CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2 (SUMMER 2009)

After Afghanistan: Maritime Options for the Future of Canadian Global Engagement

Piracy in Somalia

At Sea in a Cold and Hungry World

Kriegsgefangenenlager: A POW's Account of the Loss of *Athabaskan*

Our Sponsors and Supporters

The *Canadian Naval Review* (*CNR*) is a "not-for-profit" publication depending upon its subscription base, the generosity of a small number of corporate sponsors, and a small sustaining grant from Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies for funding. In addition, *CNR* is helped in meeting its objectives through the support of several professional and charitable organizations. Without that corporate support *CNR* would not be able to maintain the content diversity and high quality "feel" presently found in the Review. Corporate and institutional support also makes it possible to put copies of *CNR* in the hands of Canadian political decision-makers. Without the help of all our supporters *CNR* would not be able to continue the extensive outreach program established to further public awareness of naval and maritime security issues in Canada.

CANADA'S NAVAL MEMORIAL H.M.C.S. SACKVILLE MÉMORIAL NAVAL CANADIEN

(www.hmcssackville-cnmt.ns.ca)

NAVY LEAGUE LIGUE NAVALE

(www.navyleague.ca)

CNRS · SCRN

The Canadian Nautical Research Society
(www.cnrs-scrn.org)

The Naval Officers' Association of Canada
(www.noac-national.ca)

CADSI · AICDS
Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries
Association des industries canadiennes de défense et de sécurité

GENERAL DYNAMICS
Canada

(www.gdcanada.com)

THALES

(www.thalesgroup.com)

WASHINGTON MARINE GROUP

Washington Marine Group of Companies, an affiliate of Washington Corporations, is primarily involved in marine transportation, ship repair and shipbuilding.

(www.washingtonmarinegroup.com)

To receive more information about the corporate sponsorship plan or to find out more about supporting *CNR* in other ways, such as through subscription donations and bulk institutional subscriptions, please contact us at naval.review@dal.ca.

CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2 (SUMMER 2009)

The editorial offices of the *Canadian Naval Review* are located at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 6299 South Street, Henry Hicks Building, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 4H6

Phone: (902) 494-6846
Fax: (902) 494-3825
Email: naval.review@dal.ca
Website: www.naval.review.cfps.dal.ca

The *Canadian Naval Review* is published quarterly by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS) at Dalhousie University. It is a professional journal examining a wide range of maritime security issues from a Canadian perspective. In particular it focuses on strategic concepts, policies, historical perspectives, procurement programs and operations of the Canadian Navy, and national security in general. This initiative brings together members of the Canadian defence and academic communities and is a component of the CFPS's Maritime Security Program.

The *Canadian Naval Review* has three primary objectives:

- provide a public forum for the discussion of the maritime dimension of Canada's national security;
- provide a public forum for the discussion of Canada's naval and maritime policies; and
- provide a source for the public examination of Canadian naval and maritime history and for the development of lessons learned.

The material included in the review is presented for the professional and general education of the readers. Articles, commentaries and opinion pieces are invited from the widest possible spectrum for the purpose of informing, stimulating debate and generally challenging readers. The opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Editors, Editorial Board, the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, the Department of National Defence, or the Canadian Navy.

Articles, opinion pieces, book reviews and letters may be submitted via email or mailed (with an electronic copy) to the address given above. Send to the attention of the Editor, Dr. Ann Griffiths. Articles are to be in Word or WordPerfect format and no longer than 3,000 words. Articles must not have been published elsewhere. Citations should be kept to a minimum and articles must be accompanied by a 100-120 word abstract. Opinion pieces are to be 1,000-1,500 words. Authors of articles and opinion pieces which are published will be paid a small honorarium. Book reviews are to be 500-750 words. Photos may be submitted with articles or commentaries but they must be at least 300 dpi, at an equivalent size to 5 by 7 inches, and internet images cannot be used. Intellectual copyright will remain the property of the author, however, the right to re-publish articles initially published in the *Canadian Naval Review* remains with the Editorial Board. Articles and commentaries written in French are welcome and, if accepted, will be published in French.

Photo: MCpl Robin Mugridge Formation Imaging Services, Halifax, NS

The New Queen's Colour is presented to Maritime Command by Her Excellency, Governor General Michaëlle Jean wearing her naval uniform as Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces.

Contents

Editorial:
Piracy and Policy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is a subject that is in the news these days and it has given the navy a new higher profile. In this issue of *CNR* we have two articles that touch on the issue of piracy, one discusses the phenomenon in detail and the other discusses it in terms of future roles of the navy. I'd like to discuss it in terms of government policy.

It seems to me that the current Canadian policy is singularly ineffective. Canada has a policy of 'catch and release' whereby if pirates are apprehended, their weapons are confiscated and then they are sent on their way. I may be overly cynical here, but it seems probable that the released pirates will simply scoot back to their mother ship – or shore if need be – pick up more weapons and be out on the hunt faster than you can say *shiver me timbers*. In the absence of other employment opportunities, piracy is an excellent career choice, and as grateful as the released pirates may be, being 'caught and released' is unlikely to lead them to take up another career – assuming there were any.

The actions of the Canadian Navy in recent months to deter or dissuade would-be pirates have been imaginative. A helicopter brandished a bedsheet painted with a red stop sign bearing the word 'stop' in the local language. While ingenious, this method may be overly optimistic about the literacy rates in a state that is lacking an effective public education system. And although culturally sensitive, if the intended subjects of the sign are not literate, it doesn't matter what language you use. The stop sign also over-estimates the compliance rates for traffic signals in a country where such signs may not be common and their use may be seen as suggestive rather than obligatory.

Photo: WO Carole Morissette, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

*HMCS **Winnipeg**'s CH 124 Sea King helicopter displays a stop sign during **Operation Sextant**, 7 April 2009.*

Photo: WO Carole Morissette, Canadian Forces Combat

*Sgt Andy Gervais takes aim from HMCS **Winnipeg**'s CH-124 Sea King helicopter off the coast of Somalia.*

The catch and release policy contrasts with the policy of some other countries fighting piracy in the area. Germany, France and Spain have handed pirates over to the judicial system in Kenya, and others have transported them to their home countries to be tried. I understand Canada's reluctance to hand prisoners over to the judicial systems in nearby countries, systems that may not be protective of rights, or may be so corrupt that five minutes after we deliver the pirates in the front door, they walk out the back door. And I also understand that the Department of National Defence (DND) does not want to get into further legal controversy about handing over prisoners to authorities who may later subject them to maltreatment. DND probably feels it has spent enough time defending its actions in Afghanistan and wouldn't want to have to do it again for detainees captured off Somalia. However, if our NATO allies believe Kenya can try the pirates, why does Canada object?

The navy is understandably reluctant to hold on to captured pirates. The ships are not equipped with detention facilities, and no one wants to be responsible for guarding a pirate(s) for the duration of a ship's mission. Plus, detaining people without charge until they can be transported to Canada is itself an infringement of their rights.

France, Britain, the United States and Russia have all taken forceful actions against pirates, including killing some, but many Canadians would undoubtedly object to more muscular actions. We don't want to sink the pirate ships, particularly not with the pirates on them. And obviously the old-fashioned method of dealing with pirates –

hanging them – is a non-starter for countries such as Canada that have well-established systems of legal rights and which have long since abolished the death penalty. Plus it would be unfair to ask sailors to be purveyors of summary justice such as this.

The government claims that its catch and release policy is all Canada can do – that Canada has no jurisdiction in the area. This claim is puzzling. The notion of universal jurisdiction has applied to certain acts like piracy and slavery for many years. Universal jurisdiction applied traditionally to areas outside the jurisdiction of states – like the high seas – but increasingly applies even to crimes committed *within* the jurisdiction of states if the crimes are horrendous enough. As well, UN Security Council Resolutions – one of which Canada co-sponsored – authorize a variety of actions to tackle piracy. Furthermore, Canada is party to international agreements which contain provisions about piracy, and even the Criminal Code of Canada mentions piracy. Therefore, the claim that Canada does not have the jurisdiction to apprehend pirates is disingenuous at best. It would be more accurate to claim that Canada doesn't *want* to detain pirates, rather than *can't* detain them.

A team from the amphibious assault ship USS ***Boxer*** *(LHD 4) inspects the lifeboat from the* ***Maersk Alabama*** *after a dramatic rescue of the ship's captain by US Forces on 13 April 2009.*

Would handing pirates over to an international court help with the issue of jurisdiction? The International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague does not list piracy as one of the crimes under its jurisdiction but that doesn't mean that it couldn't be done, given firm resolve. Depending on the circumstances, a person perpetrating an act of piracy could be charged with crimes against humanity, which *are* in the court's jurisdiction. The ICC is new, having begun operations in 2002, so there would undoubtedly be many wrinkles to be worked out, but it is possible that pirates could be tried there. It's not clear, however, what kind of deterrent it would provide, and whether the ICC would even want to be responsible for trying such acts. There is also the problem of certain prominent non-members of the court, such as the United States, Russia and China, which are active in the Somali piracy issue. And, you'd still be left with the problem of detaining pirates until they could be handed over to the ICC.

What is the solution to the problem? As noted earlier, the current policy seems ineffective. The piracy will only end when (a) there are other employment opportunities, or (b) it no longer makes money for the perpetrators, i.e., the costs become higher than the returns.

As long as Somalia is a state without a government (and thus without the means to implement law and order, infrastructure, an education system, a judicial and penal system, and all the other trappings of a state), there will be few other economic opportunities. And as long as shipping companies and/or countries pay ransoms, piracy will be profitable. Many countries have policies that prevent them from paying ransoms to free citizens who are kidnapped. This policy is great in principle but is difficult to implement in reality. It's hard to resist the pressure to pay a ransom – just this once – to get the citizen back safely. And the same goes with captured ships and crews. It's tempting to pay to get the ship back, even if the consequences are less than rational for all concerned. The rational act would have been for the first ship owner to have said no. That would have meant no reward for the pirates, and therefore no piracy, or at least not as much. But that train has left the station. Few corporations want the negative publicity that would come from saying no to ransom a captured crew, and it's often cheaper to pay the ransom than to lose the ship.

Solving piracy is clearly a complex problem. The only real solution is to fix things on land. But that's an even bigger problem. No one wants to set boots on the ground in Somalia to address the chaos there. The United States is the only Western country with the ability to intervene militarily, but given American attention elsewhere, the bitter experience in Somalia in the 1990s, and the 'optics' of another intervention in a country with a significant Muslim population, the chances of that happening are next to nil. China *could* perhaps intervene but *would* it, and would the West like the results if it did? And, of course, we must ask if military intervention would solve the problem, or just make it worse.

So, what should Canada do? Well, perhaps strong encouragement for the faltering peace process in Somalia might lead to the establishment of a credible government in the country that could begin to establish law and order. This could lead to a virtuous circle that makes piracy less attractive as a career option. And in the meantime, Canada could provide development assistance to increase the employment choices available to people living in the region, and support the judicial systems of other nearby states so that apprehended pirates can be tried and would-be pirates can be deterred.

Ann Griffiths

After Afghanistan: Maritime Options for the Future of Canadian Global Engagement

Patrick Lennox

The government of Canada has resolved to pull its armed forces out of Afghanistan in 2011. Accordingly, the strategic moment is upon us to plan for how and where Canada will next contribute to global stability and security. The two reasons for this are fairly straightforward.

First, the transition out of Afghanistan will be eased if the process of assuming another global role of significance is underway. As a smaller 'specialized power,' Canada cannot be expected to be all things to all of its allies. But it does have to be some things. It follows that selecting a sustainable role for the country in contributing to global security and stability should be a top priority for any Canadian government considering where Canada will next contribute after it has removed its armed forces from Afghanistan. Part of the 'exit strategy' for Kandahar, in other words, should involve an 'entrance strategy' into another stability engagement, one that is suited to Canada's capabilities, interests and values. Second, planning this move proactively as opposed to reactively will put 'us' in control of our own fate, and could prevent the possibility of stumbling blindly into another Kandahar.

This article begins the job of mapping the future of Canada's global engagement. It proposes three different maritime domains where the Canadian Navy can play an important role – the Caribbean, the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden.

Photo: Cpl Jonathan Johansen, JTFK Image Tech, Afghanistan Roto 7

Soldiers from the 2R22R returning to camp after a long day on patrol near Mushan, Afghanistan, 26 April 2009.

Criteria and Constraints

Four key criteria serve as a means of determining which of the array of options for Canada's next global engagement is best suited to the country. First, the role must contribute in a direct way to the realization of Canada's national interests and values. Second, the role must enhance Canada's international profile and serve as a significant and visible alternative to Afghanistan. Third, the role must help to fulfill Canada's alliance obligations and enhance its other international partnerships. Finally, the role must contribute in a meaningful and measurable way to security and stability in the international system.

The most significant constraint is the state of the army. After Afghanistan, the army will need to come home for a year or more to heal itself after being stretched to the limit and beyond.[1] This severely constrains the options for the next significant Canadian engagement abroad. It rules out building on Canada's current and limited involvement in the Darfur region of Sudan, as well as any other potential peacekeeping/peacebuilding/stabilization efforts in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Zimbabwe.

With hulls in troubled waters the remaining option, a second constraint that must be acknowledged is the aged and depleted condition of the Canadian Navy. Both MARLANT and MARPAC are short about a crew's worth of sailors. There isn't much left of the two supply ships, and the three destroyers have also seen better days. About a third of the frigates are scheduled to go into refit soon, and the Sea Kings are a liability. This will make it very challenging, if not impossible, to put an entire Canadian task group with air assets to sea for an extended period. That being said, the navy, aged and understaffed as it is, seems like the best capability Canada has at the moment. If successive governments have been willing to break the army in Afghanistan, presumably they will also be willing to break the navy in some future commitment.

If we are left with making a sustained sea-based contribution to global stability and security as a means of compensating for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Kandahar that contribution will have to come with opportunities for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian

Photo: MCPL Marc Lacourse, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Canadian Forces personnel deployed to Senegal teach African Union soldiers to drive the Grizzly general purpose armoured vehicle, August 2005.

International Development Agency (CIDA) to become involved. This will multiply the effect of having hulls in distant waters, and make it more probable that the role will fulfill the key criteria for Canadian leadership beyond 2011.

Option #1: The Caribbean Sea

The Caribbean has been hit hard by the global recession. Major declines in rates of tourism, plunging foreign investment, tight credit, sharp declines in contributions to non-governmental organizations, and plummeting rates of remittances all promise to hit the region even harder. Murder rates there are the highest in the world, and much of this violence stems from the flourishing drug trade. About two-thirds of the narcotics produced in Latin America and the Caribbean are destined for markets in North America via Mexico. Accordingly, this activity has a direct impact on North American security and stability. The recent wave of gang violence in Vancouver, Surrey and Richmond, British Columbia, attests to this connection. Mexican President Felipe Calderon's crackdown on the drug cartels in his country has resulted in a shortage of cocaine in Canada. This resource scarcity has in turn resulted in wars breaking out between rival gangs for control of the distribution of cocaine in the Vancouver area.

The geostrategic relevance of the Caribbean has been further elevated by the reactivation of the US Navy's 4th Fleet which had been disbanded in 1950. The 4th Fleet began operations in the Caribbean in the summer of 2008. This was followed by the visit of four Russian warships to the area, which were supported by President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Cuba in late November of 2008. "Russia is back in Latin America," one Russian official declared in Caracas during the first visit of a Russian President to Venezuela.

Photo: US Navy /Released

*More than 13 metric tons of drugs exceeding $220 million in value sit onboard the guided-missile frigate USS **Samuel B. Roberts** (FFG 58) after being seized by the US Navy and US Coast Guard in the US Southern Command, 12 December 2008.*

A Canadian sea-based contribution to security and stability in this region would likely involve counter-narcotics operations in support of US SOUTHCOM's Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South. It would also involve support for the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, cooperation with developing navies and coast guards in the region, disaster relief, and diplomatic events helping to enhance economic relations with countries in the region.

It would be hard to argue that such a contribution is not in Canada's national interest. The Caribbean is basically our backyard, and given the transnational and fluid nature of the current threat environment, contributions in that region translate directly into enhanced stability and security both at home and abroad. With Mexico – the twelfth largest economy in the world – threatening to become a failed state, any contribution to Mexican stability would clearly be in Canadian interests. The ability to combine such an effort with developmental, diplomatic and disaster relief efforts suggests that it would also be in tune with Canadian values.

A prolonged and increased Canadian naval presence in the Caribbean would be well received in Washington, and with the likely exclusion of Venezuela and Bolivia, throughout the Western Hemisphere also. In this way it would help fulfill part of our alliance obligations to the United States, build and foster relations within the Organization of American States, and further assert a Canadian leadership role in the hemisphere. This being said, it is unlikely that such an engagement would get much notice on the global stage.[2]



*Sailors from the **Udaloy**-class Russian destroyer **Admiral Chabanenko** render a ceremonial salute during their Latin American deployment in November 2008.*

Option #2: The Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea, on the west coast of Africa, is a region that has long been destabilized by maritime predation. Piracy, poaching, oil bunkering (siphoning oil from transit lines for sale on the black market), abductions and arms trafficking all impede the development of the extraordinary resource wealth of the region, and all come with serious environmental repercussions as well. This is a region that could easily surpass the Persian Gulf in terms of oil production within a decade but both onshore and offshore instability plague the progress.[3]

Nigeria, for example, produces about 10% of American oil supply, and half of its production goes to the United States. It is the largest oil producer in Africa. But state corruption and domestic instability created by militant groups such as the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) make it difficult for Nigeria to reach its full potential. A high percentage of NDV and MEND attacks against foreign oil companies and government institutions in the Niger Delta region are seaborne.[4]

Failed states in the Gulf of Guinea and coastal West Africa will cause myriad problems for the international community. Take for example the incidents in Guinea-Bissau in March of 2009. The President, his chief of staff and the chief of the country's military were all murdered within a span of 48 hours. Although who-murdered-who-for-what-reason details are still blurry, most observers trace the violence to the Latin American drug cartel that essentially runs the country and uses it as a lily pad for smuggling cocaine into Europe.[5]

Because Guinea-Bissau does not have a coast guard, it cannot stop the Colombian narco-trafficking planes from landing on the islands off its coast and distributing product to sea- and air-based smugglers who push the drugs into Spain and France. The Colombians have established such a foothold in Guinea-Bissau that they were able to execute political leaders who threatened to put an end to their exploitation of the country's instability. In effect, the Colombian cartels are engaged in what I would describe as 'narco-imperialism' in western Africa, and Guinea-Bissau isn't an isolated case. There are a number of other small states in the region that could easily crumble under the corruptive pressures of drug smuggling, money laundering and black market oil sales.

Failed states in western Africa make it easier for Latin American narcotics cartels to supply markets in Europe. This in turn makes these cartels more powerful and more capable of destabilizing states in their own regions, as is happening in Mexico and Colombia at the moment. This example should demonstrate that helping western Africa achieve a degree of maritime stability will contribute to stability ashore both in the immediate region and elsewhere.

The United States has recognized this dynamic and recently undertaken a major initiative designed to reverse its malignant implications. It established the Africa Part-

Approximately 20,000 barrels of crude were spilled near Oloibiri, Niger Delta, June 2004.

*Crew from the amphibious transport dock ship USS **Nashville** (LPD 13) demonstrate fire-fighting techniques during an Africa Partnership Station training exercise in Lagos, 20 March 2009.*

nership Station (APS) in 2007 which is designed to assist and develop the capability of African navies, coast guards and mariners to stabilize and secure their littoral regions.[6] This is a major initiative that involves both African and European partners. It is focused on the Gulf of Guinea region but is also engaging East and South Africa.

Engaging in this region would contribute to the APS, help to develop the coast guard capacities of small states in the region through Theatre Security Cooperation, increase maritime domain awareness, and make a dent in the amount of narcotics flowing into and out of West Africa from South and Central America. This sort of engagement could be easily combined with diplomatic initiatives to build political and economic partnerships in the region.

The audience for this mission would be decidedly global, and it would put Canada on the vanguard of an evolving, multifaceted security issue with system-wide implications. That being said, Canada does not have much of a legacy upon which to draw in the region, and CIDA's focus on Latin America would make it difficult to add much of a development dimension to the deployment beyond assistance to nascent local coast guards and navies.

Option #3: The Gulf of Aden

There were 115 reported pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia in 2008. Already in 2009 there have been an equal number of attacks, though only 27 have been successful. As of 28 May 2009, 14 ships and over 200 merchant mariners are being held hostage for ransom by Somali pirates.

The average ransom for the release of hijacked vessels increased from $1 million (US) in July 2008, to $1.5 million by December. The Gulf of Aden, where most of the attacks have occurred and through which 20,000 commercial vessels transit each year, is slowly being choked off as a viable shipping route. More and more shipping companies are opting to take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk an attack or a hijacking, and insurance rates for vessels transiting the gulf have increased tenfold since August 2008.[7]

Somali piracy has emerged as a global issue requiring a collective response from trading states and members of the international maritime community. Over three million barrels of oil transit the Gulf of Aden each day, as does 90% of Far East trade to Europe. The Gulf of Aden is thus a strategically vital sea lane, one the international community cannot allow to become a pirate playground.

To date the international community has been extremely willing to put warships into the region. In May 2009 there were warships from two dozen different states conducting counter-piracy patrols and escorting World Food Program (WFP) ships into Mogadishu to help relieve widespread starvation in Somalia. The United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 1851 that passed unanimously on 17 December 2008 which paves the way for "all necessary means" to be employed in the effort to combat piracy. Somali land, sea and air space is now open for a multilateral military effort with UN backing to suppress piracy. Given the situation, Somalia-based piracy will be as high on President Barack Obama's foreign policy agenda as it is for most of the major players in the international system.

Japan, for example, recently considered re-writing its pacifist post-war constitution to allow itself to engage in anti-piracy patrols off the Horn of Africa. This move was inspired in part by China sending two destroyers and a supply ship into the Gulf of Aden just before Christmas 2008. The first real expeditionary deployment of Chinese naval forces since 1949 had Japan nervous that it would fall behind China in building good relations with the Obama administration, so it now has two destroyers and a supply ship positioned in the Gulf of Aden. The European Union has mounted its first-ever naval deployment, with eight member states contributing to the year-long commitment under the banner of *Operation Atalante*. India, Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia and Russia have also sent ships into the region. Combined Maritime Forces – a coalition of 20



*Pirates hold the crew of the Chinese fishing vessel **Tian Yu 8** at gunpoint off Somalia, 17 November 2008.*

navies led by the United States – has established a new regional command (Combined Task Force (CTF) 151) to deal specifically with piracy in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea region.

Despite this impressive gathering of warships in the Gulf of Aden, the international community has struggled to make significant progress in the suppression of Somali piracy. The reason for this can be traced back to the lack of a comprehensive global governance regime directly focused on the problem of maritime predation and capable of dealing with the issues of (1) prosecuting and punishing pirates from failed states apprehended at sea, and (2) creating the opportunities for the international community to pursue pirates and smugglers inside territorial waters, and ashore in failed and failing states. The establishment of such a regime would mark the beginnings of a credible deterrent threat backed by the international community that could have the effect of significantly reducing the number of Somalis willing to become involved in the piracy racket, as well as the number of prospective pirates in other regions such as the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Guinea.

Canada has a recent history of involvement in this region, which would be easy to draw on in the event that it decided to get back into the counter-piracy game. It was not that long ago that Canada had the lead on this issue. In August 2008 a Canadian Commodore was in command of Combined Task Force 150, which up until the establishment of CTF 151 included the Gulf of Aden in its area of responsibility. Onboard HMCS *Iroquois*, Commodore Bob Davidson and his staff established the Maritime Security Patrol Area though which commercial vessels can now transit with some hope of protection from pirate attacks.

HMCS *Protecteur* and *Calgary* were also in the region at the time contributing to the newly focused anti-piracy efforts of the coalition. HMCS *Ville de Québec* was even brought in from a NATO mission in the Mediterranean to escort WFP vessels carrying supplies into Mogadishu to feed hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis. In other words, Canada did a lot of the heavy lifting early on in the recent surge of Somali piracy. Typically, Canada has failed to capitalize politically on all of its hard work. Despite sending HMCS *Winnipeg* to contribute to NATO Standing Maritime Group 1's counter-piracy patrols (*Operation Allied Protector*), Canada did not join the UN-backed Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which has formed a number of working groups to deal with the issues of naval operations, judicial authority to criminally prosecute pirates, collaboration with industry and public diplomacy.[8]

Starting the push now to assert a more robust military and political presence in the Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea region could provide a significant alternative to Canada's Kandahar contribution for a number of reasons. First, the geostrategic centre of gravity has shifted decisively east in recent years, making the Indian Ocean the central theatre for competition and conflict in the 21st century.[9] Second, with al Qaeda recently setting up shop in Yemen, the deployment would have a direct connection to the 'war on terrorism.' Third, there would be a 'responsibility to protect' element to the operation, as it would inevitably involve contributions to the escort of WFP vessels into Mogadishu. Fourth, it could be combined with diplomatic involvement in the development of a proper global governance regime to deal with maritime security in a globalized era. Fifth, it would help Canada build relationships not only with states in an increasingly crucial area for global stability, but also with the numerous other mari-



Photo: Internet

*The Chinese destroyers **Wuhan 169** and **Haikou 171** en route to the Gulf of Aden to conduct counter-piracy patrols.*

Photo: WO Carole Morissette, Canadian Forces

*HMCS **Winnipeg**'s naval boarding party interrogates crew of a skiff following an attack on a merchant vessel in the Gulf of Aden, 9 April 2009.*

time states that are currently contributing to the counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden – Russia, China, India, South Korea, etc. Finally, a high percentage of Canadian sailors have developed experience in the region since 9/11, and accordingly, the Canadian Navy possesses a great deal of expertise in conducting maritime security operations, amounting to a Canadian specialization in this area.

The major challenge in this region is not the lack of a legacy on which to draw. The issue here is CIDA's lack of interest in the Horn of Africa, which will make it difficult to mount much of a 'whole-of-government approach' to the region. Most would also regard the distance from Canadian shores to be a factor against this deployment. However, it is possible for Canada to take a shore-based command of either CTF 150 or CTF 151, setting up in Djibouti, or Manama, Bahrain. Moreover, the high volume of American and Japanese oilers that routinely service the region would make it possible for Canada to leave its supply ships alongside in Esquimalt and Halifax.

Conclusions

Of the three options, the third – a prolonged contribution to stability off the Horn of Africa – has the most potential to fulfill the criteria outlined earlier. It meets the first criteria in that Canada has a responsibility to protect people who have been denied such protection from their own state, but Canada, as a maritime and G8 state, also has a responsibility to protect the sea lanes of communication across which the vast majority of global trade travels. Given that a deployment off the Horn of Africa offers Canada an opportunity to protect starving Somalis and the free flow of commerce through the region, the contribution seems well in line with both Canada's values and interests.

Given the high profile of the piracy issue, it is also likely that such a deployment would get Canada noticed on the international stage. In this sense, it has the potential to fulfill the second criteria enhancing Canada's international profile. Of the three, this option holds out the widest range of opportunities for building partnerships and fulfilling alliance obligations – the third criteria. The fourth criteria would also be fulfilled, as Canadians would have the opportunity to contribute meaningfully and quantifiably to stability operations that would have the potential to reduce the high levels of human, narcotics and arms smuggling throughout the region.

The Caribbean option runs a close second in that it opens up the debate about whether Canada should just come home after Afghanistan and focus on the Western Hemisphere as the Harper government is indicating it should, or whether Canada should attempt to remain engaged in the 'far abroad.'

The Gulf of Guinea option is novel and involvement in that region could put Canadian foreign policy on the vanguard of an emerging global problem. If the Niger Delta region could get its politics sorted out, it could become a vital piece of the global puzzle. Having relationships and connections to those countries could serve Canada and Canadian firms well in the future.

The Kandahar experiment should reveal that a reactive, ad hoc foreign policy for Canada is doomed to failure. Accordingly, before leaving Afghanistan, it might be time to start thinking about where Canada will next contribute to global security and stability. Having a sense of the options for the future and preparing for them, as opposed to stumbling blindly into another Kandahar, is probably worthwhile.

Notes

1. This is the opinion of Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, head of the army.
2. For a comprehensive review of the range of traditional and non-traditional security issues endemic to the region see Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (ed.), *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change* (Miami: Ian Randle, 2004).
3. See Patrick J. Paterson, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (2007), p. 29; and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
4. An example of this activity was the sea-based, apparent coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea in February 2009. See "Intrigue in Equatorial Guinea," *Economist Intelligence Unit* (24 February 2009), available at www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13173450.
5. See Caroline Sourt, "Africa's first narco-state?" *Guardian.co.uk*, 9 March 2009, available at www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/06/guinea-bissau-drugs-trade; and Will Connors, "Guinea-Bissau's Leader, Army Chief are Killed," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 March 2009, p. A7.
6. Tim Fish, "USN announces further support for Africa Partnership Station," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31 October 2008.
7. For a comprehensive assessment of the Somali piracy issue see Patrick Lennox, "Contemporary Piracy off the Horn of Africa," *Nexen Papers*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, December 2008, available at www.cdfai.org.
8. James Kraska and Brian Wilson, "The Cooperative Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154 (April 2009), p. 80.
9. See Robert D. Kaplan, "Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88 (2009), pp. 16-33.

Dr. Patrick Lennox is a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and a Research Fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University.

Ancient Problems Renewed: Piracy in Somalia

Stuart Palliser

Photo: Corporal Rick Ayer, Formation Imaging Services, Halifax, Nova Scotia

*Night vision photograph of HMCS **Winnipeg**'s naval boarding party searching a Somalian skiff after an attack against the MV **Front Ardenne**, 18 April 2009.*

Introduction

Today piracy rooted in Somalia is a common subject in the news. Somalia is perhaps the best example one could find of a failed state. The country has no armed forces, no police forces and a government so weak it cannot even move into the capital city Mogadishu due to violent factions competing for power. Without a military, police or even a legitimate government, and given the weakness of neighbouring states, it can be assumed that any action taken to address piracy in Somalia will have to be taken by the international community. As the issue becomes one of global importance, this article will examine Canada's role in the waters of Somalia and assess the benefits and repercussions of possible actions (or lack thereof) in the future.

A common theme when examining Canadian defence policy will always be a lack of resources. Therefore, when discussing the implementation of defence policy, no matter what the issue, the central question will be related to cost. With regard to piracy off the coast of Somalia, *solving* the problem would mean intervention on land as this is where the problem begins but such intervention is far beyond the means of Canada and quite likely NATO as well. However, progress can surely be made in *deterring* piracy off the coast of Somalia. Deterrence would not simply be a band-aid solution, rather, it is an important goal which will have far-reaching results both for Somalia and the international community. Most importantly, deterring piracy in the waters off of Somalia is a perfect fit for the Canadian military.

The purpose of this article is to show that there is a need for greater international effort to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia for humanitarian, economic and security interests. As well, the purpose is to show that Canada has played an important and successful role to date, and it is in the interests of the Canadian Navy to strengthen efforts in the region to deter piracy. After 2011, the Canadian military will need a renewed purpose. Somalia presents this opportunity. The cost, in terms of personnel and materiel would be relatively small, while the positive results of deterring pirate attacks could be rapid. A mission against Somalia's pirates should be viewed by Canada's navy as an opportunity to protect international trade, reinforce international law, export Canadian values, deter global criminal organizations including terrorists, and to gain the appreciation of the international community for performing what could be a critical act in the coming years.

The Situation in Somalia

The important starting point to understanding the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia is to examine the situation *on land*. Aside from missing the institutions of governance, Somalia is wretchedly poor – in 2008 it had an infant mortality rate of 111/1000 births (6th highest in the world), a Gross Domestic Product per capita of $600 (5th lowest in the world) and an average life expectancy of 49 years.[1]

What makes a successful piracy operation? In her article "What Makes Piracy Work?" Virginia Lunsford argues that piracy depends on five factors:

1. an available population of potential recruits;
2. a secure base of operations;
3. a sophisticated organization;
4. some degree of outside support; and
5. cultural bonds that engender vibrant group solidarity.[2]

In the case of Somalia, all five of these factors are in place.

First, piracy is the most profitable industry in Somalia. With ransom payments in 2008 averaging $0.5 to 2 million (US),[3] it is easy to see why young men in Somalia are tempted to become pirates. The financial situation of the average Somali is dire and the opportunities available within the state are almost non-existent. The number of citizens who may turn to piracy in desperation could be overwhelming. Given the global economic crisis, this situation may get worse.

The second factor, a secure base of operations, is also a crucial ingredient of piracy in Somalia. As the state lacks a police force or military there is nothing to stop criminal activity from thriving. No state wants to follow pirates on to land in Somalia. Therefore, pirates feel secure from both internal security forces, which do not exist, and international security forces who remember the consequences of on-land intervention in 1993 all too well.

Sophisticated organization, Lunsford's third factor, would have been far less evident only two years ago. As the pirates have been essentially left to their own devices however, they have thrived and have now formed very sophisticated organizations both in terms of technology and coordination. They use satellite phones, have GPS technology and knowledge of shipping routes. They have also secured larger ships to be used as 'mother ships' from which they can dispatch small skiffs to out-speed and out-manoeuvre their prey hundreds of kilometres from the shore. The simple fact that pirates are able to carry out attacks far from shore, coordinate ransom demands and then disappear within the chaos of Somalia demonstrates the extent of their organization. If the events of the last two years teach us anything, it is that deterring piracy must be undertaken before pirates become even more organized and technologically sophisticated.

Lunsford's fourth factor is outside support. At this point, there is no consensus on the degree of outside support the pirates have. There is little to show that pirates and terrorists are coordinating their efforts in Somalia at this stage. There is, however, evidence to indicate that ransom payments received by pirates are being 'donated' to terrorist organizations. The extent of the donations is unknown as is how sophisticated the network may become. However, two conclusions should be drawn: (1) some pirates in Somalia obviously agree to a certain extent with the ideology of known terrorist groups; and (2) the possibility of networks either being established or growing stronger between pirates and terrorist organizations is both likely and terrifying.

The final factor to successful piracy is the presence of cultural bonds that engender vibrant group solidarity. Somalia's pirates seem to be united with strong cultural and tribal/clan bonds. As well, the pirates are united in a national struggle. Attacks appear to be justified repeatedly on the grounds that pirates are simply attempting to replace a non-existent coast guard in order to protect national natural resources and sovereign waters. Since the collapse of the government in Somalia, international fishing trawlers have been exploiting a lack of security and have been fishing illegally – in particular fishing within sovereign Somali waters, using illegal fishing equipment which destroys the seabed, over-fishing, and reportedly sabotaging local fishing boats and equipment.[4] In fact, illegal fishing in Somalia is estimated to be a $300 million/year business.[5] Thus, many argue that illegal fishing has been the catalyst and continues to be a central issue underlying piracy in Somalia. Evidence that pirates are in fact disenfranchised fishermen is quite strong. Therefore, as tribally united, disenfranchised citizens of a failed state, many Somali pirates appear to be strongly united in what they believe is a just fight for what is rightfully theirs.

What is at Stake: The Situation at Sea

This situation shows indications of worsening in the future. To understand the implications of Canadian action (or inaction) in the region, it is important to focus on the consequences of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

The situation of piracy in the region is quickly spinning out of control – since 2003, acts have more than quadrupled. In 2005, there were approximately 100 organized pirate attacks compared to 1,200 in 2008.[6] So far in 2009 the pirate attacks have already surpassed the total figure for 2008. This is a very disturbing trend for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, attacks have cost shipping companies a great amount of money for ransom payments and delayed deliveries. They have also had a cost to the victims of ships that are hijacked. As well, increased attacks have caused the insurance premiums for ships navigating these waters to skyrocket – in fact, these premiums have risen tenfold in a single year. There are two main implications to these increases. First, they have caused an increase in the overall cost of transporting goods by sea through the Gulf of Aden. Second, they have caused some shipping companies to reduce the size of crew for voyages. Unfortunately, reducing crew numbers makes ships even more vulnerable to attacks.

Furthermore, the increase in the number of attacks has led the International Maritime Bureau to increase the 'safe range' off the coast of Somalia from 50 to 200 nautical miles, which means yet another increase in

Photo: US Navy /Released

The US Navy provides humanitarian and medical assistance to the crew of the Taiwanese-flagged fishing trawler ***Ching Fong Hwa****. The vessel was seized by pirates off the coast of Somalia in May 2007 and released six months later with the assistance of the US Navy.*

the cost of international shipping. At first most of the attacks were happening towards the southern portions of Somalia. There has, however, been a major geographical shift northward to the Gulf of Aden. This is of particular concern to the international community because the Gulf of Aden is one of the world's most important shipping routes, particularly for oil.

It is problematic that wide berths cannot be navigated within the Gulf of Aden itself. Maritime 'chokepoints' such as this pose the greatest danger to ships because they allow pirates to strike quickly and return to the protection of sovereign waters before pursuers can apprehend them. Every year, from 16,000 to 20,000 ships travel through the Gulf of Aden,[7] and avoiding the area would mean incurring an enormous cost for international shipping firms. In fact, even with the risks of piracy, it is more cost-effective for ships to continue to travel through the Gulf of Aden than it would be for them to circumnavigate Africa. Therefore, it will always be in the interests of international business to continue to travel through the Gulf of Aden.

Besides being in the economic interests of Canada, tackling piracy rooted in Somalia is also in Canadian security interests. Increased piracy has also encouraged an increase in other forms of illicit activity in the region's waters. For example, it is probable that there has been an increase in arms-smuggling in the region both by and to accommodate the pirates. The international security impact that a failure to deter acts of piracy off the coasts of Somalia could have can be grouped into two categories: the possibility of terrorist employment of the maritime environment; and the contribution to the general instability of the region.

The possible nexus between pirates and terrorists in the region has already been mentioned. The implications of closer ties between these groups could be devastating to Canada and the rest of the world. Approximately 60% of the world's oil is transported by only 4,000 tankers, many of which go through the Gulf of Aden.[8] On 15 November 2008, *Sirius Star* – a Saudi tanker carrying two million barrels of oil worth over $100 million – was captured by Somali pirates. If they could successfully attack an oil tanker such as *Sirius Star*, terrorists could deal a heavy blow to the West. As well, an attack that results in the sinking of a tanker would have huge environmental costs, and could also bring shipping to a halt for weeks or even months. Once again, pre-empting these actions will be of key importance in the future, especially given the current fragility of the global economic system.

Whether or not a link between pirates and terrorists emerges, the region is already at best a hot spot of human rights violations and at worst a threat to global security. The seizure of MV *Faina*, a Ukrainian cargo ship carrying tanks, military weapons and a variety of small arms and ammunition could have been a disaster. Somalia is surrounded by other fragile states such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Had pirates managed to get these weapons to shore, local militias could suddenly have had

Photo: Internet

Kenyan police officer guards a pyre of confiscated weapons about to be destroyed by fire, in March 2009.

more weaponry than many governments in the region. A destabilization of the entire region could have catastrophic consequences and demand potentially costly international intervention.

As an active member in international trade and affairs, Canada has a vested interest in deterring acts of piracy in this region. These attacks have already forced the global economic system to incur financial damages and, given current circumstances, piracy is only likely to thrive in Somalia. Therefore, if efforts by Canada and other countries do not increase in the region, economic costs are bound to increase, as will the potential for environmental disaster. Furthermore, the capture of MV *Faina* should demonstrate the capacity piracy has to destabilize an entire region. The international community cannot afford such an occurrence for humanitarian, economic and practical reasons.

International Law and the United Nations

Modern piracy has not been properly addressed by international law. In the case of Somalia, international law has done nothing to stop pirates from hijacking ships. Why have the piracy provisions in the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) not worked? Would international action in Somalia be a critical factor in restoring the legitimacy of international law and the UN?

The biggest problem with UNCLOS is the very definition it gives of piracy. It is defined as "an illegal act of violence,

Photo: US Navy/Released

*The supertanker MV **Sirius Star** at anchor after a ransom of £2 million was reportedly paid on behalf of the ship's owners. The ship was hijacked more than 450 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya en route from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the Cape of Good Hope.*


Photo: US Navy/Released

*Somali pirates hijack the Belize-flagged MV **Faina**, 28 September 2008. **Faina**, carrying a cargo of Ukrainian T-72 tanks and a crew of 20 was held hostage for five months until a ransom of US $3,200,000 was paid to her captors.*

detention, or depredation committed outside territorial waters for private ends by crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship, persons, or crew."[9] The problem with this definition is that it restricts acts of piracy to *outside* territorial waters, while piracy often occurs *inside* these waters. As well, UNCLOS provisions make it impossible for authorities to pursue pirates even if the act occurs on the high seas. Because of this, pirates often operate in areas such as the Gulf of Aden where they do not have to travel too far to enter the safety of sovereign waters. In other words, as with many international laws, the UNCLOS provisions for piracy have been formulated in such a way that sovereignty takes precedence. The UNCLOS provisions seem to assume that states are willing and able to prosecute piracy in their waters, but this is not always the case. In Somalia (and other states, such as Indonesia), the government does not have the resources to control piracy – nor perhaps the will to do so. While the government of Somalia has granted the international community permission to pursue pirates and use force against them within its waters, pirates still cross into foreign waters (mostly Kenya) to gain protection from naval forces.

A naval mission which succeeded in deterring piracy off Somalia may also encourage the UN to re-examine UNCLOS provisions and international law on other related subjects. A Canadian naval ship which enforces international law in Somalia could be seen as reinforcing the legitimacy of these laws in several ways. First, it has been argued that because piracy is indiscriminate and a crime against humankind (like terrorism), there are grounds to consider it an issue of universal jurisdiction. If this argument is correct, action taken in Somalia would fit the parameters of customary international law. It has also been argued that because piracy may involve murder, torture and/or slavery, it is a human rights offence.[10] Piracy has impeded the ability of the World Food Program (WFP) to deliver food aid to Somalis who are dependent on it, and this means that piracy is directly responsible for the hunger and starvation of thousands of people. If the arguments pertaining to human rights and universal

Photo: MCpl Kevin Paul, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Dock workers in Mombasa, Kenya, load relief supplies into WFP cargo ship bound for Somalia under escort by HMCS ***Ville de Québec****, 18 August 2008.*

jurisdiction are correct, and if we take into account the 'responsibility to protect' – a concept developed with significant Canadian participation – then any efforts taken to stop piracy would not be a violation of sovereignty, but rather a necessary protection of human security.

Most importantly however, the government of Somalia has authorized the international community to use force against piracy within its waters. Thus, it can be said that in a variety of forms, Canadian naval action in Somalia can easily be justified on the grounds of international law and does not violate the sovereignty of Somalia.

Even given these considerations, Canada should only proceed in Somalia if the United Nations has granted its approval. This has been done. Security Council Resolution 1816 of June 2008 allows states to intervene within Somali waters, stresses that the situation is exacerbating the overall problem of security in the region and "urges" states with naval vessels to deter acts of piracy.

The path is clear. International law, the Somali government and the United Nations all demand action.

A Critical Player: Canada in Somali Waters

Canadian involvement to date off the coast of Somalia can be seen in two separate missions: escorting WFP ships en route to Somalia; and participating in Combined Task Force 150.

Given the number of people dependent on food aid in Somalia – over 2.4 million – and that 90% of this aid is delivered via the sea,[11] it was of great concern to the WFP when its ships became the victims of pirate attacks. As a result, the WFP issued a plea to the international community to provide naval ships as escorts to aid vessels. On 6 August 2008, the Canadian government sent HMCS *Ville de Québec* to protect aid deliveries from pirates. In total, the ship escorted more than 36 million kilograms of food aid to Somalia, enough to feed approximately 400,000 people for up to six months.[12] During this period, there was not a single attack on aid ships.

This export of 'Canadian values' has not gone unnoticed. Shortly after Canada agreed to extend its mission with the WFP, the organization commented: "WFP is very grateful to Canada for generously extending the mission of HMCS *Ville de Québec* at WFP's request at this very critical time for the Somali people."[13] Canada has also been commended by the UN Security Council. Thus, the success of the WFP mission has been a victory for Canadian defence policy in more than just practical terms. It has gained international recognition, given valuable experience to navy personnel and reinforced perceptions and the practical application of Canadian values.

Let us now look at Canadian participation in Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150). This is a combined naval force included in *Operation Enduring Freedom*. The central mission of the force is to:

> Counter violent extremism and terrorist networks in maritime areas of responsibility; work with regional and other partners to improve overall security; help strengthen regional nations' maritime capabilities; and when requested respond to environmental and humanitarian crisis.[14]

Included as a key component of accomplishing this mission is to "deter and disrupt piracy."[15]

This role is of crucial importance to Canada for a number of reasons. First, in providing three ships – HMCS *Iroquois, Calgary* and *Protecteur* – to this mission Canada is demonstrating support and commitment to its most important allies in the ongoing 'war on terrorism.' Second, the 'Canada First' defence policy explicitly mentions the defence of international trade as a key component of

defence policy.[16] Involvement in CTF 150 is a concrete demonstration of this commitment. Third, the mission has been the largest Canadian naval commitment since World War II. Thus, the mission has served as an important litmus test of the capabilities of the Canadian Navy. A large-scale operation against a contemporary force such as pirates today will serve as a valuable lesson in technology, strategy and logistics for the navy.

Fourth, and most importantly, the Canadian Navy has gained experience and recognition by being granted command of the force in June of 2008. Commodore Bob Davidson, who led the force until September 2008 commented that "[l]eading Combined Task Force 150 allows Canada to bring influence and a Canadian perspective into the global maritime environment."[17] During the period of Canadian command several attempted acts were foiled by the task force, including on 3 June when a Sea King on HMCS *Calgary* scared away pirates attacking a commercial vessel.

These missions seem to indicate not only that Canada is capable of deterring acts of piracy at a relatively low cost,

Photo: MCPl David Tillotson, Combat Camera

*Somali skiff laden with ship-boarding equipment attempts to elude HMCS **Winnipeg**'s Sea King after attacking the MV **Front Ardenne** off the coast of Somalia, 18 April 2009.*

but that this yields high rewards. While these missions are, of course, not without financial cost, they help ensure that the trade on which Canada relies continues to flow, that insurance premiums do not affect the price or trade of goods, and provide an illustration of Canada acting as a good international citizen. As well, to date, Canada has not lost a sailor in either of these missions.

Stepping It Up: Implications and Possibilities for the Future

Canada's foreign and defence policy goals would be met by increased contribution of the Canadian Navy to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Both CTF 150 and WFP escort missions have had successes, but these small victories are not enough. The situation in Somalia only shows signs of worsening. If left to grow untreated, piracy will have seven major effects that Canada must consider.

Photo: Warrant Officer Carole Morissette, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

*HMCS **Winnipeg** escorts a WFP merchant vessel to Somalia during **Operation Sextant** in the Gulf of Aden. **Winnipeg** is the fifth Canadian warship to deploy under Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 since 2006.*

First, if piracy continues to grow and the WFP is unable to deliver food aid, an already dire humanitarian emergency in Somalia will quickly become one of the worst the world has ever seen. Second, the longer piracy is providing young Somalis opportunity they do not otherwise have, the more intractable the issue will become. Third, as the pirates have shown surprising capacity in the art of hijacking, there is no telling what they may get their hands on next. Whether it is another oil tanker or vessel carrying sophisticated military equipment, pirates have shown their potential to disrupt the world economic system and the fragile stability of the region. The long-term costs – environmental, economic, security and/or humanitarian – of either a destroyed oil tanker or regional chaos would be far more substantial than those of a short-term concentrated naval presence. Fourth, insurance premiums have increased exponentially which has cost the shipping industry dearly. As a trading state, the free passage of goods is in Canada's strongest interests and Somali piracy is quickly compromising this. Increased naval presence in Somalia may come at a cost which is negligible in comparison to what may happen to world shipping if the problem is not at least slowed.

Fifth, it is important for future security that a precedent – a line in the sand – be set. A concrete example of the legitimacy of international law and the UN must be made by dealing with the piracy problem. Such a precedent would speak volumes in a world which has largely ignored international law. If Canada can play a part in establishing and enforcing international law today, it may not be forced to take on such roles in the future. Dealing with piracy based on international law and UN resolutions in Somalia, for example, may deter future acts of piracy in other troubled waters such as Indonesia and Nigeria.



Photo: Sgt Edward Whitmore, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

*HMCS **Winnipeg**'s naval boarding party provides humanitarian assistance to skiff found loaded with people in the Gulf of Aden, 5 April 2009*

Sixth, as a NATO member, Canada is allied with a security community engaged in a war on terrorism. The United States, Canada's most important ally, views Somalia as one of the critical battlegrounds against terrorism in the world. Pirates in Somalia are at the very least providing listed terrorist organizations with funding, and at worst could be operating with terrorist organizations to use the maritime environment to deal a heavy blow to the West. Al Qaeda has already carried out three naval attacks off the coasts of Yemen, only a short distance across the Gulf of Aden. As Somalia slides further into anarchy it becomes more attractive as a home base to organizations such as al Qaeda. However, even if a relationship between pirates and terrorists never emerges, piracy itself is fostering the perfect environment for extremism.

The final factor Canada must consider is that it is engaged in the war on terrorism with allies, and the last thing Canada needs is to be seen either as uncommitted or part of the problem. Being home to the largest diaspora of Somalis outside of Africa should make the issue of piracy of particular importance to Canada. Canada cannot afford to be seen as a security problem for the United States. If piracy spirals out of control and Canada is found to be a base of operations, relations with the United States (and other NATO allies) would be strained. In order to demonstrate commitment to the security and interests of the North American continent, Canada must increase efforts to deter piracy off Somalia. Deterring piracy requires immediate, increased and sustained action.

Canada has a long history of supporting and contributing to multilateralism around the globe. Canadian values, human security, international law and commerce, the war on terrorism and Canada's very reputation may all be at stake. If the United Nations, the government of Somalia (however weak) and international law all support Canadian intervention in the waters off Somalia, then action should be taken. Such action would not only serve to promote Canada as an important contributor to multilateralism, it could also help to re-establish the legitimacy of international law and the United Nations.

Notes

1. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA Fact Book: Somalia*, 2008, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.
2. Virginia Lunsford, "What Makes Piracy Work?" *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 134, No. 12 (December 2008), available at www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1693.
3. Roger Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars," Briefing Paper, Chatham House, October 2008, pp. 1-12, available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203_1008piracysomalia.pdf.
4. Peter Lehr and Hendrick Lehmann, "Somalia: Pirates' New Paradise," in Peter Lehr (ed.), *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 13.
5. Christian Bedford, "The View from the West: Piracy in Somalia," *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2008), p. 35.
6. Daniel Wallis, "Canadian Frigate to Escort Food Aid to Somalia," Reuters News, 6 August 2008.
7. Middleton, "Piracy in Somalia," p. 1.
8. See Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Terrorism Goes to Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6 (November-December 2004), p. 66.
9. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Article 101.
10. See Martin Murphy, "Piracy and UNCLOS," in Lehr (ed.), *Violence at Sea*, pp. 173, 176 for these arguments.
11. See World Food Program, "Canada to protect food ships headed for Somalia," 6 August 2008.
12. Chris Dickinson, "Food Aid, Piracy and Canadian Values," *The Maple Leaf*, Vol. 11, No. 38 (12 November 2008).
13. World Food Program, "Canada saves lives by extending naval escorts to Somalia," 25 September 2008.
14. US Naval Forces Central Command, "Task Force 150," 2 October 2008, available at www.cusnc.navy.mil/Index.htm.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canada First Defence Strategy," 2008, available at www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first/defstra_e.asp.
17. US Naval Forces Central Command, "Task Force 150."

Stuart Palliser is an MA student studying International Relations at Dalhousie University. His thesis explores Somali piracy and provides a theoretical framework for international and Canadian action.

At Sea in a Cold and Hungry World

John Thompson

Introduction

There are three rules about prognostication. The first rule: avoid doing it. Colin Grey, one of the world's foremost strategists, warns against trying to predict how wars might unfold because detailed predictions are almost inevitably wrong.[1] The problem for military planners whose proper business should be the anticipation of contingencies is that the first rule has to be broken frequently.

The second rule: don't trust formulas and models. Exact models never fit, assessments of intentions seldom work, presumptions are erroneous and the behaviour of humanity and nature alike is often enigmatic. The third rule: resort to history and pessimism. While the details are maddeningly imprecise, the broad outlines of things can be guessed at, and history remains a better guide to the future than any other. Instinct exists for good reasons and pessimism is always a safe starting position.

Some things never change. Rudyard Kipling's poem "The Gods of the Copybook Headings" has some excellent general principles and has never gone stale.[2] One should also remember that trouble usually slides in on a logarithmic curve – first the curve is gently sloping and seemingly nothing to be concerned about. Then the curve gradually steepens but it is still something that you believe you can cope with. Finally, you are left clinging to the cliff face with the abyss far below, and no handholds in sight.

It is also well understood that disasters or crises seldom have one single cause. There are always numerous factors that contribute to failure, whether human, mechanical or natural. A simple experiment into causality might even lead one to the conclusion that the supernatural makes occasional contributions.[3] Sailors know only too well how a human error in judgement, a mechanical failure and a malicious sea can quickly combine into a life-threatening situation for the careless.

With these caveats, it might be time to take a cautious look at one particular aspect of the near future, food. In the last two years, much has appeared for us to be nervous about. Russia is acting truculent again, a nuclear-armed Iran is fast approaching, and the jihad movement is still booming. Some ghastly combination of hubris, post-modernist thinking and greed has gutted the global economies, and the US government is evidently trying to refashion the fundamental nature of the United States overnight. But beyond these matters, an even more critical concern is looming in front of us with all the innocent purpose of an iceberg in a shipping lane.

Photo: Internet

Artist's rendering of the breaching of the South Fork Dam 14 miles upstream of the town of Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

Malthus Still in Mode

Despite the grim model for limits on population growth set by Thomas Malthus in the 18th century, the 20th century saw the human population of the world triple from 1.65 billion in 1900 to 5.98 billion in 1999.[4] Malthus famously argued that human populations grew faster than food production did, which was perhaps true in the early half of the 18th century.[5] Yet the agricultural revolution of the late 18th century and the exploitation of new lands in the Americas and elsewhere allowed significant population expansion. The advent of railroads, steam-powered shipping, canning in the early 19th century and refrigerated shipping in the 1880s made the distribution of food even easier, holding the promise of forever keeping famine at bay. Food shortages and starvation induced by natural causes were still possible in Europe up until the middle of the 19th century – thereafter it took governments to accomplish it.

The Irish potato famine was a catastrophe for much of Ireland because of an extreme over-reliance on a single variety of potato among the rural poor, but also because much of the island was outside of the emerging networks of rural canals and railroads. The same blight on potatoes also had an enormous effect on the European mainland but as the potatoes only formed some 20% of the diet of the poor in parts of France and Germany, the shortage was survivable.

Photo: Internet

Imperial Guard soldiers take aim at peaceful demonstrators on 22 January 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia.

This brings up another point. Starving people can commit crimes if that is what it takes to live, but otherwise they will husband their energy to the task of survival. People who are afraid that their future *might* include starvation are a different matter. They will take to the streets and their fear translates to anger. The second failure of Europe's potato crop in 1847 was a contributing factor to the widespread unrest in the many revolutions across Europe in 1848. Fear of a continuing food shortage certainly underscored the start of the French Revolution, and the Bolsheviks fomented their revolution with a slogan of "Peace, Land, Bread!" because all three were lacking.

Political stability ultimately rests on an assured food supply. And food is often not produced where it is consumed which means that it has to be transported, sometimes over long distances. Developments in food distribution have made naval blockades more possible and effective. This is not a new phenomenon but it may be become more important in a globalized world with an increased population. Revolutionary France desperately needed grain shipments from the United States. Paris couldn't stabilize itself, let alone all of France, so long as hunger beckoned. As Britain became increasingly aware of how much food it imported in the late 19th century, command of the sea became even more of a necessity. Germany, recipient of a naval blockade in 1914, found itself increasingly unable to feed both its people and its armies. A growing food shortage is among the main causes of the Allied victory in 1918.

Since Malthus' time food production has kept pace with our swelling numbers, and for many consumers, food has never been cheaper or more varied. Most of us still remain somewhat confident that we can feed all of humanity. This confidence may be quite misplaced. Humanity's numbers are growing – there are 6.76 billion of us (according to US estimates) as of the middle of March 2009. While population growth rates have been gradually slowing since the 1960s, most estimates project a total population of nine billion people by 2050. Can we feed these numbers if we continue to add something like 70 to 75 million people a year, with the most intense growth in areas of the world (the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa) that are not currently capable of feeding themselves?

The Sun Trumps Global Warming

As always, in considering food shortages, look at the weather first. In recent years, we have been bombarded with warnings of global warming from the environmental movement. But it should be noted, as archeologists, historians, geologists and paleontologists do, that climate change is always occurring.

While we all agree that pollution is bad, it has been impossible for many people to accept the proposition that global warming could be catastrophic. Historically, cooler temperatures are worse for humanity, and periods of glaciation were always a severe trial for our human and hominid ancestors. On balance we prosper in warmer times. Moreover, the warnings about mass extinctions from climate change are foolish – every animal and plant species that exists today is a survivor of at least two million years of ice alternating with interglacial periods. Many of the animals and plants we know are as opportunistic as humans when it comes to adapting to change. It is human activities such as over-utilization and urban sprawl rather than climate change which present far more severe threats to eco-diversity and our natural heritage.

The data on global warming has been spotty indeed and often weak, so much so that contrary evidence was often ignored or willfully suppressed. This is why troubling news from some of the world's solar observatories was ignored in 2007 and why the implications are still overlooked by most of us. The troubling news in 2007 was that sunspot activity dwindled alarmingly. We know from historical records that low sunspot activity co-relates to cooler temperatures.

The relationship between an absence of sunspots and cooler climate was first noticed in the 19th century by the

Photo: Internet

Industrial pollution and climate change will have a negative effect on food production.

astronomer Gustav Spörer whose work was later refined by Edward Walter Maunder. Subsequent work has amply confirmed the historical linkage, but the mechanism of how reduced sunspots induce global cooling is far from understood. Ironically, the Earth gets more (not less) solar radiation when sunspots are rare or absent, while there is a reduction in the highly charged magnetic particles of the solar wind. Most astronomers believe this current solar cycle will last into the 2020s, but – as the historic Spörer and Maunder Minimums of the 16th and 18th centuries indicate – they can last for 60 to 70 years.

There is no argument that the climate is changing – there is dispute, however, on the actual changes. Given the reports in the media, many people would be surprised to hear that data sources indicate rapid global cooling in 2007.[6] Mean temperatures across the planet declined by 0.7 degrees Celsius – one of the most remarkable temperature changes ever recorded. The key engine in this rapid change was a virtual absence of sunspots on the face of the Sun. The near-absence has continued since and 2008 was cooler across the whole planet than 2007.

Mid-2007 was supposed to be the low part of the 22-year sunspot cycle, which normally means a slightly cooler year would have occurred anyway. However, the new cycle has begun with much less intensity than hundreds of years of solar observations would lead us to expect. Right now, we cannot tell if this is a very short-term aberration which might end tomorrow, the start of another Maunder/Spörer-type Minimum (several decades of cooler temperatures) or – at absolute worst – the trigger for the next ice age.

Never mind global warming. A growing opinion in the scientific community holds that we are in for a bout of global cooling, and human activities have nothing to do with it. It is hard to model the effects of a cooling trend, although it is easy enough to deduce what the effects have been historically. In the past a cooling trend has meant loss of marginal farmland in higher latitudes and higher altitudes, and reduced production everywhere else. This is unwelcome news – another contribution to a looming disaster.

Eating up our Stockpiles

In 2007 and 2008, humanity got the first sign of looming trouble. Food riots occurred in 30 countries as a result of rapid increases in food prices in early 2008. Some states, faced with reduced crop yields in 2007 also announced that they intended to curtail exports in 2008, and prices for wheat, rice and other staples often doubled.

India and China produce over half of the world's rice but they consume just about everything they grow. Vietnam

Photo: Internet

China currently consumes as much rice as it grows. Will it be able to feed its growing population? A Hani woman and child above rice paddies in Yunnan Province, China.

– one of the world's leading rice exporters – had major problems with its 2007 crop due to diseases and pests and decided to cease exports in 2008. Bad weather affected wheat production in Canada in the summer of 2007 as a 20% drop in expected yields was experienced, and European production also was reduced by bad weather – especially in the usually fertile Ukrainian breadbasket. Poor weather in China caused a 10% drop in expected production while Australia has been plagued by a long drought. Argentina (another major wheat exporter) curtailed shipments in late 2007 pending the completion of its harvest in 2008.

According to the US Department of Agriculture, the world's grain production rallied somewhat in 2008.[7] Much of this was due to increased precipitation around the world (which is one expected result of the decrease in sunspot activity), but if cooling temperatures continue, there will be continued stress on crops in North America and much of Asia. Moreover, food prices remain high around the world and the impact of the 2008 economic slump has yet to be seen on subsidies for food and grain production.

Even before the bad weather of 2007, the world's population had been nibbling into collective stockpiles of wheat, rice and corn for some years. Since 1998, annual consumption had outstripped annual production throughout the world for six years out of eight.[8] Global stockpiles were rapidly dwindling – the United States had the lowest amount of stored wheat since 1930, the European Union's stored inventory shrank from 14 million tons of grain to less than one million, and the world's total reserves which covered 115 days' average consumption in 1990 had shrunk to 50.

The market reacted to these trends, and prices immediately increased. These price increases made food too expensive for many people around the world. The trend reversed in

2008 when the United States and Europe pumped money into the UN World Food Program (WFP), but as the WFP executive director warned a UK parliamentary committee on 9 March 2009, this soothed the problem but would not solve the fundamental weakness of production and food stocks.

Besides grain shortfalls, there was a growing shortage of cooking oil. Prices for soybean, palm and vegetable oils climbed 37% through 2007 and soared higher in 2008. For most Asian cultures, cooking oil is second only to rice in its importance but its use is common elsewhere too and this is going to drive up the prices of many commercial food products throughout the world.

This situation has been developing for years but the warnings from sundry economists, bureaucrats and industry analysts have largely gone unheeded. Most Westerners, when they become aware of the problem, blithely assume that a combination of the market and new technologies might redress the issue. Perhaps this only goes to show just how far our prosperous urban societies have strayed from their family farm roots in a few generations.

What Else Caused the Problem?

Part of the erosion of our food stocks lay with the growing prosperity of India and China. When human beings are well-off, the appetite for meat increases. However, when everyone starts bringing home the bacon and putting a chicken in every pot (both expressions that evidently emerged when Europeans couldn't be sure of their daily protein supply either), the demand for feed grain (and soy) goes up. While the economic downturn might have checked this development for a year or two, when the recovery is underway, demand will rise again.

The shortage of grain has led to major problems for the world's livestock and poultry producers – the cost of feeding cattle, pigs, sheep and chickens has risen enormously in recent years. This has placed many producers under severe strain even though the growing demand for meat in China and India has opened up new markets for farmers. Canadian hog producers, for instance, were feeling the pinch of greatly increased feed prices even before the substandard harvests of 2007. The demand for bio-fuels was blamed in some media sources as the main cause of higher food prices, with predictable emphasis on American programs. American bio-fuel programs were presenting hardship for North American livestock producers before 2007, particularly when some estimates placed bio-fuel diversion at 20% of American corn production. Moreover, many American grain farmers have switched to growing corn because of the inducements for being involved in bio-fuel. The appetite for alternatives to oil also diverted corn, sugar cane, soybeans and palm oil to fuel production in Brazil, China, Western Europe, Thailand, India, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The diversion of agricultural products for hybrid fuels points out another looming weakness. The incredible production of modern farming techniques is largely due to the automation of farming activities. What this means is that farmers use a lot of fuel. There is fuel involved in every element and stage of the process – the fertilizers and pesticides, sowing and harvesting of crops, plus the transportation of all these bulk loads. The agricultural sector is acutely sensitive to the price of fuel. Notwithstanding the slump in fuel prices in recent months, 'Peak Oil' has been reached. Our utilization of known oil supplies is starting to outstrip the discovery of new sources. Slowly, but inevitably, fuel is going to become more expensive – which is going to have a prohibitive effect on expanded agricultural production and will combine to make food even more expensive.

Another dimension to the problem is the flip-side of globalization – i.e., the rapid transmission of new animals, diseases and plants throughout the world. There has been global trade and transportation since the 16th century, but it has grown at an exponential rate in the past few decades. Some effects seem innocent enough: rabbits in Australia; house sparrows in North America; Canada geese in Europe. Others are terrifying and expensive. Let me give just one example, in 2001, 10 million animals were culled in Britain at a cost of $16 billion because of an outbreak of a new strain of hoof and mouth disease. The probable cause was the illegal importation of infected meat from some Far Eastern source which was fed to some pigs as slops.[9] One estimate is that biological invaders – from fungus to birds to weeds – that have been accidently introduced to North America alone cost the combined Canadian and US economies some $137 billion every year.[10]

Waste and inefficiency have always plagued agriculture but what has changed with modern agricultural techniques is the scale of the waste. As well, the relentless quest for cheap food has narrowed the genetic diversity of plant and animal species. It has compromised soil and water safety and ruthlessly eliminated small suppliers. The net result is that our entire agricultural sector is exposed and vulnerable. For example, in 2006-7, as much as 90% of the population of honey bees in some areas of North America died off. This had the net result that 2007-08 production of dozens of crops ranging from alfalfa to watermelons – all dependent on honey bees for fertilization – were much reduced.[11] The over-use of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers is creating offshore 'dead zones' of oxygen-deprived water in some prime littoral zones such as the Gulf of

Photo: WO Carole Morissette, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

*Naval boarding party members from HMCS **Winnipeg** provide close protection to crewmates during search of three suspected pirate skiffs on 9 April 2009.*

Mexico, the Black Sea and Chesapeake Bay.

What all this discussion is leading to is that danger signals are flashing in our agricultural industries like Homer Simpson's alarm board in the Springfield Nuclear Plant.

What's in it for the Navy?

Even if a prolonged period of colder climates and continued absence of sunspots does not manifest, the weaknesses in global food production have been exposed. Humanity has now chewed through its reserves and there is no longer enough margin for error, although we are still making plenty of errors. The shortages will continue for years to come, even if efficient action is taken immediately, not least because of continued population growth.

The American science fiction writer Jerry Pournelle once famously observed that "[c]ivilization is 24 hours and two missed meals deep." People who are afraid that starvation is looming in their path get desperate and are far more likely to overthrow regimes, as history so often tells us. While it seems hard to consider a bread riot as posing much of a threat to a frigate out at sea, that frigate's mission and role might very well change in consequence – again, as history so often tells us.

Did we design our *Halifax*-class frigates with the expectation that they might be escorting deliveries of food through pirate-infested waters? No, we didn't, but versatility is the stock in trade of navies and missions like the recent ones off East Africa are likely to be more common in future. Did we imagine we might use submarines to monitor fishing boats in our territorial waters? No, but we have done it recently, and will probably do so again.

Desperate people can take to the water in the tens of thousands, looking for hope and regular meals. Our sailors have seen what has happened around Haiti in the recent past. Shall we see more of it in the future? We probably will. Worse still, not only might this become more common but if governments order their militaries to curb such movements, who is going to be doing the dirty work of fending off the floating destitute? The work of soldiers and sailors isn't always noble.

As food becomes more salient, it might – as it has in the past – become a salient weapon too. There are unruly and troublesome parts of the world that can't feed themselves like the Middle East or many parts of Asia. Naval blockades were war-winning strategies before, and who is to say they will not be used again? Can anyone say that a total blockade of such countries as Iran or North Korea will never occur?

The future is never easy to predict, but pessimism and history are the surest guides we've got. Prudence also always demands that we hope for the best outcomes, but should be prepared for the worst. So, let's tighten our belts and keep our fleet and sailors as ready as we can, for whatever may come.

Notes

1. See Colin S. Grey, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Phoenix, 2005).
2. Rudyard Kipling's "The Gods of the Copybook Headings" has been republished, and is available on the internet – an anthology of his poetry is always worth having close to hand.
3. Here is an example derived from years of experience. Make an appointment for a trip that normally takes 30 minutes, but leave five minutes late. Then watch how the universe engages in a vast conspiracy to delay elevators, puts slow pedestrians in your path, makes taxis scarce, salts new road repair projects in your way, ensures one catches nothing but red lights, etc. Repeat the experiment by leaving five minutes early and see how different results ensue. Then decide for yourself if something supernatural does indeed meddle in our daily affairs.
4. Figures drawn from the 2004 population database *World Population Prospects* compiled by the United Nations.
5. For a discussion of the nature of a static population see Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), particularly the chapter comparing traditional French 17th and 18th century children's stories to those of Germany and England. The French stories largely concern techniques for survival in a largely static population, and the hero usually must use trickery to gain a reward such as a comfortable living for the rest of his days.
6. Two of the principal reporting agencies are the Goddard Institute for Space Studies and the Hadley Institute of the UK Meteorological Office. Both, curiously, 'spun' their 2008 reportage within the context of global warming theories rather than acknowledging the opposite effect while still admitting cooling was continuing.
7. See US Department of Agriculture, "Global Crop Production Review 2008," available at the USDA website.
8. Commodity Information Systems Inc., "Global Grain Shortage of Historic Proportions Ahead," Press Release, 8 February 2007.
9. See Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, "Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in 2001," UK, June 2002.
10. Andrew Nikiforuk, *Pandemonium* (Toronto: Penguin; 2008); and Paul Roberts, *The End of Food* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008).
11. *Ibid.*

John Thompson is the President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies organized violence and political instability. He formerly served in the Canadian Army and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Kriegsgefangenenlager: A POW's Account of the Loss of *Athabaskan* in 1944

Pat Jessup

Kriegsgefangenenlager, roughly translated, is German for 'English prisoner of war.' And this is the story of Able Seaman Harry Liznick and fellow shipmates who served in HMCS *Athabaskan*, lost to enemy action in 1944. This is also the story of the short life of *Athabaskan*, a powerful British-built *Tribal*-class destroyer which, along with sister ships *Haida, Huron* and *Iroquois*, played a pivotal role in the English Channel, engaging and wearing down enemy naval forces, in the days leading up to the D-Day invasion.

Liznick, a thoughtful and observant man, articulated his wartime experience in a series of articles titled "Kriegsgefangenenlager," published in his hometown newspaper, *The Iroquois Falls Enterprise*.[1] This article is a shorter version of a paper recounting the highlights of the stories of both Liznick and *Athabaskan*, supported by the commentary of other shipmates as well as official scholarship.

First generation Ukrainian-Canadian Harry Liznick was 15 when Hitler's army invaded Poland. His European parents had witnessed German aggression first hand in 1914 while working in Germany before immigrating to Canada. They listened to the 1939 news with trepidation. Harry couldn't wait to sign up and bided his time farming, working in logging camps and mining in nearby Timmins until of age. As he wrote, "[b]y March 1942, the war was getting pretty bad as Hitler had taken quite a few countries and had bombed the hell out of England, and was well into Russia and thoughts were going on in my young mind that we would all be enslaved and I had better join up and help fight that Bastard."

A handsome, affable and a strapping young man, who could unload two box cars of logs in six hours during an eight hour shift, Liznick followed three older brothers to war. He liked the look of his brother Bill's blue uniform so he put an application into the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and was accepted. Along with Jimmy Campbell from his hometown of Iroquois Falls, Ontario, Liznick soon found himself "marching up and down the streets in Ottawa" in his bell bottom trousers, jumper, singlet and traditional flat hat – the object of admiring glances from "all the girls."

Following basic naval training at HMCS *Cornwallis*, Harry was "drafted" to sentry duty at the Dartmouth refinery and French Cable Wharf in Halifax. Bored, he wrote: "I hated it. What a way to spend the war." His complaints were short lived as he was soon posted to HMCS *Athabaskan* then under repair in England following a German glider bomb attack on a Canadian-British support group near Gibraltar.

Photo: Liznick files

Ordinary Seaman Harry Liznick on sentry duty in Halifax, 1942.

By November 1943 *Athabaskan*, was "ready to sail and fight," and she deployed to the Mediterranean to escort the British battlecruiser HMS *Renown* carrying Prime Minister Winston Churchill back from the Cairo Conference. Upon her return to England, *Athabaskan* sailed immediately to escort convoy JW 5A out of Scotland to Murmansk in the Soviet Union on 12 December. The convoy's track would have brought it dangerously close to occupied Norway and German-infested waters, and especially close to the German battlecruiser *Scharnhorst*. Underway, *Athabaskan* intercepted a radio transmission with a German U-boat that was shadowing the convoy in the vicinity of Bear Island south of Spizbergen. Giving chase, *Athabaskan* "dropped a pattern of depth charges" but abandoned the search to return and protect the convoy "when our Asdic lost contact." *Athabaskan*'s captain, Lieutenant-Commander John Stubbs said that "the next time we would ram her at all cost."[2] The war was becoming quite interesting for Able Seaman Liznick.

Caught in a major blizzard outbound from Murmansk *Athabaskan* was part of the 'home fleet' flotilla that participated in action that would change the course of



Photo: Courtesy of Wolfgang Worpahl

German glider bomb attack on HMCS ***Athabaskan****.*

the war in the Arctic. Passing in the storm and heading north to Murmansk were 14 destroyers including sister ships *Haida, Huron* and *Iroquois* escorting a convoy of 19 heavily laden merchant ships. Providing close cover were the British cruisers *Belfast*, *Sheffield*, *Norfolk* and the battleship HMS *Duke of York*. On Christmas Day, the German battlecruiser *Scharnhorst* and escort of five destroyers departed Altenfjord, Norway, to attack the convoy. As Liznick recalled, "[w]e were oblivious to what was going on in the land of the midnight sun and terrific stormy weather with ice forming two to six inches thick on the shrouds, guys and deck and making our ship top heavy. We plodded on ... just another hazardous working day for us.… At 06:15 hrs, Dec. 26th, alarm bells clanged" and *Athabaskan* went to Action Stations. As he said, "[t]he Scharnhorst [was] attacking the convoy! It was bad news because we knew we were no match for a Battlecruiser. Our 4.7 inch guns could fire nine miles while their 11 inch guns could fire 20 miles."

In the raging storm, Commander Harry DeWolf, *Haida*'s captain, had the onerous task of marshalling the escorts to ward off *Scharnhorst* as she approached the merchant ships at the rear of the convoy. In response, the guns of the Home Fleet pounded *Scharnhorst* and after a fierce eight-hour battle the German ship was sunk by HMS *Duke of York*.

With *Scharnhorst* gone, and the threat to the Arctic convoys now much reduced, *Athabaskan*, *Haida*, *Huron* and *Iroquois* with British Tribal HMS *Ashanti* and cruiser HMS *Black Prince*, joined the 10th Destroyer Squadron known as "the Fighting Tenth," operating out of Plymouth, England. The strike force conducted night sorties in the English Channel, grinding away at enemy shipping and their naval escorts prior to the invasion of Europe.

April 1944 was a busy month for *Athabaskan*. In addition to her sorties she was also participating in pre-invasion exercises. During the night of 24 April, participating in *Operation Tiger*, *Athabaskan* provided close escort for "hundreds of ships and thousands of our troops conducting landing drills … at Slapton Sands, near Cornwall…. The practice was quite successful … except two 'E' boats sneaked in among our ships undetected and killed over 800 American troops with torpedoes fired into landing craft."

The next evening the *Black Prince, Ashanti, Huron, Haida* and *Athabaskan* set out in the direction of St. Malo hoping to engage three T-22 class *Elbing* destroyers that had been spotted during an earlier reconnaissance flight over the French port. As luck would have it, the German ships were detected by British land-based radar, underway and making a dash at speed for Brest. The *Tribal*s intercepted the ships and during the battle sank T-29 and shelled both T-24 and T-27 before they could retreat to safe haven. In the heat of battle, *Huron* and *Ashanti* collided putting them out of action until repairs could be made.

The sinking of T-29 by Canadian naval forces was considered a significant feat and brought a great sense of accomplishment to the ships' companies and the Commander-in-Chief Plymouth. The action won both Stubbs and DeWolf the Distinguished Service Order.

Three nights later, *Haida* and *Athabaskan* went out alone to cover mine-laying operations near the tip of the Brittany peninsula. At 0238 *Athabaskan*'s radar picked up "two small objects traveling at high speed" near the Isle of Ushant. At the same time, Plymouth radioed "to intercept



Photo: DND

The ship's company of HMCS ***Athabaskan*** *circa 1943. Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Commander John Stubbs, centre with arms crossed.*

at full speed." *Haida* fired starshell, illuminating T-24 and T-27, 7,300 yards away. The two *Elbings*, sheltering in Morlaix for repairs, were making a run for their home base of Brest under the cover of darkness. Despite taking evasive action, turning 30 degrees to present a reduced target, a German torpedo found *Athabaskan*, blowing off her stern and killing her after gun crews. With her propulsion destroyed, *Athabaskan* was dead in the water. Stubbs reported, "I'm hit and losing power," and ordered the crew to stand by to abandon ship. *Athabaskan,* on fire, was taking on more water than her pumps could manage. Before continuing the chase *Haida* laid a smokescreen to protect *Athabaskan* from further attacks.

Ten minutes later a massive explosion amidships ripped through the ship and slammed AB Liznick from his position on the starboard forward Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun mounting into the bulkhead. Many of the crew, including the captain, were catapulted over the side. Those remaining took to the cold Channel waters. Liznick remembers the scene, "I could see fire for what seemed a hundred feet above me. I lay there looking up and saw pipes, irons, huge chunks of steel, away up in the air…. I thought to myself that all this steel would kill me when it came down." His face burned, and fearing for his life, Liznick jumped over the side. *Athabaskan* was listing to port. "Swimming for all [his] worth," Liznick looked back after 200 feet and "watched as the stern went under and the bow came up and the good old *Athabaskan* slid under and sank." Those trapped below deck, went down with the ship.

After chasing T-27 onto the rocks and setting her ablaze with gunfire, *Haida* returned to recover *Athabaskan* survivors. Launching her boats, Carley floats and scramble-nets, *Haida*'s crew managed to save 42 "dazed and exhausted" oil-soaked men. Too far away to reach safety, Harry Liznick joined the chorus of men in the water hollering for help. It was to no avail and after lying stopped for 18 minutes, *Haida* had to abandon the rescue. Stubbs yelled from the water: "Get away Haida! Get clear."[3] According to an account by Joseph Schull in *Far Distant Ships*, "[h]ands clutching at her scramble-nets lost their grip. Two of her own crew who had gone down the net were washed off by the backrush and remained in the water with the survivors they had not been able to reach."[4] Dawn was approaching and *Haida*, close to the enemy coast, was in great peril from aerial attack and from nearby shore batteries. Miraculously *Haida*'s motor cutter, after picking up six survivors sputtered across the English Channel, arriving in Penzance, Cornwall, 30 hours later.

Last seen clinging to a Carley float was Lieutenant-Commander Stubbs, trying to buoy his crew's spirits by leading them in a sing-a-long and encouraging them to move their arms and legs to keep their circulation going.

Covered in thick black bunker oil, the survivors fumbled in the water trying to attach themselves to anything that floated. "The oil seemed at least two inches thick. It covered everything and we had a hard time to hang on to anything. We swallowed a lot of water along with bunker oil and our mouths were thick with grease," Harry Liznick recalled.

> We gagged and coughed continually.... For those of us that were left behind our ordeal was just beginning.... I could hear many of the seamen yelling, moaning and crying for help. As time went on ... things became quieter as the survivors dozed off or were succumbing to exposure.... The cold water was sapping our strength and made us extremely drowsy.... I knew that if I let myself sleep, I would die.

At dawn German ships, including T-24 and several minesweepers, set out to rescue survivors. Eighty-six were recovered with T-24 picking up 47. Liznick recalled being well-treated by the German sailors. While still at sea, the survivors were given a shower and "slightly warm gruel" to eat. "It was tasteless and ... looked like the paste we used in primer school." Stripped of their oily clothing, the *Athabaskans* were issued French navy uniforms that had been confiscated when the Germans took France in 1939. The prisoners were herded below decks and confined in the hold. On the way to Brest, "there was a very loud explosion and we all looked startled and helpless as the hatch above us was sealed tight. We could hear gunfire above decks and did not know what it was. We heard later that we were attacked by our planes."[5]

Landing in Brest to a gathering crowd of French onlookers and German officials, the *Athabaskans* were taken to a makeshift hospital that had once been a convent. In the same hospital were the wounded from T-29. "They stared at us and we stared back." Within days, the survivors who had recovered from their ordeal were crammed onto trains for the four-day journey to Marlag und Milag Nord, a prisoner of war (POW) camp for naval (Marlag) and merchant (Milag) seamen, outside of Bremen, Germany.[6]

Photo: DND

*Lieutenant John Stubbs when he commanded HMCS **Assiniboine**.*

When news of *Athabaskan*'s loss reached Canada the fate of her crew was still unclear. Harry Liznick's mother fell to the floor when she learned of the sinking. Iris Johnson, the young wife of Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Ira Johnson,

Photo: DND

*Ink drawing of HMCS **Haida** rescuing **Athabaskan** survivors, Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf Room, Bytown Mess, Ottawa.*



Photo: Liznick files

***The Toronto Star**, 5 May 1944, provided photos of the crew members from Ontario who were missing. When he was released, Harry Liznick made annotations on the clipping about the fate of these men.*

dreamt for months of her husband appearing at the foot of their bed in Saint John, New Brunswick. He would tell her not to worry, "I'm all right."[7] CPO Johnson survived. While the 42 onboard *Haida* and the six in her launch were accounted for, it would take months to reconcile the whereabouts of the 213 still missing. It was known, however, that in the following days, scores of dead *Athabaskans* washed ashore on the coast of Brittany near Plouescat.[8] By 7 July 1944, the International Red Cross was able to confirm to the Royal Canadian Navy that 29 *Athabaskan* officers and ratings had been taken as prisoners of war.[9] Three months after becoming a Kriegsgefangenenlager, Harry Liznick's family received news in a postcard saying that he was alive.

Upon reaching camp, the POWs spent the next six weeks in solitary confinement, interrogated regularly by the Gestapo. Liznick passed his time counting nails and spaces between boards, pacing back and forth in his cell, three-and-a-half steps each way, and weaving strings used for stuffing his mattress. Talking was forbidden and whistling resulted in being pistol-whipped with a Luger. "It's easy to be tough with a guy when you have a gun in your hands," he recalled.



Credit: Liznick files

Drawing of Marlag und Milag Nord by an unknown POW.

Food was sparse and consisted of two slices of schwartzbrot (black bread), a pat of margarine and a cup of ersatz tea. Later the bread was scaled back to one slice per day, with the prisoners expected to save half the slice for supper. Liznick was especially challenged by the new ration and said "[w]hat a laugh it is today. How could a starving man keep anything that was edible for any length of time."

Once out of solitary confinement the prisoners were interned 16 to a room in a 16-room unheated, un-insulated barrack. Apart from mustering for rollcall or 'Appell' three times a day, life in the camp was relatively relaxed but boredom took its toll. As in the modern military, the arrival of mail was much anticipated. Cigarettes were a particularly hot commodity and were used in bartering. Inmates kept up with the progress of the war by an electrically operated radio acquired from the German guards by trading cigarettes. The cost – one radio, 5,000 cigarettes! Red Cross food parcels, containing hard tack soda biscuits, canned Klik, corned beef, cheese, chocolate bars, tea and coffee, raisins and prunes were especially welcome. The POWs would heat their food using the recycled Klik containers over fires of scrap wood. Once a month the prisoners "got

a block of dehydrated sauerkraut" about 2½ inches square. As Liznick described it, it was "hard as a rock! If you put this in a pail of water, it swelled up and we'd have a whole pail of sauerkraut."[10]

After 11 months of captivity, the mood in the camp changed as radio broadcasts indicated that the Allies were approaching. Hearing artillery fire in the distance and the occasional stray bullet in the camp caused "quite a few prisoners to dig trenches as a safety precaution." On 25 April 1945, on the anniversary of the sinking of T-29, the POWs awoke to find the British Second Army had liberated the camp, and that the 'Kommandant' had surrendered. The guards had scattered to the winds. The Canadian POWs were flown by Lancaster to Horsham, England, to recuperate and then returned home in the *Aquitania* through New York City. Harry Liznick arrived in Iroquois Falls on 31 May 1945, one month and one year after being torpedoed and just in time to help his dad plant for the summer.

Photo: Pat Jessup

***Athabaskan** survivors onboard HMCS **Sackville**, July 2002. Harry Liznick is pictured third from the right.*

Closing Remarks

"Kriegsgefangenenlager" offers a glimpse of the short career of *Athabaskan*, through the memoirs of a handful of her crew. Most did not take the time to document their story, preferring instead to put their experience behind them or perhaps discount their importance in the war. Those who did, Harry Liznick among them, have left us with an insight into life aboard and as prisoners of war as an alternative to official historical records.

As tragic as the loss of HMCS *Athabaskan* was, the Germans could ill afford to lose T-29 and T-27, on top of three earlier losses to Allied action. Fuel shortages, an increased tempo in Allied aerial attacks, and the mounting strength of Allied naval forces on the southern coast of England, hemmed in the German naval forces. German naval forces in the area were reduced to three large *Narvik*-type destroyers and two smaller *Elbings*, providing insufficient firepower to challenge the invasion of Normandy – indeed, these German ships did not show their noses. On D-Day, the entire Fighting Tenth was waiting for them when they ventured out of Brest. The Germans were sorely outnumbered and the threat to the invading forces was eliminated in a matter of a few hours.[11]

Harry Liznick passed away at his home in Iroquois Falls, in November 2005 after a long and healthy life living off the land. Harry Liznick and the 255 crew members of *Athabaskan*, 128 of whom paid the ultimate price, contributed much to ending the Second World War through their efforts in the Arctic and English Channel. The surviving *Athabaskans* continue to meet on the anniversary of the loss of their ship onboard HMCS *Haida* in Hamilton Ontario. The wreckage of HMCS *Athabaskan* has been located near the island of Batz in the English Channel. She was found by Jacques Ouchakoff, a French marine historian in 2002 in 90 metres of water.

Notes

1. Harry Liznick, "Kriegsgefangenenlager: My Memories of WW II," *The Iroquois Falls Enterprise*, 28 September-30 November 1988.
2. W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael Whitby, *A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943-1945* (St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 2007), p. 506. Stubbs, as captain of HMCS *Assiniboine* was famous for ramming U-210 in an encounter off of St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1942. A reconstruction of the incident, painted by Halifax artist Tom Forrestal, can be found in the Officers' Mess, CFB Halifax.
3. Douglas, Sarty and Whitby, *A Blue Water Navy*, p. 229. DeWolf apparently did not hear Stubbs call from the water. It is believed that Stubbs may have been telling *Haida* to get clear of the minefield that she was about to set upon.
4. Joseph Schull, *Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), pp. 253-258.
5. It would have been unlikely for Allied planes to have attacked the German rescuers. More likely T-24 set off a mine when she returned to harbour. See Robert A. Darlington and Fraser M. McKee, *The Canadian Navy Chronicle, 1939-1945, The Successes and Losses of the Canadian Navy in World War II* (St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell, 1996), p. 145.
6. See Liznick, "Kriegsgefangenenlager," for an account of this.
7. As quoted in Chris Lambie, "Don't Worry, I'm Alright," *Halifax Daily News*, 30 April 2004, p. 4.
8. Len Burrow and Emile Beaudoin, *Unlucky Lady: The Life and Death of HMCS Athabaskan* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989), p. 149. Ninety-one bodies washed ashore in Brittany and are buried in nine cemeteries along the coast; 42 of the bodies have been identified.
9. "H.M.C.S. Athabaskan Survivors Now Reported Prisoners of War," *Canada's Weekly*, 7 July 1944, p. 387.
10. Liznick, "Kriegsgefangenenlager."
11. Tony German, *The Sea is at Our Gates* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p. 163.

Pat Jessup is the Community Relations Officer for Canadian Forces Base Halifax and was born and raised in Iroquois Falls.

All Hands on Deck: So Who is Building New Ships?

Janet Thorsteinson

Canada will need more than 50 new navy and coast guard ships over the next 30 years, including Arctic patrol ships, supply vessels and a new class of 'surface combatant' to replace the destroyer and frigate fleets. Existing ships are at the end of their useful lives and in some cases, consuming an unreasonable amount of resources to keep them seaworthy.

With an aging fleet of ships, none under construction and no contracts in hand to build new ones, the navy faces many challenges. What may come as a surprise to some people, however, is the seriousness of the personnel shortage the military procurement system must overcome to meet the challenge of replacing the ships. Published reports indicate that in fall 2008 the navy was about 1,000 people short of its authorized strength of about 8,500. This spring, news reports cited a Department of National Defence (DND) study that showed a shortage of about 400 people in the next few years in the military procurement system. In that report, Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff, is quoted as writing, "I remain concerned with the CF's ability to provide ADM (Mat) [the Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel] with the project management personnel to successfully deliver the maritime equipment program." According to Robertson, the operational impact could arrive as early as 2015 or 2017. He also noted that these positions "must be the number one priority."

A recent study of military procurement by Aaron Plamondon summarized the situation:

> This absence of long-term procurement planning is symptomatic of the lack of highly trained personnel within the department who have overseen multiple projects over a long period of time. Most often, ad hoc project offices are created and once the project is over, the members of the team scatter to other posts. There is, quite simply, a lack of expertise in an area that is vitally important to the CF.[1]

In fact, major naval procurements are sailing into a perfect storm that decision-makers hope will be short term and survivable. The personnel shortages are the result of decisions taken almost 20 years ago when government was reducing the deficit. About half of the Canadian Forces' procurement capability in terms of staff has disappeared. A move to contracted-in support brought in many retired

Photo: US Navy/Released

*HMCS **Algonquin** in close formation with the **Nimitz**-class aircraft carrier USS **John C. Stennis** during RIMPAC 2004.*

military personnel but today these doubly experienced people are retiring. These trends are happening on the military and civilian sides in all the departments that touch defence procurement.

A number of factors are working in parallel to affect the procurement workforce. The unprecedented pace of deployment has pulled military personnel out of long-term procurement roles to meet urgent needs elsewhere in the system. Their experience and relationships go with them. The lives of serving military personnel changed dramatically with the transition from a paternalistic, 'enlistment-to-retirement and beyond' organization to one which more closely approximates civilian life. Given that new circumstance, it is hardly surprising that some people make the choice to earn civilian money and pursue civilian opportunities.

Further compounding the challenge was a recruiting freeze which created a five-year knowledge and experience 'vacuum' – an absence of qualified personnel – now working its way through the system. Now, in a reversal of direction, senior managers are under pressure to replace contractors with civil servants. The senior management are working as best they can within the system to find, recruit, train and retain the people they need to manage procurements. But there is a shortfall, and the available short-term solutions are very limited. The navy is disadvantaged in recruiting in particular because naval installations are located far from major population centres. The majority of Canadians live far from the ocean, and find it difficult to understand exactly what the navy does.

The new generations of skilled trades and professionals are very different from their predecessors. Their loyalty to organizations is measured by the benefits they receive in return, as remuneration, training and growth opportunities. Unfortunately, in maritime defence procurement,

skillsets and experience take a long time to grow, and new hires take time to deliver benefits to a project. There are few people available with broad experience because the last decade has seen few major procurement projects. As well, the Canadian Navy is in competition for talent with the private sector and this, combined with declining birthrates and reduced immigration, means that there is a shortage of qualified personnel. As well, young people are not necessarily looking for long-term jobs with a single employer. They may want to pick up some skills and get a decent salary, but they will have a number of employment experiences in their lives.

In a paper for the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, Commander (Ret'd) Ken Bowering wrote,

> The navy has gone through a period where its personnel, though suitably educated and trained, are fewer in numbers and, in some cases, particular classifications and trades have all but disappeared. For example, within Maritime Engineering there are today far fewer people trained as naval architects and constructors than there were up to the 1980s, and these are the people who once led the conceptual studies and design trade-offs. They are also the people who once were able to completely design our warships and manage and oversee their construction. A similar situation has occurred with civilian personnel within both the Department of National Defence and Public Works and Government Services as downsizing led to early retirement of highly experienced engineers in the 1990s. Younger engineers who joined DND to fill some of those vacancies simply do not have relevant – and necessary – experience.[2]

Efforts are underway to add as many as 250 people a year to the materiel establishment, accompanied by enhanced retention programs. Even assuming that the personnel can be found, the procurement system only has limited capacity to absorb new personnel. Personal Learning Plans have become mandatory and personnel planning has become much more formal. Departments are coordinating their activities to minimize competition for scarce personnel, but in comparison with private industry, it takes too long to hire qualified people.

A further problem is the organization of the procurement bureaucracy. At least four powerful agencies – DND, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Industry Canada and Treasury Board – touch every major Canadian defence procurement. Other countries have some form of central agency to manage these projects. In Canada, the system has split accountability and responsibility which, some have argued, leads to inefficiency and weaker accountability. The Canadian system can work effectively, if certain conditions are met. Among other things, core departments would need to define and respect their specific roles and responsibilities, budgets must be realistic and adequate, risks appropriately allocated, and industrial benefits clearly assigned. In fact, the naval procurement challenge may now be so serious that there is no time to create a new 'Defence Procurement Canada' organization. Instead, the discipline required to make the most of scarce personnel resources may impose its own regime of innovation and adaptation.

In Canada, major military procurements are carried out within a web of external and self-imposed constraints and under intense political and media scrutiny. This has exaggerated an Ottawa culture that was already prone to being risk averse. Risk has political and economic facets, but as defence analyst Brian MacDonald writes,

> What seems less apparent, in the Canadian government procurement decision model, is a willingness to accept the existence of operational risk – the risk that a critical capabilities platform won't be able to do its job, especially under adverse conditions, because it is simply inappropriate for the circumstances, too old physically, and/or its critical technologies are too out of date, and therefore the platform becomes of greater danger to its crew than to any possible enemy.[3]

In the November 2008 Speech from the Throne, the government said, "[f]ixing procurement will be a top priority." It spoke of making it easier for businesses to provide products to government through more simple and streamlined processes. The speech also noted that "Canada cannot afford to have cumbersome processes delay the purchase and delivery of equipment needed by our men and women in uniform." These procurement activities depend on skilled, experienced people. Without them, they cannot happen. Canada has to find people to help administer naval procurement programs in order to ensure the success of future operations.

Notes

1. Aaron Plamondon, "Equipment Procurement in Canada and the Civil-Military Relationship: Past and Present," *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies*, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Summer 2008).
2. Ken Bowering, "Military/Naval Procurement in Canada: A Flawed Process," *General Sir Arthur Currie Paper 1-08*, The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 19 November 2008.
3. Brian MacDonald, "Accrual Accounting, the National Security Exception, and Defence Production," *Amiens Paper 1-2006*, The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2006.

After over 30 years in the public service, Janet Thorsteinson became Vice-President Government Relations at the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI).

Making Waves

Photo: DND

*Hull **Fraser** alongside in Bridgewater, Nova Scotia.*

Our Faltering Grasp on Canadian Naval History

Peter Haydon

A picture, it is said, is worth a thousand words; something you can touch and feel is worth a hundred pictures. The photo included here shows the former HMCS *Fraser* lying in disrepair at an obscure wharf in Nova Scotia, the product of a failed business venture. The handful of people who pass her by do so largely ignorant of her history or of the role she and her sister ships played in the Cold War. *Fraser* is, in fact, the last remaining ship of the seven *St. Laurent*-class destroyer escorts designed and built in Canada at the beginning of the Cold War. Today, her fate is uncertain, and unless the naval community in Canada intervenes soon a significant piece of our history may vanish as *Fraser* follows her sister ships to the wrecker's yard or is sunk as a reef.

Because Canadians are generally apathetic about their naval history, *Fraser*'s future is gloomy. Part of the reason for this apathy is geographic; the economic heartland and thus the majority of the population believes it has little direct dependence on the sea. The ribbon of steel that carries containerized goods from Canadian ports to inland markets and assembly plants is not obviously maritime in nature. And because we have become so accustomed to globalization, the international flow of goods is accepted without much thought to the way those items get to Canada. Except for those who live close to the sea or have direct interests in things maritime, Canadians have little contact with the oceans that played a great a role in the country's founding and helped push Canada into international prominence. Unfortunately, Canada's rich naval and maritime heritage is usually regarded as an adjunct to the larger story of Canada's evolution, and shipping is often relegated to a regional factor rather than as a key part of the nation-building process. Similarly, naval history is invariably lumped into the broader military history of the country rather than defined as a separate historical activity that continually contributed to the collective endeavour.

If upholding Canada's naval and maritime heritage is important then we need to look at ways of making that heritage more widely understood and appreciated. Some will argue that we have a network of informative naval and maritime museums across Canada to do this. I do not dispute their existence, but I do question their present value in helping Canadians understand their naval and maritime history. This isn't entirely the fault of the museums; they can only work with the limited resources at their disposal. I don't know the details of their budgets or their annual attendance figures, but I suspect both are a lot smaller than ideal for their intended educational role.

To be effective educationally museums need to be more than just static displays of ship models and nautical paraphernalia, they need to be dynamic and there must be things that people can touch and smell. One of the better ways of doing this is through museum ships where visitors can actually sense how sailors lived and worked. What better lesson about the 'glorious days' of sail than to walk aboard a ship of that era to discover that the living conditions were unbelievably cramped and that life below decks fell far short of today's concepts of hygiene. Or to walk through a Cold War era diesel-electric submarine, such as HMS/M *Alliance* at Gosport, England (a real hands-on learning experience) to find that living conditions were little better only a few decades ago.

Photo: Internet

*HMS **Belfast**, now a museum ship administered by the Imperial War Museum, is seen at her berth on the Thames River in London, England. **Belfast** served the Royal Navy for 35 years and played an important role in both the Second World War and the Korean conflict.*

In Canada we are lucky to have a few museum ships, but they fall short of being an adequate representation of our naval and maritime heritage. HMCS *Sackville* and CSS *Acadia* are maintained in Halifax, the icebreaker *Alexander Henry* is part of the Museum of the Great Lakes in Kingston, HMCS *Haida* lies in partial obscurity in Hamilton, Ontario, and the RCMP vessel *St. Roch* is preserved at the Vancouver Maritime Museum. A replica of the *Hector* lies alongside in Pictou, Nova Scotia, telling the story of the early Scottish migration to Canada. Are these ships alone representative of Canada's wonderful naval and maritime history? Certainly not! Where are the Viking longships and the French ships that brought the first European settlers? Where are the icebreakers that explored the Arctic? Where are the merchant ships that took Canadian grain to Europe and provided the economic lifeline to that continent in two world wars? Where are the warships that Canada committed to world peace over the last 100 years? We have a long way to go to come close to the museum initiatives of the other major maritime nations.

Go to Boston, for instance, and you will find USS *Constitution*, a living symbol of American naval history. Go to the old naval dockyard at Portsmouth, England, and you will find a celebration of British naval history complete with some magnificent museum ships, including HMS *Victory* and HMS *Warrior*, the first modern warship. The maritime museum in Sydney, Australia, honours the role of the Royal Australian Navy in the country's growth and even acknowledges the role of the Royal Navy in founding the country. And the replica of James Cook's HMS *Endeavour* in which he began his exploration of the Pacific is a poignant reminder of the courage and determination of the early explorers and the awful conditions under which they lived. The cruiser *Aurora* is preserved at St. Petersburg as a symbol of an era of Russian history. These are living history ships with real stories to tell. Models alone do not tell the full story; one has to experience, first hand, the constraints imposed on the early sailors by the smallness of their ships and the lack of technology.

The history of Canada's relationship with the oceans is more than just military, it is also economic, scientific and industrial. HMCS *Sackville* is preserved, albeit with difficulty, as a memorial to the men who served at sea during the Second World War, especially to those who gave their lives. What many do not realize is that *Sackville* also represents a truly great Canadian shipbuilding achievement. She and the other 122 corvettes were the first warships entirely designed and built in Canada and it was from that experience that the Canadian shipyards were able to build bigger and more complex vessels including *Tribal*-class destroyers similar to HMCS *Haida* and, after the war, the Canadian-designed destroyer escorts of the *St. Laurent*-class, the DDH 280s and more recently the frigates.

To continue to tell the story of the development of Canada's navy so that all Canadians can understand the naval and related industrial role in nation-building, there is a need to preserve one of the *St. Laurent*-class destroyers as a museum ship. In the same way that the corvettes symbolize the Canadian commitment to the Battle of the Atlantic, the destroyers symbolize the long commitment to the Cold War. But more than that, the ships represent a milestone in Canadian warship design and construction which earned the respect of our NATO partners. Also, those ships were symbolic of Canadian technical ingenuity when some were converted into helicopter-carrying

Photo: Internet

Today three different vessels from the Cold War era are preserved at Holmen, Copenhagen the home of the Danish Royal Navy. Pictured is the ***Willemoes****-class, P547* ***Sehested****, the last fast-attack boat in the Royal Danish Navy.* ***Sehested****'s high speed and manoeuvrability plus her low signature and heavy armament made her and her sister ships formidable opponents.*

escorts and led the world in the integration of a medium-size helicopter, the Sea King, into a destroyer's overall combat capability.

But that is not all, most of those ships were modernized a third time to keep pace with the advances in automated data management. In all, the seven ships of the *St. Laurent*-class and the 13 follow-on destroyers of that design served the Canadian Navy for almost 40 years, forming the backbone of the navy for the duration of the Cold War. So far, not one of those ships has been saved to commemorate this accomplishment. Only three still remain and the decision to preserve at least one of the remaining ships of that class needs to be made soon before they are broken-up or sunk.

If the government wants to make a truly meaningful gesture to mark the 100th anniversary of the Canadian Navy, a commitment to maintain one of the remaining *St. Laurent*s as a museum ship would be most appropriate. Such a commitment to Canadian naval and maritime history would indeed be a lasting and significant tribute to those who 'go down to the sea in ships' and those who provide the much-needed support from shore.

Canadian Amphibiosity: Right Direction, Wrong Path

Amphion

How often has it been said that generals always prepare for the last war? Far too many times, and it is going to be said a great many more times. But if we continue to use the axiom there is a pressing need to refine it to make it 'joint' and also reflect the complete lack of political foresight that presently hinders armed response to destabilizing crises around the world.

If the recent spate of military responses to international violence tells us anything, it should be that traditional concepts are largely ineffective and invariably lead to needlessly prolonged and overly expensive commitments. Several eminent military historians have warned of the futility of trying to conduct counter-insurgency operations with heavily mechanized forces, yet we still insist on doing it and learning absolutely nothing from the painful experiences.

That said, international humanitarian law requires that the legitimate armed forces of a state observe precise rules concerning the degree of force used and the avoidance of civilian casualties. Yet, the 'enemy' – now almost always non-state irregular forces – is not bound by the same sets of rules which is tantamount to requiring that the legitimate forces of a state conduct counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations with one hand tied behind their backs.

The solution, as we are slowly discovering, is to conduct those operations rather differently, making full use of modern technology and be discriminating in the deployment of people. In this, three concepts stand out:

1. acquire the maximum amount of information about the enemy (or whatever else you want to call him) before taking any direct action;
2. carry out precision strikes against his command system and against his support system rather than try to defeat his foot soldiers; and
3. only put troops on the ground when the playing field has been levelled.

In this, the use of remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) has proven a highly effective concept of operations in both the information gathering and strike roles. Using military systems with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel rather

Photo: US Navy /Released

Canadian soldiers disembark a US Navy LCAC (landing craft air cushion) during an amphibious assault training exercise, 25 April 2009 in Mayport, Florida.

Photo: US Air Force/Released

A US Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier waits as a MQ-1 Predator lands at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. In Afghanistan, Predators support ***Operation Enduring Freedom*** *and the US Department of Homeland Security uses the Predator B to patrol the US borders with Canada and Mexico.*

than with the crudeness of a chainsaw pays dividends.

The requirement for 'boots on the ground,' which essentially underlies the perception of the need for a Canadian amphibious capability, remains valid but only as the means of providing local security once the threats have been reduced to a manageable level.

So, what should the naval role be under such a concept of operations? First, there is absolutely no need for expensive warships to act as military transports; this can be done by merchant shipping. Yes, the army had some problems in the past with shipping contracts (the GTS *Katie* incident) but that doesn't mean that all future contracts will be as bad. Second, the roles the navy can play are very logical and include:

1. information gathering electronically and by insertion of reconnaissance forces;
2. control of ROVs (both aerial and underwater) in littoral areas;
3. first response to minor acts of violence, such as piracy, provided their rules of engagement are sufficiently robust to enable those forces to suppress the threat; and
4. the traditional role of maintaining a deterrent 'presence' in a troubled area.

Is a large, multi-purpose warship needed for these tasks? No! Destroyer-size ships (around 4,000-5,000 tons displacement) with good endurance and integral helicopter support are enough for most situations. Destroyers can easily operate the ROVs and use their own data management systems to garner information, and destroyers can support small-scale 'raids' ashore to accomplish very precise tasks. Where the need for greater secrecy exists those tasks can be done just as easily by submarines.

There is nothing new in this; the Americans have had considerable success with submarine-launched ROVs both in the air and under water, and most navies that still operate submarines have the ability to land and recover small reconnaissance forces. The modern submarine has the capacity to be the first effective response to any crisis because it can gather information covertly, or overtly if politically necessary, and take limited defensive action against threats to shipping and other naval forces.

Canadian amphibiosity? Yes, but do it on a small scale using appropriately equipped submarines and destroyers and exploit the inherent flexibility of those vessels.

Editor's Note: We would like to give proper credit to the photos that we included in Volume 4, No. 1 (Spring 2008). One of the photos of Danish ships in Doug Thomas' article "Warship Developments: Those Innovative Danes," was from the internet which did not include the photographer's name. The photo was on p. 41 and includes the caption "A high-speed special operations insertion craft embarked in HDMS *Absalon*." The photographer contacted us and we'd like to make sure he gets credit for his work. The photo in question was taken by Flemming Sørensen. We apologise for not giving credit. On the positive side, it's nice to know that our colleagues in Denmark are reading *CNR*.

The View from the West: Chinese Naval Power in the 21st Century

Christian Bedford

Two significant events in 2009 have drawn the world's attention towards China and its increasingly capable maritime forces: the deployment of Chinese naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden to contribute to a multinational armada to combat piracy; and the 60th anniversary of the Chinese Navy, marked by pomp and ceremony at the coastal city of Qingdao. While the evolution of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may not yet be a topic that pops up at the dinner table, future developments may make the naval arm of one of the world's largest militaries a regular news item.

Photo: Internet

*Chinese destroyer **Taizhou** (138) alongside with 054A Frigate (529) and sister-ship, **Hangzhou** (136).*

The PLAN's rapid modernization has occurred for two main reasons: necessity and opportunity. For much of the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the national security calculus was focused inwards, towards the countries with which it shared a land border. Whether secessionist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, border disputes with the Soviet Union and India, or economic considerations stemming from China's agricultural and industrial heartlands, for decades Beijing gave primacy to land forces, to the exclusion of the navy, which was largely a riverine and littoral force. A fundamental shift in attitudes occurred in the 1980s, as China's Maoist leadership was succeeded by a more outward-looking generation of Chinese leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping. Under Deng, China began the momentous shift from a self-sustaining communist state to the globalized behemoth that we know today. The economic policies that opened China and established economic linkages throughout the world were accompanied by a greater reliance on the oceans to export finished products and to import the vital resources necessary to sustain economic growth.

While economic considerations were certainly a factor behind an expanded navy, strategic considerations played an even greater role. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Beijing was freed from worrying over its land border disputes, and instead turned its attention towards the seas and its disputes over the status of Taiwan, the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Furthermore, it has been said that Chinese officials were awed by the firepower displayed in the 1991 Gulf War, which made them realize just how lacking their maritime forces were when compared to the United States and its allies. Thus, the 1990s witnessed a fundamental shift in China's strategic thinking, with perhaps the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when the United States placed two aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait, as the crystallizing moment that steered China full-bore towards a rapid naval modernization program.

Since the 1990s, the PLAN has strengthened its forces around four core elements: frigates and destroyers; submarines; naval fighters; and anti-ship missiles. It is unsurprising that these are precisely the systems required to fight a sea battle against an aircraft carrier and its battle group, and there is little doubt that the lessons learned in the mid-1990s spurred the acquisition of this gear. Blessed with both the political will and economic resources to make the concept of a strong blue-water force a reality, China has regularly confounded analysts, producing more highly technical pieces of naval kit faster than the best estimates. US naval analysts have commented in the past that nearly every time they would venture a date by which a Chinese naval system would be created or obtained, the PLAN would beat their best guesses by months, even years.

A look at the numbers is revealing. Between 2002 and 2004, China launched 13 new submarines. In the year 2003 alone, China began construction on no fewer than 70 military ships, mainly coastal defence vessels and

amphibious landing ships. China now has the sea-lift capacity to move 10,000 troops into a war zone. Last year, analysts estimated (modestly) that China has 72 modern frigates and destroyers, 58 submarines, 50 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and roughly 41 missile patrol boats.

While the current Chinese fleet is unquestionably impressive, the question being asked throughout the Asia-Pacific region is what China is going to do with it. Given that it has so many maritime border disputes with its neighbours, few are convinced that Beijing will simply use its new maritime muscle to fight pirates in the Gulf of Aden or conduct fisheries patrols within its exclusive economic zone. Having achieved its goals of establishing a credible blue-water force that can project power beyond its 'first island chain' and into its 'second island chain,' many states are wondering whether an emboldened China will use its naval forces to reclaim Taiwan, or control all or some of the Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku Islands.

While major power plays such as these are relatively rare in an era of multilateral institutions and interwoven regional economic interests, China has not allayed fears of impending Chinese dominance in the South China Sea and beyond. There are several reasons for this. For one, Beijing has been deliberately unclear about many aspects of its expanding military clout, including details of its military budgets, strategic goals and capabilities. The reason for this is simple: keeping your opponents guessing forces them to hedge against a variety of scenarios, and gives the Chinese the element of surprise. In the chess game that is Asia-Pacific security, this gives China an edge.

Domestically, a new generation of Chinese, who have only ever known a rising powerful China, is now coming to occupy positions of power within government and the military, and there is a strong demand from this group for the country to exert its new power in the region and claim China's rightful role (as this group sees it) as a regional hegemon. This attitude was on full display at Qingdao during the navy's 60th anniversary, with the PLAN's Chief, Admiral Wu Shengli, proudly discussing the naval force's upcoming plans, which include more large surface combat ships, supersonic naval aircraft, carrier-killing cruise missiles and high-speed intelligent torpedoes.

While China's political leaders have tried to stress to the world that the PLAN's rise is entirely peaceful, military leaders appear to have skipped over that page in the speaking points. The deployment of PLAN forces to the Gulf of Aden recalls an earlier time when Chinese mariners such as Admiral Zheng He explored the far reaches of the oceans, and nationalist Chinese are remembering the humiliation that British naval forces imparted on the Qing dynasty following their resounding maritime victories during the two Opium Wars. For these nationalists, China is finally having the last laugh.

Regional states watch developments in Chinese ports nervously. China's political brass, President Hu most prominent among them, have gone to great lengths to stress that China is peaceful and that Beijing does not want to be drawn into an arms race. Notwithstanding this public relations strategy, China's dramatic increase in its naval strength has forced others to bolster their fleets, with billions now being spent to improve blue-water fleets and maritime defences throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Only one week after the anniversary celebrations in Qingdao, Vietnam announced the purchase of six Russian-built *Kilo*-class submarines, as well as 12 Su-30 fighter jets. As well, Australia released its long-awaited defence White Paper, which called for a significant boost to the country's maritime defences, including the construction of 12 new submarines, three air warfare destroyers, eight frigates, naval helicopters and 20 enhanced patrol craft by 2030. Other states, including Malaysia and Indonesia, have bolstered their navies through the acquisition of new submarines and the construction of new surface vessels. The notion of avoiding an arms race in the region seems anachronistic now.

While China is undeniably permitted to have a fleet that befits its standing in the world and one that can protect its increasingly stretched sea lines of communication, Beijing must do more to assuage the concerns of its neighbours. Starting points could be confidence-building measures, such as greater political dialogue through regional bodies such as ASEAN+3, in order to manage disputes in the South China Sea. With several Spratly claimants presenting their case to the United Nations this year, more must be done to mitigate disputes and ensure a peaceful resolution to this matter.

China could also be more forthcoming about its military capabilities and share more information with potential adversaries. No one expects Beijing to throw open the doors to its most secretive facilities, but greater openness in this area could convince would-be rivals that China need not be a threat, and could promote stronger dialogue and military-to-military relations. Peace and stability are in the interests of all states in the Asia-Pacific area, and as the new regional heavyweight, China must take the lead in promoting an atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation.

Christian Bedford is a senior analyst in the Office of the Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters.

Plain Talk: Show Me the Money

Sharon Hobson

It's a long Canadian tradition. A succession of governments has been more interested in the idea of defending the Arctic than in actually securing the territory. The navy, having watched as previous promises of a *Polar*-class 8 icebreaker and nuclear-powered submarines were broken, is playing it smart, acting in accordance with what the government does, not with what it says.

What it says is tough and uncompromising. In July 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said, "Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this government intends to use it." A year later, he said

> Whether it is the thawing of the Northwest Passage or the suspected resource riches under the Arctic seabed, more and more countries are taking an interest in the waterways of the Canadian Arctic. We will be sending a clear message to the world that our environmental standards and sovereignty are not up for debate – if you are in Canada's Arctic you will be playing by Canada's rules.

Other ministers are talking the same tough talk. In February of this year, after two CF-18 Canadian fighter jets encountered a pair of Russian bombers over the Beaufort Sea just beyond Canada's Arctic airspace, Defence Minister Peter MacKay figuratively thumped his chest as he said the Canadians told the Russian crews to "turn tail and head back to [Russian] airspace." In May, Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon said "Canada is an Arctic power, and our government understands the potential of the North. Therefore, when and if necessary, this government will not hesitate to defend Canadian Arctic sovereignty, and all of our interests in the Arctic."

Photo: DND

A CF-18 Hornet from 4 Wing Cold Lake alongside a Russian Tu-95 Bear bomber on 5 September 2007 in international airspace.

These declarations come in the wake of a fall 2005/winter 2006 election campaign in which the Conservatives promised a string of initiatives aimed at securing Arctic sovereignty, including funding three new armed naval heavy icebreakers, building a new military/civilian deep-water docking facility near Iqaluit and establishing a new sensor system in northern waters. The Conservatives also promised to build a new army training centre in the north, station new fixed-wing search-and-rescue (SAR) aircraft in Yellowknife and establish new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons at CFB Goose Bay and CFB Comox. And, not least, the party promised that a Harper government would re-equip and increase the number of Canadian Rangers, and establish a new airborne battalion at CFB Trenton for a rapid emergency response capability in the Arctic.

But what has actually happened in the three-and-a-half years since the Conservatives took power in Ottawa? The army *has* opened a new Arctic Training Centre which is expected to achieve full operational capability in 2014, and Defence Research and Development Canada has begun a four-year technology demonstration project to identify and assess different combinations of underwater sensors for the Arctic. It should also be noted that the frequency and complexity of Arctic training exercises has also increased.

However, the three armed icebreakers have morphed into six Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), the deep-water docking facility has been downgraded to a berthing and refueling facility, the fixed-wing SAR aircraft is still just a dream, the new UAV squadrons are not yet funded, and the new airborne battalion has been sidelined. The expansion of the Rangers was supposed to have been completed by March 2008, but is now scheduled for 2011-12.

So is the navy supposed to be a major player in the north or is it supposed to lurk on the sidelines, as an implied threat to foreign intruders? It's hard to say. The government's Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) contains some general comments, but little detail of what exactly the government intends to do to protect sovereignty in the north and what the navy's role will be in that mission. The CFDS says:

> The Canadian Forces must have the capacity to exercise control over and defend Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. New opportunities are emerging across the region, bringing with them new challenges. As activity in northern lands and waters accelerates, the military will play an increasingly vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence in this potentially resource-rich region, and in helping other government agencies such as the Coast Guard respond to any threats that may arise.

But, as Liberal Senator Wilfred Moore recently pointed out at a meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "nowhere in the Canada First Defence Strategy is there a commitment to maintaining Canada's naval capabilities off our coasts and around the world as well as increasing our presence in the Arctic." The Arctic demands special capabilities, and as Senator Moore alluded to, the question becomes one of priorities and trade-offs. How high a priority for the navy is the Arctic mission?

The Canadian Navy works with other government departments and agencies in protecting Arctic sovereignty, providing surveillance, search and rescue, and limited surface patrols. This suits the navy, which doesn't want a greater role in the far north. In 2007 it managed to talk the government out of proceeding with its election plan for three armed icebreakers. Instead, it is moving forward on the government's revised plan to acquire a more multi-functional *Polar*-class 5 AOPS to patrol the Northwest Passage in the summer months and the approaches to it, as well as Canada's east and west coasts, in the winter months.

Photo: Captain Cheryl Major, Public Affairs Officer, RCSU Northern

A CC-138 Twin Otter from 440 Transport Squadron flies over a Canadian Ranger patrol during ***Operation Nunalivut*** *2009. The Ranger Patrol circumnavigated Axel Heiberg Island during the exercise.*

Photo: Sgt Errol Morel, CFLAWC

*Sleds (****kamotiqs****) packed and ready .... Fully loaded, the* ***kamotiqs*** *carry enough equipment, food and fuel to support a Ranger Patrol for 72 hours.*

Vice-Admiral Denis Rouleau, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, told the Senate that the ships, a new design, "will be fairly capable of operating up North and will also be able to operate along the coast. It is a compromise that has to be met. A ship like this cannot be able to operate in first-year ice and still do 25 or 30 knots on the open water. We cannot have that."

But it appears that the plan for these "fairly capable" ships has been watered down in order to stay within the government's set budget. Instead of the six to eight ships announced by the government, the navy will acquire only six. And instead of a 40-mm gun, the ships will carry a 25-mm weapon. They also, reportedly, will be slower than planned and have less cargo capacity which will reduce their ability to support other operations.

This must be frustrating. Just as the navy is coming round to accepting a larger role in Arctic security – a role that it was not initially happy about – it has had to scale down its ship program. (And at the time of writing, industry had just been informed that the anticipated Letter of Intent would not be released as scheduled and "the extent of the delay is unknown at this time.") Moreover, just two years into the program, and the delivery of the first ship, now scheduled for 2014, is one year later than originally anticipated.

The navy's new strategic document – the follow-on to "Leadmark" – reportedly has a chapter dedicated to the Arctic. However, it will be interesting to see what it says about the naval role and anticipated capabilities in the Arctic. The smart money is on following the government lead and talking about the need to protect the region while giving few details on how it will actually do that.

Sharon Hobson is an Ottawa-based defence analyst and Canadian correspondent for ***Jane's Defence Weekly****.*

Warship Developments: C² and Area-Air Defence

Doug Thomas

With the conversion of the DDH 280 *Iroquois*-class helicopter-carrying destroyers to their current configuration (armed with the vertical-launch Standard SM-2 missile, range approximately 50 nautical miles) the Canadian Navy took delivery of a ship that has ably led naval task groups on many occasions in the past two decades. *Iroquois*-class destroyers may deploy with a Flag Officer and his staff, and are able to command and control large expanses of maritime territory and the operations of numerous ships from Canada and other countries. They can defend themselves as well as other vessels in the vicinity from attacks by anti-ship missiles and hostile aircraft. These ships are thus capable of command and control (C²) and area-air defence (AAD).

Photo: MCpl Robin Mugridge, Formation Imaging Services Halifax, Nova Scotia

*HMCS **Iroquois** and her Sea King helicopter during **Operation Altair**. **Iroquois** and HMC Ships **Calgary** and **Protecteur** deployed in April 2008 along with 850 Canadian sailors and air crew to the Arabian Sea as Canadian Task Force 150. **Operation Altair** is Canada's maritime contribution to **Operation Enduring Freedom**, the global campaign against terrorism.*

When the *Iroquois*-class re-joined the fleet in the 1990s, it revived a defence capability lost to the Canadian Navy in 1962 when the aircraft carrier *Bonaventure*'s Banshee fighters were withdrawn from her air group. (The Banshees were the first Canadian military aircraft fitted with air-to-air guided missiles and were acquired to provide air defence for the carrier and the rest of her task group.)

HMC Ships *Iroquois*, *Athabaskan* and *Algonquin (Huron* was decommissioned and sunk as a target several years ago) have been very useful ships, but although they were given a new lease on life with their major refits some 15-20 years ago, they are now very elderly: *Iroquois* is 37 years old and counting! Where are their replacements, what will they look like, and what will they need to be able to do?

Bridging the Gap: Canadian Surface Combatant

There have been several initiatives to replace Canada's destroyers, as 35-40 years is considered the maximum lifespan that can be expected from a modern warship of this type. As the reader will appreciate, maintenance requirements (and resulting expense) become excessive with increasing age. A major stumbling block is, as usual, cost: at least three or four ships are needed at a unit price in excess of $1.5 billion. Given the current age of the *Iroquois*-class, one must expect a gap of as much as five years between their being withdrawn from service and the commissioning of replacement ships.

The latest destroyer replacement project is the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), which could replace the *Iroquois*-class in the period 2016-2019. CSC, employing a common hull and propulsion machinery but different weapons and sensors, would also replace the *Halifax*-class frigates later in the 2020s, likely at a lesser cost than the more complex DDG variant.

Recent history has demonstrated the importance of this capability to a maritime state like Canada, if it wishes to play a security role on the world's oceans. Taking command of multinational naval forces, such as the anti-piracy and anti-terrorist task groups now employed off Somalia and in the Arabian Sea, is a role that Canada has

Photo: MCpl Robin Mugridge, Formation Imaging Services Halifax, Nova Scotia

*HMCS **Iroquois** conducts a jackstay transfer and a fuelling with HMCS **Protecteur** during **Operation Altair**, April 2008.*

Photo: US Navy/Released

*HMCS **Protecteur** (AOR 509) fuelling the **Arleigh Burke**-class destroyer USS **Fitzgerald** (DDG 62), 26 May 2009.*

performed on a number of occasions, and there are not many other medium-power navies which do this as well as Canada. Also, providing area-air defence is becoming more crucial as maritime forces operate in coastal areas, where the threat often includes anti-ship cruise missiles and, in the future, anti-ship ballistic missiles.

The *Halifax*-class frigates will undergo a major midlife refit and modernization during the coming decade, and it is intended that four of those 12 ships will be fitted with additional communications, situational awareness displays, and accommodation for a Commodore and his staff, in order to 'bridge' the anticipated command and control gap until CSC becomes a reality. This will permit command of national and international maritime forces, but nothing will be added to these ships' area-air defence capability.

Photo: Internet

Artist's rendering of a Danish Combat Patrol Ship.

Is there any way of expediting the process, so that we don't have to bridge the gap? There certainly are some existing designs which could be built in Canada to meet the requirement to replace the *Iroquois*-class. The latest variant of the US Navy's *Arleigh Burke*, the UK's *Daring*-class DDG, the German *Type 124* or *Type 125* frigate, or the very interesting diesel-powered Danish *Peder Skram*-class patrol frigate, would be worthy of consideration. However, CSC is intended to be developed as the core of our 'Next Navy,' i.e., a cohesive plan for two types of ships totalling perhaps 15 units, based on a common hull and propulsion system as previously described. Canada would probably need to abandon this idea if it took an off-the-shelf design for a C²AAD destroyer, and then develop a separate frigate design to replace the *Halifax*-class.

What will CSC Look Like?

Particularly if we are looking at another 8-10 years before commissioning, CSC should take advantage of some of the new developments we are seeing in the newest frigates and destroyers being developed by Canada's NATO partners. These would include:

- Integrated Electric Propulsion which would eliminate long, vulnerable and difficult to align propeller shafts and provide additional electrical power for future sensors and weapons;
- the ability to operate tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the small helicopter Firescout or fixed-wing Scan Eagle, in addition to a manned maritime helicopter such as the Sea King's successor, the Cyclone;
- a modern, vertical-launch area-air defence missile such as the SM-6, which has been selected by Australia for its new Air Warfare Destroyer. This promises to be an outstanding weapon, with an intercept range of 200 nautical miles; and
- a good multi-purpose medium-calibre gun, like the USN's 5-inch Mark 45, Mod. 4, with a range of over 60 nautical miles using precision-guided, rocket-assisted projectiles.

Photo: Internet

*Artist's impression of a modified **Arleigh Burke** DDG design which was considered for the Australian Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project.*

Book Reviews

The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin, by Peter Yule and Derek Woolner, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 364 pages, ISBN 978-0-521-86894-5

Reviewed by Commander Michael Craven

The Royal Australian Navy's (RAN) institutional history runs broadly parallel to that of Canada's navy (with the exception of the latter's unification experience) and provides useful comparisons when considering Canadian naval issues. As the Canadian Navy works toward achieving full operational capability for *Victoria*-class submarines 11 years after the Submarine Capability Life Extension Project was announced, *The Collins Class Submarine Story* provides readers with an understanding of the RAN's experience in procurement and introduction into service of its modern submarine fleet.

Today, Australia's *Collins* submarines and the *Oyashio* submarines of the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force are recognized as the finest non-nuclear-propelled submarine classes in the world. Large, stealthy, with tremendous endurance, long range, a capable sensor and communications suite and potent weapon system, the six *Collins* submarines are the most lethal component of Australia's maritime defence capability. Although personnel shortages are a problem, the capabilities of the *Collins* allow the RAN to sustain its role as a dominant regional navy.

Ironically, Australians were not convinced (and some remain unconvinced) of the value of the *Collins*-class. This is rooted in the tortured history of the project from the time that sea trials began in 1994 until acceptance into service of the last boat, HMAS *Rankin*, in 2003. During most of this nine-year period the *Collins* project was subject to unrelenting and unfavourable media scrutiny arising from a series of design, engineering and combat systems defects discovered in the lead boat, HMAS *Collins*, during pre-acceptance trials. Because it was one of the most expensive and ambitious public projects undertaken by Australia, this rancour spilled into the political arena and resulted in the project becoming highly politicized.

In *The Collins Class Submarine Story*, Peter Yule and Derek Woolner do a first-rate job of tracing the gestation, approval, implementation and travails of Project SEA 1114, the RAN activity to replace its aging *Oberon* submarines with a platform optimized for operations into the 21st century. The authors begin with a three-chapter introduction to Australian naval shipbuilding and the history of the RAN submarine service in the 20th century, and then provide an overview of the Australian *Oberon* submarine operation from its inception in the 1960s. Chapter Four introduces the *Collins* project. Subsequent chapters describe the ambitious decision to build the vessels in Australia, the surprising selection of a Swedish design, the establishment of a greenfield Australian facility, the construction and sea trials of the submarines, the training of submariners, and the Herculean and ultimately successful effort to overcome the difficulties and put right the deficiencies that materialized. The analysis is the product of exhaustive research, including interviews with hundreds of Australian, Swedish and American project participants.

The heart of the book describes the most troubled phase of the project, commencing in 1994 with the sea trials of HMAS *Collins*. During this period the ambitious nature of the operational requirement was brought into sharp relief as a series of performance deficiencies were identified that provided rich material for an inquisitive Australian media and sceptical public. Interest in the project remained high while the next five submarines were completed and introduced into service. Throughout, the project remained focused on resolving the various shortcomings, of which none was thornier (or more expensive) than coming up with a replacement for the original and ultimately ill-fated Rockwell combat system. So relentless was public attention – in which media scrutiny was aided by leaks from an increasingly fractured project organization – that even today there are elements of the Australian population who refuse to accept that the project was a success. The perception remains, in the words of Yule and Woolner, "that it was a hugely expensive failure."

The Collins Class Submarine Story is a gripping and highly educational read. All individuals involved in the definition of naval requirements and project management will find this work gratifying and instructive. Books of this nature in the Canadian naval context are extremely rare; the lessons of David Zimmerman's *The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa*, published 20 years ago, are valuable but do not address a contemporary project. Some will insist that the lack of a Canadian-equivalent analysis is because Canada has not (since the 1950s, at any rate) embarked on a military acquisition of such unparalleled ambition. However, the ultimate lesson to be gained from Yule and Woolner is that today, thanks to persistence in seeing an important project through to its logical conclusion, Australia possesses a naval capability that is second to none and ideally suited to the needs of Australian maritime security. As well, the country acquired broad industrial and scientific expertise in the process.

As Canada grapples with delays in replacing Sea King helicopters and *Protecteur*-class underway replenishment vessels, reduction of fixed-wing maritime patrol aviation

capabilities, development of an Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship design with alarmingly minimal naval capability, and the improbability of an *Iroquois*-class replacement materializing prior to the remaining ships celebrating their 45th birthdays, Yule and Woolner's description of the courageous commitment by Australia to the *Collins*-class project serves as a tart reminder that this country could do much better. *The Collins Class Submarine Story* is highly recommended, both as eminently readable naval history and as a fine treatise on project management.

Fighting at Sea: Naval Battles from the Ages of Sail and Steam, edited by Douglas M. McLean, Montreal: Robin Brass Studio Inc., $29.95, 338 pages, ISBN 978-1-896941-56-1

Reviewed by Commander David Soule

Naval warfare presents students and historians with several challenges, not the least of which is the lack of an opportunity to 'walk the battlefield,' with the exception of shore batteries and forts. Those who have had the opportunity to tour Vimy or Gettysburg battlefields know how this compares to trying to visualize a classic sea battle from the shore. Hence any writer of naval warfare is faced with the challenge of helping the reader visualize the action at hand. *Fighting at Sea* is a book that has achieved this.

The book is a collection of six studies (three from the age of sail and three from the age of steam) written by six esteemed naval historians, Canadian, American and British. All of the studies have a link – although in the case of the two War of 1812 studies, a small link – to Canadian history. The studies are carefully woven together by the editor to describe the theme of how technological change has influenced war at sea, and how certain aspects of warfare remain timeless. The real gem in this collection, which includes studies of lesser known naval actions, is how the authors have presented the individual action within a general discussion of fighting at sea at a particular point in time from all aspects including how intelligence was collected and used, period tactics and their rationale, new technologies including their strengths and weaknesses, and fleet support. The authors also examine other timeless aspects of warfare such as the impact of individual leadership on the fight, training, weather, chance and, in some cases, good or bad luck and timing. In essence, where the novice may find a larger more comprehensive study somewhat daunting, this book provides the reader with concise yet comprehensive vignettes of how warfare at sea was conducted at the time of the action described.

Notwithstanding the quality of authors, it is the editor's care in linking his editorial theme to the individual studies that makes this book particularly interesting and valuable. The authors and editor have also managed to set the studies of these seemingly single events within the context of the larger campaign or war in which the actions occurred. This provides the reader with a context to examine the action.

"Justice to the Admirals" by Donald Graves provides an interesting discussion of the naval effort required to support General Wolfe's campaign, a successful joint action, to capture Québec in 1759. This support was instrumental in providing Wolfe with a suitable base of operations for his land force. Graves examines the manner in which the Royal Navy (RN), through careful planning, bold initiative, use of (coerced) local river pilots, and navigational and seamanship skills, forced its way 800 miles up the uncharted St Lawrence River to Québec City.

"Taking the President" by Andrew Lambert and "Old Ironside's Last Battle" by William Dudley describe individual ship actions and events in the War of 1812. While not decisive fleet actions in a classic sense, the fights and chases (in the case of the USS *Constitution* ranging across and back the whole Atlantic), should not be seen as just actions where national pride was at stake but also as individual jousts fought at sea, where personal honour, pride and prestige were on the line. Arguably the events described were small tactical actions but both assumed strategic importance in terms of national pride and embarrassment. The studies discuss the personalities involved, the technology at play and the tactics involved in fighting a sailing ship, including the difficulty of maintaining a blockade and the seamanship required to chase down or evade an enemy. Lambert's study provides an interesting insight into the Royal Navy's efforts to design and bring into service a ship to match more powerful American frigates. Both studies are well written, although I preferred Lambert's style as his study reads like a real life "Master and Commander" adventure.

The final three studies focus on the Second World War and all of them provide the reader with a good understanding of the capability and limitations of technology at the time and its impact on the battle described. The authors point out that superior technology was not necessarily decisive – it had to be employed properly and training was essential to achieve this. The timeless aspects of warfare are also depicted whereby ships operating for a long period of time, together with talented officers, have been able to achieve tactical advantage against overwhelming odds. Equally well described are the doctrinal clashes that occur whenever new technologies and tactics are employed.

This later point is made in Michael Whitby's study, "Shoot, Shoot, Shoot! Destroyer Night Fighting and the Battle of Ile de Batz, 1944," of the RN's 10th Flotilla's actions against

German forces in the English Channel in 1944. Whitby describes the doctrinal clash between the RN supporters of destroyer torpedo employment and those who came to favour longer range gun engagements, especially when radar technology and training allowed for longer range targeting of the enemy. Whitby's article provides a fascinating background of these little known operations and the challenges involved in night fighting in small ships.

Douglas Mclean's "Hollow Victory: Gruppe Leuthen's Attacks on Convoys ON202 and ONS18, 1943" and "On Britain's Doorstep: The Hunt for U-247, 1944" by Malcolm Llewllyn-Jones address the technology, tactics and those eternal aspects of naval warfare that pertain to the Allied fight against the U-boat. Both studies describe actions at critical periods of the campaign where each side sought to counter advances in the other's technology. Once again technical advantage is affected by equalizers such as weather, geography, technical limitations, training, intelligence, chance and luck. These two studies present several challenges in that they involve many divergent actions that the authors must knit together to tell their story. Both authors manage to address this challenge. If you did not understand how the U-boat menace was countered by the Allies in the Second World War, these are two studies well worth reading.

The individual studies, which are extremely well written and researched by expert naval historians, can be read on an individual basis or as part of a whole. The maps that accompany the text are very appropriate and one can actually find the location of relevant points discussed in the text. I have read far too many histories where places key to the action and discussed at length are not indicated in the accompanying maps. While seemingly a small point, *Fighting at Sea* addresses this important detail and demonstrates how well the book has been put together. *Fighting at Sea* is a superb book and is a great addition to the library of both serious historians and novice readers. I consider it a great introduction into naval warfare.

Accrual Accounting and Budgeting in Defence, by Lieutenant-Colonel Ross Fetterly and Major Richard Groves, The Claxton Papers #9, Kingston: Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, 2008, 84 pages, ISBN 978-1-553392-15-6

Reviewed by Dave Perry

In this slim tome, Ross Fetterly and Richard Groves provide valuable insight into the federal government's adoption of accrual accounting principles, and the resulting impact on the Department of National Defence (DND). Despite the highly technical nature of the topic, the authors provide a relatively accessible account of the recent changes in federal bookkeeping, which makes this book required reading to understand the full impact of the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS).

The book's three substantive chapters comprise an overview of the federal government's accounting procedures, DND's capital assets, accrual accounting principles and the implications of accrual accounting for Canadian defence. The first chapter situates the move to accrual accounting within the context of wider federal government initiatives to reform the public sector by adopting private business principles. As the authors highlight, the adoption of accrual practices will require increased levels of strategic planning between defence and the central agencies. The second chapter extols the virtues of accrual principles. Here, the authors make the case, as others have in less detail, that accrual principles will facilitate long-term planning, improve resource allocation and enhance the transparency of overall resource costs.

The third, and most valuable, chapter provides an illuminating overview of the challenges and benefits of adopting an accrual system for DND. The authors begin by elaborating on the conventional wisdom that accrual practices may be the saviour of the Canadian Forces (CF). As they describe, the costs of replacing almost the entire CF capital base, as articulated in the CFDS, would probably not be possible under the old system of cash-based accounting. By spreading the huge capital outlays over the entire duration of the equipment's lifespan, however, DND will be able to manage more effectively long-term recapitalization.

The book's real insight, however, is to illuminate some of the challenges that will accompany the long-term benefits of adopting accrual accountings in defence. For instance, the new accounting practices will provide DND with greater flexibility when procuring major capital equipment by allowing the "investment cash" required actually to purchase major capital projects to be "reprofiled" from one fiscal year to the next in the event of "evolving project demands." In other words, while the cost of capital is spread over the equipment's lifetime for bookkeeping purposes, the government still actually has to purchase kit at full sticker price. Under the accrual system, DND will have the flexibility to shift investment cash from one year to the next in the event of procurement delays. This flexibility, however, is gained at a cost of more frequent and demanding financial reports that will place additional pressures on already under-resourced procurement staff.

Similarly, the adoption of accrual budgeting for procurement requires more detailed project documentation than the old system of cash-based accounting. As the authors note, however, Public Works and Government Services

Canada has frequently been reluctant to make the necessary contract changes. Finally, proper amortization of capital requires much more detailed inventorying than the department employed in the past, to track the impacts of depreciation and overall life-cycle costs. Thus, while accrual accounting will provide DND the flexibility that may actually make the CFDS program affordable, the authors argue that it comes with much more onerous financial reporting requirements. While accrual principles will benefit DND over the long run, the book suggests that implementing them will provide a short-term headache.

Although the book requires a relatively high understanding of current defence budgeting practices, an excellent appendix provides several examples to help demonstrate the impact of accrual practices on specific procurement projects in easily understood terms. The narrow focus on defence budgets might not be of widespread interest, but it will likely become an important reference for those interested in procurement, infrastructure and the implementation of policy. For navalists, the book at once demonstrates the possibility and challenges of fleet replacement from a financial perspective.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, April 2008, $20.79, 304 pages, ISBN 978-1-846-032813

Reviewed by Dave Mugridge

Why review a book on counter-insurgency (COIN) for a predominantly maritime audience? The answer is because of Canada's contribution to the joint political-military campaign in Afghanistan and the naval community's lack of exposure to this predominantly army discipline. In the era of 'joint effects,' in the world of 'comprehensive campaigns,' military personnel of all cap badges must be aware and ready to play their part in delivering national security. It is impossible to read a newspaper or watch a current affairs program without gleaning the profound importance of Afghanistan to NATO and Canada. The lessons identified on the mountain battlegrounds of central Asia or in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people will resonate around Canadian military circles long after the next COIN campaign is begun. That campaign may well be in the littoral regions and require a considerable input from the navy.

Within the maritime domain conventional naval threats to Canadian national security remain low, relatively constant and localized, but irregular, non-conventional actors are increasingly threatening global maritime security. Because of this change there are credible arguments to suggest future naval campaigns to counter the likes of piracy, organized crime and transnational terrorism can learn from an historic appreciation of COIN.

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian combine both considerable professional operational experience of COIN with a dynamic and rigorous historical perspective. This rare combination means they are well placed as editors to deliver both a readable and a thought-provoking digest of historic and modern-day campaigns. Their considerable editorial skill allows the reader to review the work of a team of knowledgeable and critical authors, who are happy to de-bunk long-established myths as well as draw out valuable lessons from a broad spectrum of campaigns.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare is a lively combination of 13 contemporary and historic analyses, and provides a comprehensive review for all manner of readers. It is the variety and breadth of the campaigns covered which separates this book from other less comprehensive tomes. To my mind, this book's successful 'warts and all' comparative appraisal of a broad operational panorama is what shouts its recommendation to the reader. The chapters are well presented, logically structured and allow the individual tactics employed and political imperatives to educate the reader on COIN's sheer diversity.

From the introduction with its excellent thematic discourse, and reason enough to read the book, to the final chapter, the book provides a stimulating review of the essence of COIN, its inherent complexity and subtlety of application. The editors allow the reader the opportunity to interpret the facts and review the arguments without holding up one example as the *cause célèbre*. Additionally, there is a comprehensive bibliography that would allow for further research into the campaigns discussed.

In conclusion, although this book may remain on the fringes of interest for most naval readers, there are many good reasons to delve into its pages, not least to provide a well-informed foundation on both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. I would argue that reading both of these chapters will wet the readers' whistles sufficiently to provoke interest in what else can be learned from the more historic analyses of COIN. For the naval reader who is perhaps facing a tour to Afghanistan, this is essential reading. Even if you don't believe you will be directly involved in military operations, COIN's inherent complexity and multifaceted nature makes even Staff Officers and those involved in support operations 'strategic corporals.' As Sun Tzu wrote many years ago, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated.... If ignorant of both the enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle."

Sackville and the Battle of the Atlantic

Jacqui Good

HMCS *Sackville*, Canada's Naval Memorial, can't go to sea under her own power anymore. But, once a year, on Battle of Atlantic Sunday, the ship is towed out into Halifax Harbour with a full complement of veterans and families. Positioned off the Navy Memorial in Point Pleasant Park, *Sackville* takes part in a moving ceremony to commemorate the longest single campaign of the Second World War. A bell solemnly tolls for each of the 24 Royal Canadian Navy vessels lost at sea. The silence is profound.

The Battle of the Atlantic was waged between September 1939 and May 1945 and performed the vital job of keeping the supply lines open between North America and Europe. Both British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt maintained that the war could not have been won without the contribution of the brave convoys. The Battle of Atlantic ceremony is held on the first Sunday in May and is dedicated to the 4,234 Canadian sailors, airmen and merchant navy who lost their lives in the cause. HMCS *Sackville*, the last of the corvettes which served during the battle, is the natural centre of the commemoration.

This year Peter MacKay, Canada's Minister of National Defence, attended a special Battle of the Atlantic dinner aboard HMCS *Sackville*. He commended the Canadian Maritime Naval Trust (CMNT) as "stewards of this fine ship." And then he joked, "in fact, to get into the spirit of being aboard ship, I slept on a shelf in my closet last night. First, I replaced the closet door with a curtain. And then I put an assistant on standby to whip open the curtain after four hours, shine a flashlight in my eyes and mumble, 'Your watch!' So I feel like I'm one of you now."

Joking aside, that is the kind of education CMNT wants to provide with its museum ship. Volunteers have carefully restored the vessel to look as it did in 1944. They can't have the decks awash with waves, but they can show the cramped quarters in the mess and explain about the short hours of sleep. Peter McKay got it during his visit, and so did a group of sea cadets who recently spent the night aboard *Sackville*, as if they were wartime recruits. A class of history students from the Halifax Grammar School, on their visit, asked to eat sailors' rations. The stew they were served was undoubtedly an upgrade from the 'red lead and strips' (stewed tomatoes and bacon) that was a regular part of shipboard cuisine.

Speaking of food, I was served a warming cup of chowder aboard *Sackville* on a cold Battle of the Atlantic Sunday seven years ago. I don't think anything ever tasted as good. My husband, mother, brother and sister were with me to share in the remembrance – and to watch as my father's ashes were committed to the sea.

Photo: MCpl Robin Mugridge, Formation Imaging Services, Halifax, N.S.

Padre Charles Black conducts the annual at-sea Battle of Atlantic service onboard HMCS ***Sackville****, 3 May 2009.*

My dad, John A. Cocks, was an engine room chief who served on the convoys and enjoyed the navy enough to stay on after the war. He learned of the revived tradition of burial at sea and asked for us to make the arrangements.

It was a solemn ceremony and one that was important to every family member aboard. We won't forget the voice of the chaplain intoning "In sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life, we commend to almighty God our brother … and we commit his ashes to the deep." And we were touched by the words of the Navy Hymn – which could have been written especially for the Battle of the Atlantic. "O hear us when we say to thee, for those in peril on the sea."

Jacqui Good is the publicity chair for the Canadian Memorial Naval Trust.

CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

Queen's Colour Event Connects the Past, Present and Future

Virginia Beaton

The photos included here and on the back cover of this issue depict the Canadian Navy receiving the newly consecrated Queen's Colour from Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada.

The Consecration and Presentation of the Queen's Colour took place on the Garrison Grounds in Halifax on Saturday, 27 June 2009, exactly 30 years after Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother presented the last Colour to the navy.

Wearing her navy uniform for the first time, and welcomed by a 21-gun salute from 1st Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, Her Excellency inspected 500 sailors and officers in the Royal Guard and the massed Naval Band including the Stadacona Band of MARLANT, the Naden Band of MARPAC and the National Band of the Naval Reserve.

Her Excellency thanked the navy for its service to Queen and country and stated she hoped the new Colour would be a symbol "of the loyalty, ingenuity and professionalism that have earned the Canadian Navy its reputation to this day. As the storm rages on, when hope seems all but lost, may it be your guide and give you renewed strength and courage."

Before the old Colour was trooped and marched off for the last time, First Nations representatives Elder Doug Knockwood and Don Julien presented a ceremonial smudging and a Mi'kmaq prayer. An Honour Guard included Navy League and Sea Cadets. Two Sea Kings from 12 Wing and a Cormorant from 14 Wing did a flypast, followed by a ceremonial march-past of the new Colour and a *feu de joie* by the Royal Guard.