



CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW


VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 (SPRING 2008)

**The Canadian Missions:
How the Navy Maintains
Its Purpose**

**NATO: The Value of
Commitment**

**Piracy, Terrorism and the
Balance of Power in the
Malacca Strait**

**The Canadian Navy in
2007: An Overview and
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VOLUME 4, NUMBER 1 (SPRING 2008)

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The *Canadian Naval Review* is published quarterly by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS) at Dalhousie University. It is a professional journal examining a wide range of maritime security issues from a Canadian perspective. In particular it focuses on strategic concepts, policies, historical perspectives, procurement programs and operations of the Canadian Navy, and national security in general. This initiative brings together members of the Canadian defence and academic communities and is a component of the CFPS's Maritime Security Program.

The *Canadian Naval Review* has two primary objectives:

- provide a respected, arm's-length focal point for discussing a broad range of issues relating to navy professional development; and
- provide a forum for naval, academic and public discussion of all aspects of naval and maritime policy.

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HMCS Toronto at speed

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Editorial: Force Development: A Demand Well Beyond 2015

[B]uilding the future navy demands the reallocation of naval talent.... [T]he navy will review its capacity for manning positions ... with a view to making the changes required to deliver the future fleet over the coming three to five years.¹

Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson
Chief of the Maritime Staff

The *Canadian Naval Review* seeks to focus attention on matters of maritime affairs – and there is no more timely task when the military focus is so firmly centred on Afghanistan. This article was prompted by Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson's urgent reallocation of fleet personnel to achieve fleet renewal by 2015. While at first glance this appears a necessary and sufficient response to the force development challenge, perhaps more is required.

In recent times, Canada's armed forces have been revitalized by a challenging mission which finally justifies decades of 'combat capable' planning and training, by a supportive political environment, by a continuing transfer of financial resources (including automatic funding increases), and by energetic busting of the procurement logjam by a determined Minister. The investment of political will to move strategic airlift from 'off-the-radar' to mission capable within two years is astounding. Similarly, the army has been rebuilt conceptually and materially without the benefit of a single major capital project. But does this translate to support for naval forces – with the capabilities and scope envisioned by the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS)?

Globally it has been tough times for navies. While armies have no need to explain their relevance in a world of counter-insurgency and air forces can tag along as providers of battlefield air support, the urgency of the naval argument is more tenuous. The argument for naval renewal is inescapably a strategic one – i.e., a search for decisions which when made will have long-term repercussions and which if not made will cause irreparable harm. A world gripped by the 'war on terrorism' and a bloody

counter-insurgency campaign has never been less friendly to the 'silent service' and its own vision of naval necessity. Replacing a declining operational capacity with the same platforms made new again may not respond to Canada's perception of its own security risks.

Similarly the Royal Navy stands "on the brink," according to many commentators, having seen a 40% decline in fleet numbers and with both the Type 45 and the carrier projects delayed, over budget and compromised from their original capabilities. The US Navy, with a new strategy, requires a 35% shipbuilding budget increase and is struggling to explain its 'soft power' and inter-agency potential. Only in the Pacific are navies steadily moving towards greater capability. Canada, for its part, has ambitious (albeit unfunded) plans for naval, coast guard and other government vessels. But the naval plans are plans to preserve what is. They offer little in the way of new thinking and their appeal may wane as other demands come to the fore. Without a compelling and publicly accepted argument for the 'new fleet' and without planning agility to match recent procurement accomplishments, the government and Canadians are not likely to accept a long-term tax mortgage simply to meet naval aspirations.

By way of contrast, \$2 billion spent on four highly useful C-17s represents not just the addition of aircraft but a significant alteration of strategic and operational concepts. In less than half the lifespan of the Arctic Patrol Vessel design cycle, new ideas and doctrine have transformed airlift in Canada. Can the same be said of the present fleet plans? The announced and proposed projects all focus on maintaining the fleet capacity of today. And worse, naval planners will need decades to bring projects to delivery and only then will we be able to judge if those platforms are still what is needed.

The challenge is more than renewing the fleet by 2015 – nothing less than fleet transformation is required. But luckily we've been here before. Both the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) and the Tribal-class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) were nothing less. They took

advantage of a governmental crisis of conscience concerning defence and the pressures of domestic industrial capacity to deliver new capabilities relevant to the Cold War. But what followed was a sense that the job was done. Shipyards and other defence capacity quietly closed despite enormous investment in their modernization. New capability development and projects such as the replenishment ship replacement languished.

Before CPF and TRUMP, a clear strategic vision identified the task group as the unifying concept. Area weapons were an evident imperative buttressed by a quantum leap in information capacity. Carefully developed political support, decades of research and development, transformation of personal and collective training, along with close collaboration with industry allowed them to stand as outstanding examples of collective vision and will.

Regrettably, since then stasis has reigned. The new fleet will lack the comfort of Cold War assumptions to guide its development. Sovereignty, littoral operations, expeditionary missions, support to special operations forces and emphasis on low-threat scenarios such as piracy are only a few of the operational demands. Just as importantly, rapid design, prototyping and production may be the new mantra. In industrial terms, ships are one of the few commodities not subject to economies of scale or serial production. The length of any project also means that within the project itself lies the root of its obsolescence demanding new emphasis on economy, adaptability, sustainability and reduced ecological impact.

All these factors mean we need a continuous eye on the future. This involves not just internal force development manoeuvring but the entire spectrum of strategic assessment, public debate, doctrine development, evaluation of personnel structures and training. And, most importantly, it means professional development including advanced education, postings and exchanges, technical monitoring, research and development, and so on.

The question is not whether to retain or replace the CPF or any other platform. The navy needs to make a sustained and meaningful contribution to an overall strategy – national as well as maritime – which recognizes the demands for maritime security as part of both domestic and expeditionary demands of a state. This strategy must have broad support internal to DND and the Canadian Forces as well as a firm base of national understanding.

Vice Admiral Jeremy Blackham, a former UK Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, and Gwyn Prins writing in the US Naval Institute *Proceedings* in 2007 reminded us of what Samuel P. Huntington wrote in 1954:



Photo: DND 2007

Is the Navy sailing into the sunset?

What, after all, is the essential capability without which you have no Navy? Not ships; not men; not bases; not even traditions and organisational forms. “The fundamental element of a military service,” wrote Samuel P. Huntington ... “is its purpose or role in implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the strategic concept of the service.... If a military service does not possess such a concept, it becomes purposeless ... and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degeneration.”

A second element of a military service is the resources, human and material, which are required to implement its strategic concept. But, Huntington reminded us, the two elements – concept and its realisation – are indissolubly linked in a democracy because, “... to secure those resources it is necessary for society to forego the alternative uses to which those resources might be put.... Thus, the resources which a service is able to obtain ... are a function of the public support of that service.”²

Force development must start with making a convincing case to Canadians that the navy has relevance, that the navy matters at home, that the navy is an essential part of the national security fabric, and that the navy reflects the best of Canadian human and physical capabilities.

This must happen in the context of global financial trends that may bring the end of “prosperity Canadensis.” In times of shrinking national resources the demands of the navy, when the navy speaks alone for its own interests, will not compete well with personal tax issues and the rescuing of broad swathes of national industrial capacity. 🍷

Rear Admiral David Morse (Ret'd)

Notes

1. Vice Admiral Drew W. Robertson, quoted in Darlene Blakeley, “Future Navy Demands Full Review of Personnel requirements,” Department of National Defence, 2007, available at http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms_strat/strat-issues_e.asp?id=635.
2. Vice Admiral Jeremy Blackham (Retired) and Gwyn Prins, “Storm Warning for the Royal Navy,” US Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2007.

The Canadian Missions: How the Navy Maintains its Purpose

Matthew Gillis



Photo: DND

HMCS *Iroquois* leads a multinational naval task group.

The post-Cold War world has seen the world's top navies used in new and awesome ways – missiles arcing into the sky from ships and submarines, carrier-borne strike aircraft supporting soldiers on the ground, and embarked marines prepared to deploy at a moment's notice. But these are often the actions of the major navies; what relevance do 'medium' navies like Canada's have if relegated to the sidelines during major combat operations? Although the Canadian Navy seems irrelevant when juxtaposed to headline-grabbing land-strike and amphibious-assault missions, these exercises of naval power are not reflective of Canadian attitudes and policies. The truly reflective missions – the *Canadian* missions – of humanitarian aid and maritime interdiction are the reasons why the navy is especially relevant to Canadians today.

This article will explore some of the more popular missions for the world's navies today and describe how these missions are ultimately unimportant to Canadians

regardless of their navy's incapacity to perform them. It will then explore the navy's successful humanitarian missions, chiefly in the Persian Gulf, and explain how they have secured the navy's relevance by best representing Canadian culture, values and interests.

The New Business

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the disintegration of the threat of 'blue-water' engagements. This prompted a shift in the US Navy from what Jan Breemer describes as "sea control" to "land control" – that is, "the business of ... influenc[ing] events on land."¹ These excerpts from the US Navy and Marine Corps White Paper define the shift in the employment of naval power:

Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environ-



Canadian Army units with USS **Gunston Hall** during the Integrated Tactical Effects Experiment held off Camp Lejeune, NC, in November 2006.

ment of the “littoral” or coastlines of the earth. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage....

... The shift in strategic landscape means that Naval Forces will concentrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea. Maneuver from the sea, the tactical equivalent of maneuver warfare on land, provides a potential warfighting tool to the Joint Task Force Commander – a tool that is literally the key to success in many likely contingency scenarios.²

Since this White Paper was written in 1992, events on land have been directly influenced by the US Navy (and other navies) in three ways:

1. The use of precision sea-launched weapons to strike inland targets.
2. The use of carrier-borne strike aircraft over foreign soil.
3. The use of amphibious warfare vessels for sealift and expeditionary operations.

The quintessential precision sea-launched land-attack weapon – the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) –

was used in its first operation in *Operation Desert Storm* in 1991. Launched from US surface and sub-surface platforms, TLAMs struck inland Iraqi targets and far exceeded the range and accuracy of other contemporary naval gunfire support. The use of TLAMs from naval platforms against inland targets was repeated in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2001 and 2003 for a total of over 1,000 missiles expended.³ Other navies have also acquired land-strike capability with TLAMs. The Royal Navy acquired TLAMs in 1995 and first used them in 1999. Spain and the Netherlands have also expressed interest in acquiring TLAMs for their navies. Several other navies possess proprietary land-attack missiles, such as the Russian SS-N-21 Sampson and Indian BrahMos.

Strike aircraft launched from carriers have been the *de facto* instruments of force projection since the successes of the British at Taranto and the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, and their employment has continued today in the Persian Gulf. US Navy and Marine aircraft striking Iraq made up about 35% of all sorties flown in 1991 and 2003.⁴ Today, eight states besides the United States field aircraft carriers – the majority of them support strike-capable aircraft – with further upgrades, replacements and additions on the way.

As part of this shift from sea control to land control,



Canada's Navy is, of necessity, multi-purpose and combat-capable.



Photos: DND Combat Camera



amphibious operations have also gained importance. The Royal Marine landings at Al-Faw, Iraq, in 2003 have reaffirmed the worth of amphibious capability. The ability to transport, supply, deploy and command fighting forces by sea increases in value as more of the world's conflicts shift to developing areas lacking infrastructure for moving forces by land or air. To this end, the navies of 13 states currently operate some form of amphibious warfare vessel.

One country has been painfully absent from these descriptions: Canada. The Canadian Navy currently does not possess any of the capabilities described above. In fact, the Canadian Navy has never had inland strike capability beyond the range of guns, has not operated an aircraft carrier since 1970, and has never enjoyed independent amphibious capability. Today's Canadian Navy, according to Commander Kenneth Hansen, "finds itself in an awkward no-man's-land, composed of warships too small to accommodate the staff, sensors and weapons needed to perform effectively in the outer littoral zone but too large to be risked in the inner littoral zone."⁵ With the Canadian

Navy seemingly left out of the new business of navies, is this a sign of its irrelevance?

Dragging our Heels?

Why has the Canadian Navy been unwilling to shift focus towards the new 'land control' business? The shift to littoral operations from blue-water operations following the end of the Cold War is certainly not something that Canadian policy-makers have overlooked. The Canadian Navy's own *Leadmark* essentially echoes ... *From the Sea* in this regard when it states:

Unlike during the Cold War, when most naval activity was geared to maintaining the sea lines of communication in the blue water of the open ocean, attention has now begun to shift to operations in the green water land-sea interface of the littorals. In part, this is in recognition that the United States and allied nations have archived *de facto* command of the sea.... It is also in recognition of the fact that the increasing threat of regional instability ... could lead to a destabilization of global security. Since prevention of this level of destabilization will undoubtedly

require the presence of some level of military force on the ground, military strategic planners will place increasing emphasis on how to support joint and allied forces in the littorals.⁶

These insights into the future nature of conflict are only a few years old, but the fleet operating today was conceived, designed and built during the Cold War. Neglect of the naval elements of Canada's defence budget is problematic in re-developing the fleet to meet the demands of littoral warfare. Yet, it is not just the money that is illustrative. Some other states have done more than Canada to accommodate the new naval reality with less money; the Dutch are notable, fielding an amphibious capability with a national defence budget of only \$12b. Still, some have done less to accommodate it with more money; with a defence budget of \$21b, Australia operates no strike missiles, aircraft carriers, or amphibious platforms.⁷

So if money is not the most important factor in determining whether a navy has changed its focus in the post-Cold War world, what is? Despite the shift in naval strategy towards land and the successes of other navies at accommodating this shift, is Canadian culture compatible with ideas like strike missiles or amphibious warfare? If not, then the Canadian Navy is not irrelevant despite its lack of amphibious capability and land-attack weapons. In the Canadian case, the navy remains relevant by the other roles it performs, in particular its prolific constabulary and diplomatic assignments.

Michael L. Hadley's excellent 1996 essay, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy," suggests that right from the beginning of the Canadian Navy in 1910 appeals to heady 'Imperial' principles were too fanciful and lofty for the Canadian naval forces.⁸ He suggests that the notion of an aggressive traditional naval force has been met with a lack of public support in Canada, especially after the end of the Cold War and the end of any obvious threat to Canadian security. Yet Canadians are supportive of their navy when the navy operates in non-traditional roles – fisheries and sovereignty patrols, constabulary and diplomatic duties – roles which are more compatible with Canadian public views and possibly more strategically valuable to build allies and prevent conflicts in developing states.

If it is in these non-traditional roles that the navy finds authentication, the Canadian fleet has excelled. In maritime interception operations (MIOs) Canada's successes have been unparalleled. The hailing and boarding of suspect vessels became routine work for the fleet in the Gulf War. Vice-Admiral Duncan Miller (Ret'd) and Sharon Hobson describe the work of the Canadian fleet in their book *The Persian Excursion*. They state that the Canadian task group



Photo: DND

HMCS *Fredericton* in the Suez Canal; these transits have become routine for the Canadian warships since the end of the Cold War.

conducted 1,877 interceptions and 22 boardings, with one-day records of HMCS *Athabaskan* challenging over 30 ships and HMCS *Terra Nova* boarding eight. “With only three ships in the Gulf,” they write, “Canada conducted 25 per cent of the total challenges.”⁹

The MIO successes in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991 were exceeded between 2001 and 2003 in *Operation Apollo*. Throughout the operation, the Canadian fleet typically constituted 20% of the coalition force yet did about 50% of the work. The Canadian Navy had conducted 600 boardings out of around 1,100 in total by the end of the operation in October 2003.¹⁰ Reports note that Canadian frigates also came to the aid of drifting dhows and their dehydrated passengers, a sample of the humanitarian contributions made by our sailors in this theatre.

Polls on Afghanistan indicate that opinions are mixed over whether or not Canada should be involved in combat missions. They also indicate much higher support for involvement in development, reconstruction and diplomatic work than combat. And, regardless of the actual facts of the matter, Canadians continue to see Canada as a peacekeeper and ‘helpful fixer’ in the world. Thus, the current capabilities of the Canadian fleet are relevant in that they reflect the type of foreign policy that the public desires. Strike missiles, aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships may be useful in the world’s conflicts, but this may project the Canadian Navy into a role that is entirely ‘un-Canadian’ and hence irrelevant and undesirable to the public. Vice-Admiral Hugh MacNeil (Ret’d) perfectly summarized the relevance of the Canadian fleet as considered from the perspective of the Canadian people when he stated: “the size of the force is one that Canadians are likely to understand and support. I believe we are in a modest but sound position to serve the maritime nation of Canada and in a way that Canadians understand and expect.”¹¹

Looking Ahead

Regardless of how the Canadian public perceives the role of the navy, littoral regions will become the site of more and more humanitarian efforts. The need for effective sealift capacity to support Canadian expeditions to these regions must be addressed. Thankfully the Joint Support Ship (JSS) should help, with its proposed ability to combine the re-fuelling and re-supply capabilities currently fulfilled by HMCS *Protecteur* and HMCS *Preserver* with the addition of sealift capacity and joint force command and control facilities.

The sealift abilities of the JSS should be helpful for furthering Canadian expeditions of a humanitarian and peacekeeping nature. The navy’s supply vessels – *Protecteur*,

Preserver and the now paid-off *Provider* – have, in recent years, contributed to humanitarian missions in Florida, the Bahamas, Somalia, East Timor and Haiti. The JSS should be able to accomplish similar humanitarian feats and also help Canadian troops to deploy and operate independently without as urgent a need to contract commercial transports.

If the public continues to view the Canadian military as a peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance force as opposed to a combat force, it is not the navy which is irrelevant, but the missiles and strike aircraft. Those who view these attributes as being crucial to modern navies – and especially do so from an outside perspective, unconscious of the foreign policy priorities of Canadians and the nature of the *Canadian* missions – will undoubtedly see the Canadian fleet as outdated and irrelevant. Yet the successes described here and projects like the JSS, which will extend the reach of Canada’s humanitarian assistance, have secured the relevancy of Canada’s fleet and certainly help it to be one of the best fleets at representing those for whom it stands and defends. 🇨🇦

Notes

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2. United States Navy, ... *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, 1992, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/fts.htm.
3. “BGM-109 Tomahawk Operational Use,” GlobalSecurity.Org, 27 April 2005, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/bgm-109-operation.htm.
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5. Kenneth P. Hansen, “Starting Over: The Canadian Navy and Expeditionary Warfare,” *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 24.
6. Directorate of Maritime Strategy, *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 – A Summary*, Ottawa, 2001, p. 18.
7. The figures in this paragraph are from 2007 and are taken from the following sources, respectively, www.mindef.nl/binaries/7302_Kerngegevens_Def_engels_tcm15-80022.pdf, p. 67; and www.defence.gov.au/budget/06-07/pbs/2006-2007_Defence_PBS_03_s1_ch2.pdf, p. 19.
8. Michael L. Hadley, “The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy,” in *A Nation’s Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), p. 35.
9. Duncan E. Miller and Sharon Hobson, *The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 150-1.
10. Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo* (Ottawa: Magic Light, 2004), p. 121.
11. Vice Admiral Hugh MacNeil (Ret’d), “Canada’s Navy,” in Peter T. Haydon and Katherine D. Orr (eds), *Canada’s Maritime Tradition: Past, Present and Future* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996), p. 22.

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NATO: The Value of Commitment

Commander Brian Santarpia

Among the many important foreign policy debates in which a state must continually engage, where to deploy its armed forces is paramount. The deployment of forces is a highly visible display of national interest and as Canada's most expeditionary service, the navy must be engaged in that debate. Being forward-deployed demonstrates the strength of the navy by permitting flexible responses to emerging international crises and by continually strengthening Canada's ability to operate with allies and in distant theatres. All sailors and informed observers understand this, but with limited resources decisions must be made about where to deploy and how often.

Prior to 11 September 2001, the Canadian Navy was committed to NATO, keeping a ship deployed with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL). The 1994 White Paper identified these deployments as a standing task for the Department of National Defence. Deployments typically lasted between four and six months and consisted of numerous force-generation exercises and flag-waving port visits. No doubt due to the enjoyable nature of the frequent port visits, SNFL deployments came to be known, both inside and outside of the navy, as "cocktail cruises." This complaint was more than just a case of perception as, depending on the Commander of the force, the operational level of activity has not always been maximized.

Understandably, with the attacks of 9/11, the navy shifted 100% of its force-generation capacity to *Operation Apollo*, the Canadian Forces' (CF) contribution to the global 'war on terrorism.' For two and a half years *Operation Apollo* was the navy's sole focus and not until the autumn of 2004 was it again possible to deploy a ship with the NATO force, now renamed Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). HMC Ships *Ville de Quebec*, *Montreal* and *Halifax* were deployed in succession leading to the Canadian command of SNMG1 in 2006, with Rear Admiral J.A.D. Rouleau embarked in HMC Ships *Athabaskan* and *Iroquois*. On



The Canadian Navy has been a steady member of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic and its recent successor the Standing NATO Maritime Group since their inception.

completion of that year, however, Canada opted not to maintain a continuous commitment to the group. Canada was not alone in terms of gaps in its commitment and for a period of several months the force was left with just two participants (United States and Germany). Following a six-month hiatus, HMCS *Toronto* deployed with the group in circumnavigating Africa but no Canadian ship replaced her in January 2008.

It is clear that our commitment is caught between two conflicting perceptions. On the one hand, it has become much more difficult and expensive to deploy a ship with SNMG1. With the attacks of 9/11, NATO began *Operation Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean Sea. With SNMG1 now participating at least part of the time in an actual operation, it has been deemed necessary to carry out the same level of technical, personnel and training preparations required of any CF unit proceeding on an operation. Added to this is the requirement imposed by CF transformation to conduct all CF operations overseas under the auspices of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM). With CEFCOM footing the bill for these deployments there is a requirement to have government

approval for each mission.

On the other hand, despite the increased operational nature of SNMG1 missions, the deployments are still tarred with the perception that they are cocktail cruises. The strategic and operational effect of *Active Endeavour* is very difficult to demonstrate and the mission has not to date demanded the full range of combat capability of the forces committed. There remains a significant amount of force-generation activity conducted during SNMG1 deployments, unlike other CEFCOM missions where force-generation activity ends before the deployment of forces. And perhaps most importantly for the perception of SNMG1 deployments, the port visits remain an integral part of the program and are viewed by many as somehow unworthy of a CEFCOM mission.

Operational Effects

The operational effect of naval deployments, not undertaken during periods of open conflict, is often hard to demonstrate. In conflicts, all naval operations can be divided into just two sorts of activity. Either a navy is seeking to control the use of the seas for its own national purpose, such as ensuring the safe arrival of material for industry or delivering and supporting an army, or it is denying the use of the seas to its rival, such as operations to prevent the delivery or supply of an enemy army. In periods of peace, however, naval deployments can have constabulary and diplomatic objectives in addition to the purely military ones described above. In all cases, because naval operations seek to enable a national objective that is not always solely dependent upon naval action, it is often



The Navy's increased international role requires that it be able to work with the US Navy as an equal.

This paradox of perceptions explains why the Canadian Navy has decided not to maintain a continuous commitment to SNMG1. That decision, however, represents a lost opportunity on several levels and should therefore be revisited. Naval deployments are different than land deployments and must be understood as such by CF planners at the strategic and operational levels. The operational and strategic objectives that can be attained by naval deployments are less direct and require a sustained effort to bear fruit.

As stated above, informed participants in this debate agree that the navy needs to be forward-deployed to provide foreign policy options to the government and therefore to be relevant. The question that divides them is whether it would be more advantageous to control our deployments, only committing to SNMG1 when we so choose or instead to commit fully to NATO for the long term.

difficult to demonstrate the effectiveness of that action. We can say, therefore, that naval action is aimed at second-level operational effects.

To demonstrate the difficulty of assessing the operational effect of naval operations, consider for example *Operation Apollo* during which Canadian naval forces were tasked to conduct interdiction operations in the Arabian Sea to prevent the escape of Al-Qaeda leaders from Afghanistan by sea routes. It can be argued that as no leaders were captured at sea the mission had little effect. Conversely, it can be argued that the presence of so many naval ships inspecting each vessel in the area of operations deterred Al-Qaeda from using the sea as an escape route. What is certain is that regardless of the enemy's intentions, only by deploying ships to the Arabian Sea could we know definitively that Al-Qaeda was not using the sea lanes to travel.

As with a police force, increased presence offers an operational effect through deterrence. That presence is not inexpensive and no medium power like Canada can afford to invest sufficient resources on its own to provide the widespread and continuous presence necessary to be effective. NATO therefore offers an opportunity for allies to pool resources to get the job done. But the demands of interoperability require a consistent effort. The demand to deploy continuously with our allies appears at first blush to be a force-generation cost that must be borne to reap what might be called 'the operational-effect reward.' This is, however, a limiting viewpoint. The reality of naval activities is that force generation and employment are always being conducted simultaneously. The only place where much of the needed force-generation activity can be conducted is at sea in the company of other ships. To produce a continuous stream of competent sailors and officers, naval ships must spend significant periods away from port, conducting a broad range of activities.

Being forward-deployed offers the significant operational advantage of combining force generation and force employment. And there are other advantages as well. Thus, only by spending time forward-deployed can navies learn to solve the logistical challenges that are presented by such deployments. Furthermore, a forward-deployed force is able to gather intelligence that will make it effective in times of conflict or emergency, and will be able to maintain a much sharper operational ability through daily use of skills. The final, and most obvious, advantage is that forward-deployment will permit a force to react more quickly, offering a greater variety of options to operational commanders and national governments.

History is replete with examples of the benefits of forward-deployment. For example, one can examine the actions of Admiral Horatio Nelson's fleet during the period leading to the Battle of Trafalgar. His fleet was at sea for long stretches conducting a blockade of French ports and was therefore able to train daily. Conversely his adversary was bottled up in port. The results of combining force generation and employment changed the course of European history when Nelson's fleet routed the much larger combined fleets of France and Spain. More recently, navies that had ships deployed in the Indian Ocean were the first capable of offering aid after the tsunami in December 2004, and those with ships in the Mediterranean Sea in 2006 were able to commence non-combatant evacuation operations immediately after the onset of the Israel-Lebanon crisis.

Strategic Effects

The difficulty of demonstrating directly the operational effect of naval operations does not mean that they are

therefore not worth the investment of national resources. Despite the challenge of linking operational effect to naval effort there are in many cases no practical alternatives for achieving a desired outcome. Moreover, operational and strategic goals are closely linked and naval action that appears to have a limited operational effect can serve to advance a strategic objective. Consider for instance the operational and strategic goals of *Operation Active Endeavour*. The operational goal of *Active Endeavour* is to deny terrorists the use of the sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean Sea, while the strategic goal is to permit the free use of the world's oceans for international trade. These goals appear to be two sides of the same coin and it comes as no surprise that the same naval activity of continuous naval patrols is designed to attain both.

No single deployment will provide a demonstrable effect on the goal of ensuring the free use of the world's oceans. Any improvement is likely to be incremental in nature and difficult to trace to an exact effort. That said, if we choose to go it alone, deploying unilaterally to theatres we believe to be more important, it is evident that we will be less effective in establishing such an international legal regime on the high seas. Despite the frustration of trying to achieve the operational goal of *Active Endeavour* while working within the constraints of a multinational coalition, a second strategic goal is advanced. By our very efforts we improve our ability as an alliance to deal with future crises, regardless of the value, perceived or actual, of our operational efforts.

In recognizing this, planners can see that such commitments must be enduring and will produce second-level effects. In the case of a commitment to SNMG1, we can expect to produce the following strategic effects over the long term: greater confidence in safe and legal use of the seas wherever the force is deployed; greater recognition for the populations where SNMG1 visits of Canada's relevance to NATO and Europe; and with NATO's recent decision to extend the areas to which SNMG1 is deployed, an increased ability to extend the zone of peace to other regions of the world. These strategic effects will take time and a concerted effort to produce, but they are clearly in Canada's interest.

These second-level strategic effects demonstrate the importance and utility of the port visit program of SNMG1 deployments. Planners at CEFCON should not view these visits as simply a well-earned period of rest for deployed sailors but rather as a strategic opportunity. The capacity of a deployed warship to conduct diplomatic functions is considerable. Beyond the cocktail parties there are countless opportunities for Canada to leverage the presence



Photo: DND Combat Camera

HMC Ships Preserver and Halifax, 2007.

of impressive Canadian technology and people. Meetings and exercises with local naval and governmental authorities can be arranged in regions where Canada wants to build confidence and support democratic change. HMCS *Toronto*'s deployment to Africa is an excellent example of this. At short notice, representatives from *Toronto* met with leaders of the Nigerian Navy to ensure their comfort with the presence of SNMG1. Just one month later the ships were involved in the rescue of Yemeni soldiers forced to evacuate their base by a volcano explosion. Each of these meetings or events served to develop relationships which might later be used to find understanding in times of potential conflict.

Where to Engage

There is no serious debate in Canada about the need for a navy. Given our extensive coastline, the immense wealth of the natural resources contained in our maritime areas and our dependence on international trade and a stable international climate, the government, based upon its most recent announcements, fully intends to re-capitalize the navy. How best to employ that navy, and in particular its capacity for international engagement, is however an open debate. If the value of forward-deployment is recognized, then the choice may come down to going it alone or hitching our wagon to SNMG1.

Alone, we are masters of our own destiny, free to decide where and when we will engage, insofar as we can demonstrate a deployment's utility to the senior leadership of the Department of National Defence. Forward-deploying by ourselves or only with missions that meet our exact foreign policy aims would ensure that our scarce resources are used most efficiently. In this way we could ensure that our ships only operate in theatres relevant to our strategic efforts such as the war on terrorism or a potential anti-piracy mission off the coast of East Africa.

Additionally, we could more easily sort through the command and control issues, such as rules of engagement, to ensure our forces could deliver tactical and operational effect.

Conversely, continually deploying with SNMG1 would require a significant diplomatic effort to have the group deployed in theatres where naval presence could add to our collective defence. Once there, however, the increased size of the force would offer the commander significantly increased surveillance and interdiction capabilities. As well the challenges presented by the need to gain consensus on difficult issues such as our

reaction to piracy could ultimately result in a more robust international response to such problems. These challenges would force Canada and the Canadian Navy to exercise our diplomatic 'muscles' as we search for consensus on theatres of operation and rules of engagement within NATO and ultimately these abilities would prove useful in the event of any international crisis requiring a multilateral approach.

Presently the navy is obliged to plead the case in advance of each deployment. A continuous commitment to SNMG1, however, would eliminate the endless debate that now surrounds the justification of each individual deployment. The navy would be able to devote the staff horsepower now employed justifying deployments to the job of getting ships out the door for the mission and any additional staff capacity could then be devoted to more strategic, long-term issues.

Most importantly, continuous SNMG1 deployments would ensure that our ships will attain the highest levels of operational readiness and be forward-deployed at all times, regardless of the current geopolitical situation. Once a ship is forward-deployed with SNMG1, it would offer the option of quickly changing its mission in the event of crisis, as happened with HMCS *Halifax* immediately after 9/11 when the ship was chopped from SNFL to *Operation Apollo*. The navy should be viewed as a strategic resource that is more flexible when forward-deployed and that will be more effective the more it is used. Once we are forward-deployed, fate is likely to provide opportunities to demonstrate the relevance of naval forces. It's time for Canada to make a continuous commitment to SNMG1. 🇨🇦

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Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait

Caroline Vavro



Photo: CNR 2007

A container ship waits in the morning mist for an alongside berth in Halifax.

The Malacca Strait has been a prime spot for piracy for centuries. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the threat perception has been heightened due to fears that the ease with which pirates carry out attacks in the strait could be translated into a terrorist group doing the same, with much graver consequences. How to enforce security in the Malacca Strait in light of the threat that pirates and possibly terrorists pose is a contentious issue not only for the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, but also for China, India, Japan and the United States which maintain an active interest in the area.

The response of the littoral states to piracy and threats of terrorism in the strait not only highlights their unease and distrust of each other but also demonstrates their desired balance of power for the region. Their preference is for each external power to be restrained by the involvement of the others. In the Malacca Strait this translates into a security strategy for the region which is enforced by the littoral states themselves and in which external powers play a supporting role.

The Malacca Strait is important to each of the external powers examined here largely because of concerns over the security of oil supply. The United States, China, Japan and India are the first, second, third and sixth largest

energy consumers in the world respectively, and given the strait's location as an oil and gas chokepoint, all will retain an interest in counter-piracy initiatives in the Malacca Strait if only for this reason. Yet piracy and maritime terrorism are not the only threats that pique their concern over oil supply security and security in general – they are wary of the role that other countries could play in threatening their interests. Each external power is therefore not simply framing its response to piracy and terrorism in the strait based on those two issues alone, but also on the basis of longer term and more far-reaching interests.

The Malacca Strait is mainly divided between Indonesia and Malaysia (with Singapore located along the strait) with a “strict but disputed” boundary existing between their territorial claims.¹ Territorial boundaries in general are a touchy subject for these states due to competing claims over offshore resources, legacies of colonial domination, and general concerns over external power intentions in the region. This sensitivity about sovereignty affects the littoral states' response to piracy as evidenced by the fact that they confine each other to conducting anti-piracy patrols only in their own territorial jurisdictions. This means that a patrol chase must end once pirates are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the patrolling state, thus allowing



Container ships like this one loading in Auckland, NZ, routinely ply the hazardous waters of SE Asia.

pirates to attack in one state's territory and then retreat to another state's territory for safety. Malaysia and Indonesia refuse to be more flexible on territorial controls due to the perceived infringement on their sovereignty that may result. Maritime security initiatives in the Malacca Strait have had to work around the hot pursuit principle.

One of the most publicized initiatives is the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (Malsindo), which was established in July 2004. Under this initiative, in which joint 24-hour patrols of the strait have been carried out, the littoral states contribute vessels that operate under a coordinated hotline command structure.

But joint patrols are not the same as combined patrols in which the littoral states establish a fleet of patrol boats that operates under one command structure. Joint patrols can be hard to coordinate given the differences in the littoral states' capabilities. According to one estimate, Indonesia, for example, has less than 100 operational vessels to patrol three million square kilometres of archipelagic waters.² In addition, "shipboard officers privately lament that bilateral coordination of these patrols amount[s] to little more than exchanges of schedules, to which in many cases partners [do] not adhere."³

The Eyes in the Sky Program, which is part of the broader Malacca Straits Security Initiative (MSSI) including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, suffers from similar problems. The Eyes in the Sky Program, initiated in 2005, involves carrying out joint aerial surveillance patrols of the strait. The effectiveness of this initiative is hampered by the fact that the air patrols cannot go within

three miles of the other littoral states' territorial coastlines when in pursuit of pirates. Given the geographical layout of the Malacca Strait and the multitude of inlets and islands into which pirates can retreat to safety, this three nautical miles can be crucial to tracking them.

The lack of trust that exists between the littoral states also hampers intelligence sharing which is a vital component of counter-piracy and counter-maritime terrorism efforts in the strait. The 2001 proposal for an Information Sharing Centre, which is part of the Japanese-led Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAPP) initiative, stalled due to infighting among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore over where to locate the Centre. Indonesia claimed it would only participate if the Centre were located in its territory, citing concerns that if the Centre were located in another littoral state, reports on piracy in the region would be overly critical of it. Although ReCAAP was signed by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in 2004, only Singapore has ratified it.

While the littoral states have welcomed external involvement in anti-piracy efforts, these efforts have largely been confined to the provision of training and resources. In 2002, the United States said Southeast Asia was the 'second front' in the war on terrorism, and accordingly attempted to step up involvement in the area. The United States has made attempts to increase its naval presence, but Indonesia and Malaysia have successfully limited the extent of its involvement. In March 2004, Washington proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), which was viewed as a complement to the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The initiative would involve mutual intelligence

gathering, joint patrolling of the strait, and the presence of US troops who could take action if a decision was made to do so. While Singapore welcomed this initiative in its entirety, Indonesia and Malaysia vetoed the presence of any foreign troops in their territorial waters thus resulting in a much watered-down version of RMSI being adopted.

Despite being denied a permanent naval presence in the Malacca Strait, the United States is active in other ways. Malaysia and Singapore have both held joint naval exercises with the US Navy (USN) to police the strait, as well as intelligence sharing. Additionally, in 2006 over 200 USN personnel spent time in Indonesia to strengthen ties between the two states' navies and look into security in the strait.⁴ The United States also recently donated 10 new radar systems to monitor the strait that should be installed by 2008.

The US interest in playing a larger role in security provision in the Malacca Strait goes beyond concerns of piracy, maritime terrorism and disruption of trade.

The US interest in playing a larger role in security provision in the Malacca Strait goes beyond concerns of piracy, maritime terrorism and disruption of trade. Like China and Japan, Washington's interest is just as much about overall geopolitical concerns in the region. The United States is trying to wedge itself into the most prominent role it can in order to be in a better position to manage an increasingly powerful China and deal with any future security threats, such as a conflict over Taiwan. However, Washington is prevented from pushing the littoral states to accept its desired role for the region largely because the balance of power in the Malacca Strait is a non-traditional one in that the littoral states are not likely to align conclusively with any one power but instead seek to maximize their manoeuvrability and prevent regional domination. The importance of China, India and Japan to economic growth and security reduces the need for littoral states to bend to US desires. Although a US naval presence may be effective in providing security in the strait, keeping US forces out is much more important in the long term than effective counter-piracy measures are in the short term.

Singapore's historical reliance on the United States to guarantee its security has resulted in it accepting external power involvement in security strategies in the strait. In addition, Singapore has been more welcoming of outside power involvement than Indonesia and Malaysia because

a devastating pirate or terrorist attack would have the greatest economic impact on it and not the other littoral states. Not only is Singapore's deepwater port the world's busiest container port, but the country is also a regional oil-refining hub and would obviously suffer greatly from oil supply disruption.

Indonesia has put its guard up to US involvement in the region. This is partly due to fears of creeping infringement of its sovereignty which are fuelled by memories of past US interference, such as the counter-coup in 1965 which brought President Suharto to power. Malaysia shares this deep suspicion regarding external involvement in security provision in the strait because, as a Vice-Admiral in the Malaysian Navy said, "Malaysia has been colonized four times, three times by Europeans, and in all cases they arrived under the pretext of fighting piracy. So you can understand why we are particularly sensitive to these issues."⁵

Although Japan has been a regional leader regarding anti-piracy initiatives, it has been similarly restricted to conducting training exercises with and providing resources to the littoral states. As a state heavily dependent on imports, sea-lane protection is vital to its economic and security interests. However, the consequences of pirate attacks thus far do not seem to warrant the attention that the issue has received in Japan. The Nippon Foundation estimates that piracy costs Japan (US) \$10-15 million/year, a relatively small sum given the size of the shipping industry.⁶ Although Japan may view the attention it places on piracy as preventive, there is reason to believe that Japan is just as concerned about regional politics and is using concern over piracy as a way to wedge itself into a larger security role in the area.

The attention Japan devotes to piracy may well be part of its desire to expand its military role internationally. Factions of the Japanese government have been eager to 'normalize' Japan's military policy, by removing provisions in the post-WW II constitution restricting the Self-Defence Forces (SDF). Because the SDF are constitutionally forbidden from acting as a traditional military, Japan's maritime presence in the Malacca region comes in the form of the Japanese Coast Guard which is not part of the SDF. The increased involvement of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) in anti-piracy initiatives could set a precedent for other missions and areas. Japan's desire for multilateral action may reflect this desire for a normalization of the SDF in that revising and expanding the mandate of these forces would be less controversial if missions occurred in a multilateral initiative.

Yet multilateral initiatives have been difficult to establish,



South China Sea

in part because of the power dynamics in the region. China for example, has hesitated thus far to join multilateral initiatives perhaps out of fear that piracy will become the excuse that helps fuel a normalization of Japan's defence policy. This was evident in 2002 when China rejected Japan's proposal for joint naval patrols of the strait with China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea. Although Japan prefers multilateral efforts to combat piracy in the Malacca region, its bilateral initiatives have met with more success. Japan's 1999 proposal for a regional Coast Guard failed, as did the proposal for the creation of the Organization for the Cooperative Management of Safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. However, bilateral exchanges of aid and training exercises with all three littoral states had been successfully carried out by 2003.

With 80% of its oil imports traversing through the strait – and this continues to increase – China has an obvious reason to be worried about the threat that piracy and maritime terrorism pose to the security of its oil supply. China's concern about its oil imports was illustrated in June 2004 when the Chinese Navy's first anti-terrorism exercise simulated an attack on an oil tanker. Threats to oil supply in the strait are referred to within China as the "Malacca Dilemma." Besides the threat that piracy and maritime

terrorism pose to disrupting traffic, the Malacca Dilemma refers to the threat that other powers pose to China's oil supply. In November 2003, President Hu Jintao warned that "certain major powers" were attempting to control the strait, with the insinuation that in a crisis, such as a conflict with the United States over Taiwan, a foreign navy could intercept energy resources transiting the strait.⁷

China has not asked to be involved in security provision in the strait to the degree that the United States and Japan have, perhaps because it does not want to add to any distrust that the littoral states have over its intentions in the region. Instead, the country has offered assistance in the form of technical support, training, hydrographic surveys and navigational aids. China has, however, been increasing its involvement in the general vicinity of the strait to counter any perceived US containment strategy and preempt Southeast Asian states from developing closer relations with Taiwan. China's increased involvement around the Malacca region is part of its 'String of Pearls' strategy, under which the country has developed ports and diplomatic ties with littoral states along vital sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea. For example, China is constructing a port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and has been financially involved in the development of ports in Myanmar. China has also developed facilities on

Coco Island, only 18 miles from Indian's newly created naval base on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

India is the external power with the longest involvement in the Malacca region. The Indian Navy has carried out joint anti-piracy exercises with the Singapore Navy for over a decade, with Indonesia since 2004 and Thailand since 2005. In 2002, the Indian and US Navies were also permitted to jointly escort vessels transiting the strait carrying high-value American cargo. Although India is not a littoral state to the Malacca Strait, it is a contiguous one – the tip of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is only 90 nautical miles from Aceh which is located at the western entrance to the strait.

Like China, India has not pushed for an increased role in security provision in the strait to the same degree that Japan and the United States have, but has stated that the country will be “ready to provide assets when asked for.”⁸ Despite many challenges to overcome, India is also a growing power and, as such, it is starting to expand the scope of its security interests. This stance is reflected in India's maritime doctrine that “envisages an ambient forward naval presence from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca.”⁹ India has expanded its maritime reach steadily over the past few years. This is evident in its naval expansion, upgrading of the Andaman base, increased ties with Japan, Vietnam and Singapore, and naval exercises with the USN. In 2006, India also began setting up a high-tech monitoring station off the coast of Madagascar, which is thought to be for monitoring the sea lanes of communications in the India Ocean. India's interest in increasing its maritime capabilities is partly due to its worries regarding the expansion of China's maritime reach into the Indian Ocean. Having a naval presence in the sea lanes – through which a vast amount of the world's energy resources passes – is of utmost importance as India is wary of energy competition with China, having already lost out in purchasing oil from Angola, Ecuador, Kazakhstan and Myanmar.¹⁰

The United States has fuelled Indian fears of Chinese encroachment on its vital interests as part of the US attempt at closer cooperation with India. Post-9/11 Washington encouraged and partly funded India's establishment of a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) centre on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This command post is designed to streamline the surveillance capabilities of the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy under one command structure to improve India's monitoring capabilities in the area and increase its maritime reach. The US desire to increase ties with India stems from its desire for the country to provide stability and balance in the region in the face of growing Chinese power.

Conclusions

The response to piracy and maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait is interesting due to the light it sheds on how power dynamics in the region are playing out. Given that there is no one dominant state, the littoral states have considerable room to manoeuvre in terms of making the response to piracy suit their own agendas. China, Japan, India and the United States will, however, continue to try to build up their influence around the Malacca Strait as much as possible, mainly to ensure that they are not left out in the fast-changing power dynamics of the region.

For the short to medium term we will continue to see rather superficial and ineffective anti-piracy initiatives, and the external states will be kept on a tight leash in terms of what role they can play in security provision in the strait. The littoral states will resist calls to increase meaningful cooperation which would result in a perceived reduction in sovereignty.

Minimally effective anti-piracy initiatives in the region could be overshadowed by two developments. The first is a major disaster in the strait which would result in more substantive anti-piracy measures being adopted either voluntarily or not. The second development is one power becoming dominant in the region and thus garnering the influence to determine what anti-piracy initiatives will look like. If this occurs, however, piracy may be the least of the concerns faced by littoral and external states. 🇮🇳

Notes

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Building the Next Fleet: A Discussion with Commodore Kelly Williams

Peter T. Haydon

Since the end of the Second World War the Canadian Navy has built and operated three different fleets. The first was made up of ships built for the war and later modernized to meet the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) demands of the early Cold War. The second fleet, built quickly as the Cold War became more complex, saw the integration of the 20 *St. Laurent*-class destroyer escorts, the aircraft carrier and the older destroyers and frigates into a series of ASW task groups. Fleet support ships (AORs) and submarines were added in the 1960s and early 1970s. This fleet was systematically reduced in size in the late 1960s as the wartime ships were paid off but not replaced beyond adding the four *Iroquois*-class flotilla leaders. The present fleet, the third, built as a more general-purpose force, consists of the 12 *Halifax*-class frigates, the three remaining modernized *Iroquois*-class frigates, two AORs, four submarines and 12 coastal patrol vessels. It is now time to replace some of those ships and to begin planning for the fourth fleet.

In early February, 2008, I met with Commodore Kelly Williams, Assistant Chief of the Maritime Staff and one of the architects for the development of the fourth fleet, to talk about the plans for the navy's next generation of ships and how the transition to the future would be made.

When I asked him "What is the rationale for the next fleet?" Williams first went back to the experience of his predecessors in building the third fleet. "They had a lot going for them," he explained, "they resonated with the government; they had political support, and they had foresight. All of this came together to produce a fleet that has been a huge but understated success." He continued, "Once built, the government started to use the fleet in a classic demonstration of 'medium' sea power to influence events on the world stage."

As we talked, it came clear he saw that through its navy, Canada has enhanced its role in the world. Yet, in this, he believed the third fleet was unique because the first two fleets didn't have the same flexibility; their function was to be part of NATO's collective deterrent against Soviet adventurism not support foreign policy. "Today, the fleet is also uniquely Canadian," he added.

"The problem today is that Canadians don't really understand all that, but eventually they will because we are




Commodore Williams.


beginning to witness a renewed focus on maritime issues both at home and overseas. In addition to the growing challenges and integrated nature of maritime security and asserting our surveillance and control of our offshore estate as well as the Arctic, there is growing concern for the stability of the Caribbean, and there is the seemingly endless worry over the Middle East. And then there is the whole issue of China's emergence as not only a regional power but its aspirations as a global power."

Continuing to explain the strategic rationale for the fleet, Williams laid out some of the main points. "All this calls for a highly flexible naval capability. It's not just more of the same," he stressed. "It is a continuing requirement for a navy that is inherently flexible, and one that is able to be both a diplomat and the force of last resort, perhaps at the same time. If anything, it has to be a damn sight more flexible than the present fleet. It is classic case of 'medium' sea power, but with more emphasis on the military side of the triangle (the 'Booth' triangle) than on the constabulary side. The challenge lies in being able to position the navy to be strategically agile for a future that is essentially unpredictable."

From there, the discussion turned to how to educate Canadians on the value of having a flexible navy. Williams



Your Fleet – In Transition Between Today & Tomorrow



admitted that overcoming the apparent lack of appreciation of the value of naval forces will be hard work because the institutional “blindness” to naval and maritime issues runs far deeper than the elected politicians alone. But, as he pointed out, there is a light at the end of the tunnel. “Canadians are beginning to sense that there is an awful lot happening in the maritime domain and are beginning to appreciate that their navy is doing a lot around the world and is working to make a difference in the bigger scheme of things. We do however have a long way to go.”

“In fact,” he said, “Canadians seem to want more navy and for it to do more. Nevertheless,” he went on while pointing to the framed quotation from Samuel P. Huntington on the wall of his office, “there is still a need to engage Canadians and keep on explaining just what it is that their navy is doing for them.” [In the quotation Huntington asks: “What functions do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?”] “After all, it is their tax dollars we are spending, and it is up to us to make sure that we remain relevant in the eyes of Canadians, and it is this that will be important in the future.” “Relevance, that’s what really counts today!” he added.

Taking a more proactive approach to engaging Canadians, he explained, requires that the navy makes sure that its intellectual foundation is stable and coherent. “And that is being done!” he said. “*Leadmark* remains the foundation of Canadian naval thinking, we are re-writing the *Maritime Force Development Guide*, and we have written a brand new *Strategic Communications Handbook* that will help navy people explain to anyone who wants to listen just what their navy is all about and what it does for them.” The booklet is impressive and really does make it easy for people to get the naval message out; the key facts are all there.

From there, we went on to talk about the characteristics of the next fleet. “To some,” Williams explained, “the next fleet will look remarkably like the present one, but that is a very shallow view.” He then described a fleet model that included 16 or more destroyer-type warships with a wide range of capabilities, three modern fleet support ships – the Joint Support Ships (JSS) – some submarines, 8 to 10 Arctic Patrol Vessels, some training vessels, and perhaps some strategic sealift eventually. “The major difference,” he stressed, “is that the next fleet will have far greater operational flexibility and so be even more responsive to government needs.”

Although new technologies will allow the fleet to do its job better, and perhaps even with fewer people, there are new constraints on operations. Environmental requirements and the need for fuel efficiency, for instance, will make running a fleet more difficult.

“There is a lot going on,” I was told. “For instance, JSS is almost a reality, the *Halifax*-class modernization program is about to go to tender, the new helicopters will be here very soon, albeit a bit late, the Arctic Patrol Vessel program is taking shape, and we have money to re-start work on the submarines. We still have to get approval for the replacements for the 280s, and we will need to begin thinking about what the replacements for the frigates will look like and what we want them to do. All that is very much ‘future thinking’ and that is why I need to keep the focus on the future.”

Getting to that force mix from the present structure presents a challenge. Here, Williams was emphatic that the focus of the navy as an organization needed to be changed from “today” with a tendency to rest too much on past successes to one that focused on “tomorrow” and the challenges of the future. He made it quite clear that he saw the navy as being in a growth period and thus had to position itself to take advantage of the future. It was quite possible, he believed, that government might actually begin to push the navy into new areas, and for the navy not to be responsive when that happened would be a disaster.

Even though the new fleet will almost certainly require more people in the long run, short-term requirements to manage the transition will demand an early shift of people from operations and training to project management – probably to a greater extent than with TRUMP and the CPFs. The *Halifax*-class Modernization Program will make some additional people available, but not enough to meet the program management demands. Moreover, the drop in ship availability may have to be offset by higher activity rates with some innovative manning concepts.

As Williams explained, one solution is to recruit more people, train them in the new technologies, and develop the new experience base as part of the transition process. To do this, however, the navy has to be seen by young Canadians as “exciting, compelling and rewarding.” This is something that needs reinforcement with both public and political support, and an obvious part of the navy’s new proactive approach to engaging Canadians.

As a closing thought, I asked Commodore Williams to describe the Canadian Navy of the future in about three words. His response – “bold, adaptive, innovative and steeped in national pride!” – is a fitting slogan for the fourth fleet. Getting there will be an uphill struggle, but it is reassuring that the architect of Canada’s fourth post-war fleet has the vision and the drive to get there. His success will depend on a number of outside factors, not least of which is the willingness of the politicians, and probably the generals, to buy into his vision of the future. 🍷

The Canadian Navy in 2007: An Overview and a Look Ahead

Commander Larry Trim
Lieutenant-Commander Paul Forget
Lieutenant-Commander David Kazmirchuk



Photo: DND

A Canadian Naval Task Group during *Operation Apollo*.

“The ships go out. The ships come back. What was that all about? No guns or torpedoes were fired, so what were they doing out there?”

Senator Colin Kenny, *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 May 2007

Senator Kenny is right; the ships go out and the ships come back. Canadians rarely, if ever, have the opportunity to witness their navy at work. But this is the nature of navies; their work is mainly done out of sight of land.

Despite the fact that Canadians could not see what the navy was doing, 2007 was nonetheless a busy year. Canadian naval operations spanned the globe from the Arctic and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, to the Mediterranean, around Africa and down the western coast of South America. At some point during the year, Canada’s navy was on patrol in each of the world’s oceans, conducting the core naval missions of:

- securing Canada’s sovereignty;
- supporting Canadian foreign policy; and
- defending national and allied interests.

More often than not, all three of those core naval missions were being conducted simultaneously at different places in the world which is quite an achievement for a relatively small navy. The importance of demonstrating the capacity and capability to execute concurrent core missions cannot be understated. It establishes with allies and potential adversaries alike the fact that the Canadian Navy is versatile, flexible and capable – the world over.

Broadly speaking, the navy must be able to conduct operations at home and abroad at the same time. As demonstrated throughout 2007, the activities of Maritime Command consistently centred on one theme: to generate the broadest spectrum of maritime effects for Canada. But as Senator Kenny alluded, unfortunately most of those activities took place well out of the sight of Canadians.

“There will always be a navy in Canada’s waters: ours or someone else’s!”

Anonymous

Domestic and continental – i.e., ‘home’ – missions include patrolling Canada’s three vast ocean areas on behalf of



HMCS Regina fires a Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.

the government and all Canadians. Although few people stop to think about it, Canada is a maritime nation with an ocean domain that is more than two-thirds the size of its immense landmass. The navy has a key role to play in safeguarding our offshore areas because it is Canada's only armed maritime force and the only national organization with the resources, training and capabilities needed to assert sovereignty at sea.

Three things make Canada sovereign at sea:

- effective surveillance;
- meaningful presence; and
- an ability to control maritime events in our own waters.

In 2007, Canadian warships spent over 106 weeks on patrol asserting national sovereignty, assisting other government departments in enforcing their jurisdictions, and demonstrating the effectiveness of the national maritime 'whole-of-government' response to domestic operations. Every time our ships leave the harbour, they are multi-tasked and alert to maritime activities around them.

But it is far more than just putting ships out on patrol. The Marine Security Operation Centres (MSOCs), operated by the navy, are the hubs through which information enters the government and military intelligence nets and truly demonstrate the whole-of-government organization. This information is passed to ships and aircraft at sea in helping keep watch for those who would do harm in Canadian

waters. Every year tens of thousands of ships transiting Canada's waters are tracked and the information shared with other government departments such as the RCMP and the Canada Border Security Agency (CBSA).

Operation Nanook 2007 took place in the waters off Nunavut. This annual exercise is an acknowledgement of the Arctic as a maritime theatre of operations. In 2007 the exercise included HMC Ships *Fredericton* and *Summerside*, the submarine HMCS *Corner Brook* – the first deployment of a Canadian submarine into the Arctic – and land and air force units.

The navy's work at home extended far beyond the Arctic, with Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs) as the mainstay of domestic operations during the year. These ships are sized to patrol, provide a presence and assert sovereignty in the many smaller waterways along our coasts, and they did this for a total of 46 weeks last year.

The navy also responded to over 20 search and rescue (SAR) calls in 2007. This was in addition to the periods that warships were on dedicated SAR zone coverage, supporting our Coast Guard colleagues by pooling resources to make safe a very large ocean estate for Canadians and those lawfully using Canadian waters.

There are four Port Security Units (PSUs) in Canada. These units are a unique element of the whole-of-government maritime response. The annual domestic port security exercise *Western Sentry 2007* (WS07) was conducted at

HMCS *Discovery* in Vancouver and focused on operational responses with other government departments and agencies. Participants included: Joint Task Force Pacific and other MARPAC units; 39th Brigade, RCMP; Vancouver Police Department; Port Authority; CBSA; Coast Guard; and others. Over 150 reserve PSU sailors were involved along with a Task Unit of HMC Ships *Edmonton* and *Whitehorse*. This was the largest joint domestic port security exercise in recent history. Rear Admiral Roger Girouard, then Commander of Maritime Forces Pacific, commented that “the port security construct has matured tactically, technologically and from a leadership perspective in the last decade.” WS07 was the first in a series of integrated maritime port security exercises conducted in preparation for the 2010 Olympics.

Regardless of affiliation, all government departments have a stake in day-to-day maritime issues and the navy is the natural lead agency because of its maritime focus and command structure. Its real strength, however, lies in the ability to support other government departments in enforcing their maritime jurisdictions, and by taking advantage of the range of skills and expertise resident in each of those departments in asserting Canadian sovereignty.

“The rise and fall of nations is often tied to the rise and fall of navies.”

Admiral Mahan, USN

International missions constitute the navy’s second line of operations. Canada maintains a naval presence overseas on a near-continuous basis to generate and maintain political and diplomatic effects for Canada. In international law warships are sovereign extensions of the state. Sending one to visit another country is a significant event, the most powerful signal a government can send regarding its interest in interaction and trade with that country. Similar actions and results are just not possible by the other services. Dispatching a frigate to support the Governor General’s trip to northern Africa, the Prime Minister in the Caribbean, and the Minister of National Defence in Ireland, resulted in goodwill and better relations with the host states.

Unexpected events led the navy to support diplomatic efforts abroad. For instance, HMCS *Toronto*’s rescue of Yemeni military personnel fleeing a volcanic eruption in October was an event that may not have been obviously diplomatic, but it is exactly the kind of response the navy provides on a routine basis that sets the stage for friendly relations, or at least a friendly exchange, with the other state.

Port visits in Africa and South America, the British Isles and Europe, the Middle East, Mediterranean and the Far



Photo: DND Combat Camera by MCpl Doucette

HMCS *Iroquois* closes another ship of the Task Group at dawn.

East provided opportunities to improve diplomatic and trade relations. These are significant contributions to Canadian prosperity and security.

“Canada’s prosperity is tied to the state of its navy.”

Lawrence Herman, *Globe and Mail*, 7 May 2007

Canadians value their way of life. The lifestyle they enjoy and a large part of their standard of living is dependent on trade – maritime trade. Almost 90% of the products traded globally are moved over the oceans at some point in their journey. A destabilizing maritime event in one part of the world can easily affect many states. Whether from piracy, theft, or environmental factors, costs increase and in turn force consumer prices to rise. Prosperity for a major trading state such as Canada depends upon the free and unimpeded use of the oceans, a transportation system that is highly susceptible to disruptions.

The effect of naval operations on their prosperity is not obvious to Canadians. The security of maritime trade is provided by navies such as ours, and that is why we maintain a presence overseas. Consider the country of origin for much of Canada’s household contents, cars, gas and oil – all of it can be affected by events in the maritime domain. Canada’s navy is vital to our way of life and uniquely positioned to project Canadian power and influence. Our navy’s utility derives ultimately from its ability to provide assertive diplomacy when required, i.e., from its ability to fight.



Photos: DND



Since the end of the Cold War the Canadian Navy has been active in many parts of the world as these photos show. HMCS *Calgary* in Sydney, HMCS *Protecteur* refuelling US Navy warships in the Arabian Sea, HMCS *Algonquin* with an American Task Force and HMCS *Charlottetown* in Malta.



In addition to the threat of terrorism, there are problematic regimes around the world whose actions have the potential to influence events in Canada. Our security extends beyond our shores by way of the practice of collective security. Canada has long actively supported the concept of collective security. The navy's activities attest to this continuing commitment.

"The greatest threat to North America right now is on the water.... It is essential to Canada's sovereignty and safety of our citizens that we continue to be vigilant in guarding our coastlines. As a trading nation, our economic well being depends very much on this."

Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, Canadian Transport Security and Technology Forum, 28 November 2007

The year 2007 started and ended in much the same manner: a Canadian ship was on the other side of the world protecting Canada's interests. HMCS *Ottawa* returned to Esquimalt early in the year from her six-month deployment to the Arabian Sea for *Operation Altair*, a UN-authorized

mission to deter and disrupt terrorist activities. In the fall, HMCS *Charlottetown* sailed from Halifax to participate in the same operation. Both ships were integrated into US naval carrier strike groups. Canada is one of only two navies that can seamlessly join this type of fleet deployment; the Royal Navy is the other. As well as these operations, HMCS *Toronto* deployed with the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) on its groundbreaking circumnavigation of Africa.

Surprisingly, the navy was also involved in Afghanistan in 2007. The deployment of clearance divers with expertise in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) was an integral component of the overall Canadian effort. Sailors were also part of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Strategic Advisory Teams. In addition, Maritime Command sent personnel to UN missions – in Sudan, for example – including 20 naval reservists.

As a member of G8, Canada has an abiding stake in the values, norms and institutions upon which the international community is built. It is clearly in Canada's interests to contribute to global maritime security abroad: this is navy business.



A Canadian frigate leads a US Navy Carrier Battle Group.

“Not maintaining an effective naval force is tantamount to surrendering one’s sovereignty at sea. An effective navy is a prerequisite of statehood; a country with an ocean but without a navy cannot claim to be truly sovereign.”
Peter Haydon, “Why Does Canada Still Need A Navy?”

As an institution, the navy is expected to deliver two core outputs: success in operations today and success in operations tomorrow. This coexists with a responsibility to preserve and promote its history, heritage and traditions, as this is where Canadian sailors draw both their identity and their desire to excel.

Success at sea is based on readiness, which in turn rests on the technical readiness of our ships, submarines and aircraft, and the competency of the people crewing them. At any one time in 2007, naval shipyard infrastructure and personnel resources were fully utilized on both coasts with each having one destroyer or frigate and one MCDV completing extended docking periods (major refits), while one or two others were either finishing or just commencing one. After a major refit, ships remain at a reduced readiness level for a short period while crew expertise is regenerated and other maintenance issues are resolved.

Twelve of Canada’s 17 major warships were at a standard or high-readiness state during a portion of the year, and 10 of the 12 MCDVs and the submarine HMCS *Corner Brook* were available for operations as well.

Maintaining that degree of readiness requires a great deal of effort and money. The navy is on the threshold of a major period of transition, in which, over a seven to 10 year period, it will be modernizing or replacing all of its major surface combatants, while at the same time introducing into service a new maritime helicopter and two new classes of ships. Navies take a long time to build but provide returns on that investment for decades.

In 2007, the government announced its intention to modernize the 12 *Halifax*-class frigates, to build up to eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and to establish a deep-water berthing facility in Nanisivik. With new maritime helicopters nearing fleet introduction, the Joint Support Ship (JSS) well into project definition, the submarine fleet progressing towards full operational capability, and work relating to options for a destroyer replacement underway, there is much to look forward to. These steps are important to preparing the navy for tomorrow’s sailors, but building the future fleet is not just about the navy: it’s also an investment in Canada, for Canada. It is an investment that needs continual careful management to keep it effective.



Halifax-Class Modernization (HCM) will begin in 2010, with the final ship being completed in 2017. When the modernized *Halifax*-class frigates are married to the new CH148 Cyclone helicopter, there will be no better tactical ship-helicopter combination available to any navy. HMCS *Montréal* is designated as the lead ship and trial platform for the Cyclone, and commenced the required refit in July.

The AOPS is intended to complement the Canadian Coast Guard's (CCG) fleet, not replace it. One of the CCG missions is to break ice as a navigation service, while the navy supports other government departments in enforcing Canada's laws and jurisdictions in our three oceans. Hence, the AOPS will be designed to operate in first-year Arctic ice during the navigable season, but not to break ice for other vessels. The difference may be subtle but it has profound design implications that will permit AOPS to be more capable for missions in our other two oceans and thus free our major combatants to deploy abroad. Combined, AOPS and the Nanisivik facility will enable the navy to exercise a potent and sustained presence in the North during the navigation season – when it counts.

The JSS project gained initial approval in 2004, with contract award and implementation due for late 2008 and delivery of three ships expected between 2012 and 2016. JSS will expand on traditional replenishment-at-sea capabilities, adding sealift and organic facilities to support

a sea-based joint headquarters for forces operating ashore or at sea in the littoral areas.

HMCSubmarine *Corner Brook* was very active in operations and exercises as she assisted in training the surface fleet and operating both domestically and internationally. Despite media reports to the contrary, our submarines are proving to be among the finest conventional boats in service anywhere. *Victoria* and *Windsor* remained in docking or maintenance periods but with the maintenance contract issues seemingly resolved, we look forward to having two submarines simultaneously available for operations and one in extended refit.

The most pressing force development concern remains the replacement of the *Iroquois*-class destroyers, the key component of a Canadian task group. The task group provides Canada with the capacity for independent, sustainable and sovereign action at sea. Without the air defence and command capabilities these ships provide, Canada will not be able to operate a task group in contested waters.

In addition to ship readiness achieved through at-sea work-ups, training and courses for personnel resulted in the operational deployment of our warships. However, the navy's continuing challenge is in attracting sufficient numbers of personnel suitable for skilled trades. This situation is being addressed through specific measures within the recruiting system.

In 2007, the navy was also involved with the Canadian public. 'Outreach' is a special component of naval activity that provides an opportunity for Canadians to see their navy. In addition to the many port visits as a result of ship patrols, the navy conducted a Great Lakes deployment of HMCS *Halifax* through the St Lawrence Seaway to the lake-head in Thunder Bay. Over 45,000 Canadians visited the ship at various port visits during this deployment.

As part of the naval portion of the CF Parliamentary Programme, warships hosted 10 Members of Parliament for one-week periods at sea. This key activity exposed elected officials to the options naval power provides and to the unique calling of service at sea.

The navy's centennial year of 2010 is fast approaching and the team managing the Canadian Navy Centennial Project was understandably busy preparing. The navy looks forward to hosting ships and sailors from around the world in Victoria and Halifax, and across the country committees are being organized in each of the 24 cities where Naval Reserve Divisions are located. (Further information can be found at <http://www.canadiannavy100.forces.gc.ca/>.)

While there are challenges in addressing the elements of change, we are also on the threshold of building the navy that Canada needs. It will be tactically effective, operationally responsive, strategically relevant and capable of sustaining two separate lines of operations. It will deliver maritime security both at home and abroad, projecting Canada's power and influence when called upon.

"In summary, colleagues, domestic security activities, supporting other government departments and participating in collective global defence while projecting Canadian values is what the navy is doing for us now at sea."

Senator Hugh Segal, Statement in the Senate of Canada, 14 November 2007

The world is changing. The number of crises is increasing and gone are the days where each seemed very similar. Today there are civil and ethnic wars, financial and economic events, natural disasters and political interference. This is the new face of the international security environment and the skeleton of the security challenge. The navy is at the leading edge of the CF's response.



What can we tell from the events of 2007? First, the Canadian Navy can be found patrolling every ocean in the world; ours is a globally deployable navy. Second, the navy matters when sovereignty is discussed, especially concerning the Arctic. Third, our way of life is protected through the activities of the navy within the global maritime security effort, and lastly, the navy is on the threshold of change.

From such diverse operations as supporting the Prime Minister in the Caribbean, to participating in NATO operations and exercises, operating within SNMGI, working with Western Hemisphere navies off the Panama Canal, or asserting Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, the navy was at sea on behalf of Canadians.

Yes, in 2007 our warships went out and then came back in, but rest assured that every ship was doing, and continues to do, its utmost to accomplish the Canadian Navy's fundamental mission: to defend Canada. 🇨🇦

Making Waves

The Icecort Carrier: A Naval Aviator's Solution for Arctic Surveillance Brant Fotheringham

Arctic surveillance is a subject of concern for the Canadian government. Countries such as Denmark, Norway, Russia, possibly China and perhaps the United States, are showing a growing interest in what Canadians have, until now, assumed to be areas of Canadian territory. If we are to substantiate this assumption, we must establish a viable and continuous presence in the waters off our northern coast. No one anticipates that Canada will need to deal with a shooting war, rather we need the ability to intercept and identify seaborne surface and sub-surface traffic with the inherent capability to question intentions. It is understood that present government considerations include the construction or acquisition of a number of sophisticated armed escorts with ice-strengthened hulls – a proposal with a frightening pricetag.

For a period during World War II the RCN manned two escort carriers. These ships had significantly reduced size, armament, speed, cost and complement when compared to conventional carriers. Having personally deck-landed F4U Corsairs aboard such a vessel – HMS *Smiter* – the major difference between these carriers was the total number of aircraft which could be embarked. Despite their reduced characteristics they played a significant if not vital role in dealing with the U-boat threat in the Atlantic.

Let us consider the possible characteristics of an icecort carrier. It is proposed that this ship be a helicopter carrier. It requires no catapult, arrestor or haul-down gear. It requires no armament. A speed capability of 15 knots should be quite adequate. It requires an ice-strengthened hull. It requires a flight deck with an elevator to a hangar deck. It requires a capability to embark and operate four helicopters of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) type which would currently be in service. In every other sense this would be a ship of conventional and unsophisticated characteristics capable of rapid construction by a selection of Canadian shipbuilders.

Operationally such ships would be stationed in Arctic waters. Their helicopters would continuously patrol areas within range. Knowledge could thereby be acquired of all traffic along our northern coast. They would provide continuous Canadian presence within our internationally recognized borders.

Our wartime escort carriers had their air components provided by another service, the Royal Navy. Since that time, countries operating ships with embarked aircraft have their air components provided by the same service as that which complements the ship. This is obviously considered to be the most effective procedure – except in Canada. Perhaps this aspect is a subject requiring further study. 🍷

Canada's Naval Presence Abroad: Forward-Deploying Warships Key to Contributing to Canada's Security at Home Lieutenant-Commander Mike Davie Executive Officer, HMCS Charlottetown

Operation Altair is Canada's maritime contribution to *Operation Enduring Freedom*, the continuing US-led campaign against terrorism. On 1 November 2007, HMCS *Charlottetown*, with a CH-124 Sea King helicopter embarked, departed Halifax, NS, for a six-month deployment with the USS *Harry S. Truman* carrier strike group for the Middle East region. *Charlottetown* is conducting maritime security operations (MSOs) in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. *Charlottetown* spends the majority of her time operating in the Arabian Sea and working for the Commander Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, the coalition of ships and aircraft engaged in the international campaign against terrorism. While *Charlottetown* is deployed, CTF 150 is under the Command of Commodore Hasham Saddique of Pakistan and Rear-Admiral Jean-Louis Kerignard of France. Canada will take command of CTF 150 from June to September 2008 under Commodore Bob Davidson.

The objective of MSOs, and the presence of *Charlottetown* in the Gulf region, is to establish and maintain security as well as deny international terrorists the use of the seas to launch attacks or transport personnel, weapons and illicit cargo. Maintaining maritime security in this region is vital to global prosperity. Almost 90% of the world's finished goods and raw materials is shipped by sea. As well, 66% of global oil production moves through three chokepoints in the Gulf region that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Believe it or not, Canada's security starts overseas. *Operation Enduring Freedom* is a part of Canada's involvement in the campaign against terrorism and directly supports our national interests by enhancing the security of Canadians. *Charlottetown's* participation in *Operation*



Altair helps prevent future attacks on Canada and its allies by working to eliminate or disrupt illicit activities.

Naval, coast guard and maritime security agency ships and aircraft provide deterrence to terrorist activities in the region, thereby contributing to regional and international security. By providing warships, aircraft and Canadian Forces' (CF) personnel to the Combined Forces Maritime Component Command (CFMCC) in the Gulf region, Canada has developed and enhanced relationships with coalition allies over the course of the last 10 years. Since events of 11 September 2001 sparked the navy into action during *Operation Apollo*, Canada has been deploying warships with embarked helicopters through *Operation Altair*. Each *Altair* has given Canada opportunities to assume leadership roles in several operations, controlling numerous coalition forces. This, in itself, has provided visibility among the coalition regarding Canada's strong commitment to international peace and stability.

There is no doubt that this is one of the most complex and volatile regions of the world. *Charlottetown* has just completed her sixth and final transit through the Strait of Hormuz on this deployment, with an underway force protection component closed up as a general precaution. Being cordially hailed by Iranian and Omani naval or Coast Guard vessels is usually the highlight of each passage. Their proactive involvement in monitoring activities in this part of the region plays a fundamental role in the region's security. However, even in the few months since *Charlottetown* has been deployed, relationships and priorities among Gulf states are changing, and with it the region's stability.

Historically, Canada has assisted its allies and regional partners in working to bring stability to this part of the world. *Charlottetown* has led the current coalition of ships during this segment of *Operation Altair* with an 87% operational tempo, spending 116 out of 133 days at sea conducting operations. During her four patrols, *Charlottetown* provided assistance to three vessels in distress, escorted the USS *Harry S. Truman* while her aircraft conducted bombing runs in Afghanistan in support of NATO and Canadian forces in that region, conducted theatre security cooperation operations with regional navies, and led the coordinated efforts to intercept five vessels carrying illicit

cargo and suspected of ties to terrorism.

Charlottetown helped plan and has been part of a number of major operations in the Arabian Sea in support of MSOs. The most significant of these is *Operation Argos Canthos*. During this operation, *Charlottetown* controlled up to eight coalition ships, six helicopters and various patrol aircraft in order to show a presence in the area and deter the movement of vessels carrying illicit goods such as weapons, ammunition, alcohol and drugs. On 18 February 2008, near the coast of Pakistan, *Charlottetown* received a report that a vessel linked to smuggling and terrorism, the Pakistani dhow *Al Moula Madad*, was in the area. *Charlottetown* was directed by CTF 150 to locate and track the dhow and, based on actionable intelligence, eventually received direction from CTF 150 to board and search the vessel. The boarding team discovered sacks of hashish hidden in the fuel tanks and under the deck planking. In all, some 4.3 tons of hashish were found. CTF 150 reported the dhow to the Pakistani authorities and then directed *Charlottetown's* boarding team to take samples of the cargo, heaving the rest of the drugs overboard. A Pakistani Maritime Security Agency (MSA) vessel then took charge of the dhow and crew. Because of our focused counter-terrorist operations at sea, *Charlottetown* has made a concerted contribution in reducing the ability of terrorists to use the waterways of this region to their own ends.

This is a long-term venture to which Canada must remain committed in order to maintain regional stability and build on the superb relations we now have with these regional partners. Having a warship(s), forward-deployed to this region on a continuous basis, conducting operations such as *Altair*, is the best way for the navy to support Canadian interests. The accomplishments that *Charlottetown* has made during this deployment have been noteworthy, and the ship has now given regional and allied commanders a leadmark to follow. *Charlottetown's* leadership and persistence have made a difference, however, in order to sustain these advances, Canada must continue to provide ships on a sustainable, routine basis.

Canada's fourth rotation of *Operation Altair* – which will take over where *Charlottetown* leaves off this June – will include HMCS *Iroquois*, the command ship, HMCS

Calgary, a frigate, and HMCS *Protecteur*, an auxiliary oil replenishment ship.

Any way you look at it, there is much work to be done in this region and Canadian sailors will be busy for sure, just the way we like it. 🍷

A Rebuttal of “Defending the Empty North”

Colonel (Ret'd) Brian K. Wentzell

The fundamental premise of Aaron Jackson's article, “Defending the ‘Empty North’: Comparing Canadian and Australian Challenges and Strategies” (CNR, Winter 2008) is “Canada's Arctic security situation is increasingly echoing the situation Australia faces in defending its own northern territories and sea lanes” (p. 4). Jackson argues that, despite differences in their respective histories and environments, the challenges Canada and Australia face “in defending their northern territories and approaches have, over the past decade, converged” (p. 6). While there may be similarities, it is the opinion of this reader that Jackson underestimates the differences and over-simplifies the response that Canada must make to a very different threat.

The analysis of the threat faced by Australia and its response is adequately described in the article. My frequent visits to that country and reading about its security and defence challenges substantiate Jackson's description of the situation. However, as a concerned Canadian, I cannot accept his description of the threat faced by Canada in its northern territories.

Australia faces a variety of economic, social, security and military threats and potential threats from one large developing country and several smaller countries, some of which are in or near failed state condition – Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are examples. The specific threats range from illegal fishing, illegal migration, and illicit drug trafficking to acts of terrorism against Australians, as occurred in Indonesia. Except for illegal fishing and the potential for other unauthorised natural resource exploration, the threats faced by Canada are different and come from countries of completely different character.

The threat to Canadian sovereignty in the north comes not from failed states but rather our closest ally, two NATO allies and our former main adversary, Russia. The territories of the United States and Denmark flank the boundaries of Canada while over the North Pole lay Russia and Norway. Other countries, notably China and Britain, have conducted scientific or military operations in the Canadian Arctic area. They are lured by hopes of finding shorter

transportation links, hydrocarbons, diamonds, minerals and fish. A downside of this lure will be the migration of people with all their social and other problems to this fragile and barren environment. Thus, Canada's challenge is to engage and manage the adversarial interests of sophisticated competitors, most of whom share Western traditions and values.

This threat to Canadian sovereignty is not a new issue. It is a demon that we have dealt with before. At the close of World War II, one of the major concerns of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was the reduction of the American presence that resulted from the construction of the Alaska Highway, the oil production facilities at Norman Wells, and a string of airfields and weather stations across the north during the conflict. Canada purchased these facilities following the war. In the 1950s, the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was financed by the United States and subsequently operated by it under rules established by the government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, that required a certain level of Canadian participation and presence. These actions recognised challenges to Canadian sovereignty that were not necessarily products of ill-will but rather consequences of national and collective security.

As Rear Admiral Robert Timbrell eloquently observed in 1979:

Sovereignty is not the same as security... [S]ome of the sources that threaten our sovereignty could be our strongest allies for the preservation of security. Whereas our security is bound up with our allies, our sovereignty is our own problem, to be defended by ourselves alone.¹

The need for the defence of national sovereignty is not a uniquely Canadian requirement; it is a core function of every state. With the emergence of environmental threats arising from the exploitation of fisheries, marine transportation, nautical tourism, and accessible sea bottom minerals and hydrocarbons, the concepts of sovereignty have been extended by international agreement and national legislation to include regulation of activities in vast areas contiguous to the territorial sea. Most countries, excluding the United States have signed the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty which legitimises many of these actions.

In this context, the defence of sovereignty is broader than



mere military defence. First and foremost, defending sovereignty is a political and diplomatic responsibility. The requirement is for intelligent and forward-looking politicians to develop strategies that gain recognition and acceptance of Canada's position internationally. Whether such efforts prove to be successful or not, Canada must develop the means to express and defend its sovereignty. In the context of international law this involves both physical presence and the means to detect and counter physical incursions into Canadian territory or the interference with legitimate national interests, such as protection of the environment. This requires a joint inter-governmental agency approach.

In Australia an integrated inter-governmental agency has been created with a joint headquarters staffed and led by a civil-military team, with assigned civilian and military resources. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) coastal patrol vessel commanders have a law enforcement power akin to that of the US Coast Guard's law enforcement teams. Canada has yet to determine the mechanism for its response but the establishment of a joint northern security operations centre patterned on the joint Marine Security Operations Centre concept may be a starting point. It may be that the centre would be led by a civilian from another federal agency, for example the Department of Transport, or Fisheries and Oceans. The Canadian Forces (CF) and the Canadian Border Services Agency would be part of the headquarters but would play a support role in the provision of border control, ground, air defence and maritime resources.

The CF has a long tradition of providing aid to the civil power. In addition to providing command and air resources to search and rescue operations, there are many examples of ad hoc support to other federal and provincial government departments in times of natural disaster. Providing support for the security of Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is consistent with history. The real difference is that the Arctic would become a standing commitment requiring specialist equipment, knowledge and training. The allocation of scarce resources to this new task will, however, be contingent upon the assignment of resources to other tasks. As we can see, the new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft seems to have fallen victim to the

greater urgency of Afghanistan.

The government has mandated the CF to support such northern activities with dedicated command and control facilities, ice-capable ships with embarked helicopters, an army training facility, and a port at Nanisivik. As this appears to be a crucial part of the "Canada First" defence policy, the CF must get on with its implementation. Perhaps this policy will allow DND to leverage its new capabilities to meet emerging Canadian needs in the international community.

In conclusion, Mr. Jackson has misunderstood the nature of the challenges to sovereignty in Canada's north and the type of response that is demanded to respond to such threats. It is time for the Canadian Forces to join other government agencies in putting the necessary talent and resources into Canada's north. 🇨🇦

Notes

1. Rear Admiral Robert Timbrell, Address to the Royal United Services Institute, Victoria, BC, 21 March 1979, quoted in Major Jeff Tasseron, "Facts and Invariants: The Changing Context of Canadian Defence Policy," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol.4, No.2 (Summer 2003), p.20.

Access Denied!

David Perry

Under the 1985 *Access to Information Act* (ATIA), Canadian citizens and permanent residents are afforded the right to access information in federal government records by filling out a simple form and mailing the government a \$5 cheque. As stated in the act, the intention is to "provide a right of access to information in records under the control of a government institution in accordance with the principles that government information *should be available to the public*, [and] that necessary exceptions to the right of access *should be limited and specific*" (emphasis added).

For the Department of National Defence (DND), one supposes that the ATIA provides government records to a few members of the attentive public, a smattering of researchers and the rest to the media. The latter group has both the money to submit repeated requests (plus search fees) and the patience to wait for the documents to arrive, and then sift through mountains of documents, many of which contain no information due to redaction. In practice, the act restricts the release of documents that

would disclose third party information, endanger the economic interests of Canada, or reveal advice given to a Minister of the Crown, to name only a few exemptions. Furthermore, the government may also refuse to disclose any record "that contains information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the conduct of international affairs, the defence of Canada, or any state allied or associated with Canada..." At the best of times, then, for DND the possible exemptions appear pretty broad, rather than limited and specific.

Defence journalists decry what appears to be a clampdown on the distribution of information via the ATIA (and other avenues) under the Conservative government. As early as the fall of 2006, David Pugliese, of the *Ottawa Citizen* noted that information previously released without trouble via ATIA, such as DND's Cost Factors Manual (a detailed compendium of strictly economic data related to the salaries of CF personnel and operating costs of military vehicles) was no longer being released. A study by *The Globe and Mail* in the fall of 2007 furthermore documented a slowdown in the processing of ATIA requests, and a clear restriction in the amount of information being released through the request process. Informally, reporters attribute this phenomenon to a government-wide move to control information, through a process whereby most media inquiries are referred to the Privy Council Office (PCO) or the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) for review before being released – frequently well after deadlines have passed. As a result, the phrase "Defence officials were not available to comment" appears more and more frequently in the news.

If one discounts this as the whining of a few journalists, consider that Information Commissioner Robert Marleau, responsible for investigating complaints about the ATIA system, felt compelled to write an op-ed in *The Globe and Mail* stating that a "A fog, ... even when the news is positive, has crept, little by little, over the government's activities."

There is, of course, a completely acceptable explanation for this phenomenon: the war in Afghanistan has engendered such a high demand for information from DND that the department is being overwhelmed. Defence officials note a huge increase in the volume of material being requested – especially in light of the detainee imbroglio. Obviously, the same number of staffers would be hardpressed to field all these requests, all other things being equal.

The problem, however, is that things are not otherwise equal. In March of 2007, the Strategic Joint Staff at NDHQ created a "Tiger Team" (officially the "Information Support Team") to review ATIA requests related to the investigation into Canada's handling of Afghan detainees. This

team quickly expanded its mandate, however, to include anything related to Afghanistan operations, and it would appear, far more. Here, one might ask why such a team is needed in the first place. If the ATIA system was functioning properly, presumably there would be no need for the Tiger Team. However, rather than address the problems with the ATIA process, the solution is to add another layer of bureaucratic review.

Furthermore, in addition to what seems to be a questionable way to address a problem with *new* ATIA requests, to *really* make sure that information is not made public, the Tiger Team has also expanded its reach to include previously completed, *old* ATIA requests. Once an ATIA request is completed, and the information released, DND makes the information public in its reading room and posts a list of completed requests on its website. Interested parties can request these documents which have already been through the formal ATIA process – i.e., they've been vetted for operational security and any other exemptions.

In theory, requesting previously completed requests should be a quick process as the work has already been done to ensure that anything sensitive is redacted. At present, however, the Tiger Team is re-vetting this information. To use a hypothetical example, Reporter A requests and receives in May 2007 a document revealing how much the army's new trucks cost to operate. In November 2007, Reporter B sees that the operating costs of the trucks is now public information and asks for a copy of the same documents. Whereas prior to March 2007, this would be a simple matter of asking for the files on CD, now the Tiger Team has to take a second look at the documents in question to make sure that giving B the same information DND released to A six months ago won't endanger our troops in Kandahar.

There is, of course, justification for ensuring that information that might place CF personnel in harm's way is not released into the wrong hands. Thus, an extension of the ATIA process to at least 150 days (the process is normally supposed to be completed within 30) if the subject involves anything related to operations is somewhat understandable. If the folks at NDHQ claim that the Taliban are reading the *Ottawa Citizen* in Kandahar, I might be sceptical but I'll take their word for it. DND should take the time to make sure nothing that would endanger lives is released.

Unfortunately, it seems that the entire system of ATIA

requests at DND has ground to a standstill. In addition to matters related to Afghan operations, new *ATIA* requests related to mundane subjects such as CF recruiting or defence economic data require extensions of hundreds of days to process. Furthermore, there are now delays of several months to receive previously completed *ATIA* requests that are already a matter of public record, due to the Tiger Team's re-censoring.

In its first test during a real war, the *ATIA* system is proving woefully inadequate. With recapitalization, force expansion and transformation efforts happening concurrently with the Afghan war there is an urgent requirement for the public to know what is going on with the Canadian military. Under the current system, this isn't happening, so something needs to change.

Substantially increasing staffing in DND's *ATIA* branch would help, as would limiting the Tiger Team's work to new requests related to Afghanistan. Unless there is a program to recover operationally sensitive material that was released in error (and this doesn't appear to be happening) what's the point in re-censoring publicly available information?

Beyond these immediate solutions, the system itself needs to be changed. While those in government decry the hassle of responding to an *ATIA* tasking, as it stands now, it's the only way to get information. If DND proactively disclosed information without operational, or other, sensitivities it would free up more resources to process the information that should have real constraints on its release. If the CF Cost Factors Manual was released via *ATIA* in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 without any redactions it seems likely that the same would hold true in 2006. Rather than waste someone's time vetting the document when it is inevitably requested through the *ATIA* system, take a look at the final draft, and if it is fit for public consumption, put it up on the DND website. If DND started doing this with all non-sensitive material (people and economic data being a good starting point) the Tiger Team could focus its efforts on the stuff that matters.

The Taliban shouldn't be given anything that will put Canadians in harm's way, but Canadians shouldn't have their right to DND's information taken away because there's a war on. 🙏


Why Not a Mobile Base for AOPS? **Poseidon**

I welcome the government decision to go forward with the naval-manned and operated Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) project. The Canadian Arctic is going to be increasingly important to our country, and it is wonderful to see some long-term strategic vision – at last! In support of the AOPS project, there is a requirement for an estimated \$274 million in infrastructure, for docking facilities on both coasts and a docking/refuelling facility in Nanisivik.



Royal Fleet Auxiliary *Diligence*.

My suggestion is that the base in Nanisivik should be a mobile base, at least initially. In other words, it should be a ship with a refuelling/docking/maintenance/administrative support role. There are many examples of this concept, most in the last century when Depot Ships supported destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats, etc. A current example is the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) *Diligence* which has provided maintenance support for destroyers, frigates and mine hunters in the Persian Gulf, and has been deployed to the Falklands as well. This particularly useful ship is also strengthened for operations in ice, has extra accommodation for 203 people, and can provide electrical power, water, fuel, steam heat, naval stores, ammunition and communica-



Courtesy of DND

Artist's impression of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship.

tions support to alongside vessels. In Canadian naval history, the Escort Maintenance Ships *Cape Scott* and *Cape Breton* used to deploy with the fleet to Caribbean operations every winter during the 1950s and 1960s, and their skilled technicians employed the ships' extensive machine shops to build and repair parts for in-company warships.

If fuel is required in the Arctic to support operations, and it certainly will be as proven in recent northern deployments such as *Operations Lancaster* and *Nanook*, it will have to come from another ship such as a Coast Guard icebreaker or by visiting Nuuk, Greenland. Why not deploy the required fuel in a support vessel, such as the proposed Depot Ship, and leave it in the north throughout the navigation season for AOPS deployments? Perhaps it could be a retired/about to be retired icebreaker as the ship must be mobile and ice-capable.

Why a mobile support base? It is not just fuel. There is *no* appreciable infrastructure at Nanisivik or the vicinity. When the Coast Guard icebreaker *Terry Fox* visited Nanisivik in August 2007, the ship brought all the materials to repair a jetty bollard because there were no materials or local expertise on site. This lack of support is going to be the case for many years: an isolated and remote location in the Arctic is almost like going to the moon.

Surely it would be desirable to be able to move a docking/ refuelling base to support other northern operations, or perhaps to assist an AOPS hundreds of miles away and unable to move for some reason? You cannot do this with a fixed base.

I suspect that there might still be remaining life in retired Canadian icebreakers. For example, the ex-CCGS *Norman McLeod Rogers* – which was in service as a medium icebreaker for 33 years – was sold to the Chilean Navy in 1995 and is still busily employed as an Antarctic patrol and survey ship. I saw her in Valparaíso in June 2000, and she was gleaming like a new ship. Maybe the solution to procuring an *interim* naval-manned AOPS, or a depot ship to support future AOPS deployments, is as simple as putting some naval money into a thorough refit or conversion of a recently retired CCG icebreaker.

Alternatively, we could go to industry – which constructed RFA *Diligence* initially as an oil rig support vessel – and have it build or lease us a purpose-built vessel with the facilities to support our future AOPS deployments. During the months of the year when AOPS cannot readily operate in the north, such a ship could support AOPS in sovereignty patrol deployments off either Canadian coast, or frigates and destroyers anywhere in the world. 🇨🇦

Plain Talk: Why Doesn't Hillier Speak Up?

Sharon Hobson

General Rick Hillier is known for speaking out. He's the first Chief of Defence Staff to make a point of talking to the public in plain language, with a passion that stirs Canadian souls, and a frankness that compels belief. So why hasn't his penchant for openness filtered down to the rest of the Canadian military? Why is there an unhealthy silence surrounding the Department of National Defence (DND)?

The easy answer is that it's the Harper government's fault. This government appears obsessed with controlling information. It's not just DND that is struggling with the chokehold, it's all government departments and agencies, and even companies in the private sector which want to do business with the government.

Ask anyone at DND and they will tell you – well, anyone who isn't too scared to talk to you – that the rules for dealing with the media (and through them, the public) come directly from 'the centre' (the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and/or the Privy Council Office (PCO)). The rule is that no one in the military is to speak to the media without specific clearance by the PCO/PMO.

That clearance is rarely given. Requests for interviews are routinely denied in lieu of PCO/PMO-approved written 'bullets.' So instead of a reporter being able to have a broad discussion with a DND project manager, the PCO/PMO controls the message by providing one or two carefully crafted sentences in an email. Anyone who is cleared to speak to the media is given the expected questions and the approved answers beforehand and warned not to stray from those responses.

Incredibly, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Public Affairs wrote a letter to the *Toronto Sun* in which she claimed nothing has changed. Ms. Josée Touchette wrote, "Canadian Forces regulations, which govern CF engagement with the media, have been in place since 1998. There has been no change in policy." She is playing a word game. The 1998 openness policy may still be on the books, but it is no longer being implemented. The new rules are not written down anywhere, but they are most certainly in place and strictly enforced.

Officials protest that the media embedding program in Afghanistan – probably the most liberal among the allied states – is proof that the military is not hiding anything,




Photo: DND

General Hillier speaking out!

that it is open and accessible to the media. But providing information in a closed environment, on a limited operation on the other side of the world is not enough. Sure, Canadians now know what life is like for soldiers in Kandahar, what kinds of threats they face, and what new equipment they're using. The soldiers deployed in Afghanistan have been incredibly accepting of, and open with, reporters working on stories. But what about back here in Canada? Why is no one at DND allowed to talk about equipment projects such as the C-130J purchase or the Chinook helicopters, or future plans for the army, navy and air force? Why has DND told companies they are not to talk about the various projects in which they're involved? Worse, why does DND lie about things such as tank parts, claiming there were no spare parts problems, when subsequent information leaks reveal there are?

The spread of secrecy is insidious, frightening and, at times, ridiculous. In a scene reminiscent of *Catch 22*, David Pugliese of the *Ottawa Citizen* asked for information on the number of ammunition rounds expended in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces refused to release the number for reasons of operational security. When asked how that information would compromise operational security, the DND official said that information could also not be released because of operational security.

The government is showing few signs of loosening its grip despite criticism in the Manley report for a deficient communications strategy and from the growing number of journalists and columnists who are complaining about the government-wide shut out. In fact, when criticized, the government becomes offensively defensive by suggesting that the critics are putting Canadian lives at risk with their demands for information.

Sometimes the defensive posture is more subtle. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Laurie Hawn, in a speech to the Conference of Defence Associations and a few days later in the House of Commons, criticized the media and critics of the Afghanistan mission by saying – without a trace of irony in his voice – “Canadians are being asked to form an opinion about the mission, but most are only getting part of the story.” At the CDA, incredibly, he followed this up with a call for more “honesty.”

It's not just reporters who are feeling frustrated. Public affairs officers and other military personnel are also chaffing as they watch their hard-earned trust with individual journalists evaporate, and as stories appear which contain inaccuracies that they cannot correct.

But why can't they? Why can't Hillier's openness, his frank talk, his plain language, be adopted by the rest of the military? Why is he a proponent for free speech only for himself? Why has he, a leader who is so willing to speak up when he deems it necessary, acceded to the demand that his people stay silent?

Yes, in a democracy, the civil-military relationship is such that the military has to obey the orders of its political masters, but it's hard to believe that if Hillier advocated a more open and informative stance by the military, he couldn't breach the wall of silence built by the PCO/PMO.

Let's be clear – this is not asking for the military brass to comment on policy decisions (although Hillier seems willing enough to broach even that line), but for straightforward, factual information about decisions and choices. This kind of information has been provided to journalists




Photo: DND

General Hillier in a lighter moment.

in the past, during the Cold War years and even during the 'decade of darkness.'

So why doesn't Hillier stand up to the political appointees in the PCO and PMO and tell them to loosen the reins? Probably because the government's clampdown works for him. General Hillier has built a reputation for frankness which is perceived by most Canadians as honesty. But it's not openness, it's not transparency. If anyone doubts this, just look at the so-called 'Tiger Team' Hillier's Strategic Joint Staff has established to review and control the release of information on Afghanistan to the public and the media via the Access to Information requests. That team is set up under his auspices, not the PMO or PCO.

By gagging the rest of DND, Hillier makes sure that the only message that is heard is the one that he wants out there. He apparently doesn't want anyone looking closely at the impact Afghanistan is having on the military's future plans, so no one talks about them. He wants the public to focus on our brave men and women fighting the good fight in Afghanistan, and their supportive families at home, not the financial costs, the opportunity costs, or the future burden of today's decisions. His emotional calls for Canadians to "support our troops" obscure the hard issues behind the Afghanistan deployment and attempts to shame those who would question the decisions his command team makes.

Our military is fighting a war on the other side of the world in defence of democracy and Canadian values. Those values include freedom of speech, a free press and an informed public. Too bad we're losing that war at home. 🇨🇦

Sharon Hobson is an Ottawa-based defence analyst and Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

The View from the West: RIMPAC, an Exercise in Politics

Kerry Lynn Nankivell



Allied fleets during RIMPAC 2006.

The biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, held every other July, represents one of Canada's most longstanding commitments to regional security in Asia. RIMPAC 06, the world's largest military exercise, involved 40 ships, six submarines, 160 aircraft and more than 19,000 personnel testing their interoperability off Hawaii. Participants from Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States were joined by observers from India, Singapore, Malaysia and Ecuador. RIMPAC 06 was led by US Pacific Command but Canadian Commodore Bruce Donaldson was the Deputy RIMPAC Commander, and the three ships, eight aircraft and 1,000 personnel made Canada the second largest participant in the event.

RIMPAC 06 had three major operational goals. First, the exercise was meant to introduce a new, common cyberspace through which allies could coordinate their military activities in battle. Second, it worked through an operational level headquarters, giving participants the opportunity for leaders to train in a large multinational operation. While anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was the exercise's main feature, RIMPAC was also an exercise in politics, and the navy's participation will help prepare Ottawa for tomorrow's Asia.

Submarines in the Pacific

ASW was a major feature of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall prompted NATO navies, including Canada's, to reduce their costly ASW capability. Ironically, just as the Canadian Navy was shifting away from ASW, a period of expansion in submarine fleets was beginning in the Pacific. China is building submarines at an alarming rate – it has built four, possibly five, classes of indigenously designed submarines within the last decade. It is widely believed that the People's Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) boasts roughly 40 operational submarines, and that Beijing holds dozens more older or obsolete submarine hulls. A 2007 Pentagon report on China confirms that the PLA(N) will operate more submarines in the Pacific than the United States by 2010, although it notes that China will lag behind technologically.

At the same time, other Asian navies are working to enhance their submarine fleets. There are reportedly more than 200 submarines in the Asia-Pacific region, more than any other maritime region. China and Japan are the leading powers in submarine operations but major expansion plans exist in South Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan. Singapore, Malaysia, India and Indonesia are all active in the submarine realm, projecting modest fleet expansions in the next decade to



CF-18 *Hornet* taking part in RIMPAC 2006.

complement overall increased naval power. In sum, the Asia-Pacific region is rife with submarine activity, and submarine traffic will only become denser in the future.

The sheer number of submarines in the Pacific presents a challenge. The use of submarines to deny an adversary access to maritime regions is a frustratingly successfully tactic. In contrast, ASW is an expensive and complex capability, and requires the sustained focus of naval assets that can draw resources away from other uses. For that reason, RIMPAC has served as an important forum in which states can put their ability to detect diesel-electric submarines to the test. Our ability to detect submarines will be our main defence against their use, not only for war-fighting, but also interdiction or intelligence gathering.

An Exercise in Politics

RIMPAC allows Canada the opportunity to interact with the navies of the Pacific and to support confidence-building measures in the region. While our relationship with the US Navy is always important, RIMPAC allows Canada access to a multilateral forum to strengthen relationships with other states. Some, like Australia and the United Kingdom, are states with which Canada has a relationship built up over many years. Others, like Japan, are states with which Canada shares interests but finds little opportunity to interact on a military-to-military basis.

The RIMPAC exercise serves an even more important function in the Asian region – a political function. Relations in Asia remain tense and vulnerable to political shocks. Many Asian states – particularly China and South Korea – have not forgotten Japan's occupation during World War II; others, including Australia and Japan, recognize the possibility of a conventional attack on their

territory by a hostile neighbour. As well, boundary disputes persist, threatening to undermine increasing economic interdependencies among Asia's largest powers.

RIMPAC allows military-to-military interaction among states that would not muster the political will to do so if left to their own devices. Canada's participation allows us to support the conditions for multilateral cooperation and peaceful resolution of political disputes in the region. Positive navy-to-navy interaction is an important first step in building confidence among Asia's biggest powers.

The obvious weakness of RIMPAC as a political vehicle is the absence of China and Russia.

Russia has been invited to observe the exercise more than once, but has declined. It agreed to observe the 2008 iteration but it remains to be seen if Russia-US relations will remain cordial enough long enough for this to happen. The reinvigoration of Russia's naval capability makes it an increasingly important player in the region and its exclusion from RIMPAC seems a glaring oversight. RIMPAC's function as a confidence-building mechanism depends on its ability to bring together states in which suspicion of military motives impedes positive political relations.

More problematically, it seems unlikely that China will be included in RIMPAC any time soon. Domestic legislation prevents the US Navy from inviting China to act either as a participant or an observer. China's rapid and impressive naval build-up is viewed with suspicion by many in Washington, and until Beijing offers more transparency in its military expenditure and activities, it will likely continue to be excluded from the RIMPAC circle.

A Place for Canada in Asia's Crowded Seascape

Participation in RIMPAC allows Canada to begin to address the maritime challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, both in operational and political terms. But the political challenge cannot be met by a single biennial exercise alone. Not only will we be asked to prepare ourselves for a rising China, we will be forced *simultaneously* to prepare for a strong China, a strong India, an established Japan and an unstable Indonesia in an evolving Southeast Asia. This task will require more effort than planning for China alone. We cannot pretend that preparing for a multi-polar Asia will simply involve a scaled-up version of preparing for a strong China. A bipolar system characterized by a China challenging US hegemony in Asia provides Canada with relatively simple policy options. As seen in the Cold War, a bipolar system invites a basic balancing calculus.



Commodore Bruce Donaldson with a US Navy Petty Officer aboard an American warship during RIMPAC 2006.

Unfortunately relations in a multi-polar system are more complex and defy the logic of 'with us or against us.' A multi-polar Asia will be prone to unstable relationships and shifting allegiances as competing powers, wary of one another, guard their sovereignty and act in their own interests.

In short, preparing for the Asia of tomorrow will be much harder than we think. A multi-polar Asia will not provide us with the same kind of certainty in this century that a bipolar Europe offered in the last. Determining which policy approaches will be the most successful will be no easy task – particularly as Canadian officials do not have any experience with this. We have not experienced multi-polarity in the international system for almost a full century; this means of course, that the Canadian Navy has *never* truly operated in a multi-polar environment. The Royal Canadian Navy was in its infancy when a multi-polar Europe imploded. Not only did the main players in Europe fail to keep the peace among themselves, but Canada ended up fighting a large-scale conflict far from home.

Avoiding this outcome in 21st century Asia is in all of our interests. Although the way forward is not clear, participating in multilateral activities like RIMPAC is an important political exercise that earns Canada a place in the regional, multi-polar military seascape. Participation in such operations demands that the Canadian Navy focus on the Asian continent on a biennial basis. Working in the Pacific region every two years also helps develop a more nuanced understanding of the forces at work there.

But this alone will not be enough to meet the challenge of an increasingly powerful, multi-polar Asia. Changing international dynamics call upon us to use RIMPAC as a stepping-stone toward a greater emphasis on our western flank. The new realities require that we position our assets and focus our energies to reflect the shifting centre of gravity of the world toward the Pacific Ocean. Perhaps more importantly, they demand that we challenge our minds to do the same. 🇨🇦

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Warship Developments: Those Innovative Danes!

Doug Thomas

The Danish Navy is currently in the midst of replacing much of its fleet, most of which was designed for operations in the Baltic and North Seas against the Warsaw Pact. In the post-Soviet era, in a time of a vastly different and largely littoral threat, the Danes have recognized that a different fleet mix is required. The appearance of the resulting fleet will be very different: fewer but larger, more capable, highly automated ships will replace the Cold War navy.

Combat Support/Patrol Ships

The highlights of the current building program are the new Combat Support Ships *Absalon* and *Esbern Snare*, and a follow-on class of three large frigates (Combat Patrol Ships) based on the same hull and with much similarity in combat systems and propulsion. Space and weight provisions are included in the design to provide flexibility to perform a broad range of future roles. The *Absalon*-class ships are built to naval rather than commercial standards, with five standard flexible (stanflex) container positions and electrical connections for various weapons and sensors. A Ro-Ro ramp aft gives access to 900 m² of multipurpose deck, for vehicles including Leopard 2 tanks, logistic supplies, ammunition and up to 34 20-foot equivalent unit (TEU) containers. Two high-speed special operations insertion craft are carried on the cargo deck, and the flight deck and hangars are capable of operating two 20-ton helicopters. These 6300-ton ships could be employed as a command and control platform, transport for up to 200 personnel and equipment, provision of joint logistic support, or a



Photo: Internet

HDMS *Absalon*.

containerized modular hospital could be installed on the flex deck. Such a hospital would have the capacity to treat 40 emergency patients a day or up to 10 major surgical operations.

The *Absalon*-class has a crew of 100. Permanent accommodation is also included for up to 70 additional personnel such as combined or joint task force headquarters staff. Containerized accommodation for up to 130 additional personnel can be installed on the flex deck. The ship has galley and accommodation facilities for up to 300 embarked passengers and crew.

The three Combat Patrol Vessels, or Area Air Defence/Command and Control Frigates, are based on the same hull design as *Absalon*, and utilize much of the same equipment. This will ease the training and maintenance bill for these major units. There will be one less deck (the flex deck) than in the support ships, and four rather than two main diesel engines so that maximum speed will be increased from 23 (*Absalon*) to 28 knots in the frigates. Dedicated staff facilities will be provided for a task group commander, five stanflex container positions, and upper-deck space for four 20-foot containers. The flight deck is to be capable of operating 20-ton helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles.



Photo: Internet

Artist's impression of the new Danish Combat Patrol Ship.

These ships are intended to have a global, expeditionary role and to be capable of providing area air-defence and support of land forces with Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) area air defence, and a 5" 62-calibre gun capable of firing extended range guided munitions (ERGM) to about 60 nautical miles. It is expected that these ships will commence construction in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and commission in 2011 and 2012.

Arctic Patrol Ships

The four *Thetis*-class frigates, designed for sovereignty and fisheries protection around Greenland and the Faroe Islands, were completed in 1991 and 1992, and are strengthened for operations in up to one metre of ice. They are 369' loa x 47' beam, 3,500 tonnes full load displacement. The frigates are armed with a 76-mm gun and a Lynx helicopter, equipped with a broad range of radar, sonar and electronic warfare (EW) sensors, have excellent endurance (8,500 nm at 15.5 knots) and a small crew of 60 with 30 additional bunks.

These very adaptable ships have performed well in coalition operations with an augmented crew and additional communications. The government information issued at the time of our Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship project announcement in July 2007 described a vessel quite similar to *Thetis*.

Two new Arctic patrol ships are being completed to operate in a sovereignty role off Greenland. First of class *Knud Rasmussen* (1,720 tonnes, 235ft/71.8m) to be commissioned in 2008, was constructed in Poland and delivered to Denmark for final fitting out.

These vessels are lightly armed (two .50-calibre heavy machine guns) with a retractable sonar dome, but they can



An artist's impression of how a rescue boat would be launched from a bay in the stern of HDMS *Knud Rasmussen*.



A high-speed special operations insertion craft embarked in HDMS *Absolon*.



HDMS *Thetis*, one of the four patrol ships designed for sovereignty and fishery patrol off Greenland.

be readily fitted with containerized weapons and sensors – such as a 76-mm gun, Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles, or anti-submarine torpedoes. The crew may be as few as 18, but there is considerable capacity for carrying additional people in these very sea-worthy and highly flexible vessels.

Conclusion

The Danish Navy has built some very interesting and rather unorthodox warships. Some of Denmark's requirements, such as Arctic operations, have much in common with Canada. I believe that we could benefit from closely examining some of the clever concepts embodied in Danish vessels when planning our next fleet. 🇩🇰

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Book Reviews

Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era: Canada and North America, by Elinor C. Sloan, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, notes, bibliography, index, ISBN 07735-2973-X.

Reviewed by Ken Hansen

Military theorists and defence analysts have struggled since the end of the Cold War to devise a term that accurately describes the contemporary security environment. The rise of extremists who will resort to suicidal acts of terrorism to advance their causes have led some to call our present circumstances "the terrorist era." Elinor Sloan, a professor of International Relations at Carleton University, has chosen to use this terminology and a related theoretical framework to conduct a concise security analysis of Canada's situation.

Sloan, whose earlier work *The Revolution in Military Affairs* received favourable reviews, has produced an excellent analysis of the theory, factors and options that seem to present such a bewildering maze of false starts and dead-ends. Her thesis explores the policy balance needed between offensive military (war fighting and stabilization) and defensive capabilities (homeland defence), and reviews the difficulty Canadian governments have had in achieving this equilibrium. Recognizing that security from a terrorist threat cannot be obtained solely by military operations, Sloan adds civilian response at home (homeland security) and abroad (diplomacy and development aid) to provide four categories of response for the future.

The book includes two chapters that look at the nature of the terrorist threat and an historical appraisal of security organizational changes and developments in Canada and the United States. Sloan maintains this comparative analysis through four more chapters that deal with homeland security, homeland defence, and military requirements for 'offensive' war fighting and stabilization (what she calls "addressing threats to the homeland abroad"). The fourth category is analysed indirectly through commentaries embedded in other sections. Interestingly, the author dedicates an entire chapter in the discussion to an analysis of ballistic missile defence. The book concludes with a chapter in which Sloan makes her recommendations on finding the right mix of offensive and defensive military and civil measures.

Sloan asserts that the theoretical supposition that "the best defence is a good offence" has motivated American policy. In contrast to current Canadian military engagement in Afghanistan, the author shows there is a clear

trend in the policies of both Liberal and Conservative Canadian governments towards placing more emphasis on defensive policies, organizations and capabilities. Sloan views shifting emphasis and resources away from offensive military operations toward a more equitably balanced formula to be "the primary [governmental] responsibility of guaranteeing the security of its citizens" and that "the bigger challenge will now be to ensure that this new emphasis makes it way into future military capital-acquisition decisions" (pp. 140-141).

This work's major deficiency is that it contains little in the way of maritime theory. Sloan is not an expert in maritime strategy, operations or doctrine. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework provided by the book is still valid and several noteworthy recommendations about maritime capabilities exist. Sloan favours restructuring and re-equipping the Coast Guard to make it the lead agency for security issues close to Canadian shores and in inshore waters. The bureaucratic realities of having Canada's naval forces lead in these areas creates friction between departments and a misalignment with the basic security organizational arrangement in the United States. The navy is recognized as a highly flexible organization but its focus should be oriented to providing defence from threats to the homeland outside of territorial waters, and in carrying a clear message of resolve into international waters. Sloan endorses naval littoral operations, including amphibious operations, precision fire support and logistical capabilities, underscoring a general move to 'joint' support for forces ashore. Sealift is recognized as essential to rapid and effective deployment but the author warns that the three planned Joint Support Ships are likely to have insufficient capacity for a major military deployment, and that they are too few to ensure ready availability.

Sloan also makes important distinctions between the land- and sea-based components of the American ballistic missile defence system, itemizing their utilities and limitations. Her analysis points towards an expanded naval role in NORAD and the development of a deployable naval missile warning and defence capability that can be used against a wide variety of short-, medium- and intermediate-range missile systems in all three of their flight phases (launch, mid-course and terminal), which will avoid the complicating arguments about the deployment of weapons into space.

Clearly, all of Sloan's recommendations cannot be accomplished within the current capability and resource limitations of the navy. Apart from advocating a general trend toward more defensive capabilities, the author does not deliver a comprehensive plan to achieve the desired mix of the categories she describes. One of her

most interesting recommendations about the army is to increase the ratio between combat and support/service support troops to a ratio of 1:1, rather than the traditional (but never achieved) ratio of 3:1. This assessment is based on the fact that stabilization operations abroad require more support capability than typical combat operations. In the absence of a peer naval competitor, what would a similarly restructured Canadian navy look like if the same logic were applied? Although Sloan does not provide an answer, her interesting and thoughtful analysis compels readers to contemplate a radically altered fleet structure. For those brave and curious enough to explore a sensible approach to security planning for Canada, this work is highly recommended. 🍷

Through Water, Ice and Fire: Schooner Nancy of the War of 1812, by Barry Gough, Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2006, 213 pages, photos, maps, paintings, appendices, bibliography, index, ISBN-10 1-55002-569-4/ISBN-13 978-1-55002-569-9

Reviewed by Jay White

Writing about the War of 1812 is a little like setting up a lemonade stand next to a Wal-Mart: no matter how good your product is, the big wars, like the discount stores, always seem to capture the lion's share of business.

Barry Gough's *Through Water, Ice & Fire: Schooner Nancy of the War of 1812* will not topple the Goliath next door, but it is a meticulous and authoritative account of the naval war on the Upper Great Lakes. Aficionados of this aspect of the War of 1812 will shelve it alongside Gough's own *Fighting Sail* (2002) and Robert Malcomson's *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814* (1998).

Incongruous as it may sound, strategic control of the Great Lakes was once a life-and-death struggle between the United States and Canada. Commodore Perry's startling success on Lake Erie in September 1813 shifted the balance of naval power in favour of the United States. Sailing into Lake Huron, the victorious Americans targeted British outposts, especially Fort Michilimackinac, gateway to Lake Michigan. Standing in their way was *Nancy*, a non-descript, 25-metre schooner built for the fur trade. For nearly a year, this lightly armed transport conveyed crucial supplies while managing to evade destruction by superior American forces.

Such stalwart service earned a commission in His Majesty's navy, but no sooner had the honour been conferred when HM *Nancy* was cornered near the mouth of the Nottawasaga River (in present day Wasaga Beach, Ontario). Gough says the schooner was torched by her crew, counter-

ing American claims (reproduced in an Appendix) that enemy gunnery found its mark. Her intrepid crew went on to avenge *Nancy*'s loss by daringly capturing two of the attacking vessels, *Tigress* and *Scorpion*, a few weeks later. In an ironic twist, those vessels now lie on the bottom in Penetanguishene harbour, while the "charred bones" of *Nancy* are displayed *in situ*, like sacred relics.

If *Nancy* truly is one of the "treasured vessels of our past," readers may be disappointed with how little detailed information Gough provides about her. In fairness, the documentary evidence is slim. From Peter Rindlisbacher's cover painting to handsome 1/10 scale models (the latter no doubt looking better in the flesh than it does in this book's grainy photograph), all are based on conjecture. This is problematic because, as Gough must surely know, being able to visualize a vessel goes a long way toward bringing that ship's personality to life. Instead of clear explanatory illustrations of *Nancy*'s hull, rigging, gunnery, etc., the reader is presented with a grab-bag of images of varying quality and relevance. This is unfortunate because there are numerous replicas and models of vessels similar to *Nancy* – *Sultana* and *Halifax*, for example – that could have served as instructive visual surrogates. Reference to an intensive survey of *Nancy* conducted in 1997 by a team of Texas A&M University students is unaccountably absent. The results of that research, including detailed line drawings of a reconstructed *Nancy*, are readily available online.

In some respects, the reader may expect more than the author is able to deliver. Napoleonic fighting ships and Nelsonian tactics are far removed from the *petite guerre* of stealth and skirmish described here. It was, as the author states, "a supply war," fought with canoe and musket as much as cannon and sail. Not only that, both vessels and combatants changed sides on a regular basis. The fog of war takes on a whole new meaning in such an amorphous and shifting theatre of operations. Gough's dutiful recounting of familiar battles and heroic icons, from Brock to Perry, is occasionally an unwelcome distraction from the central narrative driving this book.

The fiery demise of *Nancy* is a climactic moment, to be sure, but equally dramatic is Lieutenant Miller Worsley's 500-kilometre relief expedition to Michilimackinac and bold seizure of the two aforementioned American vessels. The exploits of Worsley's "gallant band of seamen" (mostly Newfoundlanders, as it happens), not to mention the able assistance of native allies, deserve greater prominence. Other recent work on the War of 1812 probes the roles of previously overlooked actors. Is there a story here yet to be told, if given a proper vessel to bear it?

For all the revisionism of late, the War of 1812 is still viewed along surprisingly nationalistic lines. To the author's credit, British/Canadian and American sources are well balanced. Gough also pays obligatory homage to predecessors like C.H.J. Snider and E.A. Cruikshank. For the most part, *Through Water, Ice & Fire* avoids narrow partisanship and makes a worthwhile contribution to War of 1812 historiography.

Purveyors of lemonade, rejoice. 🍹

Battleships of World War I, by Peter Hore, London: Southwater Books/Anness Publishing, 2007, 96 pages, £8.99

Battleships of World War II, by Peter Hore, London: Southwater Books/Anness Publishing, 2007, 96 pages, £8.99

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Mark R Condono, Philippine Coast Guard Auxiliary District Palawan

From HMS *Dreadnought* to *Almirante Latorre*, *Battleships of World War I* is the highly useful account of about 70 battleships and battle cruisers in service with 16 navies in the years 1906-1918. The author, retired Royal Navy Captain Peter Hore, is to be commended for this impressive tome. He is also the author of various books on naval history such as *Habit of Victory* and *HMAS Sydney II*. He is currently Associate and Book Review Editor of the *Warships International Fleet Review*.

Beginning with an introduction covering the origins of the battleship, he then proceeds with a discussion of the history of the type and the advocates of the vessel, particularly Royal Navy Admirals Jacky Fisher and Percy Scott, Admiral William Sims of the US Navy and Italian Naval Architect Vittorio Cuniberti.

Captain Hore discusses the major naval battles of World War I from operations in the Black Sea to that of the Battle of Jutland. He also looks into the arms race between the Royal Navy and Imperial German Navy and the scuttling of the German Fleet in Scapa Flow in 1919. Then the remaining pages form the core of the book in a country-by-country listing and coverage of all battleships and battle cruisers. The account commences with the British Royal Navy from HMS *Dreadnought* to HMS *Renown* which was launched in 1916. For the US Navy eight of its battleships classes are covered from USS *South Carolina* to USS *New Mexico*. Next is the Japanese fleet from the *Kashima*-class to the *Ise*-class battleship. The latter class, *Ise*, and *Hyuga* were converted to a carrier-battleship type with the removal of their after turrets after the Battle of Midway



HMCS *Toronto* returning home to Halifax.

in 1942. The Imperial German battle fleet is represented from SMS *Nassau* to the battle cruisers of the *Derfflinger*-class. The book also discusses the capital ships in service with the Italian, Soviet, Swedish, Austrian, Dutch, Spanish and Greek Navies.

The second book, *Battleships of World War II*, begins where the first volume left off, after World War I. It covers the interwar years to the battleship engagements of World War II. Similar in format to the first book, the author covers the treaties of the 1920s, the *Kriegsmarine*, Pacific battleship encounters and the post-World War II life of the class. Again the core is the country-by-country directory of the seven countries that possessed the type during World War II from HMS *Hood* to the USS *Montana* and *Iowa*-class to the Soviet Navy's *Sovetskii Soyuz*-class.

In assessment, Captain Hore has done an outstanding job in chronicling the capital ships of the past century. The books are both exciting and informative. One of the books' gems is their vast array of black and white as well as coloured historical and current photographs for each ship class. Lucidly described are their operational and construction histories – for example, refits and changes to the *Iowa*-class to their retirement after the 1991 Persian Gulf War is covered. Specifications details are also provided for each class. A glossary of terms, key to flags and index supplement the book.

Battleships of World War I and *II* are valuable accounts for naval officers, historians, officer candidates, service and academic professors, students and enthusiasts. The books are highly recommended. 🍹

Announcing the Winners of the 2nd Annual Bruce S. Oland Essay Competition

Photo: Dan Middlemiss



Commodore Bruce S. Oland presents Mr. David McDonough with his prize for winning the 2007 Bruce S. Oland Essay Competition.

First Place

Joint Expeditionary Warfare and the Dilemmas for Canadian Maritime Strategy
David S. McDonough

Second Place

Defending the 'Empty North': Comparing Canadian and Australian Challenges and Strategies
Aaron Jackson

Third Place

The Canadian Mission: How the Navy Peacefully Maintains a Purpose
J. Matthew Gillis


Peter Mitchell Essay Competition 2008

The Sea Power Centre - Australia (SPC-A) is conducting the 2008 Peter Mitchell Essay Competition, which is open to all members of British Commonwealth navies (full time and reserve) of commander rank and below who have served at least 20 days in the 12 months prior to 29 October 2008.

Full details of the competition can be found at www.navy.gov.au/spc/mitchell.html; and enquiries should be directed to seapower.centre@defence.gov.au.

Publication Announcement

The second volume of the official history of the Canadian Navy's operations during the Second World War is now available in bookstores.



Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War – 1943-1945, Volume II, Part 2

by W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael Whitby
(with Robert H. Caldwell, William Johnston and William G.P. Rawling)

St. Catherine's, ON: Vanwell, 2007

ISBN 1-55125-069-1. 650 + xvii pages.

Maps and photographs. \$60.00 in hardcover.

With the earlier volume *No Higher Purpose*, there is now a comprehensive history of how the Royal Canadian Navy grew awkwardly from a tiny force of a handful of destroyers in 1939 to the third largest Allied navy at the end of the war. That fleet, drawn together with the help of the Royal Navy, provided the nucleus for the development of the series of post-war fleets that have served Canada so well.

Yesterday's Canadian Warships: A reminder of what almost 100 years of evolution has brought.



A Task Group (1984)



HMCS Bras D'Or (1970)



HMCS Haida (1949)



HMCS Labrador (1955)



A Task Group (1976)



HMCS Sioux in Korea (1951)