-degree Channel. The Six-degree Channel is important as it is the western entry to the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean for Japan’s energy imports. The Bay of Bengal waters will, however, become even more important in the future to Japan. The Japanese government is collaboratively attempting to build a massive economic corridor through...
the Mekong sub-region. Crucial to this will be the development of special economic zones adjacent to deep-water ports at Thilawa and Dawei in Myanmar.

When the East-West Economic Corridor becomes operational, this will connect the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea, thus allowing the Strait of Malacca to be circumvented. This will be a boon for Japan as it will improve the cost, timeliness and security of its trade and energy shipments, and will contribute to the integration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mekong sub-region. Such developments have made the increasingly positive relations with Myanmar and India particularly valuable from the point of view of Japan’s security planners.

As Myanmar opens up to the international community, the prospect that it would support China’s strategic objectives, or even serve as a staging point for the projection of Chinese naval power into the Bay of Bengal, no longer appears plausible. The Japanese government, in coordination with private industry, has embraced Myanmar and has enthusiastically devoted resources in the form of debt waivers, low-interest loans, ODA grants and technology and planning resources to the development of infrastructure there. There are signs that this reinvigorated relationship will spill over into the security domain.

During Prime Minister Abe’s visit in May 2013, the two countries committed to strengthen their cooperation on security issues alongside development. In late September of 2013, three MSDF training ships, including two destroyers, made their first port call in Myanmar as part of a round-the-world voyage. While joint exercises were not conducted at the time, Rear-Admiral Kitagawa Fumiyuki stated that the two sides would engage in joint naval exercises some time in the future.† Interestingly, just prior to the MSDF’s visit to Myanmar, the countries’ two Defence Ministers agreed that they would strengthen their cooperation on North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear issues and issues relating to Chinese maritime activities in the region. This is important ahead of Myanmar taking over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2014. Such acts are rich in symbolism given China’s formerly close relationship with Myanmar and its increasing naval presence in Southeast Asia generally, and may presage more concrete developments in the security realm in the future. This increased commitment to strengthen security relations comes on the back of Indian military interest in Myanmar. The Indo-Myanmar security relationship has been strengthened since 2011 by visits by Indian political leaders and the chiefs of each of India’s armed services, naval port calls and joint naval exercises, the launch of coordinated controls in the Bay of Bengal, discussions of Indian provision of offshore patrol vessels and sensor technologies, and increased training for Myanmar’s forces.

The Indian connection is important in its own right for Japan. India’s potentially decisive influence in the Bay of Bengal region due to its rapid naval modernization, proactive military engagement with Southeast Asian states, the establishment of the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands, and the inauguration of INS Baaz naval port at Great Nicobar’s Campbell Bay, are significant for Japan in the sub-regional balance of naval power. In a strategic division of labour, the Indian Navy could offer assistance to Japan through the provision of security for Japanese commercial ships around the strategic chokepoints throughout the Indian Ocean. Unsurprisingly then, Japan has reached out to India on security matters. Japan joined the regular US-India ‘Malabar’ naval exercises in 2007, and then in 2009 hosted the exercises in Okinawa. Such exercises have focused on sea control operations, maritime interdiction operations, ASW and anti-piracy search and seizure operations. In late 2009, when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama visited New Delhi, the two sides committed to an annual sub-Cabinet ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue. In 2012, India and Japan conducted the first of their planned ongoing bilateral naval exercises. Japan has also relaxed its arms export restrictions in small part because of requests from countries like India which are interested in sharing high-level defence technology. This has already led to discussions about the likely export from Japan to the Indian Navy of at least nine Shin Maywa US-2 search-and-rescue amphibious aircraft, considered to be one of the best planes of its type.
Conclusion

Japan’s relations with these countries are a subset of the broader web of maritime relations it is forging beyond its southern periphery. Japan has cooperated with other southern states, notably Malaysia and Indonesia, on piracy, disaster relief and other non-traditional maritime security issues. Japan has provided equipment and training to both, and is planning to increase its capability-building efforts in Southeast Asia and beyond.  

Aside from maritime balancing against increasing Chinese military influence in the region, Japan has four major motivations for pursuing this new southern strategy. First, maritime capacity-building is an end in itself, as piracy and other non-state threats to sea lanes have not been eliminated, and it strengthens ASEAN’s independent institutional capabilities through this focus on non-traditional security. Second, in cooperation with other states, such as the United States, India, Australia and even Russia, it helps empower geo-strategically important states to manage their own maritime security challenges. Third, working with countries such as the Philippines and India helps to strengthen the US-Japan alliance and the network of partnerships that surrounds this. Indeed, at the Security Consultative Committee meeting in 2013, Japan and the United States agreed that, in addition to strengthening its ability to defend its own sovereign territory, Japan also has the responsibility as an alliance partner to “reach out and assist Southeast Asian countries in building up their own defensive capabilities.”13 The new “arms export management principles,” which replace the “three principles of arms exports” in late 2013, will allow the Japanese government to do this more proactively. Fourth, and often overlooked, this strategy allows Japan to consolidate important relationships with countries vital to its broader maritime security, which may allow it to become more militarily autonomous over the medium to long term, and less dependent on US military commitment to the region to safeguard critical maritime interests.

In the coming years analysts should not, therefore, be surprised to see Japan remaining committed to this southern strategy, even if a less conservative administration than the current one comes to power.

Notes

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Breaking News: Incidents at Sea Did Not End with the Cold War!

David F. Winkler

Unlike terra firma, which separates opposing military forces through international boundaries, space on the high seas is open to all comers. Given the increased tension in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, there seems to be good reason to promote agreements that reduce the likelihood of naval accidents snowballing into wholesale confrontation. Can we learn something from the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) signed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War?

During the second decade of the Cold War, growing Soviet maritime activities placed ships bearing the hammer and sickle in daily contact with the West. Soviet merchant ships berthed in Cuba and North Vietnam found themselves in harm’s way, others found themselves under constant surveillance, and others performed a surveillance role. These intelligence collection trawlers often hindered Western navy operations, but it was a growing Soviet Navy that truly alarmed the Americans. Collisions involving USS Walker in the Sea of Japan in May 1967, followed by close interactions between Sixth Fleet and Soviet warships in the Mediterranean a month later during the Six-Day War, moved US Navy leadership to push for bilateral talks with the Soviets about safety at sea.

With this in mind, the US State Department approached the Soviets in April 1968.

In the wake of a collision between a British aircraft carrier and a Soviet destroyer in November 1970, the Soviets accepted the American proposal, and negotiations led to the May 1972 “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas” (INCSEA). Mainly devised by naval personnel, the accord served to moderate the behaviour of the naval surface and air forces of the two sides up to the end of the Cold War, and has continued to do so with Russian naval assets. It did so despite the October 1973 Middle East War and the 1980s, a period of deteriorated superpower relations and reassertion of American maritime superiority.

At the conclusion of my dissertation on the INCSEA accord in 1998, I postulated that the lessons learned from the Cold War at sea would have applications for international relations in the 21st century. I cited seven fundamental reasons for the accord’s success and why it should be used as a model confidence-building measure.

1. Best interests of both sides: USN Rear-Admiral Robert Hilton once wrote: “Neither country wants to have its valuable ships damaged by inadvertent or imprudent actions of its officers. Neither nation wants an incident to escalate into a governmental confrontation.”

2. Simplicity: Over the long term, the American insistence on a simple formula calling for commanders to abide by the rules and use prudent judgement probably served each side’s best interests.

3. Professionalism: Former ship operators and aviators served on the delegations. Rooted in a shared environment, professional naval officers are often able to communicate better with officers from other navies than with those from sister services.

4. Preparation: If an incident occurred, the reported violation was passed through the other state’s naval attaché well in advance of the normal review, allowing the opportunity to investigate. Agendas were organized in advance.

5. Atmospherics: Establishing a touring/entertainment itinerary as the first item of discussion at the initial plenary session enabled the two delegation heads to get a sense of each other’s likes and dislikes.

6. Lack of publicity/visibility: INCSEA received little press attention at its signing, and a consistent effort has been made to maintain this low profile.

7. Verification and accountability: The establishment of direct navy-to-navy communications mechanisms and the provision of annual consultations provided means for holding both parties accountable. Since a violation of INCSEA occurs only in the presence of the other party, each side produces photographs, videotapes, charts and deck logs at the annual reviews to demonstrate which party was at fault.2

Although INCSEA did not end all US-Soviet incidents at sea, it served as a confidence-building mechanism addressing the serious problem of harassment at sea that plagued both sides in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In October 2012, US and Russian naval delegations met in Washington DC to clink glasses of vodka to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the accord.3 Nowadays, there are few reports of American and Russian ships confronting each other. Thus the annual consultations called for in the agreement have had a scripted rapidity followed by a signing ceremony. Given the pro forma ritual of the meeting, is it worth the logistics involved? With the Cold War a quarter century in the rear window, is INCSEA still germane?

Apparently the answer is affirmative. The accord continues to serve as a forcing function in several ways, reminding those in command at sea that behavioural norms have been established and they can be held accountable for their actions. This has become even more germane in recent years as the Russian Navy strives to reestablish a blue-water presence. The ongoing crisis in Syria, for example, has led to the presence of both Russian and US naval vessels in the same location and in a situation where national interests do not coincide.

Another reason why the accord has remained alive and well is that the dance that occurs every autumn has morphed into a platform for additional constructive engagement. At the 1992 20th anniversary review in Moscow, for the first time, the two navies held staff talks to exchange information, coordinate activities and discuss joint training opportunities. In the years following the 20th anniversary talks, staff talks held in conjunction with the INCSEA review assumed the greater portion of the annual get-together. For example, in 1993, the United States hosted the talks in San Diego, allowing the Russian delegation to tour facilities of the US Pacific Fleet. The US Navy hosted the 1996 talks in Seattle to familiarize the Russians with Trident missile submarine and other facilities in and around Puget Sound.
These navy-to-navy staff talks might have fallen by the wayside given budgetary constraints faced by the Russians in the 1990s and current fiscal challenges that the US Navy confronts if not for the existence of a government-to-government accord that forces delegations from the two states to review safety at sea issues.

Perhaps as a result of dialogue that led to additional operational interaction, in 2005 the Americans shifted responsibilities for preparing for the annual reviews from the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations to an operational commander, Commander US Naval Forces Europe. That administrative adjustment aside, the American delegation continues to have representatives from various agencies in the Pentagon and the State Department.

The INCSEA between the United States and Soviet Union/Russia has been a longstanding success. This illustrates that an accord can be signed by two competitive non-allied world powers, and that it can work well to prevent incidents (or accidents) at sea from having serious consequences. But can this experience be extrapolated to other relationships? Would it work between the United States and another competitive non-allied world power, China?

Until the 1990s, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was a coastal defence force with few encounters with foreign naval vessels. Those that occurred were considered non-confrontational, such as a three-day October 1994 encounter between US Navy anti-submarine warfare assets supporting USS Kitty Hawk and a Chinese nuclear-powered Han-class submarine in the Yellow Sea. The hide-and-seek games in which no direct contacts were made by the opposing forces provided real-world training opportunities that money can’t buy. However, when news of the encounter broke in the Los Angeles Times in December 1994, the Foreign Ministry of China expressed its concerns about violations of Chinese airspace by US Navy aircraft. Two months later, in February 1995, it was reported that the United States intended to open dialogue with the Chinese for an agreement modeled on INCSEA.4

It took nearly three years to reach an accord. This is not surprising, especially with the occurrence of the serious events in 1996 – i.e., the visit of the President of Taiwan to the United States, and China's missile tests in the Strait of Taiwan conducted in response. In addition, the two sides looked at safety at sea through different prisms. From the US perspective, the issue was and remains providing for the physical security/safety for sailors and aviators operating in international waters. China took a broader interpretation, thus, as well as the security/safety of its forces, it includes a homeland free of foreign interlopers – an expansion of a Soviet view in the 1970s negotiations for the INCSEA at which the Soviets proposed fixed-distance regimes to stand off American forces.

On 19 January 1998, an “Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China” was signed. It required the establishment of a Mechanism for Coordinating Incident-Related Matters (MCRM), whose purpose was to provide a forum for consultations, discussions, and exchanges on matters related to contact incidents at sea. To facilitate these discussions, representatives from the two countries would be stationed at each other’s defense attaché offices in Washington, DC and Beijing. The MCRM would meet at least once per year, but no more than twice in a calendar year, and would consist of senior representatives from both countries. The MCRM was to be chaired by one of the two countries in rotation, with the US Navy Force Japan commanding officer serving as the first chair.

In February 1988, the US Navy cruiser USS Yorktown, while exercising the right of innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters, was intentionally rammed by the Soviet frigate Bezavetniy with the intention of pushing the Yorktown into international waters.
of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety” (Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA)) was signed by US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chinese General Chi Haotian. A review of the nine articles indicates that many of the positive lessons learned from the INCSEA were incorporated into the language of the MMCA. Since the term ‘incidents’ had Cold War connotations, it was replaced with ‘accidents’ in the accord. As with INCSEA, MMCA provides for annual consultations to be hosted on a rotating basis and that details of the consultations should be kept between the parties to encourage a free exchange of views.\(^5\) The INCSEA annual review features working group and plenary sessions. At the working group level, mid-grade officers and civilian subject-matter experts examine specific issues, share positions and draft statements. If there is a disagreement, it is put in writing. At the plenary sessions, senior officers of flag or general rank review the efforts of the working group and sign a summary of proceedings. A similar format has been instituted with MMCA, except that working group meetings are not only conducted during the annual consultative meeting but also independently, usually every four to six months.

The executive-level government-to-government status of the INCSEA accord helped to sustain the annual consultation process despite breaks in military-to-military contacts following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.\(^6\) Perhaps because the MMCA is a ministry-to-ministry accord, it has been subject to the ongoing relational flux between the two states. The first consultation meeting was held in July 1998, but the unintentional US Air Force bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 during the NATO air campaign against Serbia led to the postponement of the second round of talks. Two years later, the April 2001 collision between a USN EP-3E aircraft and a PLAN F-8 interceptor near Hainan again pushed back the meeting.\(^7\) Thus the third consultation was conducted in Shanghai during the fourth year of the accord in April 2002.

Annual consultations have continued, as have the bumps in the road. No doubt the Chinese harassment of USNS *Impeccable* in March 2009 made the agenda for the MMCA talks held in Beijing in August 2009. The “cautiously optimistic” assessment that progress had been made at the 2009 MMCA discussions was set back the following January when China suspended military-to-military communications following the announcement that Taiwan would acquire $6.4 billion of US-produced arms. Following a meeting in Beijing in September 2010 between Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Security Michael Schiffer and Director of the Chinese Defense Ministry Foreign Affairs Office Major General Quan Lihua the meeting ban was lifted and MMCA resumed in Hawaii in October 2010.\(^8\) The problem with this pattern, however, is that you need discussions and meetings when relations are difficult, not when they are easy.

A month after the *Impeccable* incidents in March 2009, the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, met with his counterpart, Admiral Wu Shengli, in Beijing and addressed the media. Asked if there was the need for an INCSEA between the United States and China, Roughead stated “I think the current existing rules, agreements and laws that exist and the professional nature of our navies is adequate to the types of operations that we are doing.”\(^9\) Should this be reconsidered in light of further hiccups in the US-PRC military-to-military relations since then?

There have been a number of academic articles discussing whether an INCSEA between China and the United States should be adopted. I’d like to examine two of them, one in favour and one against the idea. The first article,
published in 2010, was written by retired Canadian Navy Commander David Griffiths. Griffiths concludes that the MMCA is a good start but it lacks “the relationship-transforming elements” that could make it more useful. He blames the lack of provisions for real-time communications for inhibiting naval commanders on both sides from effectively co-managing their forces. In addition, he expresses concern that the MMCA delegations, often composed of non-seagoing officers and civilian advisors, lack the saltiness that has been seen in INCSEA delegations. According to Griffiths, “[e]xperience has shown that this works best when delegations are led by naval officers, with diplomats serving as advisers to the military head.”

The second article is by retired US Navy Captain and Staff Judge Advocate Pete Pedrozo. He argues against an accord because: (1) PLAN is not a blue-water navy as the Soviet Navy was and thus isn’t deserving of the elevated stature that INCSEA would render; (2) US and Chinese views on international law differ and cannot be reconciled; (3) INCSEA is a navy-to-navy accord and many of the issues with China have involved non-navy units; (4) INCSEA is a Cold War instrument not appropriate for the relationship that the United States is trying to forge with China; (5) China’s actions in the South China Sea undermine its credibility as a responsible state actor; and (6) international regulations and regional arrangements have been implemented to supplant the communications mechanisms associated with INCSEA.

In my opinion, both authors fall short in making their cases. In the case of Commander Griffiths, while US Pacific Command is a joint unified command assigned responsibility for the selection of the plenary delegation head, that delegation head has been a naval officer. Likewise individuals assigned to working groups from US Pacific Fleet also wear navy blue.

Captain Pedrozo undermines his own case through making incorrect or irrelevant arguments. Ironically, his reasoning for not bestowing equal status to the PLAN by arguing that it is not a true blue-water navy echoes arguments made by senior US naval officers about the Soviets during the negotiations for the 1972 accord. With operational experience in the Indian Ocean, the world’s most productive submarine-building program, and the placement into service of an aircraft carrier, the PLAN is improving its blue-water capability. Pedrozo is correct that the United States and China have different interpretations of the Law of the Sea, but Griffiths notes that the Soviets and Americans also had different interpretations. Griffiths cites the 1988 Black Sea incident in which two Soviet warships rammed USS Yorktown and USS Caron as they pursued rights under international law to free passage through Soviet territorial waters – rights that the Soviets clearly did not recognize. Strangely, Griffiths cites the incident as a positive example of force co-management.

Both Pedrozo and Griffiths incorrectly portray INCSEA...
as a navy-to-navy accord. While the composition of the
delegations may look all navy blue, many of the naval
officers assigned to the delegations are representing other
government agencies. Where Pedrozo is inaccurate is
that the 1973 protocol to INCSEA extended the accord to
cover non-military vessels and aircraft of the two sides.
Regarding Pedrozo’s point that INCSEA was a Cold War
instrument, it should be noted that when MMCA was
being negotiated in the 1990s, the Cold War had just
concluded and no one wanted to suggest a new Cold War
struggle between the United States and China by declar-
ing the need for an INCSEA. However, it has now has
been the US-Russia INCSEA for a longer period than it
was the US-USSR INCSEA. Rather than adversary, Russia
is a non-allied competitive power. The same can be said
for China.

Pedrozo provides a long list of Chinese maritime trans-
gressions. But how is that relevant – INCSEA was negoti-
ated in the wake of numerous Soviet transgressions in the
1960s. Perhaps if an INCSEA were in place, the Chinese
might be more constrained in their actions.

Pedrozo’s last argument, that international regulations
and regional arrangements have supplanted the commu-
nications mechanisms associated with INCSEA, is
his most reasoned. Pedrozo correctly points out that
the capacity for naval commanders on both sides to
communicate, which Griffiths argues is lacking, exists in
spades starting with the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS),
which came into existence only months after the INCSEA
accord was signed in 1972. However, there are activi-
ties and manoeuvres unique to naval vessels that are not
covered in COLREGS. The Western Pacific Naval Sympo-
sium (WPNS), beginning in 1988, has served as a bien-
nial forum for naval leaders from the Western Pacific
rim to discuss topics of mutual interest. Regarding the
void in naval-specific signals, naval leaders attending the
7th WPNS in 2000 opted to incorporate elements of the
original INCSEA wording and added tactical signaling
and manoeuvring instructions common throughout
NATO during the Cold War, thus creating the Code for
Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES).

Are the signals being used? One American commander
of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer recalled encoun-
tering a Chinese PLAN frigate in the East China Sea in
the spring of 2008. “It was 3 AM in the morning and we
were in the middle of a fog,” recalled Captain Winton
Smith. A Chinese Jiangwei-class frigate had contacted
his ship to determine identity. Smith responded and the
Chinese warship remained astern hidden in the mist. This
presented a problem for Smith who planned to conduct
engineering casualty drills that would cause his ship to
stop and go. Using the CUES signal book, he told his
Chinese counterpart he was going to conduct engineering

On 5 December 2013, USS Cowpens (CG 63) was involved in a minor confrontation with a Chinese warship that was escorting the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning in the South China Sea. After Cowpens refused a Chinese demand to leave the area, the ship crossed in front of Cowpens and halted, forcing Cowpens into an emergency stop. China said that the action was intentional and that US ships sent to observe PLAN manoeuvres would be ‘blocked.’
drills and asked if the frigate could reposition itself 500 yards off the port beam. “We watched on radar and the Chinese frigate immediately responded to our request,” noted Smith. He closed the distance on the Chinese warship so it could finally be visible and friendly waves were exchanged.\textsuperscript{16}

Whether this anecdote reflects routine operations or is an exception is worthy of further investigation. Given the number of joint and multilateral exercises and humanitarian and anti-piracy operations in recent years, there are certainly opportunities for naval commanders to become proficient in their use.

So if it isn’t broke, is there a need to fix it? During the immediate post-Cold War era in which it was negotiated, it is understandable that the MMCA was framed to avoid the rigid INCSEA annual review process developed to accommodate a confrontational superpower relationship. What was more attractive to the MMCA drafters was to formalize the type of staff talks that had evolved with the Russians in conjunction with the bilateral INCSEA reviews in the early 1990s. In retrospect, the less structured format of the MMCA accord may give a wishy-washiness to the proceedings as the two parties have reportedly come with differing agendas and talk past each other. Matters of true substance do not get addressed. Another shortcoming could be that the ministry-to-ministry level of the accord has made its continuous execution vulnerable to the whims of senior government officials. The government-to-government nature of INCSEA has made it bulletproof to arbitrary foreign policy decisions.

Negotiating a government-to-government US-China INCSEA and holding the annual reviews concurrent to MMCA meetings could be one approach. However, a more expedient solution could be for a renewal of wedding vows between the United States and China on this subject. By this I mean the signing of an enhanced MMCA at the head of state level, with provisions that the new agreement provide for a constructive safety at sea review process modeled on the current US-Russia INCSEA relationship.

The bottom line is mutual commitment. Signing a US-China INCSEA, upgrading the current MMCA, or just maintaining the status quo does little to enhance bilateral relations if there is non-compliance. Such was the case in the US-USSR accord following the shootdown of KAL 007 on 1 September 1983 when Soviet vessels harassed American maritime salvage operations. The Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Sylvester R. Foley, summed up what happened: “the Soviets gave us trouble and hassled us and we said, ‘if the Incidents at Sea Agreement means anything, cut it out,’ and they did.”\textsuperscript{17}
A Canadian Naval Turn to the Pacific? Beyond Rebalancing the Fleet

Adam P. MacDonald

After a decade hiatus Canada has begun a gradual re-engagement with the Asia-Pacific region focused on establishing economic relations, specifically with China which has become Canada’s second largest trading partner.1 Alongside this, however, there is a growing chorus from Canada’s strategic community for Ottawa to incorporate political-security matters into renewed interactions with the region.2 Canadian attention and involvement, it is argued, is needed because the region is undergoing power realignments, particularly relating to China, and encapsulated within a number of security challenges with potential effects on global prosperity and stability. These issues directly affect Canadian economic interests in the region, relationships with the United States and regional partners over diplomatic and military commitments, and the larger interest of preserving the stability of the international system during this power reconfiguration.

Canada’s allies have already begun to react to the changing realities in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, in response to developments which threaten to limit its freedom of action and manoeuvre, has embarked on a multi-dimensional ‘pivot’ in foreign and military focus, most evident in the plan to rebalance its naval forces from a distribution of 50-50 to favour the Pacific 60-40 over the Atlantic. Regional partners including Australia, South Korea and Japan, as well, are re-evaluating their strategic posture in light of changing power dynamics. Despite its far more limited means compared to Washington, and the less immediate challenges faced compared to regional actors, the Asia-Pacific region presents a wide range of issues affecting Canadian security. And yet the regional tensions and the longer term effects of this power realignment on the international system barely receive mention in Canadian defence policy and discourse. The region was largely absent from the previous Liberal government’s 2005 International Policy Statement and only fleeting reference to it is made in the Canada First Defence Strategy written by the current government.

Despite such policy omissions, a number of developments, such as the large military forces and command level positions Canada contributed to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012 exercise and investigation into establishing a small staging and logistics hub in Singapore, demonstrate that a shift in military priorities is potentially underway. Before further action is taken, however, a public debate should be conducted to determine to what extent (if any) Canada should be involved in the region’s security dynamics. Analysis needs to move
beyond the general consensus that developments in the Asia-Pacific region affect Canadian security and investigate the opportunities, challenges and consequences of any sustained military presence and interaction in the region. In addition, other non-military security aspects need to be explored.

In the absence of clear policy guidance on this matter, much commentary promotes a rebalancing of naval forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast in preparation for larger regional commitments. A rebalancing, so the argument goes, is an essential move and would signal a shift in Canadian attention. But for the military, a turn to the Pacific would involve more than just repositioning ships from one coast to another. It would also include a wide spectrum of changes and compromises made in terms of command and control, capabilities, missions and interactions with new partners. In addition it would require the development of an intimate understanding of the region, and the almost certain reduction of military operations from other theatres. Any turn from the Atlantic to the Pacific, furthermore, implies not just a reorientation of focus but an internal reconfiguration of objectives, inter-service relationships and budgetary priorities, specifically pertaining to naval forces.

**Canadian Security Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Canada has criticized North Korea's nuclear weapons program but has been silent about the continued flare-ups over maritime boundary disputes. This demonstrates a selective approach to addressing the region's security concerns. China looms large in these distinctions as Ottawa has attempted to focus on economic relations and ignore political issues for fear of jeopardizing the relationship by taking firm positions on matters that are sensitive to Beijing. As a country with vast energy resources, Canada is an increasingly sought after partner by China and other resource-hungry East Asian states, such as Japan, not just interested in forging trade deals but investing in Canada’s natural resource industries. These interactions raise a number of domestic security issues, particularly dealing with state-owned enterprises, but additionally regional tensions themselves threaten Ottawa’s economic focus on the Asia-Pacific region and thus cannot be separated from one another.

There are a number of important Canadian security interests in the region. First, there are significant power realignments underway as the region is increasingly being populated by actors constraining the freedom of

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Credit: Trade Data Online, Industry Canada 20 February 2013.
manoeuvre and access that has characterized the area since World War II. In particular, the increasing profile of China and speculations about the direction Beijing will take as its power and influence grow are of major concern for those within the region and the West. We can see that power is being diffused away from the West, and a new system of multi-polarity is emerging. The international system must change to accommodate and integrate emerging powers such as China but must simultaneously balance against any attempts to challenge it militarily. Canada faces a complex task of ensuring commensurable (not synonymous) defence policies with Washington, its most important ally, and understanding the responsibilities that are expected of it in hypothetical regional security scenarios (including hedging against China). At the same time, Canada wants to continue to build cordial ties with Beijing which is hostile towards any criticism of its military modernization program. Canada, while obviously closely aligned with the United States, is not perceived as a threatening proxy which opens the possibility of playing the role of an honest broker in promoting Beijing’s continued interaction within and support of multilateral forums and channels as the best avenue for conflict resolution.

The second security interest for Canada in the region is nuclear stability and non-proliferation. Like its Western allies, Canada wants to ensure further proliferation does not occur during the power realignments. While American bilateral security arrangements have so far stopped Japan, South Korea and Taiwan from acquiring nuclear weapons, the persistent threat from North Korea is a major challenge to the entire region. Canada does not have direct relations with North Korea – it suspended diplomatic relations with Pyongyang following the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in 2010. Although not directly involved, Ottawa is supportive of the resumption of six-party talks to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The attempt to trade or sell nuclear and missile technologies by Pyongyang to Iran and Myanmar is in contravention of many international laws and treaties that Canada supports.

Third, there are a number of territorial (mostly islands) and maritime claim disputes in the Asia-Pacific region which should be of interest to Canada. Contrary to popular belief, not all of these involve China, although it is the most obstructionist actor. Disputes between Japan and Russia over the Kuril Islands, half a dozen claimants vying for parts of the South China Sea, and China, Taiwan and Japan over the Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, for example, show the numerous states involved. Historically Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula have been seen as the greatest flashpoints in the region but maritime disputes have become extremely sensitive and possible sources of conflict, particularly in the South China Sea. Beyond their security dimension, these disputes include varying interpretations of the notions of freedom of the seas and innocent passage, and threaten the legitimacy of and adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Canada, which has its own maritime boundary disputes, is a supporter of this institutional framework and has an interest in preserving it as the best avenue to resolve disputes.

Finally, Canada should be interested in the fact that many Asia-Pacific states, particularly China, are looking outward. Increasingly, China, India and Japan are becoming more active in other areas such as Africa which has been long neglected by the West. As well, some Asian states are increasingly involved in international institutions such as the United Nations and the G-20 and in general are critical players in the maintenance of global economic, ecological and security stability. The middle power category in which Canada resides, therefore, is increasingly being populated by Asian states such as Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam which are gaining greater access into international decision-making forums. Ottawa will need to build positive relations with them to contribute to global peace and prosperity. And one final element of the Asia-Pacific countries looking outward is the Arctic. There is interest in the growing accessibility of the Arctic, and China, Japan and South Korea now have observer status in the Arctic Council. This is one circumstance with a potentially direct impact on Canadian security.

There are, thus, a number of interconnected and serious issues which affect Canadian security interests both regionally and internationally. Security interests, however,
should not be the sole determinant of the nature of any possible involvement. Other factors and considerations must be incorporated including liaising with partners to develop coherent approaches, domestic support, effects on the military and security establishment, and cost-benefit analyses particularly when the investment of resources and time will be diverted from other foreign and defence foci.

**The Impact on the Military of a Rebalance to the Pacific**

The government, military and security establishment at large must begin to develop strategies to determine niche areas of expertise upon which to capitalize if Canada is to become an important partner in the Asia-Pacific region. The current lack of defence policy, however, impairs military planning because there is no guidance for the roles and types of missions expected. The military and defence community could be called upon to:

- Continue to work with the United States and other regional allies to improve cooperation and interoperability in preparing for a full spectrum of warfare operations as part of an offshore balancing force to counteract the rise of China and in case of conflict with North Korea. With this in mind, China’s anticipated participation in RIMPAC 2014, though in a small and restrictive capacity, should be welcomed.
- Contribute maritime forces and expertise in enforcing international legal regimes against proliferation of nuclear and missile technology.
- Conduct regular visits and exchanges of military personnel to Asia-Pacific states as part of a maritime diplomatic strategy in order to develop presence, networks and knowledge of the regional dynamics.
- Provide assistance for humanitarian and natural disasters.
- Participate in security forums, particularly the Shangri-La Dialogue and ASEAN Defence Minister Meetings to convey a determination to become more involved in the region’s security.
- Contribute expertise in the fields of counter-terrorism, interdiction operations, and search and rescue to regional partners in multilateral and domestic contexts.

Within the military, a shifted focus to the Asia-Pacific region could potentially be a source of dispute among the services. Given that the region is largely defined by its maritime component – shipping, disputes over island and maritime claims, and naval modernization – the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) would most likely be the

![The route that critical oil supplies take from the Middle East to China.](Credit: Fig. 8, China Report 2006, U.S. Secretary of Defense)
prioritized service. With the near completion of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan and budget tightening to be expected for the next few years at a minimum, the spending and priorities could become a source of tension within National Defence Headquarters. All the services are having to making cuts but the army has made the largest reductions both in absolute terms and proportionally – in percentage, the army cuts almost double those of the RCN. A rebalance toward Asia in a time of cutbacks, therefore, may signal a redistribution of funding among the services in part motivated by forecasts of future operational priorities there.

This does not mean, however, that bureaucratic struggles will necessarily polarize the debate about Canadian involvement in the region but recognition of this new environment and the capabilities needed is crucial. The littoral environment of the Asia-Pacific region, for example, could be an opportunity to increase interoperability or ‘jointness’ among the services as they enter an area which requires potentially all their participation; air power, transport, blue-navy capabilities and amphibious forces are some capabilities that readily come to mind. The silos separating responsibilities, organizations and operating procedures of the services will have to be broken down in order to develop linkages and experience working together in a joint effort in a multi-domain environment.

Within the navy determining what capabilities to develop will take a lower priority than concerns about spending. The construction of surface ships, submarines, naval aviation, boarding capabilities and amphibious/littoral vessels are all legitimate priorities but realistically they are not all going to be pursued given the costs. The government, DND and the RCN will have to decide on the order of production of vessels and the emphasis of these expensive projects. This will likely cause friction between those promoting niche capabilities, such as anti-submarine warfare which would be valuable in the Asia-Pacific region as many states augment their submarine forces, and those who want a more balanced fleet composition.

Mission priorities are another source of conflict as the RCN is being pushed to its limits by participating in a host of operations continentally and globally. Contributions to counter-terrorist and piracy operations in the Arabian Gulf, counter-narcotics support in the Caribbean, and patrolling the increasingly accessible Arctic will have to be weighed against a decision to develop a presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The ability to meet all these requirements over the next few years is doubtful as the RCN will continue to be under-strength with the Halifax-class mid-life refit leaving many frigates first in dry dock and then going through extensive trial periods. This will be combined with the decommissioning of a number of older vessels, and the replacement platforms most likely at least a decade away from service.

The division of responsibilities and naval assets between the coasts will also have to be studied carefully as it could have large ramifications for command and control and infrastructure priorities. Halifax is the larger base, responsible for overseas deployments and has throughout the entire existence of the RCN been prioritized over Esquimalt, although there has been a significant shift in terms of platforms and spending since the end of the Cold War. A shift in expeditionary priorities to the Pacific rather than other theatres, therefore, may potentially give rise to splits within the naval command over the duties and seniority of the coasts. The question of the Arctic complicates the picture, as the government has said that the Arctic is one of its priorities and Halifax is much closer to the Arctic than Esquimalt.

For a military that has long been focused on Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia, it will take time to develop networks of contacts in Asia and an understanding of the regional dynamics. Working with regional militaries (including China) will be crucial not just to exchange knowledge about operations, such as search and rescue and humanitarian aid relief, but to understand the cultures, politics and strategic concerns defining the region. More port visits, military exercises and especially exchanges, including at educational institutions, are needed. The military needs experts in Asia-Pacific affairs and languages. Understanding the nature of contemporary disputes,
such as in the South China Sea, will inform Canada’s perceptions of the security environment, the potential sources of conflict, avenues to reduce tensions, and where to focus in terms of military procurement, tactics and employment.

**Tough Choices Ahead**

Any pivot to the Pacific affects government and military planning from the strategic level to the tactical level. A revised defence strategy detailing the role of military assets is needed to tie together their development and employment in achieving objectives in support of Canada’s larger goals in the region. Ideally the government would lay out an Asia-Pacific strategy encompassing all government priorities so the strategic/security objectives could be seen in tandem with economic and political/diplomatic objectives. Such a framework would provide a roadmap not just to Canadians but to Western allies and actors in Asia about Canada’s interests, involvement and contributions. It is useful for other actors to know Canada’s interests because any interaction will largely be within a multilateral context. The inability or unwillingness of the government to construct such a strategy could potentially shut Canada out of the region, or allow events to take a life of their own without any sort of plan. Alternatively, Canada could simply bandwagon off Washington’s initiatives in the region but this would mean little say in what happens, including military expectations in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

Despite the call in some quarters for a military turn to the Asia-Pacific region, it is not obvious that a long-term, visible presence of maritime diplomacy would be either sustainable or effective in asserting Canada’s credentials in the region. That brings up the question of what exactly Canada should do to show its interest in an increasingly important region of the world. Other non-military security avenues such as providing assistance to regional coast guards, fisheries management and delineation of maritime boundary disputes may be more effective, cost-efficient and desired contributions to regional security.\(^6\)

While many East Asian states are set on developing their military power in response to balance of power calculations, Canada can assist in highlighting the importance of other security agencies in executing constabulary duties which are critical for the maintenance of regional trade and stability. Working through these avenues, as well, provides access points of influence and an opportunity for Canada to contribute its expertise in the matters.

The deployment of Canadian naval assets could, however, also be valuable due to their extensive experience in global constabulary duties in the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Middle East. Working with East Asian counterparts not only assists in regional security matters but also other Canadian expeditionary missions, such as piracy in the Arabian Gulf or the Malacca Strait. The presence of a non-threatening third party could facilitate the interaction between otherwise suspicious states – for example Japan and China, or China and India, or China and the United States. These issues are not only tests of these states’ willingness to contribute public goods, specifically security of the global commons, but demonstrate their complexities and the need for coordination and cooperation. There must be a combination of both maritime diplomatic and other security agency involvement in any renewed security interactions with the region.

East Asia is an important security concern to Canada but determining the exact form and content of Canadian contributions requires deep deliberation on the objectives, the practicality and effectiveness of utilizing specific power assets, and the impact on other interests as a result.

**Notes**


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From Good Beginnings

Janet Thorsteinson

The Auditor General of Canada holds a place in public esteem that may be unique. Bureaucrats and politicians do not enjoy being audited, and media outlets can be excessively keen to find fault rather than applaud achievement, but to the Canadian public, an Auditor General report describes plain facts in plain words. The resulting clarity can establish a new foundation for progress. Most recently, Chapter 3 of the Fall 2013 report, “National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy” put straightforward language around several important issues that have been hanging over the recapitalization of Royal Canadian Navy and Coast Guard fleets “at a cost exceeding $50 billion and over a time period of 30 years or more.”

The Auditor General wrote what many had been saying. Among other concerns, there simply isn’t enough money earmarked for the Canadian Surface Combatant. The project budget “is insufficient to replace Canada’s 3 destroyers and 12 frigates with 15 modern warships with similar capabilities.” Under the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), the government specified a requirement for 15 ships. In fact, the Auditor General writes, “[t]he actual number of ships that the project can deliver will not be known for several years.” Elsewhere the report states that while the CFDS “did outline the expected number of Navy ships and the core missions for the Canadian Forces, it did not define the specific naval capabilities required to fulfill the government’s level of ambition.” The report went on to note that “[i]n our opinion, a gap appears to be developing between the CFDS level of ambition, the evolving naval capabilities, and the budgets.”

The current planning process for major defence acquisitions attaches specific dollar amounts to projects at the outset. As time goes by, inflation and project office expenses reduce the defence department’s spending power. As a consequence, the Department of National Defence will be forced to reduce either the number of ships it expects to receive or their capabilities in order to stay within the budget.

By laying out the facts and pointing out the contradictions, the Auditor General’s report has the potential to change the way the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) is perceived and discussed. Renewing Canada’s fleets is not a series of battles to be won or lost in the headlines. By validating the way shipyards on each coast were chosen to build Canada’s ships, the report indicates how the NSPS can manage shipbuilding in the future. As the report notes, “[t]he competitive process for selecting two shipyards resulted in a successful and efficient process independent of political influence, consistent with government regulations and policies, and carried out in an open and transparent manner.”

The Auditor General’s report set out the challenges of current policies clearly and simply. These challenges include making decisions about how many ships should be built, what capabilities they should have, and how much they should cost. It has been suggested that perhaps the budget should not be set in concrete. In the report’s words, “military ships are complex developmental projects, their design will be defined more precisely over time, which will result in greater certainty on the cost of the vessels. It is not realistic to expect that the original budget cap will remain the same from a project’s conception to completion.”

If current numbers do not reflect a changed reality, then new numbers are needed and there is a possibility changes will be made. The 16 October 2013 Speech from the Throne referred to the renewal of the Canada First
The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy was only announced in 2010, but it has already had an impact on how government and industry work together on defence procurement. Despite some concerns about the budget, the Auditor General noted that the process of shipyard selection was a success and encouraged Public Works and Government Services Canada to consider using this approach in future major capital acquisitions.

Notes
2. Ibid., p. 20.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Ibid., p. 23.
5. Ibid., p. 23.
8. Speech from the Throne, 16 October 2013, Section 3: Armed Forces.
11. Ibid.

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Making Waves

Dealing with an Assertive China (by Learning the Lessons of Afghanistan)

Ambassador David Mulroney

Canadians need to get used to the fact that China is growing increasingly capable of projecting its power and influence in East Asia and beyond. And this capability is matched with the inclination to do just that. China’s new assertiveness is based, not unreasonably, on confidence generated by its stellar economic performance. It is stoked by new voices in its foreign policy community. And it is shaped by a slowly emerging sense of long-term possibilities.

By 2009, it was clear to anybody who was watching that China was moving, albeit in fits and starts, beyond Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that the country “should hide its capabilities and bide its time.” When I arrived in Beijing in July of that year to serve as Canada’s Ambassador to China, praise for China’s success in hosting the 2008 Olympics was giving way to wonderment at the country’s success in weathering the global financial crisis. China had unleashed a torrent of stimulus funding, something that was helping to build gleaming new airports and high-speed train lines, and to transform the skylines of its cities. Awe-struck visitors routinely assured their hosts that they had seen the future, and it was China! To many foreign visitors, China’s authoritarian, technocratic rule seemed far superior to democratic systems back home, which seemed hopelessly mired in partisan gamesmanship and numbing bureaucracy.

Not surprisingly, many in China came to believe their own headlines. This seemed particularly true among the ranks of the new players who were re-shaping the foreign policy landscape. Senior officers in the People’s Liberation Army muttered darkly about challenging US hegemony. Hawkish journalists called on China to show more backbone internationally. Aggressive state-owned enterprises pushed China into new regions and new commitments. And hyper-patriotic netizens bristled at threats, real or imagined, to constrain China’s seemingly inevitable global triumph.

As I watched the parade on 1 October 2009 celebrating the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, it was easy to see where China had been turning its attentions in the years during which the United States was busy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chinese-made aircraft filled the sky over Tiananmen while, far below, the latest missiles, artillery pieces, tanks and landing craft rolled down the Avenue of Eternal Peace.

China was quick to test its new capabilities. It moved aggressively to challenge Japan over rocky islets that both countries claim. Regional tensions also flared as China asserted its ownership of barely visible shoals in the South China Sea, and doggedly pressed its contention that what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh is actually part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

That same feistiness was on display when Chinese leaders gave the cold shoulder to newly elected President Obama during a visit in late 2009. This surprised many because the US government had for months before the visit been signalling its willingness to lower the volume on human rights disputes. Within a year, disdain had given way to active fury as the United States commenced the difficult process of pivoting back to East Asia. American re-engagement with the region was made much easier by the fact that China’s new and unbridled assertiveness had set back years of patient efforts to supplant the United States as the principal actor in the region.

Things are changing. We are already seeing a more disciplined, focussed and patient foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. Xi’s rise means that China will be less inclined to indiscriminate assertiveness and, as a result, far more effective in expanding its influence. Although tensions remain still high with Japan and the Philippines, China has moved to reassure others in East Asia and to step back from border confrontations with India. Xi’s first international visit was to Moscow, where he carefully underlined the strategic importance of that relationship.
The recently completed third Plenum gave Xi even more control of what is ambiguously termed ‘state security,’ a mandate that probably includes foreign affairs as well as domestic anti-terrorism.

When Xi did get around to meeting President Obama in June of 2013, he spoke of the emerging opportunity to craft a “new type of great power relationship.” This was meant to be a reassuring message, expressing Xi’s belief that China and the United States could avoid the strife that is generated by confrontation between a rising power and the existing (and in China’s view, declining) hegemon. But the flip side of this concept is less reassuring. Xi also seemed to be suggesting that the great power relationship could be achieved by agreeing on a broad geographic division of influence. The United States would dominate a zone that runs out to somewhere beyond Hawaii. China would be the master of things on the other side of the line, effectively ending the US role as the guarantor of peace in East Asia. China’s recent imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) off its east coast is likely an early move in this direction.

This does not bode well for East Asia, or for those whose future development is linked to it. The risks are already evident: rising regional tensions; threats to the spread of human rights and democracy (think of Burma); and diminished opportunities for building trans-Pacific economic ties. This poses a long-term challenge to the United States and its allies, Canada included, and brings a growing risk of direct Sino-US confrontation.

We need to view what’s happening as something more than a tense bilateral showdown between China and the United States. In reality, accommodating China’s rise should be a far more broadly shared process in which a community of nations, Canada among them, works together. A big part of this involves reassuring China, making it clear that we welcome and respect its new vitality. In doing so, Canada and its allies must also signal, with confidence and real resolve, the expectation that China will far more readily embrace the responsibilities that come with being, in the memorable words of then-US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, a responsible stakeholder.

Key to success is making the point that, far from being a region entirely dominated by a single power, East Asia is home to diverse, autonomous and, to a gratifying degree, increasingly democratic countries. And these countries have many friends. Indeed, their stability, prosperity and unhindered development are, to use a Chinese phrase, ‘core interests’ of a wide range of important global players, Canada among them.

Of course, if Canada is to play such a role, it needs to be able to bring assets and influence to the region. This is partly a hardware challenge. The Royal Canadian Navy is still years away from bringing new ships into service, and even then, their nature and probable tasking makes it unclear that they will be able to meet important trans-Pacific commitments. These will almost certainly include helping to combat problems of piracy and human trafficking, sharing in humanitarian missions, and building trust and confidence through exchanges with the navies of the region, China’s included.

But there is no justification for passivity or inaction while Canada waits for new ships to be delivered. Canada is already beginning to display a capacity for effective engagement, as shown by the speedy deployment of humanitarian resources to the Philippines in the fall. It has also signalled its long-overdue willingness to be more involved in the emerging architecture of the region. Put simply, Canada is showing up more often. East Asia is now on the itineraries of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Trade and, long overdue, Defence.
While such activity is welcome, it would be a mistake to think that activity alone can turn Canada into a respected player in the region. We need first to think carefully about our core objectives. And these need to be something more than securing membership in the regional organizations that haven’t yet decided to let us in. Surely, Canada’s overriding objective in the region should be encouraging China’s peaceful rise. Implicit in this is better managing our own bilateral relationship with China, seeing it steadily and seeing it whole. China is both a key contributor to our future prosperity and a very real challenge to regional and Canadian security.

Managing this will require a level of focus, policy coherence and disciplined implementation that we have rarely achieved in the past. The messages that the Foreign Minister provides to his Chinese counterpart need to be coordinated with the reassurances that the Defence Minister shares with his colleagues in Vietnam and the Philippines. And both need to be calibrated against Canadian ambitions when it comes to long-term trade and investment objectives. No one should assume that any of this happens naturally, easily or frequently in our system of government.

But there is a useful precedent to study. In making their recommendations about Canada’s future role in Afghanistan, John Manley and his fellow panelists described the Kandahar mission as a once-in-a-decade challenge, something worthy of a rare level of commitment, effort and coordination by the government. And it worked. Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister, took responsibility for the oversight and regular review of a mission that was finally, and far too long after its launch, based on clear and limited goals endorsed by Parliament. These were in turn effectively tasked out to public servants and the Canadian Forces, who were now finally working in concert.

If we are to step up to the far greater challenge of engaging a rising China, we would do well to re-learn the important lessons of that now almost-forgotten chapter in our recent past.

**Pacific Naval Operations**
Ken Hansen

There is a lively discussion going on about whether or not the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) should ‘rebalance’ its Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The US Navy is in the process of shifting 60% of its fleet to the Pacific Ocean by 2020, half of which will be forward deployed. The idea is that naval power serves as a form of leverage against the rise of Chinese maritime power. Should Canada follow the American example?

The 15-vessel Canadian Pacific fleet comprises five frigates, a destroyer, two submarines, a replenishment ship and six coastal defence vessels. There are 18 vessels on the Atlantic coast: seven frigates, two destroyers, two submarines, a replenishment ship and six coastal defence vessels. While some claim a 60–40 split favours the Atlantic Fleet over the Pacific, the actual numbers are 55–45.

Eric Lerhe’s recent editorial column in CNR (Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2013)) argued that Canada should adopt a Pacific-heavy stance. He thinks that all the replenishment ships, the submarines and long-range patrol aircraft would be of greatest value in the Pacific. But, he says, “they will only be credible if they are permanently forward deployed – perhaps at Guam.” David McDonough, writing recently in *Broadsides*, supported the Guam idea for basing Canadian submarines.

McDonough also noted that Canada and Japan concluded a mutual logistics agreement in September 2013, known as the Canada-Japan Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Prime Minister Stephen Harper called the treaty “an important step towards strengthening bilateral defence relations.” David Pugliese reported that the treaty “will allow the Canadian Armed Forces and Japan’s Self-Defense Force to exchange basic goods and services such as fuel, water and facilities wherever both forces are cooperating” but quoted a DND official as saying “it does not involve the stationing of troops in either country.”

While major troop deployments may not be contemplated, Canadian naval vessels operating from a Japanese naval base with a small shore-based logistics contingent might be a lot easier to arrange, especially in the event of a conflict with China. Japan certainly has more in the way of physical space than Guam.

Guam is definitely small: the island is only 48 km long and varies between 6-19 km wide, with a total area of 594 km². This makes it about three-quarters the size of Singapore. Apra Harbor on the southwest coast of Guam is the largest deep-water port in Micronesia and is the site of US Naval Base Guam. Capable of receiving aircraft carriers and the home port of Submarine Squadron 15, the military facility on Guam is already very busy and will become even more so when 8,500 US Marines from Okinawa are transferred there in the not-too-distant future. Would there actually be space for Canadian naval forces to operate from there?

USS Frank Cable (AS-20), an auxiliary naval ship, provides most of the support to the American submarine squadron at Guam. Ashore facilities for submarine operations are
probably very limited. While Canadian submarines might visit there occasionally, to operate from there on a regular basis would mean bringing all of their own support. The distances involved mean this will be a major logistical undertaking.

Guam is 5,642 nm from Victoria, British Columbia. By comparison, the distance to Yokohama is 4,262 nm and the distance to Honolulu is 2,350 nm. The distance from Halifax to Liverpool is 2,368 nm, similar to the distance to the Hawaiian Islands from British Columbia. Why is this significant? The scale of Canadian naval logistical capacity was established during the Cold War where the focus of operations was on the North Atlantic.

The new Berlin-class sustainment ships will have significantly less capacity for fleet support than the Protecteur-class. The scale and scope of naval operations in the Pacific, if they are supported out of either Japan or Guam, will be vastly more challenging than anything the RCN ever experienced in the Atlantic. Just getting there will be either 75% (for Tokyo) or 138% (for Guam) more demanding than a trip across the Atlantic. Once at Guam, you are still not anywhere in particular. Manila is another 1,575 nm away and Singapore is 2,925 nm. The physical restrictions at Apra Harbor, competition for space with US naval forces and commercial activities, and the complete lack of a Canadian mobile submarine support capability will probably rule out Guam as a support base for the RCN.

Japan is closer than Guam and the North Pacific is more closely linked to Canadian defence and commercial interests. However, even with a logistics treaty, there will be language problems and different supply systems between the two navies. The inestimable advantages of operating with the USN are the longstanding bond of culture and commonality of logistical systems.

Where does all of this leave us? For Canada-US initiatives, Pearl Harbor will remain the operational centre of gravity for the Central Pacific, as it has always been. For a strengthening Canada-Japan relationship, it will be advisable to start small and work up from there. For our own national operations in the Pacific, increasing logistical capacity at Esquimalt and working toward improved efficiencies of all sorts will be necessary to offset the logistical shortcomings imposed on the navy by the smaller Berlin-class sustainment ships. Beyond this, a lot more thought about the importance of logistics to naval operations is required.

For anyone considering a Canada-Australia naval alliance, the distance to Sydney from Victoria is 6,705 nm.

Notes
4. Ibid.

Could Guam become pivotal in any future Canadian Pacific Pivot?

Sending Signals: Canada Needs to Get Serious About Asia-Pacific

David A. Beitelman

There has been a great deal of debate recently within policy circles about Canada’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and whether the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) should shift naval resources from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific. The debate grew so loud that the RCN released an official statement from Vice-Admiral Mark Norman in August 2013 in response. He said “[t]here are no plans to redistribute RCN ships from the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific fleet as the current distribution meets our strategic and operational requirements.” However, in light of recent developments in the Asia-Pacific region and Canada’s new ‘economic foreign policy,’ it is time the RCN reconsidered its position.

For a resource-strained naval force that cannot contribute materiel to the region on a level that would tilt the scales one way or the other, ‘rebalancing’ to the Pacific
is a relatively costless move that helps the government convince the world that Canada is serious about the Asia-Pacific region. Shifting naval forces to the Pacific sends important signals to those in the region with whom Canada is trying to foster closer ties, as well as to allies, particularly the United States. It would make resources more readily available in case of an emergency and demonstrate support for US policy shifts in the region, and to other friendly states which are facing an uncertain future in an increasingly tense region.

Since the RCN stated that it considers the Middle East and the Caribbean the “most likely areas of operations for the CAF for years to come,” there have been a number of developments that suggest the tides are shifting to the Pacific. The Canada-US Asia-Pacific Defence Policy Cooperation Framework, signed (perhaps ironically) in Halifax in November 2013, and the Global Markets Action Plan, Canada’s new foreign policy road-map, also announced in November, are two developments specific to Canada and reinforce the region’s increasing importance. There is also China’s recent announcement of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea (which includes disputed territory), raising tensions in the region. South Korea has responded by expanding its own ADIZ, which also includes disputed territories and overlaps with air defence zones of both China and Japan. Japan has reacted to the developments by moving to implement a more robust, ‘China-centric’ defence posture.

The Canadian government has supported Canada’s economic interests in the region, but is lagging when it comes to security. Canada wants a seat at the table to help create the economic and security architecture taking shape in the region, and, as Eric Lerhe has noted in an earlier CNR editorial, “[m]ilitary strategy and trade are linked.” More than simply ensuring a seat at the table, shifting focus to the West Coast and increasing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region gives Canada a voice.

As proof of its interest in Asia-Pacific, the government touts its participation in the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, and in the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, as well as the US Pacific Command Chiefs of Defence Conference. As well, the government has stated its desire to participate in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. Canada has also taken steps to increase ship visits, expand its Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), and improve bilateral relations with many countries in the region.

These are important steps and should not be diminished. However, while there are good arguments to be made as to why Canada’s contribution to regional security is destined to be limited due to its lack of resources and logistical capabilities far from home (including foreign port access), more can be done to signal to others that Canada is taking even its limited role seriously. In Vice-Admiral Norman’s statement, he notes that “[w]e can deploy RCN assets from either coast to any maritime area of operations in the world,” and so the 60-40 naval resource distribution that favours the Atlantic coast needn’t change. Shifting resources from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast, however, sends such a signal, even if it is a perfunctory one. In a region where relationships are all important and “business is done with friends,” having materiel close by bolsters Canada’s attempts to expand its economic footprint; support with military resources helps prove Canada’s willingness to defend its interests and investments in the region. It would also go a long way in supporting Canada’s attempts to join the Defence Ministers’ Meeting and East Asia Summit, as well as strengthening its position in regional institutions where Canada already has a seat – particularly those with a security/defence focus.

Leaving things as they are, conversely, communicates something else entirely. First, it tells people that while Canada is interested in the economic benefits of the Asia-Pacific
region, it is committed to the security needs of others (in this case, Europe, the Middle East and the Caribbean). Or, second, that Canada is content to assert itself as a Pacific power while leaving the heavy lifting to others, principally the United States. Neither of these should be acceptable to the government of Canada, particularly when they complicate or contradict other stated policies and objectives. Canada’s largest trading partner, the United States, is increasingly investing resources in the Asia-Pacific region. Canada’s second largest trading partner is China. ‘Economic diplomacy’ still needs teeth. If Canada wants to play a larger role in Asia-Pacific, even the nominal contribution of a single frigate to a US carrier group sends an important signal to countries in the region: Canada is investing in more than just Asian markets. There is no guarantee that such a move would have the desired effect. There is nothing guaranteeing Canada’s economic aspirations in the region, either. Attending conferences and joining institutions is great; supporting talk with action is better.

More than strengthening burgeoning relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, shifting west sends an important signal to Canada’s most important economic and security partner. The United States is pivoting – or ‘rebalancing’ – to the region. It is expanding military ties with the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia and others. Critically, it is attempting to support India’s military modernization. The focus of this policy reorientation is, undoubtedly, China. Rather than moving to ‘contain’ China, a Department of Defense report to Congress instead refers to American “strategy to shape China’s choices.” That is, the United States wants to create the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region rather than allow China to do so.

China is an increasingly important economic partner for Canada. Helping maintain a stable Asia-Pacific is in Canada’s economic interests. Supporting the United States in the region helps ensure American support for Canadian efforts to increase its institutional presence, both directly and by virtue of its ability to influence other states in the region, and buys favour as Canada negotiates a burden-sharing arrangement with the United States in the Arctic (where China is also making moves). Canada is a country with limited military resources; this is a known and accepted reality by all. The Canadian navy is especially strained by the need to maintain a presence along three coasts spanning extremely large distances. That said, the country’s military capabilities, particularly naval, should match its foreign policy aspirations. Canada cannot be all things to all places, but if the Asia-Pacific region is where Canada’s economic future lies, then it is time the government starts taking it seriously.

Shifting west will not be an entirely painless or costless experience for the RCN, but it is the government’s willingness to endure these costs that gives it value. A redistribution of naval resources to the Pacific coast is a good start, even if it is largely about optics. Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird has said “[s]ecurity and prosperity go hand-in-hand.” Perception matters, and right now the perception is that Canada is engaging the region with one hand.

Notes
2. Ibid.

Boom and Bust: An Opportunity?
Timothy Choi

Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was conceived not only to recapitalize the federal fleet, but to do so in a sustainable manner over many decades. This was considered especially important in face of the fact that previous Canadian naval construction plans occurred on a ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle, when years would pass between construction contracts, resulting in mass layoffs and loss of expertise. In turn, this expertise would have to be regained at an extreme cost every time the federal fleet (both the navy and the coast guard) was renewed. The NSPS, by aiming to ensure shipyards continue to receive work throughout the coming decades on a constant basis, promises to end this pattern for the first time in Canadian history.

The desire to have an NSPS arrangement is based, of course, on the underlying assumption that boom-and-bust itself is always a bad thing. Certainly, the massive costs (to date, some $600 million combined for both Irving in Halifax and Seaspan in Vancouver) associated with renovating the NSPS shipyards would appear to agree with this assumption. But what if rebuilding shipyards almost from scratch is not necessarily a bad thing?
Can there actually be advantages for Canada in doing so, given the massive advances in engineering and design in recent years?

Our point of comparison is the new East Asian shipyards that have been so prolific in the past decade. Readers may be familiar with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy (RN) and its decision to outsource the construction of its new replenishment ships, the Tide-class, to South Korea. In contrast to Canada where we will build the German Berlin design in the Seaspan Vancouver shipyard, the RN is doing the opposite: letting the shipyard of South Korean company Daewoo do the physical construction based on the design created by British firm BMT Defence Services.

The purpose of this observation is not to add yet another log into the fire of whether Canada should have done as the RN. Rather, I seek to offer several possibilities on the longer term scenarios for Canada’s shipbuilding industry using the South Korean experience as a loose model.

The introduction and adoption of computer-controlled machining and computer-aided design over the last two decades has drastically altered the manufacturing process. While this has manifested itself most prominently in daily items such as automobiles and kitchen appliances, it is an evolution that also applies to shipbuilding. However, due to the scale and costs associated with the shipbuilding industry, the massive restructuring needed to accommodate new construction methods is rarely undertaken. This can be especially true in the case of yards that ‘benefit’ from continual construction orders, such as the major yards in the United States and Europe – they would hardly have time to stop construction in order to reconfigure their yards. While they can implement smaller-scale changes (e.g., new computers) on a piece-by-piece basis, these can lack the cohesive integration that would result in optimal efficiency and lowered costs.

This is where Halifax and Vancouver may be able to shine. By having to reconfigure their entire construction processes and infrastructure from the ground up, these yards will have the opportunity to take advantage of all the latest technological advancements in engineering and construction while implementing them wholesale. The complete integration at a single point in time can effectively bring Canada’s shipbuilding industry and capabilities up to the latest 21st century standards.

What implications might this have on Canada’s shipbuilding fortunes? South Korea’s example may provide some clues. Just as Irving and Seaspan are doing, South Korea’s Daewoo, Hyundai and other yards have established their processes and structures fairly late in the current era. It can be argued that this is one major reason why their ships could out-compete European yards on a cost basis. Lest the Tide-class example be insufficient evidence, Danish transport giant Maersk is building its latest and largest cargo ships, the Triple E-class, also at Daewoo’s yards, ending a tradition of building them in its own yards.

The cost benefits of a completely new 21st century shipyard have yet to be fully examined. Indeed, most, if not all, cost estimates of the NSPS have been made based on decades-old examples from North America and Europe. This suggests the possibility that, shockingly, the costs of carrying out the NSPS program may actually be less than predicted. Current cost estimates have been made based on outdated construction processes and techniques. They have not accounted for the latest shipbuilding methods and the decreased costs with which they are associated. Going forward, an examination of South Korean warship construction may provide the most accurate information regarding the likely costs of Canadian programs.

In particular, the Republic of Korea Navy’s KDX-III-class Aegis destroyers may provide some interesting insights. In a sense, the procurement of these destroyers has a similarity to one method by which Canada may procure its new surface combatants: using or adapting an existing...
and proven design to fit Canadian requirements. The KDX-III is essentially a lengthened version of the American Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and although these ships’ capabilities are likely well beyond that required of Canada’s future fleet, their cost characteristics provide some useful comparisons. Whereas the latest Flight IIA Arleigh Burkes built in an American yard cost some $1.5 billion (US), the KDX-III comes in at $923 million (US), despite being larger and better armed. Given that this cost is based on a class of three vessels (just as Canada plans on having three area-air-defence replacements for its Iroquois-class), it appears to be a fair comparison that compensates for economies-of-scale differences.

But if Canada’s new yards can indeed become competitive due to adoption of the latest shipbuilding techniques, then the benefits extend far beyond the NSPS as it currently stands. A competitive Canadian shipbuilding industry can make it an attractive option not just for the Canadian government, but for others as well. The RN’s Tide-class tankers are already proving that Western militaries are willing to go abroad for their construction; the Dutch construction of their Joint Support Ship in Romania (albeit at a Dutch-owned yard) is another example. Should this willingness to go abroad for naval construction become a trend, Canada may well become a viable option for some of the smaller navies in the West.

I limit this optimism to quantitatively smaller projects due to the physical size of the Halifax and Vancouver yards. As any person who has visited Seaspan’s premises in North Vancouver and Irving’s waterfront property can attest, there is not much room available – both in terms of property currently occupied and in terms of nearby unoccupied space for expansion. Therefore, Canadian yards are unlikely to be able to support the simultaneous construction of vessels necessary for larger orders.

Despite this drawback, the possibility that Canada’s new shipyards may become shipbuilding centres in the West holds much promise both for Canada and for its allies. A fully-modernized and cost-effective yard can enjoy a measure of protection from the vagaries of changing domestic governments. Should a future government decide to alter or cancel the NSPS, the modernized yards can still attract foreign clients, allowing them to survive until the domestic orders resume.

The government of Canada stated at the outset of the NSPS that Canada’s shipbuilding industry is a strategic priority. It likely had something different in mind when using that term for the industry, but the possibilities outlined here, given the changes in 21st century technologies and global shipbuilding dynamics, suggest a much more concrete importance. While physical constraints will likely prevent Canada from becoming a global powerhouse in shipbuilding, a vital niche of small-scale, but technologically-intensive, orders can be filled by Canadian shipyards.

Costs may still be higher than construction in East Asian yards due to factors like higher worker pay-scales, but Canada enjoys a close relationship with other Western states, and shares two of the languages of the West – English and French. This translates not just to clearer communications between parties but also to smoother interactions when it comes to sensitive materials. A lower barrier to technology sharing and access may well mean that foreign customers would not only build their hulls in Canada, but possibly the combat systems as well. Given that this barrier to technology sharing and access may well mean that foreign customers would not only build their hulls in Canada, but possibly the combat systems as well.

In sum, the radical bottom-up reconstruction of Canadian shipyards holds the promise of not just decreased costs for Canada’s ships, but also the possibility of competing for foreign orders and decades of continual work. Clearly, more research is needed to confirm or refute what I have suggested here, but it is an interesting possibility which merits greater examination.

Notes
Some considerable discussion and debate has emerged examining a possible Canadian defence shift to the Asia-Pacific region, which would presumably involve a significant role for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Much of this, including in these pages, has been undertaken without taking into account the impact of the substantial change that has occurred in Canadian defence over the last three years. This has on the one hand substantially reduced defence resources (cutting funding by $2.1 billion a year) and on the other hand identified several areas where the defence establishment would like to invest new funding. Given this, despite the wider strategic arguments for greater involvement in the region, neither the funding nor inclination to become more involved in the Pacific appears to be present.

This is particularly the case given the release of four important documents in quick succession in the fall of 2013: the Defence Renewal Plan; the 2013 Speech from the Throne; the 2013 Fiscal and Economic Update; and the Fall 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada. Combined these suggest the following: DND’s current efforts to find money and people to reinvest in new priorities will produce fewer reinvestment opportunities than the 2010 Transformation initiative believed necessary; DND will face more budget pressures starting next year; the government of Canada will renew its defence strategy, but has shown no inclination to focus this on Asia-Pacific; and budget constraints will mean Canada’s future seagoing fleet will be less capable than the one the navy currently operates. Taken together, these factors indicate a significant degree of scepticism is warranted regarding the feasibility of any move to the Asia-Pacific region that requires financial investment in the short term.

In 2010 the Chief of Defence Staff appointed Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie Chief of Transformation. Leslie’s Transformation Team sought, by reforming the way National Defence operates, $1 billion and 3,500 regular forces, several thousand reservists and civil servants that could be re-directed towards new departmental priorities (detailed below). While the Transformation Team was stood down without action on its major recommendations, the notion of finding efficiencies to allow for reinvestment in new priorities was transferred to the Defence Renewal Team launched in August 2012. The result of its preliminary work, the Defence Renewal Plan released in October 2013, outlines opportunities that could allow for a reinvestment of 2,362 to 3,741 full-time positions and $528-$845 million to new defence priorities.\(^1\)

This is a positive, if much delayed, effort by DND to try and free up resources by making changes to internal processes. However, even if the full reinvestment potential materializes, not a given because of the difficulties in implementation, it will fall short of what the Report on Transformation identified as necessary just two years ago. Furthermore, it will take several years and significant initial investment to realize these defence renewal reinvestments. Critically, it has not yet been determined how much of the reinvestment potential will be devoted to new initiatives or to helping offset the impact of several years of budget cuts which have reduced readiness funding sharply. While the original intent of this effort was to allow DND to reinvest in new capabilities, it may well morph into an effort to preserve the status quo.

The prospect of defence renewal becoming a way of dealing with fiscal austerity gained greater salience after the 2013 Speech from the Throne pledged a two-year operating budget freeze and “targeted reductions to internal government spending.”\(^2\) The operating budget freeze will mean DND must reallocate operations and maintenance funds towards personnel spending so it can honour contractually mandated pay increases for its personnel. Based on the impact of the same measure in 2010, I estimate that the annual impact will likely be at least $118 million, with the cumulative impact by 2015/2016 of $236 million.\(^3\) As a result, the downward pressure on the defence budget will increase in the short term, even

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Will Canada be able to replace all three of these warship classes?
If DND avoids a targeted reduction. Notably, the Speech from the Throne also pledged balanced budget legislation once the deficit is erased. Thus, although many argue that additional defence funding is needed to bolster the naval shipbuilding program, fund the priorities identified to date, and/or enable a Pacific pivot, the balanced budget pledge makes the prospect of substantial additional defence funds uncertain, if not unlikely.

This continues to be problematic for the navy as there is evidence that the naval shipbuilding program needs more money. In his fall 2013 report, the Auditor General (AG) found there is a “key project risk” that the budget for naval recapitalization is inadequate as the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project budget of $26.2 billion “is insufficient to replace Canada’s 3 destroyers and 12 frigates with 15 modern warships with similar capabilities.” In essence, while the Canada First Defence Strategy pledged to “improve and replace key existing equipment,” the AG contends that the navy’s future surface fleet will be less capable that the one it operates now, unless the fleet shrinks. As the AG acknowledges, this could mean that “Canada may not get the military ships it needs if budgets are not subject to change.” Since the CSC is in the first year of a lengthy project definition, a substantive understanding of exactly how much certain capabilities and fleet sizes will cost will not be known for several years; presumably after Canadian defence policy is renewed. Yet, despite the recognition of a possible funding shortfall, securing additional funds for naval shipbuilding has not emerged publicly as a priority likely to influence defence policy renewal.

Indeed, while sound strategic arguments can be made for bolstering the naval capital program and taking a more active approach in the Pacific, several other priority areas of investment appear to take precedent. A 2012 letter from the Prime Minister to the Minister of National Defence directed several areas to which DND should devote additional effort. These included protecting Arctic sovereignty, monitoring and defending the sea and air approaches to Canadian territory, enhancing intelligence and cyber capabilities, bolstering search and rescue and capabilities to respond to domestic emergencies, and establishing a sovereignty protection mandate for 5 Wing Goose Bay as key defence priorities – not improving Canada’s attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Although the Defence Renewal Team has not yet determined its potential reinvestment areas, it has stated that space and cyber capabilities are leading contenders for potential reinvestment.

Finally, the 2013 Speech from the Throne emphasized domestic emergency response, a capacity to respond to terrorism and cyber-attacks, and the Arctic as focal points for CFDS renewal. While none of this precludes an additional focus on the Pacific, and some of these new capabilities could contribute to such a move, there are strong indications that the government has other priorities.

Taken together the prospect of a substantive refocus westward seems bleak. DND is midway through its fourth year of fiscal austerity, with at least two more years to go. A plan for using efficiencies to facilitate reinvestment has finally been produced, but it is less ambitious than the transformation effort launched just three years ago, and may end up simply helping DND deal with its reductions. While naval recapitalization is edging closer to cutting steel, the AG has raised concerns about how much capability the budget can buy.

This has not yet influenced the government’s defence priorities. The government has consistently called for greater investments closer to home, and in space and cyber capabilities, not the Pacific. Altogether, this indicates that CFDS renewal will provide incremental policy adjustments, not a new direction, westward, or otherwise.

Notes
6. Ibid., p. 20.

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Typhoon Haiyan was one of the most destructive storms in human history, with winds of up to 315 kilometres per hour and storm surges of 25 feet. Over 6,000 people lost their lives, nearly 1,800 are missing, and over 12 million people lost their homes in the aftermath of this huge storm which hit the Philippine Islands 8 November 2013.

As I have stated in this column a number of times, large ships – particularly aircraft carriers – have the capacity to re-role quickly to conduct humanitarian assistance and/or disaster relief operations. If a range of different types of aircraft are available, combat aircraft and their supplies, aircrew and maintenance teams can be removed and replaced with transport and rescue aircraft and helicopters together with their support personnel and equipment. Even if time is not available to swap-out aircraft and personnel, operational ships and their well-trained ship’s companies can readily adapt to new tasks. This was the case with USS George Washington and her accompanying task group which are home-ported in Japan.

The task group deployed promptly to the disaster-stricken coast of East Samar in the Philippines after the area was hit by Haiyan. The task group members were pressed into the relief effort as soon as they arrived. Indeed, missions were flown from the carrier in advance of her arrival. Among other capabilities brought to bear was manpower – the group included thousands of sailors and marines. Other capabilities consisted of the ability of the nuclear-powered carrier to distill 400,000 gallons of fresh water daily and transport it ashore via helicopters and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, and medical personnel manning the 55-bed hospital onboard and sent ashore with relief supplies. The carrier remained on-station until relieved by several Landing Ship Docks which were able to close the shoreline and use their helicopters and landing craft to continue work.

Coincidentally, the re-built Kuznetsov-class Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning was conducting trials and training in the South China Sea area at the time of the typhoon. However, she was not deployed to offer any aid to a neighbouring state. Why was this?

Although Liaoning has been in commission for over a year, it seems likely that it will be a number of years before she will be a truly operational ship – if ever. This is not a criticism of the Chinese Navy – it has done wonders in bringing a hulk towed from the Black Sea a dozen years ago to its present state, but it is a lengthy process to establish a true sea-based organic air capability. Then too, these are the early days of establishing a capability to project air power from the sea – the breadth of resources that the US Navy can bring to bear in response to such events does not exist in China.
not currently exist in the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) – China’s Navy.

What was mystifying to observers was why it took so long for China to respond and provide aid to this hard-hit area. It seems very likely that the state of relations between the two countries had a lot to do with the delay. China is playing hard-ball with all of its neighbours in the South China Sea regarding sovereignty, mineral rights and fishing rights. However, although China did not deploy Liaoning to the Philippines, it finally did send a very appropriate, if tardy, response. This was the hospital ship Peace Ark, sent to treat sick and wounded survivors of the typhoon. Peace Ark is a world-class ship of her type: new, purpose-built and with room for 300 patients and eight operating theatres. The ship was commissioned to respond to regional disasters exactly like the one the Philippines has just experienced. As well, she embodies the win-win ideal that China’s leaders aspire to in their foreign policy efforts: helping people in need while deservedly improving China’s international image. When it comes to boosting Chinese prestige, Peace Ark has more firepower than any other ship in the PLAN fleet.

Even so, Beijing has emerged from this win-win scenario looking less than triumphant. Super Typhoon Haiyan struck on 8 November. It took 12 days for the Chinese Foreign Ministry to confirm that Peace Ark would be sent to assist. This meant that she did not treat typhoon victims until two to three weeks after the disaster.

Peace Ark still made a huge difference. Sick and injured people will require treatment for months to come, and despite the delay Peace Ark did arrive. But the difference is that the United States, and others including Japan, Thailand, Australia and the United Kingdom, responded immediately with the assets they had in the region at the time.

When the medical staff of the Peace Ark finally did get to work, the relief and gratitude of Filipinos must have been tinged with a sense of disappointment that precious days were lost while political pride trumped humanitarian common sense. Peace Ark was built as a symbol of China’s arrival as a great power. But, on this occasion at least, she has been more a symbol of China’s future potential – and of the inability of the Chinese leadership to do the right thing in a timely manner.

**Future ‘Soft Power’ Naval Response**

Navies can be very useful instruments in a state’s foreign policy tool box, not least for winning hearts and minds through providing a fast and effective response in times of major disasters. It will be interesting to see if the Chinese Navy employs Liaoning and other large ships more effectively in the coming years to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the waters off its southeast coast following the example set by the US Navy and other navies on many occasions.
Book Reviews


Reviewed by David Morse

This volume recounts the story of the sinking of the Soviet missile submarine K-129 while on patrol north of the Hawaiian Islands in 1968 and the subsequent partially successful attempt by the CIA to retrieve the submarine and its missiles – intact – using an enormous and technically innovative vessel, Glomar Explorer. Given that these events took place in the early years of the Cold War and in the face of significant unknowns about Soviet nuclear missile technology, the mission, had it paid off, would have been an intelligence coup of unprecedented proportions.

After a first glance at this book one wonders why now, what is it that makes this old story new again? The technological marvels of Glomar Explorer and the various plots and subplots engaging the CIA, the US Navy and Air Force and the Soviet Navy have been visited and revisited many times. On closer reading the book appears to be a companion piece, invoking the reputation of one of the most well-known and respected American commentators on naval technology and intelligence, Norman Polmar, to support a television documentary, the work of the co-author and film director Michael White.

The mystery of K-129 rests in the unexplained disappearance of this early ballistic missile submarine while heading for a patrol station to the north of the Hawaiian Islands. Many tales have been woven to attribute ulterior or sinister motives to the mission including the abrupt cancellation of leave and the redeployment of K-129 well before the end of a normal period of refit, rest and retraining, the sudden embarkation of strangers, the unexplained lack of routine communications, and sealed orders known only to the higher command of the Soviet Navy. Some previous writers have spun this tale into a rogue mission intended to attack the United States while it was distracted by Vietnam and the capture of the spy ship Pueblo.

Polmar and White provide a convincing narrative to the K-129 disaster. They explain the circumstances that gapped the Hawaiian station and prevented any other submarine from being deployed. They posit technical difficulties which could have prevented communication and contributed to the accidental ignition of the missile propellant, and detail the missile tube design compromises which penetrated the pressure hull and which might have led to uncontrollable flooding.

The authors’ handling of the internal US program explains the intelligence imperatives which drove the decision to attempt to salvage the submarine, and their detailed explanations of the design, construction and operation of the extraordinary Glomar Explorer are clear and concise and yet contain enough drama to keep the reader engaged.

While there is nothing new in the book, and the bibliography lists accounts starting in 1978 and leaves out a number of documentaries and exposés that have added to the story, the access enjoyed by the authors to both Soviet/Russian and American actors and their extensive use of contemporaneous reports, operations logs and intelligence reports provide a valuable context to these events. The authors’ reputations and their authoritative material add a deeper understanding reflecting their intention, perhaps, to provide the definitive and final explanation for the loss of K-129 and the subsequent US exploitation of the wreck.


Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham

James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie have written an educational and enlightening book on the development and present-day level of effectiveness of navies in South-east Asia. They have consciously excluded the larger, more widely known countries of Japan and China in order to focus upon the smaller, developing countries in this region.

The first chapter is used to provide the context within which the national evaluations are undertaken. Therefore the historical influences of colonialism, primary training doctrines and methods of the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union on long-term development, the role of the navy within society and the physical requirements (both long and short term) of establishing an independent navy are investigated at length. Additionally, the authors also outline the navies in an easy to follow chart that clearly identifies parameters of capability, developed by Michael Morris and Eric Grove, termed the ‘Hierarchy of Navies.’
The follow-on chapters provide specific analysis of individual countries – Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (including South Vietnam and North Vietnam) are all addressed. Each of the chapters is structured in a similar manner thereby providing for ease of comprehension and a common method of evaluation. The historical development of the fleets and the factors affecting them are laid out in a manner that is easy to decipher. The authors are to be complimented on the way in which they are able to present what, in reality, are very complicated and involved issues. Thus, for example, we find out that in Brunei the limiting factor on the navy is not cost but population, and can compare this to the Philippines where both internal instability and cost have been key factors on development and employment.

The concluding chapter of *Navies of South-East Asia* focuses on the influences in the present and in the future that will drive development. These include the diminishment of US regional influence, the quest for disputed resources especially centring upon the Spratly Islands, the growing assertiveness of China, and the internal stability of the states that are the focus of this review.

Additionally, the authors provide some very concrete insights for regional progression. These focus on the need for cooperation among the smaller Southeast Asian states, an acceptance that naval development requires not only good governance but also long-term commitment and a realization of the critical need for inter-agency operability. They also extrapolate where they anticipate the countries will be in terms of the hierarchy of navies in the next few years.

This book is of very high value. Included in the text is an extensive acronym/abbreviation listing which is critical for understanding the jargon associated with each country. In addition to this, there is a comprehensive bibliography and many footnotes. I would, however, have liked to have seen a regional map at the front of the book in order to provide a quick reference of the area.

Goldrick and McCaffrie have produced a stellar reference for the navies of the Far East. What sets this book apart is that it looks at the history and factors in the development of the navies as opposed to a two-dimensional rendition of ship types and capability. The authors focus on what happens behind the scenes and where they anticipate naval developments are going. This book is not for the casual reader but rather for those with a focused interest in the naval development of the region. Recommended.


Reviewed Colonel P.J. Williams

It seems to me that if there’s one certainty in naval history, it’s that each year one can expect another book on the *Bismarck* sinking. Accounts of the Battle of Midway in June 1942, appear headed toward a similar level of proliferation. My own library includes four volumes on this action. Although this account is somewhat a case of ‘old wine in new bottles,’ I’m quite happy that there is continued interest in what many have termed the decisive battle in the Pacific which enabled the United States, and its navy in particular, to turn the tide against the Japanese, whose loss of four fleet carriers, numerous planes and irreplaceable pilots, put them on the strategic defensive from that point on.

The wine analogy needs some explanation. What Thomas Hone has done is to compile in a single volume many of the key writings on the battle, accounts which have appeared since the 1940s in the US Naval Institute’s *Proceedings*, its *Naval History* magazine as well as numerous books published by the Naval Institute Press. In addition, the book contains interviews with participants from both sides, and operational reports dating from 1942. Lest one think that this is mere rote history with a procession of places, names and dates, far from it. One chapter by the noted British naval historian, Geoffrey Till, poses the question of whether Midway was the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific, and concludes that it was not necessarily decisive as Japan had already lost, but that the battle was a “necessary victory.” In contrast, another chapter, by former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaks of Midway as “the underappreciated victory,” and ends with the exhortation, “Now Hear this! It’s time to go forth and proselytize and underscore the world-historic role of Midway. The battle and its veterans deserve no less.”

The facts of the battle are well known to us today: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, decided on an invasion of Midway atoll in June 1942, while also hoping to draw remaining US naval strength out for a final decisive battle (remember that this was but six months after Pearl Harbor), aiming in particular to destroy the US aircraft carriers, which had escaped destruction on 7 December 1941. Supporting operations were also planned for the Aleutian Islands much further north. Through excellent intelligence and skillful deployment by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,
commander in chief US pacific fleet, of available carriers – USS enterprise, hornet and yorktown (which had been heavily damaged at the Coral Sea battle a month earlier) – and a gut decision by lieutenant-commander Wade McClusky to follow a Japanese destroyer which appeared to be headed somewhere in a hurry, US dive bombers were able to catch three of the four Japanese carriers in close company and relatively unprotected. In five minutes it was effectively all over and the Japanese carriers Akagi (Red Castle), Kaga (Increased Joy) and Soryu (Blue-Gray Dragon) were fatally hit, and Hiryu (Dragon Flying in Heaven) was sunk shortly thereafter. The US Navy did not escape unscathed as Yorktown was also lost.

The book is divided into eight parts which cover everything from pre-battle preparations, the battle itself, post-action analysis, assessments of senior commanders, the role of intelligence and a part which seeks to put Midway in its place in US naval history, a place which has been overshadowed by more Eurocentric events such as D-Day.

Despite the abundant literature on Midway, the great thing about books such as this, or indeed good historical scholarship of any sort, is the extent to which so-called myths are challenged and new information is presented. In this regard this book does not disappoint. For example, for some time after the battle great praise was heaped on the US Army Air Forces for the role their B-17 bombers played in achieving victory at Midway, even though it seems that not one of their bombs resulted in damage to any Japanese vessels. In another example, it had long been believed that when McClusky’s bombers struck the carriers, their demise was hastened by the fact that their decks were crowded with planes in the midst of refuelling and re-arming, but some accounts in this book suggest that these actions were taking place below decks. As one who has long been interested in how senior commanders make decisions, I was very glad to read of the description of how Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, one of Nimitz’s task force commanders at Midway made his. Apparently he made decisions through the use of a “rolled up twenty-inch square maneuvering board [a paper form containing a compass rose and a distance scale] fastened by a paper clip,” a device with which the non-aviator Spruance was never without. Good thing too, as without it, McClusky’s bombers, which were near the end of their search radius when they found the three Japanese carriers, may not have been launched in time.

While American historians continue to debate the place of Midway in US Navy history and the value of history in general to the sailor/soldier, other historians are now producing works on the Great War of 1914-1918 and the decisive battles of that conflict. One contributor to this book postulates that Midway was the US Navy’s Trafalgar. One wonders what similar comparisons Canadian historians will make of some of our past battles.

The book is well supported with photos, although additional maps would have been useful. There are several appendices, and the bibliography, though not all-inclusive, is annotated, something I always welcome. For navalists in general, and enthusiasts of Midway in particular, this book is highly recommended.


Reviewed by Ann Griffiths

Pomeroy’s Quay is somewhat lighter than the usual serious books that are reviewed in CNR. It’s a novel that takes place in a small fishing village in Newfoundland in 1914. It tells the tale of a 12-year old boy named Richard who has to go to work on the fishing boats after his father is killed in a storm while out at sea.

The other half of the story is about Korvettenkapitan Otto Feldman in the German Navy. Feldman has just been promoted to Captain of one of the new Unterseebooten or U-boats which were part of the Kaiser’s ambitious expansion of the navy. Although war had not yet started, it was in the air in early 1914. Feldman pushed his superiors to use the U-boats more widely and farther away from home – as offensive weapons as opposed to just for defence – and they eventually agreed to his suggestion. He came up with a plan to send U-boats to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River to prevent re-supply from Canada reaching Britain in case of war.

Richard gets signed on for his first year on the fishing boats, and heads off to sea. The fishing party locates off Labrador for the summer and we learn all about the hard life of a fisherman at this time. Meanwhile, the German U-boat travels toward Labrador. As summer 1914 turns to fall, war begins.

It would be wrong of me to give the story away. In summary, there are lots of fish caught, storms braved, and souls lost. And, of course, at some point the fishing boat and the German U-boat meet, and Richard saves the day.

Pomeroy’s Quay is nice light reading, and tells an entertaining story. It also gives us some history of a way of life that defined Newfoundland and Labrador, and that has virtually disappeared. For fans of historical novels, and fishing, this will be an enjoyable book.

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The Canadian Naval Review will be holding its annual essay competition again in 2014. There will be a prize of $1,000 for the best essay, provided by the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust.

The winning essay will be published in CNR. (Other non-winning essays will also be considered for publication, subject to editorial review.)

Essays submitted to the contest should relate to the following topics:

- History/historical operations of the Canadian Navy
- Canadian maritime security
- Canadian naval policy
- Canadian naval issues
- Canadian naval operations
- Global maritime issues (such as piracy, smuggling, fishing, environment)
- Canadian oceans policy and issues
- Arctic maritime issues
- Maritime transport and shipping

If you have any questions about a particular topic, contact naval.review@dal.ca.

Contest Guidelines and Judging

- Submissions for the 2014 CNR essay competition must be received at naval.review@dal.ca by Monday, 23 June 2014.
- Submissions are not to exceed 3,000 words. Longer submissions will be penalized in the adjudication process.
- Submissions must not have been published elsewhere.
- All submissions must be in electronic format and any accompanying photographs, images, or other graphics and tables must also be included as a separate file.

The essays will be assessed by a panel of judges on the basis of a number of criteria including readability, breadth, importance, accessibility and relevance. The decision of the judges is final. All authors will be notified of the judges’ decision within two months of the submission deadline.
One key to any future Canadian reorientation to the Pacific will be aerial transport and resupply. A Royal Canadian Air Force CC-177 Globemaster aircraft sits on the tarmac of Iloilo City airport during *Operation Renaissance* in the Philippines, on 17 November 2013.

*Credit: MCpl Marc-Andre Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera.*