



CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3 (FALL 2007)

**Joint Expeditionary
Warfare and the Dilemmas
for Canadian Maritime
Strategy**

**Interoperability:
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Graphic Design: Kim Squared Incorporated

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The editorial offices of the *Canadian Naval Review* are located at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 6299 South Street, Henry Hicks Building, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 4H6

Phone: (902) 494-6846

Fax: (902) 494-3825

Email: naval.review@dal.ca

Website: www.naval.review.cfps.dal.ca

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Photo: US Navy Official Photograph

HMCS Algonquin off the coast of Hawaii during RIMPAC 2006.

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Editorial: Naval Modernization: The Impossible Dream?

A recurring theme of Canadian defence policy is the lack of funds for capital programs, and so compromises have to be made, often to the detriment of the overall effectiveness of the military. Unfortunately, this is about to happen again over the naval modernization program. As the government and naval staff struggle to meet demands for Canadian maritime security within the usual fiscal constraints it is becoming clear that a major problem exists.

Decades of fiscal mismanagement, policy confusion and bad political decisions have come home to roost and now threaten to undermine the continued existence of a naval capability that has served the country well for a long time. Simply, the navy's entire inventory of ships needs replacing over the next 20-25 years and there is neither the money nor the industrial capacity to make it happen – at least not without a new approach to government shipbuilding.

To understand today's problem we need to look at the traditional factors that drive defence spending and naval budgets in Canada. First, the defence budget is intensely political and has become a part of the Canadian regional economic equalization process. The patrol frigate program showed that the object of providing the navy with a modern warship could be a secondary consideration to making sure that the program funds were distributed as widely as possible, especially where they would have the greatest political impact. As one would expect, there is a complex bureaucratic process to ensure that major capital spending conforms to political expectations. The need to divide the pie politically, rather than any other way, leads to criticism that the political tail wags the operational dog.

Second, no consensus exists on what the Canadian Navy should be or what it should be able to do. This lack of a nationally-approved 'core' naval policy is a significant obstacle to progress. Inter-service rivalry for scarce funds heightens the problem and results in a time-consuming requirement to re-invent the rationale for naval capabilities every time a major capital program goes up for political approval. Also, there are widely divergent views within DND of what the navy's role in national security should

be. Many colonels and generals see the navy as a sea-going version of Allied Van Lines that exists for the sole purpose of moving their equipment around.

Third, the procurement process moves at glacial speed, and it can take as long as 15 years to acquire a replacement warship. The fleet modernization process is a political and military nightmare because it requires decisions to be made on issues well beyond the prevailing political horizon. Moreover, there are operational implications imposed by having to buy obsolescent technology because the long bureaucratic lead time does not permit the acquisition of the latest systems. Only a government with courage and a clear vision of the future (as well as a political majority perhaps) is likely to commit to a major fleet modernization program. That said, there is no shortage of suggestions on how to improve the process and make it faster, and efforts are now being made to speed up procurement; largely driven by the necessities of the Afghanistan mission.

Today, five requirements drive the naval modernization program.

1. *Replace the two remaining fleet support ships (AORs).* The requirement to provide strategic flexibility for naval and joint operations has been a policy football for many years as naval and army staffs argue on what capabilities are necessary. Even though the program is now at the stage of selecting the industrial consortium to design and build the new ships, it is unlikely that they will be ready for use much before 2015. In the meantime, the strategic requirements for underway fleet support and emergency troop lift will still exist. It is unreasonable to expect the remaining two AORs to continue to serve for that long because they will soon become technically unsupportable, and so some interim capability will be needed.

2. *Build six to eight Arctic Patrol Vessels.* This concept is barely out of its infancy and the 'experts' and lobbyists are already trying to influence the design and capabilities. Clearly, the navy needs to finalize design and the concept of operations quickly. Yet, unless the present procurement



process is drastically shortened, it will be 2020 at least before the ships begin patrolling our northern waters. One has to wonder how those waters will be patrolled and Canadian sovereignty upheld until then. Challenges to national security and sovereignty are not going to wait while the bureaucratic process runs its ponderous course.

3. *Modernize the 12 frigates* so that they can remain the workhorses of the fleet for another 15 or so years. But that is only a stop-gap measure; eventually the ships will have to be replaced – some are already 15 years old. Based on present procurement models the decision to replace them needs to be taken within the next five years and building begin before 2020.

4. *Replace the four Iroquois-class destroyers* as command and area force protection ships. One has already been scrapped and the others are increasingly expensive to maintain, but there is no politically-approved plan to replace their capabilities. Does this mean that the surface fleet will be reduced to the 12 frigates? It will unless a decision is made soon, and until then we should expect the surface fleet to drop in capability.

5. *Modernize the submarines.* For some reason this program remains controversial politically. Entrenched myopia and, in some cases, paranoia within the bureaucracy and among some generals over the use of submarines in national security are stalling the *Victoria*-class modernization. This is not helped by the fact that the media still seems to be sulking from its exclusion from the Board of Inquiry into the *Chicoutimi* accident and refuses to publish anything remotely positive about the strategic flexibility provided by submarines. It is myopic to advocate obtaining money for the Afghanistan mission by paying off the submarines. With the imminent decline in the capability of the surface fleet, the submarines will be needed to close the gap in naval surveillance and patrol capability created by the demise of the *Iroquois*-class and the decline in the numbers of operational frigates as that class of ships is modernized. This was done in the 1980s and early 1990s when government foot-dragging left Canada short on its minimum fleet requirements and NATO commitments. Squandering good strategic resources for short-term gains makes absolutely no sense.

If the navy is to remain as Canada's first response to crisis at home and abroad and be a versatile commitment to international security, some 25 warships have to be built



The building blocks of a responsive and effective navy.

between now and about 2030. This means that once the AOR replacement (likely the Joint Support Ship) and Arctic Patrol Vessel contracts are awarded (hopefully in the next five years), a new ship will have to be launched roughly every 12 months if the fleet is to remain effective. In addition, 12 frigates and 4 submarines have to be extensively modernized.

Can this be done? Today it is doubtful, but if the government makes a serious commitment to a comprehensive naval modernization program it could be done. For that to happen, there has to be a new approach to Canadian naval shipbuilding based primarily on a “steady-state” production plan engaging the whole of industry working as a team rather than the continuing present approach that pits pieces of the industry against each other in competing for parts of the overall program. Common sense would integrate Coast Guard and other government fleet requirements into the naval shipbuilding program to make best use of shipyard and related industrial capacity. This would allow the industry to make long-term plans, purchase new equipment, train the necessary workforce, and create the supporting facilities. A vibrant shipbuilding industry – one that includes all the associated industries – is very much in the national interest, especially as a technological innovator.

The naval program is at a crossroads: either the government commits to a full modernization of the fleet, or the navy that has proven itself to be a superb instrument of foreign and security policies will wither away and become little more than a token constabulary force. 🇨🇦

Peter Haydon

Winner of the 2nd Bruce S. Oland Essay Competition

Joint Expeditionary Warfare and the Dilemmas for Canadian Maritime Strategy

David S. McDonough



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

HMCS *Protecteur* refuelling HMCS *St. John's*.

The Canadian government has gradually embraced the strategic vision of an expeditionary-oriented military. The command structure of the Canadian Forces (CF) has been redesigned to include four operational commands – a streamlined and *potentially* more effective command and control arrangement. ‘Intervention-enabling’ capabilities were prominently featured in the over \$20 billion package of platform acquisitions announced in 2006. The air force was a primary beneficiary of this largesse, with the promise of a strategic, tactical and in-theatre airlift fleet, but the navy could also breathe a sigh of relief that calls to replace its aging fleet of *Protecteur*-class ships were finally heeded. Three multi-role Joint Supply Ships (JSS) are expected to be delivered commencing in 2012 and will maintain the critical auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) capability needed for sustained naval operations.

Yet it is uncertain whether this reinvestment in Canada’s ‘hard power assets’ will also be sustained into a long-term rearmament program. CF combat operations in Afghanistan continue to preoccupy Canadian policy-makers and consume government resources, while the

Conservative government’s Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) has incorporated additional requirements for homeland defence and sovereignty protection. Canada’s maritime forces may certainly benefit from the potential capability requirements needed for a renewed ‘Canada First’ policy, but the navy also faces the difficult task of fleet-replacement planning at a time of ‘transformational’ changes in American security strategy. The expected costs of such a large and expensive recapitalization project promise to make the future fleet-in-being and Canada’s attendant maritime strategy a highly contentious issue.

The Home and Away Games in the ‘Long War’

The late strategist R.J. Sutherland, in a prescient article written in 1962, called Canada’s geo-strategic location the most important invariant of Canadian strategy.¹ Canadian territory was sufficiently distant from other theatres to be largely protected from direct attack, while security was ‘involuntarily’ guaranteed by the presence of the American colossus on its southern border. But Canada was also entrusted with the responsibility of not becoming a security liability to its superpower ally – a ‘defence



Allied warships replenishing in the Arabian Sea in 2004.

against help' approach that has informally underpinned this bilateral alliance since the Second World War.

The events of 9/11 have placed significant pressure on Canada's traditional approach of assuaging American security concerns. Non-state actors were shown to have the capability to undertake mass casualty attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction carries the promise of potentially more devastating attacks in the future. Renewed concerns over American societal vulnerability have resulted in growing US 'addiction' to ever-more expansive security measures. The consolidated Department of Homeland Security, for example, was the recipient of consecutive budgetary increases that total nearly US\$60 billion in 2007, which makes overall spending on the 'home game' of domestic security comparable to the defence spending of either Russia or China. Yet the 9/11 attacks have also triggered an ambitious strategy centred on expanding American 'primacy' in order to quash clandestine terrorist networks and so-called 'rogue states' alike. This 'away game' has already resulted in military expeditions into Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is unlikely – despite the spectre of imperial overstretch – that Iraq will remain the last front in the Long War.

The maritime dimension plays an important part in the post-9/11 reprioritization of the home and away games.

The maritime dimension plays an important part in the post-9/11 reprioritization of the home and away games. High levels of container traffic in the deep-water ports of both Canada and the United States, and the inadequacy of current port security measures, have highlighted US maritime vulnerabilities. Indeed, commercial ships can be used to damage port facilities directly, as a base of ballistic or

cruise missile attacks, or as a means to transport dangerous materials and agents into American territory. The US Coast Guard (USCG) has the primary responsibility for coastal defence. Unlike its Canadian counterpart, the USCG is a branch of the US armed forces and is currently undergoing a 20-year, US\$11 billion program to replace its existing fleet.

The United States has also been keen to utilize its sea power as a force multiplier in the current military campaign. The demise of the Soviet Union's blue-water fleet secured American naval supremacy for the foreseeable future, and what had been a contest over sea control has been transformed into US command of the seas – an integral component, alongside air and space supremacy, of the American 'command of the commons.'² The US Navy (USN) is in the enviable position of having its sea lines of communication secure and the Mahanian threat of a rival blue-water navy eliminated, and has begun to emphasize the maritime role of projecting force from the sea to land. Maritime power projection has been noted in various naval documents in the post-Cold War period, most recently with *Sea Power 21's* emphasis on a 'sea strike' capability, and will likely be expanded with the USN's DD(X) family of large and small surface combatants tailored for littoral combat operations. The land-sea interface that was pioneered by British strategist Sir Julian Corbett seems to provide a remarkably savvy vision for US maritime strategy in the 21st century.³

The USN may be fixated on preventing states from acquiring sea denial capabilities in littoral environments, but it has also sought to broaden its maritime domain awareness and interdiction capabilities through a number of global partnerships. The USCG and the USN participate in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative which seeks to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction




Photo: Combat Camera

A Beachmaster directs a Canadian Army vehicle being landed from an LCU during the fall 2006 Joint Amphibious Exercise.

with air and maritime interdiction operations. Meanwhile, the requirement for expanded situational awareness has led to the Regional Maritime Security Initiative amongst countries near the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This initiative appears destined to expand as part of the Global Maritime Partnership (formerly called the 1,000 Ship Navy), which will consist of a global, transnational network of naval and law enforcement partners, and will be a key plank in the forthcoming US maritime strategy.

Canada's naval forces face the difficult task of expanding their homeland defence capabilities to secure the maritime approaches to the continent, while also expanding those expeditionary capabilities necessary to participate in the coalition military operations that have become *sine qua non* for American allies in the Long War. The United States may be capable of maintaining two militaries for homeland security and overseas operations, but as Joel Sokolsky succinctly writes, "Canada ... must rely on one set of armed forces, one team, for both the home and away games."⁴ Canadian policy-makers appear to have recognized these pressures on the country's strategic posture. Yet with the significant constraints on Canadian resources, it remains to be seen whether the current fleet-replacement planning will survive unscathed in the coming years.

Canadian Expeditionary Forces: The Maritime Dimension

The 2005 Defence Policy Statement introduced the vision of a redesigned CF that would be tailored for expeditionary operations on the scale of the current Afghanistan mission. Canada Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), one of the four operationally focused commands created in

2006, will integrate global CF operations and will utilize a newly created 2,800-strong Standing Contingency Force for rapid amphibious deployments. Canada Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM) will meanwhile utilize the Special Operations Task Force and its contingent of first- and second-tier Special Forces for unconventional counter-terrorism and combat missions in Canada and abroad. The CF has also gradually embraced operational 'jointness' as a means to maximize synergy among land, air and maritime forces and to act as a force multiplier in any future CF operations.

This expeditionary vision can be criticized as representing an army-centric perspective of CF transformation, in which the air force and navy are relegated to providing air- and sealift for boots on the ground. Indeed, the current government has been quick to begin the acquisition process for four C-17 Globemaster II and 17 C-130J Hercules aircraft for strategic and tactical lift, as well as 14 CH-47 Chinook medium- to heavy-lift helicopters for in-theatre transport, but it has been noticeably silent on replacements for the rapidly aging CF-18 aircraft. The navy may have been fortunate with the upcoming JSS replacement of its vital AOR capability (and the acquisition of modest sealift capability), but it also faces the critical task of replacing the majority of its surface combatants. Meanwhile, the government also briefly added the prioritization of new capability platforms, including a fleet of armed icebreakers, which have since been downgraded to Arctic Patrol Vessels, and the seemingly defunct notion of an amphibious landing platform dock (LPD) vessel for the Standing Contingency Force.

Canada is certainly correct to highlight the continued importance of its 'medium global force projection navy.' The Ship Replacement Program in the 1980s was designed to provide an anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare capability for the Canadian Navy to complement the Reagan administration's aggressive maritime strategy. This resulted in development of 12 *Halifax*-class frigates and the Tribal Update and Modernization Program (TRUMP) for four *Iroquois*-class destroyers. Both platforms may have been designed for specialized roles in the Cold War but their versatility made them easily adaptable to new missions. The TRUMP modifications and sophisticated command and control equipment created the wherewithal to deploy a self-contained naval task force, while the multi-purpose frigates remain highly interoperable with American naval forces. The naval task group concept has been a particularly successful Canadian method of operation, as the navy developed the capability to exercise tactical command over multinational naval formations that was impressively demonstrated during *Operation Apollo*.

Not surprisingly, the navy has prioritized the Single Class Surface Combatant (SCSC) as the replacement for the destroyers and frigates that form the nucleus of any Canadian naval task group. [Editor's Note: The SCSC program was replaced by the Destroyer Replacement Program after this article was written.] The SCSC is expected to utilize modular technology that is currently being pioneered by navies in Europe and the United States, and will allow for a single hull and propulsion system for an expected 6,000 tonne vessel. Command and anti-air warfare modules can be incorporated onto the ship replacements for the destroyers, while other modules can be developed for the frigate replacements. It is to be a long-term program, with the destroyer replacement SCSC delivered first and the frigate replacement delivered in subsequent years.

While the traditional naval task force concept has served Canadian maritime forces admirably in the post-Cold War period, there are reasons to question the SCSC program and, more broadly, the continued utility of the naval task group concept as it is currently envisioned. First, the use of the SCSC as the primary means of fleet replacement seems to suggest that the eventual goal is the replacement of the existing fleet's capabilities. Yet this goal seems to belie the nature of modular technology, which allows for the rapid change of capability modules and therefore eliminates the need for multi-purpose vessels that have to be sufficiently large (e.g., 6,000 tonnes) in order to incorporate various capabilities. Indeed, the high expected cost of the SCSC fleet – with estimates ranging between \$21-29 billion for 14-18 ships⁵ – raises question on whether this technology will act as a cost-saving device or will make these vessels overly expensive for the envisioned capabilities set.



Artist's sketch of the DDX.

Second, if the SCSC is simply meant to update existing capabilities necessary for the current naval task force, this project would be curiously antiquated in a strategic environment marked by sea denial threats in contested littoral zones. Indeed, the navy's own strategic guidance documents, such as *Leadmark* in 2001 and *Securing Canada's Ocean Frontiers* in 2005, envision a shift from oceanic sea control to 'sea-based joint operations' in the littoral areas. But large vessels like the SCSC are too unwieldy to venture into these regions, while there is continuing uncertainty on whether the navy will acquire the naval fire support (NFS) and power projection capabilities necessary for littoral combat missions. Indeed, the failure to acquire a significant sealift capability for tanks and armoured personnel carriers prevents the most effective use of the forthcoming strategic airlift fleet, which is ideal for delivering personnel and light equipment.

Canada's traditional naval task force role, while certainly useful for maritime interdiction and task force command missions, has more substantial limitations in facilitating joint expeditionary operations. As pointed out by Eric Lerhe, a joint expeditionary task force raises the possibility for "simpler, more Canadian weighted command arrangements" that might provide a degree of insurance at a time when a unilateral United States favours less structured 'coalitions of the willing.'⁶ A number of allied navies have begun to incorporate concepts for joint expeditionary warfare into their maritime strategy. The Royal Netherlands Navy, for example, has even sold the majority of its fleet of frigates and is in the process of acquiring strategic sealift and smaller littoral combatants. The Canadian Navy must be equally careful that any fleet-replacement plans will complement the American strategic shift towards the littoral zone.



Artist's sketch of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Lastly, the acquisition of a SCSC fleet that may cost upwards of nearly \$30 billion may simply be politically unpalatable to a government that has already spent tens of billions on the military and is currently mired in an increasingly unpopular and expensive war in Afghanistan. The current financial largesse to the CF will not continue indefinitely. The navy's plans for the SCSC will likely face continued pressure from the other services, which have their own recapitalization projects to fund, and from maritime command's own 'home game' capability requirements. Indeed, the government has already earmarked \$1.8 billion (and potentially \$3 billion including in-service support) for the six Arctic vessels that will likely be modelled on the Royal Norwegian Navy's *Svalbard*-class offshore patrol ships. Moreover, the navy will likely need to procure several cutters or patrol vessels that have improved situational awareness and coastal interdiction and enforcement capabilities. With such disparate and pressing defence requirements, the current plans for the SCSC may be substantially modified and reduced in scope or even cancelled.

Fleet-Replacement Planning in the 21st Century

With the potential uncertainty surrounding the SCSC, it may be prudent to reassess current plans for fleet replacement. According to Ken Hansen, a fleet structure that is optimized for joint expeditionary warfare should be based on two principal types of warships: (1) a few large vessels that have the offensive land-attack and area-defence capabilities necessary to protect allied amphibious forces; and (2) a higher number of small, stealthy and manoeuvrable littoral warships armed with short-range offensive and defensive weapons for direct fire support during land operations.⁷ These vessels would have an important role in facilitating multinational littoral operations, whether this

includes power projection or coastal interdiction, and would provide a critical support capability in the event that an amphibious sealift capability is acquired. After all, any amphibious landing of troops and equipment requires robust sea control and power projection capabilities in order to access this land-sea environment.

A replacement for Canada's guided missile destroyers would thereby be a primary priority. A large frigate that combines command and control with area-defence and NFS capabilities can maintain Canada's traditional role in task group command and serve as a useful addition to multinational littoral combat operations. The traditional role of the frigates as part of the naval task group would, however, be given to smaller warships that are tailored for the littoral environment. The USN's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project under the DD(X) program constitutes a potentially attractive option. The LCS is a small warship, with its two test models displacing roughly 3,000 tonnes, and features modular technology that could be designed for mine warfare, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare. Aside from power projection and self-defence capabilities, the LCS will also be capable of carrying helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, and as such be able to replicate many of the sea control and maritime interdiction capabilities of the navy's frigates. While utilizing the similar modular technology envisioned for the SCSC, this vessel appears to maximize the use of this transformational technology to obtain capabilities that would otherwise be located within a larger, multi-purpose frigate.

Any proposal to eliminate the frigates will rightly appear extreme to many....

To be sure, the LCS lacks the endurance of the frigate, with an estimated operating area of 4,500 nautical miles (nm) compared to the frigate's 7,000 nm range, and might appear to be a curious choice for a country with such expansive domestic maritime responsibilities. But these vessels are also expected to be relatively low-cost ships, with current attempts to limit cost to US\$350 million per unit and crew complements of only 40-50 personnel. Indeed, the savings that can be accrued from the acquisition of an LCS, compared to the expected cost of the SCSC, could be used to acquire a fleet of long-range and relatively inexpensive coastal cutters – similar to the ones envisioned by the USCG – capable of the long endurance missions necessary to safeguard Canada's maritime approaches. The *Victoria*-class submarines, which can be modified for Arctic patrols, and forthcoming Arctic Patrol Vessels could be used to complement cutters in various domestic security tasks.



HMCS *Fredericton* closes an iceberg at the entrance to the Northwest Passage.

The potential savings of such a fleet-replacement plan are impressive. Even if one uses a high \$2 billion for the SCSC to replace the destroyers and \$500 million for the LCS, the total cost for a fleet of four SCSC vessels and 12 LCS would only be \$14 billion. A more realistic estimate is perhaps \$11-12 billion. This fleet mix would not only be highly interoperable with American allies and capable of commanding and supporting joint expeditionary task groups, but the LCS would be a useful and cost-effective platform for maritime homeland security requirements. Indeed, if one includes the high endurance of the forthcoming Arctic Patrol Vessels and potential acquisitions of long-range cutters, Canada would be in the enviable position of having various coastal, oceanic and littoral ships that – while designed for specific roles – could be utilized in various other missions. The Arctic vessels could improve Canada's ocean-going sea control capabilities, while the LCS could give more teeth to Canadian maritime enforcement. The proposed fleet structure would also provide an important support infrastructure for any subsequent decision to acquire an amphibious LPD vessel, and the savings accrued could be used to finance such a 'big honking ship.'

A more in-depth assessment of this alternative fleet-replacement plan is required. Any proposal to eliminate the frigates will rightly appear extreme to many, and the potential consequences of such a radical change needs to be examined lest Canada finds itself repeating Admiral Horatio Nelson's complaint of a 'want of frigates.' However, with the current uncertainty surrounding current fleet-replacement plans, extreme proposals may be necessary to

prevent further reductions in Canadian naval capabilities. This alternative fleet structure would usefully maintain Canada's traditional role in task group command, while complementing the joint expeditionary warfare concepts that are currently percolating in American maritime strategy. Not only would Canada be able to play a continuing role in important global maritime initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Maritime Partnership, but it would also be able to increase spending on much-needed domestic maritime defence capabilities. In the current strategic threat environment, it may be prudent to adopt a naval philosophy of 'more ships, cheaper ships, but smaller ships.' 🇨🇦

Notes

1. R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," *International Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1962).
2. See Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony," *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.
3. For more on Corbett's strategic thinking, see Barry Hunt, "The Strategic Thought of Sir Julian Corbett," in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan (eds), *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).
4. Joel Sokolsky, "Guarding the Continental Coasts: United States Maritime Homeland Security and Canada," *IRPP Policy Matters*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2005), p. 51.
5. David Pugliese, "Fleet of Warship Replacements on Navy Wish List to Cost Billions," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 March 2007.
6. Eric Lerhe, "Taking Joint Capability Seriously," *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 12.
7. See Kenneth P. Hansen, "Starting Over: The Canadian Navy and Expeditionary Warfare," *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 23.

David S. McDonough is a PhD student in political science and a SSHRC Canadian graduate scholarship holder at Dalhousie University.

Interoperability: The New Frontier

Patrick Lennox*

Scenario: Two commercial vessels are hijacked in international waters. One is headed to Halifax, the other to Boston, but the plot is connected. The group with the vessel headed towards Halifax claims to have a big dirty bomb aboard that it will detonate close to shore if its demands for exorbitant amounts of money are not met by government authorities. Intelligence on the other group is sketchy, but it can be assumed that it has similar designs.

Which government organization would take the lead in dealing with this ugly scenario? How would the bits of information necessary to resolve the crisis flow within and among the many relevant government agencies in Canada and the United States? What resources would be brought to bear to prevent the hijackers from realizing their goals?

HMCS *Preserver* participated in a live joint Canada-US exercise designed to prepare for such a scenario. On 25 June 2007, I joined the crew of *Preserver* for a three-day sail to participate in the exercise. *Preserver* was to act as the hijacked commercial vessel headed towards Halifax. To be frank, I had little understanding of the exercise I would witness firsthand before boarding the ship. I was told by the Executive Officer that it would all unfold in the middle of the night, around 4 am. He asked if I was planning on being awake to watch. Of course I was. But within a couple of hours, I was informed that the exercise would be carried out that afternoon and to be ready. From what I witnessed, the exercise involved members of the RCMP, JTF 2, the US Navy and Coast Guard, and the Canadian Navy and Coast Guard. Later I would learn that there was a lot more to the exercise than met the eye.

What I witnessed about 100-150 miles off the coast of southeastern Nova Scotia was a display of what can only be described as the 'new interoperability.' The standard NATO definition of interoperability is the "ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together." Denis Stairs and Danford Middlemiss put the concept of interoperability in simpler terms, saying it was "best conceived as lying near the middle of a continuum between basic compatibility at the low end (where systems and forces can operate, as it were, side-by-side without interfering with one another's functioning) to complete integration at the high end (where there is an ineluctable element of functional interdependence between systems and forces acting together)."¹



USS *Wasp*.

What was new in the exercise in terms of interoperability had more to do with scope than with form. Instead of two (for example) NATO navies working side-by-side (a common form of interoperability), I witnessed two navies, two coast guards, as well as a national police force and a special forces unit combine in the performance of an off-shore security exercise. But as I would find out later, the scope of the interoperability in the exercise was actually much broader.

Late in the afternoon *Preserver* was surrounded by USS *Wasp* and a Canadian Coast Guard vessel. Out of *Wasp*, a towering amphibious assault vessel, emerged members of Canada's RCMP and JTF 2 aboard rigid inflatable boats. They boarded *Preserver* armed with mock machine guns. The Canadian Coast Guard vessel played a supporting role, while HMCS *Iroquois* and *Fredericton* lurked out of sight. While it was fascinating to see members of JTF 2 and the RCMP being supported by the US Navy and Coast Guard, the exercise itself did not amount to much. There was no shakedown of the ship. No 'hijackers' were 'arrested' or 'shot.' And the bulk of the exercise was carried out within three-quarters of an hour.

What happened on the water was significantly less important from the perspective of the exercise planners than what happened behind the scenes. From the perspective of the planners, the main purpose of the exercise was to work



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

HMCS Fredericton at anchor.

out the bureaucratic and legal kinks of bringing together an unprecedented number of Canadian and American government agencies and departments to resolve a common security threat. This was interoperability taken to an entirely new level. This was 'whole-of-government' interoperability. Here's who was listed as directly involved in the exercise: the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Transport Canada; the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada); the Canadian Coast Guard; Public Safety Canada; Canadian Border Services Agency; the Canadian Forces; the US Navy; the US Coast Guard; and the US Customs and Border Protection Service. The Department of National Defence and Canada Command were also involved, as were the US Department of Defense, US Department of Homeland Security and US Northern Command. NORAD's role in the exercise was, according to the planners, ambiguous. Indeed, it is still to be determined how US Northern Command and Canada Command would be involved in such a security situation should one arise. They will be running a table-top version of the exercise from Ottawa shortly which is designed to resolve this ambiguity.

This is an impressive list of actors. But aside from the US and Canadian Navies, they are not used to acting together to solve a common problem. They are not, in other words, interoperable. They do not have long-term working relationships to fall back on in the event that things do not go as planned, and as a result they do not have the bonds of mutual trust, respect and understanding built from years of cooperation in joint ventures. In the event of a scenario such as the one described above, the probability of confusion and complication about command and control and information sharing is, one would imagine, rather high.

So while in theory it might be comforting to the average citizen to think the 'whole of government' could be brought to bear on such a security problem, in practice and multiplied by two (and then some) by adding the United States into the mix, the situation might become overly complex. The layers of bureaucracy and red tape might become too thick to deal with the situation with the agility and efficiency it demands. Collective action problems could arise.

The pushing and pulling of bureaucratic politics could handcuff the operation. The results could be catastrophic.

The planners of the exercise were acutely aware of all of this – hence their efforts to put together Frontier Sentinel, a series of live joint Canada- US exercises designed to deal with the new maritime-based

threats to continental security. The exercise I witnessed was the fourth in the series, and the first led by Canadian planners. Last year's exercise explored what would happen if a commercial vessel armed with lethal gases and a fogger (i.e., a means of dispersing the gases) were headed for a North American port.

The layers of bureaucracy and red tape might become too thick to deal with the situation with the agility and efficiency it demands.

The objectives of the 2007 version of Frontier Sentinel were extensive, but in sum they amounted to a desire to see what goes wrong both legally and practically when such an array of resources and departments are brought to bear on a common security threat. What are the technical and legal barriers involved in establishing a common operational picture using both Canadian and American intelligence sources ranging from submarines (there was a US nuclear submarine tracking the vessel headed towards Boston) to satellites? What happens in theory and in practice when US assets come under Canadian command and are used as an afloat staging base for interdiction operations? Can



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

HMCS Preserver entering Halifax.



Photo: Author

RCMP RHIBs close HMCS Preserver.

the whole of both the Canadian and US governments come together to coordinate a tactical interception of a targeted vessel utilizing all of their combined sources of surveillance and intelligence? These and other more technical questions needed to be asked and answered.

The stated objectives of the exercise were of great importance. But perhaps of even greater importance were the *unstated* objectives. As I alluded to above, this type of intra- and inter-governmental interoperability is untried and unprecedented and to make it work requires more than a written list of standard operating procedures. To make this sort of interoperability work within and between the Canadian and American governments requires the construction of a single, common security culture. And while this notion of a common security culture remains absent from the official paperwork surrounding the exercise, the planners placed great emphasis on this aspect of their venture.

Operating in silos, in isolation from one another, Transport Canada and the Department of National Defence (for example) will have developed very different understandings of the meaning of security and their roles in its provision for Canadian citizens. Beyond this, they will have developed and deeply embedded in their own departmental cultures a very different set of concepts and terms – a different language, if you will – to describe those roles. Operating in unison, these different understandings and different cultures can play havoc with inter-departmental cooperation, making imposed interoperability more of a hindrance than an asset.

Exercises such as the Frontier Sentinel series help to develop a common set of norms, rules and expectations among the various departments and agencies in Canada and the United States that could be asked to deal with the multiple situations that could occur in the era of new asymmetrical (terrorist) threats. Along with the development of this common continental security culture goes the development of important relationships of trust and surety of mutual competence.

This is important both within Canada and between Canada and the United States, and perhaps especially so in the latter case. A crucial element of maintaining Canadian sovereignty has traditionally been to defend the country against undue 'help' from the United States in keeping the Canadian half of the continent secure. Through exercises like the Frontier Sentinel series, Canada can prove a level of professional competence that can go a long way in maintaining the current tenor of its vital relationship with the United States.

Cooperation in land, sea and air security between Canada and the United States has no doubt been brought closer together by the new asymmetrical threat environment. Six years after 9/11, the efforts of the Frontier Sentinel exercises to develop whole-of-government interoperability within and between Canada and the United States can be seen in a positive light as it clearly strives to create and refine the necessary working relationships across government departments responsible for the collective security of Canadians and Americans.

That being said, there will be those who regard such efforts with skepticism, if not fear. The creation of a common, continental security culture involving the whole of both the Canadian and American governments might not be of great concern to our neighbours to the south but some Canadians might tweak a concerned ear to the possibility since, inevitably, that culture, and all of the assumptions, fears and objectives that are carried with it, will have a uniquely American flavour.

RCMP RHIB at speed.



Already since 9/11 Canadians have seen the basic structure of their state dramatically altered in an effort to (at least in part) mimic the changes that have occurred since then in the United States. In response to the *US Patriot Act*, the Canadian Parliament passed Bill C-36 – the *Anti-Terrorism Act*. Canada passed Bill C-42 – the *Public Safety Act* – and created Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (now Public Safety Canada) in response to the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security. And in response to the standing up of US Northern Command, Canada took on its own revolutionary transformation of its armed forces through the creation of Canada Command. These changes, plus others such as the creation of a National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and the first articulation of a national security strategy (in “Securing an Open Society”), could be seen to amount to a transformation from the neoliberal state of the globalization era to a more muscular and paranoid security state of the post-9/11 era based on the American model.²

There was of course a certain necessity behind this transformation on the Canadian side of the border that was not there on the American side. Canada was forced to conform to the new security state model by virtue of its economic dependency upon access to US markets. The asymmetry of the Canada-US relationship is a constant underlying factor in the vast majority of policy areas in which the two states are involved. This is especially true with respect to matters of continental security.

At a time when security is an obsession in the United States, it would seem that Canada has no choice but to become equally if not more obsessed with keeping the continent safe from further terrorist assaults. Creating a common whole-of-government obsession with security is an unfortunate necessity of both the times and (to borrow the phrase of American international relations theorist William T.R. Fox) the tyranny of Canadian proximity to the United States.³

Taking interoperability with the United States to the whole-of-government level brings with it the same political challenges and benefits of the more traditionally defined scope of interoperability. Challenges come in the form of the limited autonomy brought about by the asymmetrical interdependence that characterizes the Canada-US relationship at home. As well, the perception abroad that Canada is no longer an independent political community increases as continental integration intensifies as a result of this broad-based interoperability. Benefits come in the form of increased access to American intelligence resources, an entitlement to participation in important decisions regarding continental security, and potentially warmer diplomatic relations with Washington.

In the summer of 2002, Middlemiss and Stairs called for a “closer public look” at the implications of interoperability between the armed forces of Canada and the United States. Surely, they said, “no one would think that the process itself should proceed by stealth, or even by osmosis.”⁴ Five years later, and without anything in the way of a significant public debate, this process continues. 🍷

Notes

* I would like to thank the crew of HMCS *Preserver* for having me aboard for the three-day sail, especially the Captain, Commander Don Shubaly, and Executive Officer, LCdr Rod Drugett. It was one of the most memorable experiences of my life. I am indebted to Commander Ken Hansen who made it happen.

1. Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, “The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues,” in Ann Griffiths (ed.), *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002); or in *Policy Matters*, Vol. 3, No. 7 (June 2002), p. 11.
2. See Patrick Lennox, “From Golden Straightjacket to Kevlar Vest: Canada’s Transformation to a Security State,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2007), pp. 1-22.
3. William T.R. Fox, *A Continent Apart: The United States and Canada in World Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), p. 4.
4. Middlemiss and Stairs, “The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability?”

At the time of writing, Patrick Lennox was the Security and Defence Forum Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University. As of September 2007, he is the J.L. Granatstein Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary.

Arctic Sovereignty, Submarine Operations and Water Space Management

Captain (N) Phil Webster



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

HMCS Corner Brook during Operation Nanook 2007.

The Canadian government has decided to establish an armed naval presence in the Canadian Arctic with a supporting Arctic docking and refueling facility at Nanisivik. This decision reflects the requirement for Canada to assert an increased naval presence in the Arctic Ocean under Canadian jurisdiction. These ocean areas include internal waters, a 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial sea, a 24 nm contiguous zone, and a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). They also include the areas covered under the *Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA)*, which was established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and gives Canada the right to control shipping access to the ice-covered regions of the Arctic.

As the modest fleet of Arctic Patrol Vessels will have little or no capability to detect or monitor submarines operating or transiting through these waters, or any other underwater activity, Canada's submarine force will be needed to contribute to comprehensive Arctic surveillance. Although

the *Victoria*-class submarine does not have an under-ice capability, the mere presence of a Canadian submarine operating in the ice-free areas of the Canadian Arctic, including the chokepoints in the Northwest Passage, can have a significant impact in assessing underwater activity and the operations of non-Canadian submarines transiting or operating in these areas.

This is accomplished in two ways. The first is the actual detection of submarines by different types of organic and non-organic submarine sensors, in coordination with fixed or mobile bottom sensors, CP 140 Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Canadian Patrol Frigates. This type of operation is resource intensive, and would only be considered as a 'show of force' in times of tension or crisis against non-allied submarines. In peacetime, a Canadian submarine operating under the current NATO Water Space Management (WSM) regime is the second method available to understand allied submarine movements in the Canadian

Arctic, including the Northwest Passage. It is this second method that we will discuss here.

What is Water Space Management?

Water space management (WSM) can be thought of as somewhat analogous to a limited air traffic control system that monitors ('de-conflicts') the movements of submarines throughout the world. The concept was adopted by NATO in the early days of the Cold War, and is used by national, NATO and regional submarine operating authorities (SUBOPAUTHs) to ensure the safety of submarine operations in the world's oceans.

Using a number of different protocols and procedures, submarines are routed to their operating areas using a SUBNOTE which provides a 'moving haven' (MH) of defined dimensions (including depth) in which the submarine must remain. In days before GPS and Inertial Navigation Systems, this 'haven' was traditionally quite large – 50 nm ahead, 100 nm astern and 20 nm either side of the centre – but as navigation technology progressed the moving havens have tended to become much smaller. This allows for more submarines to be routed in closer proximity to each other without danger of mutual interference.

The actual patrol or operating area is defined by a Notice of Intention (NOI), or a Submarine Patrol Area (SPA) published by the SUBOPAUTH and providing the geographic coordinates, depth and time period in which the submarine will be operating. Submarines operating in their own territorial waters or national submarine exercise areas are usually routed using a Diving Message, which is not shared with other states. Operating a dived submarine in another state's territorial seas is considered a serious act of provocation, and consequently it is assumed by national SUBOPAUTHs in times of peace that there would be no foreign submarines in territorial seas.

There are other aspects of tactical WSM that are used when a submarine is operating in conjunction with surface and air forces to prevent tactical weapons use against a friendly submarine in times of conflict, but for the purpose of this article only the more operational aspects of WSM will be discussed.

Why would a submarine-operating state want other states to know the location of its submarines outside of its own territorial seas? In peacetime, safety of submarine movements is paramount, and all submarine Commanding Officers understand that an underwater collision will ruin their whole day. Consequently, all submarine movements



USS Scranton surfaced at the North Pole.

Photo: Internet image

are de-conflicted by ensuring that there are no other submarines operating in the same NOI, SPA or transiting in the same MH. This does not mean that the Canadian, or other national or NATO/regional, SUBOPAUTHs know the location of every submarine. Deployment areas for US Navy, Royal Navy and French Navy nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are closely held by their national authorities, but even these operations are de-conflicted among the three states at a high level. Covert submarine operations again are held closely by national authorities, but de-conflicted by national authorities against known allied submarine movements using the NATO and/or regional SUBOPAUTHS and the WSM system.

Why would a submarine-operating state want other states to know the location of its submarines outside of its own territorial seas?

There is a close relationship between national and NATO/allied SUBOPAUTHs, with real-time communications to exchange data and information. In the North Atlantic, the traditional area of Canadian submarine operations, the Canadian Navy established an exchange officer position at the USN Submarine Atlantic Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, in the early 1970s to enhance the relationship between the Canadian Navy SUBOPAUTH located in Halifax and the USN SUBOPAUTH. With the recent location of Canadian submarines in Esquimalt, British Columbia, a similar position has been established in Pearl Harbor at the USN Submarine Pacific Headquarters.

The WSM system was established to ensure the safety of allied submarine operations throughout the world. One aspect of the system is not well understood and this is the ability for a submarine-operating state to temporarily de-



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

HMCS *Windsor* returning to Halifax in 2006.

clare a Notice of Intention for submarine operations on the high seas, thus de facto controlling that area unless other states are willing to risk the safety of their submarines by not notifying the state that established the NOI of their operations. For example, using the NATO SUBOP-AUTH system, Canada established a submarine Notice of Intention (NOI) off the Grand Banks during the so-called Turbot War with Spain in 1995, and declared this NOI to NATO using WSM protocols. Whether or not a Canadian submarine was ever deployed in the area with a heavy-weight torpedo capability was not important – what was important is that NATO SUBOPAUTHs, including Spain, were aware that if another submarine entered the NOI, a potential safety issue could occur. This may or may not have helped de-escalate the situation, but it was certainly one tool the Canadian government used to resolve this unfortunate incident.

WSM and Canadian Arctic Sovereignty

How do submarine operations and WSM affect Canadian Arctic sovereignty? First, operating a submarine in the Canadian Arctic, and chokepoints in the Northwest Passage, and declaring these operations to non-Canadian SUBOPAUTHs, indicates to other states that Canada has the capability to control the water column in ocean areas claimed by Canada, even if only for part of the year. Second, although the WSM system is not meant to prevent other states' submarines from operating in the Canadian Arctic under the control of Canada (with the exception of internal waters and territorial seas), it will ensure that when a Canadian submarine NOI is established, other allied states which want to take their submarines through the NOI need to de-conflict their submarines' movement with the Canadian SUBOPAUTH to ensure the safety of both states' submarines.

Over time, this will allow Canada to understand the level of underwater activity in the Canadian Arctic. The judicious establishment of submarine NOIs in chokepoints and other areas limited by depth and geography would make it difficult for other states' submarines covertly to go under or around the operating envelope of the *Victoria*-class submarines without being detected. Finally, operating Canadian submarines in the Arctic, even if limited by time of year due to ice, will increase our understanding of the undersea oceanographic environment, and enhance the capability of the Canadian Forces to operate in Canada's north.

Conclusion

Depending on the time of year and ice conditions, the *Victoria*-class has the capability to operate in the Canadian Arctic and chokepoints of the Northwest Passage. HMCS *Corner Brook*, a *Victoria*-class submarine, completed a very successful deployment in the Northern Labrador Sea and Davis Strait in August of this year. If predictions about global warming are accurate, ice coverage in the Arctic will be reduced, the ice edge will recede and the potential areas for operating Canadian submarines will increase significantly. Demonstrating to Canadians and non-Canadians alike that Canada has the will and the capability to assert sovereignty in the seas of the Arctic claimed by it will become more important as global warming allows the increased exploitation of the Arctic seabed, and Canada makes claims to extend its continental shelf under the UNCLOS treaty. The use of the current NATO and allied water space management regimes will not only allow Canada to operate submarines safely in the Canadian Arctic, but will assist Canada in gaining an understanding of other submarine movements and other underwater activity in these waters. The WSM system is an important tool in this endeavour, but only if Canada maintains a viable and capable submarine force.

Returning to the analogy of an air traffic control system, Canada would have little credibility in declaring sovereignty over air space without a fighter interceptor capability to enforce its claim. Likewise, without submarines, Canada will be excluded from sharing in the NATO and allied WSM systems, and will not be in a position to enforce sovereignty by monitoring submarine and undersea activity in the Canadian Arctic, and control the movement of submarines in the Northwest Passage. 🇨🇦

Captain (N) Phil Webster is a former Commanding Officer of Canadian Oberon submarines, HMCS Fraser, and Maritime Operations Group 5. He is currently Director of Submarine Warfare at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre.

The Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service

Laura Allan

Women are typically remembered for their work rolling bandages for the Red Cross and working in the factories, and that is seen as the extent of their contribution to the war effort during World War II. But the war also saw the first opportunity for thousands of women across Canada to become members of the Canadian military. Before WW II, women were only permitted to wear uniforms and travel overseas during a war with the Nursing Sisters, members of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, taking care of the wounded in the hospitals behind the fighting. In WW II, however, for the first time in Canadian history, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of National War Services (DNWS) formally recognized the value of women's labour and their ability to serve Canada by creating an official women's division for all three branches of the military: air force, army and navy.

This article will focus on the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS or Wrens) but the government policies also applied to the other women's services. In particular, we will examine government policies relating to servicewomen's pay and benefits, jobs available for women, and societal concerns about women in the military and their effect on DND policies.

For Canada, World War II began on 10 September 1939 with the Canadian government's decision to support Britain and declare war against Germany. The war was not a complete surprise – the tensions in Europe had been apparent for some time – and some Canadians had anticipated its inception. Women in British Columbia began organizing women's service corps, based on the British Army's Women's Auxiliary Territorial Service, as early as October 1938. With the outbreak of war, membership in these groups grew and by 1941 they boasted approximately 6,700 members across the country. These groups created their own uniforms, sometimes as simple and inexpensive as an armband or as elaborate as a replication of the uniforms used by women in the British military. As well, they organized themselves into rank structures used by the Canadian Army and instituted their own command hierarchy. Members learned skills they hoped would be of use to the military, such as clerical work, transport driving, first aid and cooking in large quantities. Some groups even had ex-army personnel who taught military drill with rifles.

Soon after war was declared, these groups began asking DND and DNWS for official recognition but it was denied due to DND fears that it would have to provide the same



Photo: Crowstest, September, 1949

Sub-Lieutenant (NS) Hazel Mullin. Joining the Nursing Sisters was the only option for women until WW II and the formation of women's divisions in the navy, army and air force.

recognition to everyone, even those which were not up to high military standards. DND was uncertain as to how to handle these groups and contemplated issuing warnings that they were in violation of the Criminal Code of Canada provision forbidding unauthorized groups from wearing uniforms and using ranks mistakable for those used by His Majesty's Forces.

As the war progressed DND realized that it would be foolish to ignore the resources at its fingertips. As early as June 1940, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) began to consider the possibility of putting women into uniform to free men for active service overseas. All three branches of the forces were asked by NDHQ to estimate the number of jobs that women would be able to fill. Initially, the navy responded with a mere 20 positions as light transport drivers – hardly enough to bother creating a women's division.¹

Even before the creation of the women's services, many women worked in naval and air base offices as civil servants. The Canadian Forces had also used volunteer female labour since the declaration of war. With the increasing manpower shortage, the Canadian government decided to allow women to join the military. But the government made it clear that it was doing so because of the war, and



A female naval officer firing her side arm at sea. Gender is not a factor in determining the allocation of duties aboard ship; females are expected to go in harm's way when necessary.

the need for men to serve overseas. In July 1940, the air force was the first branch of the Canadian military to create a women's service – the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force, later renamed The Royal Canadian Air Force, Women's Division. The army followed shortly after with the Canadian Women's Army Corps in August. The navy would wait a full year after the other branches before it set up its women's division, forced into it by manpower shortages from the Battle of the Atlantic and the need to free shore-based sailors.

Given the delay, the navy had an opportunity to learn from the experiences of the other branches. Therefore, instead of creating the women's division as an auxiliary component, the navy integrated the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service directly into the Royal Canadian Navy, thus avoiding many administrative difficulties that occurred in the army and air force women's divisions. The Wrens remained the smallest of the women's services, and claimed to be the most selective.

Unfortunately – but perhaps not surprisingly – not all members of the military were open to having women in their units. Servicemen wanted to know that their women would be at home when they returned from the war. Many soldiers overseas wrote bitter letters home condemning the newly created women's services. Many Canadians were unsure how to react to servicewomen. As Rosamund Greer recalls, “[My former employer] seemed to think that all women in uniform were prostitutes, and I took exception to that.”²

According to a 1942 poll, just 7% of Canadians felt military service was the best way women could support the war effort.³ The opposition was particularly strong in Quebec where the support for the war was lukewarm at best and

the Catholic church was committed to the values of home and family. One former Wren recalls being pushed out of a store in Montreal by the owner because she was shopping in uniform and her friends were spat on in the streets.⁴ Given the strong opinions about the respectability and femininity of women in uniform, it is understandable that the Canadian government felt the need to implement policies that reflected these opinions.

When creating the women's services, DND decided employment for women should be in non-physical, secondary jobs. In all cases, men were to remain firmly in charge with women in the subordinate positions. Recruiters responded to the societal concerns about servicewomen losing their femininity by ensuring that the jobs they'd be doing were similar to those in the civilian world. Most servicewomen were employed as cooks, clerks and laundry maids, which earned them the reputation as secretaries in uniform.

These jobs were not terribly glamorous, but they were in line with the applicants' work experience, and their preferences. The majority of Wren duties required no additional training beyond practical on-the-job experience. Most women did not request non-traditional jobs, which was lucky as the navy rarely granted such requests. But as manpower shortages worsened, women took on new jobs. By the end of the war, the number of trades available to women reached a peak of 39, which included dietitian, communications operator, signalman, coders and radar plotters.⁵ Unlike earlier positions available to women, these highly important trades required a new level of training that had never been available to women before. The few who were chosen for this training acquired unique skills in an exclusively male domain which would never have been available in a civilian career.

While the number of trades available to servicewomen grew throughout the war, none of the jobs involved combat activities. It was thought that men were by nature more suited to dangerous jobs and that it was against a woman's nature as the nurturer and giver of life to kill another human being. And, indeed, for most women, the fact that they would not have to bear arms was a relief. Many had not wanted the responsibilities associated with using offensive weapons and were content to carry on with their active duty without the worry of having to use lethal force. The policy was also in line with the current social beliefs. The Canadian public simply did not want its women involved with firearms and the Wrens were happy to oblige.

Despite the fact that women were doing the same jobs as the men they were replacing, they received only two-thirds

of the pay. The military attempted to rationalize the inequality by stating that the government expected it would take *three* women to do the work of *two* men. As well, the government did not want the women's services competing with civil employment. Others argued that the differences in pay were because the navy provided benefits, such as food, lodgings and medical care, which were unavailable in the civilian world. But it was not just that they received lower pay, servicewomen were also denied other benefits provided to servicemen, such as the dependence allowance. As well, a woman whose husband was in the military was entitled to a separation allowance, however, as soon as she put on a uniform, she was no longer eligible for the assistance.

Despite the general lack of enthusiasm for women in the military, the Canadian public did not support the inequality in pay and benefits provided to women and the criticism began to hurt recruitment. Many girls joined the services as a means to contribute to their family's income and thought they should receive fair benefits. Despite the government's low expectations, in reality, the women often outperformed the men they replaced.

In recognition of all these factors, in July 1941, adjustments were made to the pay and benefits of servicewomen – women would now make about 80% of what men made. Servicewomen also became eligible for benefits, such as the separation allowance and allowances were given for dependent siblings and parents. No benefits were provided for children as one of the conditions of recruitment for women was that they have no dependent children they would be leaving. As well, the benefits confirmed that only a wife, never a husband, could be declared as a dependent. Since the pay and benefits in the women's services were now better than those provided in private industry, servicewomen could hardly complain. The rate of pay, however, reminded women that they were only temporary employees of the military and they were still subordinate to servicemen.

By mid-1942, servicewomen faced a new challenge. Based on rumours that were circulating, the public began to question their morality. These women were attacked at their most vulnerable point, their sexual respectability. The 'whispering campaign' seemed to confirm fears about the unsavoury things that would happen if the genders were mixed in the military. Only a small percentage of young, unmarried servicewomen became pregnant or contracted venereal disease, but this did not stop Canadian society from believing that servicewomen were 'loose.' The Wrens were luckily spared most of the allegations as they had always recruited the 'better type' of girl. Ironically, the rumours may have been a result of *high* morals, as some

suspected that it was rejected servicemen who began the rumours.

Any woman who became pregnant was discharged from the women's services. Of the fathers named by discharged servicewomen 86% were members of the military, but there were no repercussions for servicemen. The Canadian forces viewed "illegitimate pregnancies [as] unfortunate, but primarily the woman's responsibility."⁶ In fact, men were almost expected to have a 'fling' once they joined the military. The double standard with regard to sexual morality in the forces is clear – women were discharged from service in shame, and men suffered no recriminations.

Another concern for servicewomen was the rumour that they were plagued with venereal disease (VD). Infection was more prevalent in servicemen than servicewomen, but again this did not stop the rumours. Initially, the treatment was different as well. Servicewomen were given a medical *discharge* for VD (as well as for pregnancy), while men were given *treatment*. This policy was replaced within six months, however, and women were extended the same medical treatment as men, although men received medical priority.

In order to reduce and prevent the number of infections, men were given 'early preventative treatment' and condoms; women got scare tactics and questionable information. Servicewomen complained that they were told there was no infallible measure to protect themselves other than abstinence, which seemed to contradict what the men were being told and the condoms they were given. Women were reminded that a VD infection would risk their dreams of a husband and family once the war was over. With one social violation, women turned from being innocent and in need of protection to a menace that threatened both the brave men of the services and society in general.

The government decided not to counter the rumours as it would bring more attention to the problem. Instead the women's services attempted to emphasize the positives of the servicewomen's lives, and the Wrens highlighted the high morality of their recruits. In attempts to gain public support and entice recruitment, the women's services used the media to get their messages across. Advertisements reminded Wrens that they were ladies before they joined the navy so they should conduct themselves as ladies not sailors. As an example of their ladylike qualities, Wrens kept their hats on indoors while other servicewomen and men had to take off their headdress.⁷

A short film, *Proudly She Marches*, was made by the National Film Board as a response to the 'whispering campaign.' A recurring theme in the video was the idea of freeing a man for active service. Servicemen were seen passing

their workspace to a servicewoman so that they could go off to fight. The film made the services appear like a thrilling experience, but with no danger.

Another way the women's services attempted to reach average Canadians was through household magazines, such as the *Canadian Geographical Journal*. An article entitled "Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service" in the December 1943 issue was surprisingly honest about the hesitance of some Commanding Officers towards having women in their units. The article confronted the gossip that plagued the women's services saying it "was only a matter of days before hard-bitten critics had to admit that those girls could do the jobs they had assumed just as well as any man, sometimes better"⁸ While *Proudly She Marches* ignored the problems and instead focused on the highlights and excitement of joining up, the journal articles provided a forum to promote as well as discuss the women's services.

Despite the contributions of the WRCNS, recruiting was phased out in early 1945 as it was clear the war would soon be coming to an end. The Wrens began to prepare members for the return to civilian life. For some women returning home to friends, family and their former lives was exactly what they wanted, but for others it was an unwelcome step backwards. Not all women wanted to return to civilian life. Many petitioned the government to retain the women's services as a reserve force, but Cabinet turned down the proposal and they were disbanded in 1946. A former Wren wrote in *Women's Home Journal* that sending women back to the home after the war experiences was "like putting a chick back in the shell – it cannot be done without destroying the spirit, heart or mind."⁹ Some women were furious that the war had turned them into skilled and competent workers who were being cast aside at the war's end.

The Canadian government quickly realized that the military could not return to its pre-war exclusively male recruitment policies. The manpower shortages that plagued all branches of the military continued into the 1950s and with the start of the Korean War it was apparent that women would be required to supplement the dwindling forces. In late 1950, the government authorized women to serve in the reserve forces of all three services but only to fill the vacancies where it was difficult to recruit men.

The positions offered to women continued to be limited and they were denied positions in DND headquarters in Ottawa, positions that had been filled by women during the war. But, despite setbacks, progress continued to be made. In January 1955, the government authorized women to be integrated into the Royal Canadian Navy as regular force

members rather than re-establishing the separate female component used during the war.

While these steps showed that Canadian government and society were willing to accept the contributions women could offer the military, they were still limited in their employment opportunities and always regarded as secondary to men. As well, the number of women who could join the RCN as regular force members was limited to 400 and they were given only positions that would not "interfere with men's prospects."¹⁰ And, despite being members of the navy, women were not permitted to sail.

Debate continued about whether women were necessary to peacetime operations. In 1964, at the lowest point of female recruitment, there were only 288 women serving in the navy across the country. From the 1950s to the 1980s the involvement of women in the navy came under relentless scrutiny as experts tried to decide the fate of female sailors. Some believed that women no longer served a purpose in the navy and their involvement should be ended, while others advocated a greater equality between servicemen and servicewomen.

The discussion continued, but the fact remained that after all their hard work and dedication, the government could not take away a woman's right to serve her country. And as the women's movement gained ground in society, it seemed inevitable that women would continue to appear in more and more non-traditional professions. The liberal social trends in Canadian society helped encourage the pursuit of equality within the navy and ensure that women could continue to be full-time members. Despite fears that employing women would cause Canada to lose credibility in the eyes of its allies, by the mid-1970s women were serving in all major locations within Canada, with NATO forces in Europe and assisting United Nations forces in the Middle East. However, despite these advances, women were still excluded from combat roles, sea duty and postings in isolated areas.

The *Canadian Human Rights Act*, which forbids discrimination in the workplace based on gender, came into effect in 1978, and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* came into effect in 1982. These acts forced the military to re-examine its policies regarding women. The navy conducted trials aboard HMCS *Cormorant*, a non-combat vessel that could easily support a mixed gender crew. By the end of the trials in 1984, the navy concluded that women would be suitable to serve on minor war vessels but not on the destroyer fleet which represented the vast majority of the sea duty positions.

In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Commission Tribunal declared that the military must eliminate all obstacles



Photo: Pte Darcy Lefebvre, Formation Imaging Atlantic
 Prime Minister Harper talking to a female sailor aboard HMCS Montreal in August 2006.

preventing women from pursuing careers in any trade offered by the navy. Women were permitted to choose any position with the exception of the Roman Catholic chaplaincy and service on the *Oberon*-class submarines because of concerns about accommodation. These concerns were addressed in 2001 when Canada purchased four *Victoria*-class submarines from the British Navy which provided servicewomen with more privacy in their accommodations, and the restrictions against women serving in submarines were lifted.¹¹ The service of women on submarines represented the final step on their road to equality within the Canadian Forces.

As the views about women changed in Canadian society, women were provided with a greater number of opportunities within the navy. Despite (or perhaps because of) the initial skepticism of their male superiors and co-workers, they proved themselves capable and professional in all of the work they were given.

Today, however, women are still a minority within the military, representing only 12.8% of regular force members and 20% of reserve members. Women are under-represented in leadership positions, at 9.5% of senior non-commissioned members and 9.3% of senior officers.¹² In the navy, women represent only 12.3% of both the regular and reserve forces,¹³ although usually more women choose to serve in the reserves rather than regular forces. Women also remain under-represented in leadership positions within the navy as a whole and no woman has been promoted beyond the rank of Lieutenant-Commander.

In my experiences within the Naval Reserves, I have been in both the majority and minority. Thus, for several courses, including my basic training, the ratio was equal or in favour of the women. Yet once I began my training on the ships, I noticed the ratio declined for the hard sea trades, as I found myself the only woman in the communications department. As well, on a ship with 62 crew members only seven were women and none were above the non-commissioned rank of Petty Officer Second Class. While I cannot speak for all possible situations, I have noticed that women are under-represented within the Naval Reserve yet they

are nonetheless treated as equals and are given the same opportunities for training and career advancement as servicemen with the same qualifications.

In conclusion, the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service was considered a success not only by its members but also by the Canadian government. The military recruited over 43,000 women to serve during the war, and 6,600 served as Wrens.¹⁵ Government policies relating to servicewomen during WW II were not written to create inequality between servicemen and servicewomen. Instead they were influenced by values in Canadian society. Because of the fluid nature of society, these policies evolved to reflect changes. The policies regarding employment opportunities, pay and benefits and the treatment of venereal disease adapted to meet the needs of servicewomen even as they bowed to the pressures of society.

Allowing women to become members of the military was a huge change and it is not surprising that 'society' was initially reluctant to accept it. But given the imperatives of war, and the excellence with which the women fulfilled their duties, it became more acceptable. A democratic government must reflect the wishes of society, but in the midst of war it must also be realistic about wasting human resources. As societal values and the position of women in society evolved, women were permitted to continue as members of the navy and achieve equality within their military careers. 🇨🇦

Notes

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Leading Seaman Laura Allan has been serving as a naval communicator in the Canadian Naval Reserve since 2003. She is currently parading at HMCS Prevost in London, Ontario, while attending university.

Submarines and the Canadian Navy Today: One Man's View

J. David Perkins

Foreword

This essay by David Perkins was originally published in the Spring/Summer 2000 edition of *Maritime Affairs*. It is reprinted here for two reasons. First the essay is a tribute to David himself. A former submariner who served as a member of the RCN in British submarines and later when Canada bought the three *Oberon*-class submarines he served in them in Halifax until 1979 when he retired as a Chief Petty Officer. He also became Canada's submarine historian and wrote five books and several papers on the colourful and often controversial evolution of the Canadian submarine service, ending with *The Canadian Submarine Service in Review* (St. Catherine's: Vanwell Publishing, 2000). Sadly, David died last year; this was far too early and his input into the on-going process of telling the story of Canada's submarines is missed enormously.

Second, the essay is a good summary of Canadian submarine history and forms an excellent beginning to understanding the complexity of Canada's present submarine program. The only comment one might add to David's analysis is that by the early 1990s the urgency of acquiring replacements for the *Oberons* was considerable because unless new submarines were obtained, the level of training would quickly deteriorate and the ability to operate submarines safely would be lost.

Peter Haydon

That the Canadian Navy has submarines at all is quite remarkable. The story of Canadian submarines is one of deeply entrenched reluctance on the part of government arrayed against the determination of a few senior naval officers and enlightened bureaucrats. To this can be added a certain amount of pressure from allies badgering Canada to give its navy greater operational scope. Only with the acceptance of the concept of a balanced naval force capable



Photo: Peter Haydon

An A-class submarine of the 6th Submarine Squadron (SM6) in 1957.

of conducting a full range of operations upon, above and below the surface has the submarine gained a measure of acceptability.

When it was founded in 1910, it would have been impractical for Canada's navy even to consider operating submarines. Theoretically, possession of submarines would have had a deterrent effect on the aspirations of a belligerent power, but the likelihood of Canada having to face such an adversary was negligible. During WW I, the relative isolation of Canada's coasts served to provide a real measure of protection. In 1914, when a German cruiser squadron was loose in the Pacific, it never ventured within a thousand miles of Canadian waters despite the fact that Canada was the only 'enemy' possession along the entire American Pacific seaboard. The Germans had much more urgent concerns than risking battle damage for little gain. On the East Coast, a few German U-boats did operate off the Halifax approaches, but only for a brief period towards the end of the war. Neither the West Coast ports nor those in the east were ever directly threatened by surface forces against which Canadian submarines could have been deployed effectively.

Nevertheless, for want of other warships, two submarines – CC1 and CC2 – were acquired and commissioned for




Photo: J. David Perkins

HMC Submarine CH 14 at anchor in the early 1920s.

the defence of the West Coast inshore waters. They took turns patrolling the Juan de Fuca Strait during the crisis of late 1914. Canada's first submarines were manned for the most part by ex-Royal Navy (RN) personnel who were serving on loan or had settled in Canada. Worn out by the rigours of service the two boats were replaced with new submarines of an obsolete design by a gift from the Admiralty in 1919. These, along with most of the navy, were discarded in the retrenchment that followed the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

The RN was ill-prepared for the U-boat onslaught that Nazi Germany unleashed during the first three years of WW II.

During WW I a number of Canadian officers, including some who trained in the CC-boats, served in and even commanded RN submarines overseas. Canadians, though small in number, were the only other national group to serve in RN submarines. A Canadian was the first Volunteer Reservist (VR) ever to serve in RN submarines and the only one to last out the war. Another was the first VR ever to command an RN boat and, with a shuffling of the cards, became the first of only six Royal Naval Reserves (RNRs) to command one. This officer also won a coveted DSO for his service in submarines. An RCN officer was the first midshipman ever to serve in RN submarines. He was also one of the very few RCN officers to command an operational RN warship in that war and his was the only submarine to be sunk by aerial bombing at sea, albeit at the hands of an ally.

Throughout the course of WW I a large number of submarines were built in Canada for allied navies including

10 for the RN and eight for the Italian Navy while a total of 17 prefabricated submarine building kits were assembled for the Imperial Russian Navy. Eleven of these were completed in Russian shipyards and entered service with the Imperial or, as it became, the Soviet Navy. With the advent of the Bolshevik revolution, six of the Russian kits lying in storage in Vancouver were acquired by the United States, assembled and commissioned in the USN.

The same strategic situation held true in WW II. Neither coast was ever seriously threatened by hostile surface forces although U-boat attacks in Canadian and Newfoundland waters were fairly frequent.

Considering the state of the country's economy and industrial capacity, Canada had much more to gain in building and operating surface vessels than submarines. There was a strong case to be made for having submarines for anti-submarine training, but this was not appreciated until WW II was well under way.

In the period between the end of WW I and Hitler's rise to power, it was the stated British opinion that U-boats would never again become a significant force in a future German war. Only when Hitler repudiated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and German rearmament began in earnest was this fallacy exposed. Because of this, and the slow pace of naval weapons development between the wars, the RN was ill-prepared for the U-boat onslaught that Nazi Germany unleashed during the first three years of WW II.

To help redress the balance, Canada undertook the building and manning of a fleet of anti-submarine (A/S) escorts: the famous or infamous, depending on your experiences, corvettes. When these ships began entering service, it was quickly realized that there was a real need for submarines with which to train them. The RCN had no way of providing these and Canada prevailed on the Admiralty for assistance. Ultimately, training submarines were provided by the RN through various means, including 'lend-lease.' These operated from Halifax, Pictou, St. John's, Digby and Bermuda throughout most of the war.

Once again Canadian officers were afforded an opportunity to serve in British submarines on an equal footing with their British and Commonwealth counterparts. Twenty-six RCNVR officer volunteers were accepted for training in submarines. Three of these volunteers rose to commands of their own and two were decorated for their service in submarines, one of them twice. Three more



The three Canadian *Oberon*-class submarines.

RNCVR volunteers were chosen for the Special Services where two were pioneers in the Chariots, or ‘human torpedoes.’ The third served in the *X-craft* mini-submarines.

As the allies turned their attentions to the Pacific at the end of the European war, the RCN was preparing to man and operate a flotilla of four Canadian-based British submarines in order to facilitate the training of Canadian anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. The sudden capitulation of Japan following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki terminated this project before it could be brought to fruition.

With the creation of NATO in the late 1940s and the intensification of the Cold War during the 1950s, the Canadian Navy assumed an increasing responsibility for the deployment of ASW assets as its contribution to the NATO partnership. However, during the war ASW had been made a specialty of the naval reserves. But once the reserve had been returned to a peacetime footing, the navy found itself having to scramble for ASW expertise as well as for suitable ships.

Along with the acceleration of ASW training that began in the early 1950s came a new requirement for seagoing training submarines. These were needed to provide services for RCN ships, carrier-borne ASW aircraft and the long-range patrol aircraft of the RCAF. It was the story of WW II all over again – the RCN had none. Surplus submarines were available but for a variety of reasons the Canadian government steadfastly refused to consider their acquisition. Fortunately, Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, was able to provide training submarine services to the RCN on a part-time loan or rental basis for over 20 years. This arrangement was formalized with

Britain in 1955 with the creation of the 6th Submarine Squadron (SM6) and the permanent stationing of two or three submarines at Halifax. As a condition of the deal, Canada offset the manning requirements of the two RN boats with Canadian personnel who served aboard British submarines both in Canada and abroad. Not until the mid-1960s did Canada begin acquiring submarines of its own.

It has long been recognized in naval circles that Canada, with the longest coastline of any country and responsibility for a vast area of accessible offshore territory and its attendant resources, can ill afford to ignore the underwater dimension. Modern conventional submarines make ideal maritime surveillance platforms. One submarine on station can monitor an enormous area continuously for weeks at a time without betraying its presence. To provide the same level of coverage with a combination of bottom sensors, ships and aircraft would be prohibitively expensive and patently obvious. As well, by this juncture the submarine had become a very capable ASW platform in its own right. Nevertheless, Conservative and Liberal governments alike rebuked repeated efforts to equip the Canadian Navy with submarines. Even when submarines were eventually acquired, quality, combat capability and numbers were all sacrificed in the name of politics, unrealistic fiscal restraints and lowered expectations.

As the Cold War intensified, the Canadian Navy at various times identified a need for either a combination of six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and three conventional (non-nuclear) attack submarines (SSKs) or a total of 12 to 16 SSKs. These were to be deployed primarily as operational units although training was still considered to be an important secondary role. Ultimately, a plan to

buy three SSKs offshore and to build a further six to nine in Canada was established. As a stopgap, one obsolescent ex-USN fleet boat was acquired on a five-year lease for the West Coast. In the end only three British-built *Oberons* were procured to replace the boats of SM6 while the West Coast lost its submarine altogether.

For their first 15 years in service the *Oberons* were relegated exclusively to a training role on the East Coast. The Canadian defence establishment, it seemed, wanted nothing to do with operational submarines. The big shift occurred in the early 1980s when, to help fill in for an aging ASW fleet, these boats were rearmed, brought up to an operational state and given meaningful operational employment. By then, however, they were long past their prime.

When the time came to consider replacing the *Oberons*, a modest requirement of between four and 12 SSKs was identified. This plan was swept aside by the 1987 White Paper on Defence which called for the construction of 12 SSNs in Canada. Within two years this ambitious scheme had evaporated without ever reaching Cabinet. So too had the Cold War. When the dust settled, the Canadian Navy was left with its three obsolescent *Oberons* and little hope for the future.

After 12 years of uncertainty and a trail of abandoned submarine replacement schemes the government announced in 1998 that a lease-to-purchase deal had been made with Britain for four redundant *Vickers*, Type-2400 patrol submarines. In a survey of suitable submarine designs conducted in 1986 as part of the conventional submarine acquisition program, these boats had been rated second behind a German contender in an international field of seven designs. The '*Vickers*' boats, or the *Upholder*-class as they had become, were considered to be lacking in diving capability, generator capacity, weapons-carrying capacity and patrol endurance. However, the price was right and the 30-year-old *Oberons* were getting perilously close to reaching the end of their hull life.

In the Canadian Navy these submarines have become the *Victoria*-class. The first change that occurred with the assumption of Canadian ownership was the removal of the *Harpoon* surface-to-surface missile (SSM) capability along with the somewhat dated fire control system. At the same time it was announced that the *Victorias* would be fully operational units of the fleet. This was followed by the removal of the state-of-the-art electronic countermeasures (ECM) suite. The fire control and ECM will be replaced by 20 year-old refurbished equipment recovered from the obsolescent O-boats. This will give the *Victorias* a limited combat capability. Just what the Canadian government means by 'operational' seems to be very different



Photo: J. David Perkins

An *Oberon*-class Control Room.



Photo: Peter Haydon

The Control Room of HMCS *Windsor*.

from what the phrase implies in other NATO navies. All front-line SSKs in NATO are armed with SSMs in addition to modern multi-purpose heavyweight torpedoes.

One would like to think that the Canadian Navy today possesses combat-capable operational submarines because of a genuine conviction on the part of government that they are a necessary component of a modern, balanced and effective Canadian fleet. However, the record of Canadian governments, past and present, reveals a less than reassuring state of affairs. From the public perspective it appears that the navy has submarines at all only because of pressure from within DND and because it was politically expedient for the government of the day to be seen to be cooperating with its allies. This was as true in 1964 when the *Oberons* were purchased as it was in 1998 when the *Victorias* were acquired. No Canadian government, and most certainly no Prime Minister, has ever admitted publicly that submarines are a legitimate component of Canada's maritime forces. Consequently, Canada's Submarine Service is destined by longstanding political tradition to occupy a somewhat tenuous position in the eyes and minds of its masters. 🍷

Making Waves

A Maritime Strategy for the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives on the Potential Scenarios

Rear-Admiral R. Girouard

The scene is spring 2009, the Korean peninsula. The Beijing Olympics are over. UN sanctions on North Korea, strengthened in response to a round of nuclear tests and missile launches in late 2007 and largely carried out by the United States and Japan, have stifled much of the drug trade, covert arms sales and reach of counterfeit currency upon which North Korea's fiscal liquidity is dependent. Bribes, influence and power are thin and their impact tenuous, as is the continued existence of the Kim family's hold on power. It is campaign season in East Asia and the incentives of survival, of a ruler in extremis, have determined that it is time to go to war.

The opening act of Korean reunification is initiated at midnight on a date which originates in the hopes of numerology or astrology, it matters not. Kim Jong-Il, the 'Dear Leader,' has determined it is time for the Korean people to again be one, if only to allow him to remain in power. The rocket launchers, conventional artillery barrage and armoured pincers are all textbook. The table-top exercises and war games of the last 50 years prove themselves as the North Korean army's headlong rush to take back Seoul and the port of Incheon plays itself out. The DMZ is a memory as US and South Korean forces initiate their counterattack, designed to minimize the North's penetration if not loss of life in a National Capital area of some 23 million people. Allied forces hope to see reinforcements soon.

The sea campaign is immediate and violent as surface, submarine and air forces from the North preemptively pound everything that enters or approaches Korean waters, whatever its purpose, whatever the flag – save that of China, which appears shocked by unfolding events and acts to prohibit its own vessels from being caught in the melee. Intelligence centres quickly note an unbalanced air effort, one that leans heavily towards maritime interdiction as opposed to the land campaign and North Korea's surge south, but they fail to note that a conventional CAP has been displaced over the land assault by an inordinately robust mobile air defence capability. Analysts sense a possible flaw in the effort to seize terrain, and the North's selected air component strategy is costing it ground not gained, but progress is still being eked out. What analysts fail to acknowledge is that South Korea has effectively been an island since the 1953 armistice and that the North plans to blockade that island, even if it does not hold all its territory. Grab and hold is in effect, but the trump card has yet to be played.

With Seoul and Incheon occupied or under siege, North Korean operatives confirm that South Korea's President and key decision-makers have arrived at the Presidential summer residence outside Busan on the south coast to sustain their war effort. In turn, the North's military assessments confirm that the invasion has effectively bogged down. It is time for the second act.

Three days into the war, occupying only a fifth of South Korea, with a submarine cordon, minefields or a defensive blockade in place about the peninsula and allied forces still awaiting reinforcements, North Korea initiates a nuclear strike on Busan. In one fell swoop, Kim Jong-Il has shown that he is deadly serious, rid himself of nearly a million bourgeois mouths, has effected a 'head shot' on the leadership of the South and has taken the main industrial port complex out of the campaign. Replicating MacArthur's 1950 'Pusan perimeter' is now impossible. Forced entry and attrition will be the only source of succour for the South, if it comes at all.

Having gained the capital, put a defensive ring about the littoral region and stalemated an inadequately reinforced Southern counterattack, the North's military goals have been achieved. With the infrastructure of the South – and its farms – the Kim regime is assured of lasting another generation, long enough to convert the population of the new provinces to the glory of a democratic people's socialism. Kim Jong-Il sues for peace, giving the allies and the United Nations 24 hours to accept his terms – peace, full recognition of a reunified Korea under his governance and a return of all prisoners of war. The alternative is another nuclear strike and the possible incineration of Tokyo, the annihilation of the allied forces which remain on the peninsula and losses never before seen in warfare for any force which approaches the region in an attempt to drive back North Korean forces on the peninsula.

The tale described above is of course purely science fiction. It is neither inevitable nor impossible. It is merely possible, inasmuch as the opaque nature of North Korea's force mix and its military capabilities describe an untested entity and suggest a range of possible scenarios, many frightening. The nature of a post-Olympics China is no more predictable but it is fair to say that, unfettered by the 'invitation to the world' that 2008 represents, self-interest and nationalism may no longer be symbolized by a fuzzy Olympic mascot. Japan, the United States, Australia and every state



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

Rear-Admiral Girouard as a Commodore when in command of the Canadian Task Group in the Arabian Sea during *Operation Apollo*.

in the region would react out of self-interest, however it might be perceived or calculated.

Still stretched, if not worn out, the United States may be hard pressed to respond to any scenario on the Korean peninsula, let alone to one which asks the American people to endure losses akin to that which motivated President Truman to employ the atomic bomb in 1945. The West – and one would hope humanity – would recoil at the thought of just letting Korea go, if only in view of the incentive it would represent to every other authoritarian regime on the planet. Numbers matter, however, as with for example the Royal Navy's (RN) inability to respond with even the minimum of 'presence operations' in the wake of North Korea's 2006 nuclear tests. The recent announcements of further cuts to the RN – and of course its attendant ability to respond to any new eventualities – confirm that the importance of the maritime domain is being forgotten in some spheres. These developments, and they are surely not

unique to the UK, speak directly to the potential fragilities that inadequate numbers represent and appear largely a result of the current facts of life in ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both fiscal and emotional.

Notwithstanding the fact that the global death rate from conflicts across the planet has gone down over the past 50 years, the potential at least for regional conflagration is on an upward trend for a variety of geopolitical, economic and cultural reasons. Besides Korea, Taiwan, the Malaccas, the Spratleys, Somalia, Yemen, Iran, the Balkans, East Timor and the Philippines, all remind us that a landlocked conflict is the exception, not the rule. Fifty years of NATO faith told us it was always as much about the reinforcement of the northern flank and Norway as it was the tank battles of Kursk II. Nothing has changed apart from the geography.

Two dominant issues come into focus as we ponder the fragilities and the complexities of Canada's region and our place in delivering security here. First, that shared responsibility, the potency of a coalition and the reality of Admiral Mullen's '1,000 Ship Navy' indeed represent the singular means for us to survive the worst of what is to come during the next generation, whoever 'us' is, whatever 'the worst' may represent. Second, in a decade where stability operations are defined by the meaningful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and the remarkable investment of land forces these two scenarios represent, the temptation to describe conflict as continental in nature is tremendous, with perilous results for naval matters, and global security in general. How quickly we forget Lebanon, Libya, Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Desert Storm.... You get my point.

I will touch on the latter issue first, as the existence of a naval coalition at all in the next 20 years is dependent on tackling this fundamental debate. The Royal Navy's experience described above is instructive but even Canada, a maritime state with three ocean shores, is suffering opinions, punditry and pronouncements disguised as sage reflection that Canada has always been a continental entity and will be through this coming century, and so too must its Armed Forces.

Historically, nothing could be further from the truth. That Canada's military roots originate in its militias and militias present a land theme is a given, but that is where

the exclusivist continental point of view comes to a dead end. The infantry is always the Queen of Battle and the army is indeed the tip of the spear, but it will never survive in unbalanced exclusivity, and history reminds us of this again and again. The fall of Louisbourg, the fall of Quebec, Hudson's Bay, the battles of the Great Lakes all point to sea mobility and the operational and strategic use of navies in Canada's creation and we ought not forget that the loss of the Battle of the Atlantic would have delivered us a very different world in 1944 and today.

WW II saw soldiers die in troopships which fell victim to submarines and surface raiders in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific for want of more effective naval capabilities, never fulfilling their potential on the field of battle. They will again, on their way to Korea or Iran or any of a number of potential conflict destinations if we disregard our history, and the facts of modern life regarding such issues as submarine proliferation. Conveniently forgetting truths about the value of balanced forces, through parochialism, misunderstanding or willful ignorance represents dodgy force planning. The realities of globalization, from geopolitics to economics to demographics, stridently point to the movement of goods, people and ideas around the world, the lion's share moved by sea. As U-boat captains and Winston Churchill knew in 1942, tonnage matters. The life-blood of our way of life still pumps through the sea lanes, subject to all the opportunities and vulnerabilities they represent.

The rejoinder to the continental view is a wake-up call regarding the growth of naval forces in both India and China and the reminder that naval forces represent capabilities, options and flexible roles never achieved in standing armies. The price of hardware weighs heavily on every state's budget to be sure, and this is why the coalition approach is paramount in concert with the diplomatic and political effort to expand the potential membership in such partnerships – emanating in the vision of the 1,000 Ship Navy.

The Indo-Pacific region has many fractures and ugly historical baggage that urge such trust-building cooperation. The multinational humanitarian effort around the tsunami of 2004, in large part a naval effort, delivered many amazing results. Indonesians were wary of, and then surprised by foreign forces. They left when they were done, Indonesian sovereignty intact and possibly strengthened, and trust was born where apprehension had long endured. The potential first steps for such cooperative and trust-building ventures may lead to the foundation of international naval cooperation and indeed enhanced regional stability. From humanitarian operations, a measured stride to anti-



Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

Canadian and allied warships manoeuvre together in the Arabian Sea in 2003.

piracy and regional stability patrols is in the realm of the possible.

There is potential, there is a need. The window of opportunity is wide open for the moment and simply in need of the right leadership along with a meaningful and sincere display of responsibility sharing. A Pacific NATO is unlikely, but much is possible. The mechanism for avoiding the scenario at the start of this article is to achieve a level of cooperation and collective will so as to prohibit a climate which allows the scenario to emerge in the first place, a climate which would deny the states of the region, including North Korea, any sense that such a conflict is winnable by its instigator. Think of the possibilities that such a sense of regional cooperation, security and confidence might represent. At play is the theory that any democracy on this planet will be sacrificed by the rest simply to avoid cost or casualties. That theory must be soundly refuted.



The maritime domain will exist and so too its hot spots and potential conflagrations when Iraq and Afghanistan are done, win or lose. Numbers matter. Cooperation matters. The idea of a 1,000 Ship Navy matters, as does any construct that enhances cooperation. 🍷

Are We a Thinking Navy?

Ken Hansen

Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Bryant's recent article in *Australian Army Journal* ("Are We a Thinking Army?" Vol. III, No. 2) could be used to examine any service in any country's armed forces. His central question "Why don't Australian army officers write?" is just as relevant if asked about Canadian naval officers. There is a general scarcity of contributions by serving naval authors to *Canadian Military Journal*, *Canadian Naval Review* and *Maritime Warfare Bulletin*. The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies' new on-line discussion forum, *Broadsides*, currently contains more commentaries from foreign naval officers than Canadian ones. These symptoms indicate that the Australian situation is both a trans-national and a trans-service phenomenon.

Bryant recommends three corrective actions to counter service bias against intellectual writing. First, he suggests creating enthusiasm for writing by establishing role models and a peer network. Second, he advocates personnel policies that recognize and reward writers. Finally, he proposes that the army take greater interest in educating itself by getting the few gifted writers it possesses into its service schools and joint war colleges. Bryant argues that the new security environment demands intellectual flexibility and laments, in typically Australian fashion, that the army will be 'done over' because its leadership has not provided for "a carefully sponsored culture of dispassionate and networked self-examination and conceptualisation." Would these recommendations have any effect if applied in Canada?

A smattering of naval names appears in the three professional journals named above. Among them, a few are (or were) flag-rank officers, but they did not sustain their efforts and establish credentials as *bona fide* intellectuals during their rise to power. Rather, their written work came as more of a postscript to their careers than a springboard

to higher rank. A few contemporary mid-grade officers have some very noteworthy works in print, but their path to higher rank is unlikely to be determined by their 'word-smithing' skills. Instead, the route to flag rank lies through tactical fleet assignments. Role models with solid intellectual credentials are scarce in the Canadian Navy.

Likewise, there is no organized peer network for the co-operation of navy intellectuals in what Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond would have called a Young Turks Society. If a clandestine version of such a group exists, its efforts to remain secretive have succeeded, rendering its agenda to effect change impotent.

Canadian personnel policies recognize effective communication skills in the annual evaluation and reporting process. But, with a bureaucratic organization intent on self-replication, how much value is placed on out-of-the-box thinking and effective writing that, at its most provocative, produces myth-busting exposés and runs counter to the conventional wisdom? In his Foreword to the first issue of *Canadian Naval Review*, then Vice-Admiral Bruce MacLean wrote: "I encourage all serving and retired members of the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Forces as a whole to write freely and wade into the debate." Unfortunately, not much has appeared in print that could be called controversial. The naval debate in Canada, it seems, is still limited to '100-psi' finger-pointing at the wardroom bar rail and little else.

Finally, the educational priorities of the Canadian Navy also leave a poor impression. A small handful of mid-grade officers comprise the naval staff at the Canadian Forces College. However, no special criteria are attached to any of the naval billets there, where the incumbents frequently have not taken the courses they design and teach. The lack of a high-ranking alumnus amongst the former staff members indicates that career path is a dead-end. Military professorships, of the type that exist at foreign war colleges, are deemed too expensive and too difficult to sustain in Canada. The recent decision to drop the Maritime Component Program (along with the comparable land and air programs), with no plans to reincarnate it elsewhere, indicates that the navy's leadership feels higher naval education is not relevant to current service needs.

The conclusion drawn by using Bryant's thesis is that the navy is not a thinking organization, at least not at the

operational and strategic levels. A single joint doctrine has erased unique maritime concepts of operation from the military lexicon. Strategic theories are devoted solely toward the justification of naval capital acquisition goals. The naval officer corps is, for the most part, engaged in a single-minded pursuit of the same professional goals it has held throughout its nearly 100-year history: tactical command at sea.

It is a small wonder, then, that so many naval officers lament their last days at sea and abhor the administrative positions that lay ahead of them. Without either a clear strategic vision or an approved operational doctrine to guide them, and without tangible goals and rewards to motivate them, intellectual disengagement follows as a natural consequence of any move away from sea duty.

Bryant worries that the Australian Army is not doing enough to encourage officers to write about visions for the future, and does not have sufficient inquisitive spirit to develop an analytical capacity that will help it overcome what he anticipates will be tactical defeats. If the same is true of the Canadian Navy, it might explain why uncertainty is viewed as risk rather than opportunity, and the agenda for transformation looks more like a defence of the status quo than a roadmap to the future.

Debate over reform of the US Navy has produced many written diatribes. The recent Maritime Security Conference at Dalhousie University brought a vague equivalent to a Canadian forum, where advocates for change coalesced around the acquisition of an amphibious capability while opponents rallied around preservation of the existing fleet structure. Whether either side will choose to expound on their views by writing freely, as Admiral MacLean urged, remains to be seen.

Bryant's thesis recommends many unpalatable changes to the resource-limited navy. First, the navy must adopt a culture of education that will make it the service of choice for the shrinking cadre of future officer candidates. The traditional recruiting base of the navy is vanishing quickly. The way to attract and retain new streams of high-quality people is to offer a career progression that both stimulates and rewards beyond the gratification that tactical command provides. Educational goals and clear job-related qualifications should be established for all mid-grade officer billets that are not directly related to daily fleet activities. This will establish both a peer network and an active competition for academic as well as military advancement. The ability to conduct research, form coherent theories and write effectively will take on new relevance for all officers, even those who hold no professional ambition beyond tactical employment.

The navy must realize that it has service-specific education requirements that cannot be satisfied by the current joint system. If the equivalent of a naval war course cannot be sustained in Canada outside of the Canadian Forces College, then sufficient numbers of candidates must be sent abroad to ensure the officer corps is collectively aware of its distinctive culture. The theories and concepts that underpin naval strategy and doctrine cannot be allowed to be diluted by a collective educational organization that is not manifestly expert in naval issues. The few credible naval writers the navy possesses need to be channelled into higher education, where they must be sustained with the time, support and resources needed to attain academic qualifications and contribute to the naval literature. These role models are vitally important to the ability of the navy to analyse its situation and devise options for adjustment to changing circumstances.

The lack of an indigenous naval doctrine is conspicuous. While Australian, British and Indian naval doctrine has recently been developed, the lack of a conceptual framework upon which to build Canadian strategies and guide operations leaves our maritime logic without a credible foundation. Confusion over naval operational functions, their application and terminology hamstring professional education and leaves the other services mystified about the meaning of naval utterances. This confusion stems from the lack of a detailed analysis of Canadian naval history. A clear illustration of this problem can be found in the two 'operational histories' on the Second World War activities of the Royal Canadian Navy (*No Higher Purpose* and *A Blue Water Navy*), which, although tactically sound, are almost entirely devoid of consistent use of operational terminology and comprehensive understanding of functional concepts. Without insightful and rigorous analysis by educated professionals, naval history does not provide the profound lessons upon which strategies and doctrines can be built.

Vice-Admiral Glen Davidson said it best in the closing address for the recent Royal United Services Institute conference "The RCN and New Perspectives on World War Two." He said, "[i]t has been said before, and I ascribe to the view, that a nation (or a Navy) that does not know its history has no soul." There is more to history, however, than just recounting the facts. Bottom-up analysis based on tactical events should not supplant sound academic analysis that makes connections between strategic theory, operational doctrine and tactical action. Currently, the



soul of the navy is not in its own keeping, but has been entrusted to well-intentioned trustees that do not know the whole being.

Bryant is correct that careful sponsorship is required if a culture of self-examination and conceptualization is to be created, either in Canada or in Australia. Without meaningful involvement by the navy's leadership in its education, the navy will almost certainly be 'done over.' Some will view the shifting of resources away from tactical capability to satisfy these education needs as contrary to traditional values and vital service interests. They can be forgiven for this; they are the product of a culture that has used superlative tactical proficiency as the basis for naval identity. Whether that ideology can still sustain the spiritual and physical health of the navy is the question of our age. 🍷

Terrorists Using Naval Tactics?

Pat Bolen

One of the potential threats in the overall 'war on terror' and specifically in attempting to deal with Iran is the possibility of sleeper cells of terrorists in the United States, Europe and the Middle East being activated. These cells could include both Hezbollah and potential Al Qaeda units put in place both to deter actions by the West and to respond at short notice in a terrorist version of fleet-in-being.

The fleet-in-being theory dates back to 1690 when Royal Navy Admiral Arthur Herbert found himself facing a stronger French fleet at the Battle of Beachy Head in the English Channel. Herbert decided to avoid battle unless he had an advantage, until he could be reinforced. By keeping his fleet-in-being, Hebert felt he could maintain a threat which would force the enemy to remain concentrated and so prevent him from taking the initiative elsewhere.

The strategy succeeded in its goal of mostly preserving the British fleet but allowed temporary control of the channel to the French. For not engaging in battle Herbert was accused of cowardice and court-martialed and, although subsequently acquitted, he was dismissed from the Royal Navy.

Despite the apparent failure of the strategy, fleet-in-being became an accepted part of naval warfare and was used

in both World Wars. With battleships both expensive and vulnerable, in the First World War both the German and British Navies were reluctant to risk capital ships in direct combat. Facing a larger British fleet, the Imperial High Seas Fleet chose to avoid direct combat, instead using its forces to tie down the Royal Navy. With the strategy, the German fleet was able to use smaller-sized units to strike at times of its own choosing.

German surface raiders, operating both individually and in larger groups, were able to inflict losses on merchant shipping in the South Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. German Admiral Graf Von Spee had the greatest success, operating along the fringes of British naval power in the South Atlantic and Pacific. Spee was able to isolate, expose and destroy the ships of Admiral Christopher Craddock at the battle of Coronel including the armoured cruisers *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. But Spee lasted only until the Royal Navy was able to concentrate its forces and destroy him six weeks later using the battlecruisers *Inflexible* and *Invincible* at the Battle of the Falkland Islands.

Meanwhile trapped in its harbours by the unwillingness of the Kaiser to risk his fleet, the ships of the German Navy swung at their anchors for two years. With morale sinking in late May 1916 the High Seas Fleet attempted to use its fleet again to isolate and destroy units of the British fleet, resulting in the Battle of Jutland. Despite inflicting losses, the German Navy was forced to retreat back to harbour leaving the British in possession of the North Sea. The High Seas Fleet would not emerge again in strength for another two years when it sailed out to surrender and eventual scuttling.

Twenty years later the strategy was again used by the German Navy, achieving more success but ultimately failing. After initial losses of the *Graf Spee* and the *Bismarck*, surviving units of the German Navy were used piecemeal with most of them, including *Tirpitz* and *Scharnhorst*, destroyed in the same way.

The Japanese Navy was also reluctant to commit its main fleet to battle in the Pacific because of its desire to fight the decisive battle it had planned for before the war, although the decisive battle was already being fought in late 1942 in the waters around Guadalcanal. Unable to recognize the opportunity, the Japanese withheld many of their major units until it was too late.

Today terrorist cells face the same challenges navies did decades ago and like battleships, terrorist cells are hard-to-replace assets, making it difficult to know when to commit them to battle.

Countries trying to plant terrorists in opposing countries face greater challenges than those using sleeper agents in the Cold War. Agents placed during the Cold War were assets available after years under cover and whose training mainly consisted of codes, surveillance and espionage which could be kept up to date relatively easily. The value of a sleeper agent also increased over time as his influence grew as part of his chosen cover.

But terrorists trained in paramilitary skills who are placed in target countries can more accurately be described as *frozen* rather than *sleeper* agents since they are unable to train or to communicate for fear of exposure, and have little access to supplies. Their commanders face the choice of using a cell in an attack that will, while causing damage, almost always result in its loss and possibly expose other networks.

At the same time, the commanders realize the agents are declining assets as months and years pass. With the passage of time and extended inactivity, as captains and admirals have always found out, morale suffers and skills decline. Subjected to the temptations of the West over extended periods of time, commanders of potential jihadis may find their call to action unwilling or unable to be answered.

With an unwillingness to commit their major assets for uncertain gain, it appears terrorist leaders may have decided to or been forced to use – as the German Navy did 80 years ago with its smaller units – less valuable units, as the recent attempted attacks in Britain illustrate, in an attempt to keep their enemy off balance and win smaller victories. Leaders and commanders on both sides of the terror war should note that many of the fleets-in-being, whatever their nationality and despite some success, eventually become neither fleets nor in-being. 🍷

***Race for the North Pole:
Why Russia's Arctic Adventures Should Serve as
a Wake-up Call to Canada***
David James Meadows

Russia's recent actions in the Arctic should serve as a wake-up call to Ottawa that Canada's national interests and sovereignty claims in the Arctic can no longer be ignored. This is particularly true if global warming continues to make the Arctic Ocean increasingly accessible to navigation and exploration. Considering the vast quantities of natural

resources that are waiting to be exploited – oil, natural gas, diamonds, minerals and fish – Canada must do better to make its presence felt in the Arctic.

This means enhancing Canada's Arctic military capabilities in order to reinforce Canadian claims and ensure that Canada's sovereignty is respected. Without such capabilities to make Canada's presence felt and show the flag, Canadian interests and sovereignty claims in the North will not be respected by other states. Moreover, by not having the ability to project power and command respect in the Arctic, states such as Russia, which have the ability to project their power in support of their interests, will have the major say in setting the agenda over how the Arctic's wealth will be divided in the future.

Russia's actions illustrate that the Kremlin is currently not interested in sitting down at the bargaining table to divide up the Arctic in a manner in accordance with international law. In fact, as Russian government sources have publicly declared, Moscow's recent Arctic adventures, while carrying out scientific purposes, were mainly to project Russia's resurgent power by highlighting capabilities in the Arctic, and to gain prestige and exert Russian sovereignty in the region.¹ This was seen with the planting of the Russian flag in a titanium capsule at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, at the geographic site of the North Pole.

Currently, Canada lags far behind in its Arctic power capabilities. Russia's recent actions only serve to highlight just how weak and lacking Canadian capabilities are. As Canadian defence analyst Brian MacDonald argued in the *National Post*, the trip to the Arctic "demonstrates that Russians have the capacity to move in the Arctic, and we don't."² As many defence experts have rightly argued, this lack of capabilities directly threatens Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic.³

This is not the first time Canadian claims have been threatened by the lack of ability to manoeuvre in the Arctic. Washington's refusal to recognize Ottawa's claims to the Arctic and sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, as well as Denmark's one-upmanship over the issue of Hans Island, illustrate this. Therefore, if policy-makers in Ottawa do not increase Canadian capabilities and presence in the North, Canada's long-term interests and claims to sovereignty in the Arctic could be severely jeopardized. This is because in the race for the Arctic, actions will speak louder than words, and those states that have the capabilities to project their power and prestige will be the ones that will be setting the agenda at the negotiating table.



Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced on 9 July 2007 an increase to Canada's Arctic capabilities with the acquisition of six to eight new *Polar*-class Arctic offshore patrol ships and on 10 August the creation of a new army training centre at Resolute Bay, Nunavut, and a new navy deep-sea port at Nanisivik, Nunavut. These are a good start, but more decisive action is needed by Ottawa to project Canada's presence and promote national interests in the Arctic. This would include the acquisition of new icebreakers, to replace Canada's aging ones, as well as the acquisition of two to four nuclear-powered submarines, which would have the capability to patrol and conduct surveillance under the ice of Canada's Arctic waters, something which Canada's lemon *Victoria*-class submarines cannot. Another thing which could be done would be to arm more fully the Canadian Coast Guard and also possibly make it a part of the Canadian Forces. Without these tools Canada will continue to lag far behind in the race for the Arctic, and Prime Minister's Harper's words in relation to the Arctic that "we either use it or lose it,"⁴ will become increasingly prescient. By not confronting Russia's claims head-on from the beginning, Moscow will be encouraged to lay claim to vast swaths of the Arctic, and attempt to set the agenda to suit its strategic interests.

In combination with enhancing Canada's capabilities in the Arctic, Ottawa should encourage Washington to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and work cooperatively with our American and NATO allies Denmark and Norway, who also have Arctic claims. By confronting Russia on a unified front, Canada and its allies can help to ensure that Moscow does not overstep its boundaries in the Arctic. This is of vital importance considering Russia's increasing nationalistic, atavistic and authoritarian attitude, as well as the disturbing decline of political, democratic, economic and press freedoms that are occurring within Russia.

While then Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay scoffed at Russia's actions in the Arctic, claiming that the flag planting was reminiscent of behaviour from the 15th century, several important points should be remembered. First, Moscow has a history of invading foreign countries and planting the flag to claim territory. Second, one should not have total faith in international law, since Russia's adherence to the rule of law both internationally

and especially domestically has quite frequently been of a dubious nature. Finally, it is important to point out that Moscow probably means business with regard to its Arctic claims. This is because Russia's resurgent power has largely been facilitated and financed because of Moscow's exploitation of the country's vast oil and natural gas resources. No doubt Moscow views the mineral wealth of the Arctic as a means to continue to rebuild Russia's global power and prestige. Russia's recent actions in the Arctic have been strongly supported by President Putin and the Kremlin, as well as the Russian secret police, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor of the KGB. Another expedition is apparently in the works.

Russia's actions in the Arctic will have serious long-term consequences and should not be taken lightly by policy-makers in Ottawa, and leaders in Washington, Copenhagen and Oslo. The arguments made by international relations scholar William C. Wohlforth after the end of the Cold War are becoming increasingly important. Wohlforth astutely warned Western leaders to "keep a weather eye on Russia," because while "Russia may be down now ... prudent policymakers should not count it out."⁵

Russia's recent attempts to make its presence felt in its 'near abroad,' its assertive and antagonistic attitude towards the United States, its decision to redeploy naval forces to the Mediterranean, and now its actions in the Arctic are all examples of an increasingly resurgent and atavistic Russia trying to flex its muscles once again on the world stage. These actions should not be taken lightly by Canada and its allies. 🇺🇸

Notes

1. Russia's chief explorer and Presidential Envoy to the Arctic, Artur Chilingarov, has repeatedly said that "the Arctic always was Russian, and it will remain Russian." Reuters, "Russia North Pole Explorers Dismiss their Critics," 7 August 2007, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0785133420070807>.
2. Brian Macdonald quoted in Craig Offman, "Russia to Stake Arctic Claim," *National Post*, 25 July 2007, available at <http://www.canada.com/national-post/news/world/story.html?id=b3b7b50c-0fd8-493e-9998-0498d821ae26&k=14717&p=2>.
3. MacDonal noted that "unless we do something soon, such as deploy ships in the region, we are going to weaken our own claims to sovereignty." *Ibid.*
4. "Prime Minister Stephen Harper Announces New Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships," 9 July 2007, available at <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1742>.
5. See William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994-95), p. 129.

Plain Talk: Do Ministers Make a Difference?

Sharon Hobson



Former Minister of Defence Gordon O'Connor with CDS, General Rick Hillier.

What difference does a Defence Minister make? Gordon O'Connor is gone, demoted to National Revenue Minister, and Peter MacKay has taken over the bridge. Will it make any difference to the future of the Canadian Forces? Certainly on paper the importance of the Minister of National Defence (MND) cannot be underestimated. As Dr. Doug Bland wrote in *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985*,

As MND the Minister is the active and actual link between the military, a force maintained by the government to inflict or threaten to inflict violence on others, and the Constitution of Canada within which the military act under Parliamentary control. This particular duty places a special burden on the Minister to act rightly, because in so many ways the safety of the nation resides in his hands. Other Ministers can fail and their departments with them but with no more harm to the nation than to lose face and money. The failures of a MND may well occasion not only a loss of blood and treasure but the humiliation or loss of all the nation.

In practice, however, the impact of an individual MND varies greatly. (Some Ministers have been either so short-lived or so low-profile as to be almost invisible. Quick, name the last two Conservative Defence Ministers before

O'Connor.) Some Ministers come into the portfolio with an agenda, and some come in as caretakers, seeing their job as keeping everything running smoothly, with few newsworthy incidents that could cause the government of the day any problems

Conservative Marcel Masse was definitely one of the former. He had an agenda. He ran the department with one thought uppermost in his mind: how would the decisions and actions affect Quebec? While his time in office included the publication of "Statement on Defence Policy," his legacy was actually the CH-412 Griffon helicopter purchase, built by Bell Helicopter in Quebec. Masse persuaded the CF to buy 100 of these helicopters for a utility role – a role for which they are sadly ill-equipped.

Liberal Art Eggleton, on the other hand, was a caretaker. A politician with no ties to the military and no strong interest in defence issues, he saw his job as a manager, someone who would keep the military from causing problems for Prime Minister Jean Chretien. It was ironic, therefore, that after five years of navigating the department through wave after wave of potentially contentious issues, Eggleton lost his job after a very newsworthy scandal involving the awarding of a defence contract to a past girlfriend.

Some ministers want to do more than keep things running smoothly. They see themselves as innovators. Not all of them, however, are given the time or the support to do the job. David Collenette took an active and leading role in formulating the 1994 White Paper which governed the actions of the Canadian Forces for 11 years. That policy accorded with Prime Minister Chretien's desire to reduce both the size and the cost of the Canadian military, and it left the Canadian Forces teetering on the edge of disaster as they attempted to cope with decreased capabilities and increased commitments. Significantly, although Collenette was in favour of a submarine purchase, he was unable to convince the Prime Minister, and the acquisition was delayed for four years.

Doug Young arrived in the defence job with a mandate to make the Somalia Inquiry go away and clean up the departmental mess in the wake of that scandal. However, a year into the job, he lost his seat in a general election. Some of what he set out to do, however, lasted longer than he did. For example, his report to the Prime Minister on the leadership and management of the Canadian Forces included recommendations that the government establish

an Ombudsman's office, and that a university degree be a prerequisite to the commissioning of an officer (unless s/he is commissioned from the ranks). Those recommendations, among others, were accepted and implemented.

David Pratt was Chair of the parliamentary committee on defence, and as such, was responsible for reports which were critical of his own party, calling for a review of defence policy and an increase in defence spending. He came into office intent on conducting a defence review and updating the military's capabilities. Pratt enjoyed a high profile and much support within the defence constituency, and his appointment was seen as a signal that Prime Minister Paul Martin was ready to rebuild the military after a decade of budget and personnel cuts. However, a general election intervened, and David Pratt lost his seat before he was able to move forward on any of his plans.

Bill Graham came in with a solid background in international affairs and, picking up where Pratt left off, oversaw a White Paper that outlined a significant force restructuring and emphasized expeditionary capabilities. However, his tenure was also cut short by a general election.

Perhaps the Minister who arguably came in best equipped for the job was Gordon O'Connor. Unlike any of his predecessors of the previous 25 years, he had recent military experience, knew how Ottawa worked and, most importantly, had the support of the Prime Minister.

Consequently, despite media and opposition attacks on his integrity and intelligence, he accomplished a great deal. He essentially wrote the government's electoral platform on defence issues, and he was charged by the Prime Minister with implementing the promises. O'Connor obtained a major budget increase for DND, embarked on several major procurement programs, and paved the way for a substantial increase in the size of the Canadian Forces. He also began a change of policy direction with his Arctic initiatives. Not bad for only 18 months in office.

Looking at the various Defence Ministers of the past 20 years, what is most striking is that while the Minister is important to the implementation of defence policy and the management of the CF, to have any real impact, he needs the support of the Prime Minister. In addition, he needs time to get the programs he wants through the various governmental processes. (O'Connor, as part of a minority government, knew he had to move quickly, and,



Former Minister of Defence Bill Graham in Halifax in April 2005.

damning the torpedoes, pushed hard to get his plans underway.)

Unfortunately, MacKay may not have the luxury of either time or prime ministerial support. There are suggestions that Prime Minister Harper is tired of being immersed in international security issues, and may now be looking to MacKay just to keep things humming along with no major hiccups. In other words, Harper may now want a caretaker for DND, not an innovator. Harper is struggling with the Afghanistan issue, having originally come out of the gate in full support of the mission. How much he's struggling is perhaps illustrated by the latest cabinet shuffle. Doug Bland points out that the PM replaced all of his 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) Ministers – O'Connor in Defence, MacKay in Foreign Affairs, and Josee Verner for International Cooperation – which suggests he was unhappy with how they were handling the Afghanistan file.

With an election likely in the not too distant future, and with Canadians showing a continuing preference for peacekeeping rather than warrior roles for their troops, the PM may not want to stir the pot by issuing a new defence policy which, of necessity, would have to deal with Afghanistan, expeditionary roles and combat capability.

All of this suggests that MacKay may not be in a position to bring down a much-needed policy statement, which will leave him supervising costly plans put in place by his predecessor. Without a policy statement and with little budgetary flexibility, MacKay's impact will be minimal. 🍷

Sharon Hobson is an Ottawa-based defence analyst and Canadian correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*.

Warship Developments: Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships

Doug Thomas



Photo: Internet image

Northwest Passage.

Prime Minister Harper announced the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship Programme 9 July 2007, thus delivering on what most naval officers would agree was the spirit of his election promise to place more emphasis on a military presence in the Canadian North, including three armed heavy icebreakers for the navy. Since these heavy icebreakers would have a naval role only for three or four months of the year – the summer navigation season – their operational value for the remainder of the year would have been limited, and I suspect that they would soon have been transferred to the Canadian Coast Guard, as was HMCS *Labrador* in 1956. True icebreakers are very specialized – broad beams, ice-breaking bows to ride up over the ice and crack it with the ship’s weight, poor rough-weather characteristics (they reportedly roll heavily), and relatively slow maximum speed (their short, stubby hulls are not designed to achieve speeds much above 16 knots).

After the current government assumed power, advice tendered by the navy recommended multi-role vessels capable of a broad range of missions. This resulted in the announcement of a program for six to eight Polar Class 5 Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPS) with the following characteristics: a maximum speed of at least 20 knots; sea-keeping ability sufficient to handle the very difficult conditions which may be experienced off our Atlantic and Pacific coastlines; and good command and control facilities in order to develop and contribute to maritime domain awareness. The hull of the A/OPS must be ice strengthened

to operate in medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions (i.e., old ice that is denser) and may strike the hull of the ship. This ice capability is exclusively for the ships’ own mobility, not to provide icebreaking services to other ships.

Polar Class (PC) 5 is an internationally recognized classification standard of structural capability and readiness to operate in the ice, with PC 1 being the most and PC 7 the least capable as indicated in the following table.

Following rapidly after the announcement of new ships, a decision was made to locate an Arctic refuelling and docking facility in Nanisivik, just to the south of the Northwest Passage. This appears to be an excellent choice – an existing dock that can be upgraded for this new role, facilities in the area that include a jet-capable runway and a weather station, and good proximity to the fabled route between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

There has been extensive discussion in “Broadships” and articles in this journal about how best to patrol these waters and what characteristics are desirable for new patrol vessels. One hopes that the A/OPS will compare favourably with two conceptually similar designs operated by our northern neighbours, Denmark and Norway. Let us review their solution to perform similar missions to those we will require of A/OPS in the future.

Denmark has four *Thetis*-class frigates designed for sovereignty and fisheries protection. They were completed in

Table 1. Polar Class Descriptions

Polar Class	Ice Description (based on World Meteorological Organization Sea Ice Nomenclature)
PC 1	Year-round operation in all polar waters
PC 2	Year-round operation in moderate multi-year ice conditions
PC 3	Year-round operation in second-year ice, which may include multi-year ice inclusions
PC 4	Year-round operation in thick first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions
PC 5	Year-round operation in thick first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions
PC 6	Summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions
PC 7	Summer/autumn operation in thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions

Photo: DND, Directorate of History and Heritage



HMCS Labrador in the High Arctic.

1991 and 1992, and are strengthened for operations in up to one metre of ice. They frequently patrol waters around Greenland and the Faroe Islands, are 369' loa x 47' beam, 3,500 tonnes full load displacement, armed with a 76-mm gun and a Lynx helicopter, equipped with a broad range of radar, sonar and electronic warfare sensors, have excellent endurance (8,500 nm at 15.5 knots) and a small crew of 60 with 30 additional bunks. These are very flexible ships: a friend of mine commanded one in a coalition operation in the Mediterranean some years ago, with an augmented crew and communications. The background information issued at the time of the Canadian A/OPS announcement seems to describe a vessel quite similar to *Thetis*.

The other vessel that invites comparison with the A/OPS is the Norwegian Coast Guard (an arm of their navy) Arctic Patrol Vessel *Svalbard*. She was completed in 2002, is shorter and more beamy than *Thetis* at 340' x 62.7', has a 57-mm gun, also operates a medium helicopter, and has a long endurance (10,000 nm at 13 knots). *Svalbard* has a broad-beamed hull, a slower maximum speed of 17.5 knots, and at 6,300 tonnes is a very substantial vessel.

Oddly enough, the official announcement of the A/OPS Programme stated: “the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship offers the best blend of capabilities in one platform; however, a ship with these capabilities does not currently exist and would have to be designed to meet a series of high-level requirements” (emphasis added).

It is understood that the first A/OPS will not be acquired until 2013 and the last about 2017. This seems an excessive delay! Are we studying the issue to death and re-inventing the wheel? Yes, we want capable vessels, but *Svalbard* cost less than \$100 million to build and is a highly successful, purpose-built vessel. I believe that *Svalbard* or *Thetis* represents a 90% solution to our A/OPS requirement: a proven design that can be fine-tuned to meet Canadian operational requirements.

The government has shown laudable speed in this summer’s announcements. Why can’t we pay license fees to the Danish or Norwegian shipbuilder who developed the



Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel *Svalbard*.

Photo: Internet image



Thetis-class FFH.

Photo: Internet image

design for *Thetis* or *Svalbard*, and build at least one ship in Canada so that we can establish presence and gain experience in northern operations? The current government wishes to assert sovereignty over our Arctic lands, territorial waters and continental shelves. At a time when Russia and Denmark are announcing their claims to Arctic resources, a delay – longer than the time it took to fight and win World War II – in completing the first A/OPS is hard to understand. 🙄

Book Reviews

Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post 9/11 World, by J.L. Granatstein, Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2007, 246 pages, index, CDN \$ 34.95, hard bound, ISBN-10: 0-00-200845-9, ISBN-13: 978-0-00-200845-7.

Reviewed by Colonel (Ret'd) Brian K. Wentzell

In some respects *Whose War Is It?* is a sequel to Dr. Granatstein's previous book *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (2004). In that book Dr. Granatstein answered his own question by blaming all Canadians, irrespective of background, vocation or political belief for the sorry state of the Canadian Forces. In the final chapter of that book, entitled "The Way Ahead: Resurrecting the Canadian Military," he challenged Canadians to identify their national interests, which he defined as follows:

- Canada must safeguard its territory and the security of its people, and work to maintain its national unity;
- Canada must act to maintain and enhance its independence;
- Canada must promote the nation's economic growth to enhance its prosperity; and
- Canada must work with its friends for democracy and freedom (p. 205).

Whose War Is It? attempts to demonstrate that our country has denigrated these interests through the substitution of several well-intentioned but incredibly naïve values that bear no resemblance to what matters in the real world. Values such as the promotion "of human rights, the rule of law, democracy, respect for diversity, gender equality and good governance" (p. 52) do not determine national interests. In Granatstein's view "interests are critical, tempered by values" (p. 69).

As Dr. Granatstein is a well-respected historian, one would expect this book to be a rigorous historical analysis of Canada's national interests and values. Sadly, it is little more than a political rant that attacks the opinions of politicians, former politicians and other Canadians. There is no attempt to reconcile their opinions with his own. This book is simply *his* prescription to repair Canada's position in the world.

Dr. Granatstein appears to fear for the future of *his* Canada. In his view, adherence to the national interests as he describes them, without undue deference to Canadian values, will bring focus and meaning to Canada at home and abroad. He may be correct, but he does not make a

convincing case. The use of hypothetical situations and generalizations of differing perspectives within our diverse and pluralistic country does nothing to prove his case.

Canada's national interests were better stated by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in 1947 and clearly argued in 1962 by Dr. R.L. Sutherland of the Defence Research Board, Ottawa.¹ The world, Canada and Canadians have changed since those years and analysis of the impact of internal and external events upon our national interests is long overdue. We should not fear the work required or the debate that should result. In conclusion, Dr. Granatstein's book, except for highlighting his concerns, does not advance the consideration of these matters. There is a need to review Canada's national interests and the outcome will have an impact on a wide range of domestic and foreign policies, including defence and national security. It is time to get on with it. 🍷

Notes

1. R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long-Term Strategic Situation," *International Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1962), pp. 199-223.

Gators of Neptune: Naval Amphibious Planning for the Normandy Invasion, by Christopher D. Yung, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 292 pages, maps and photographs.

Reviewed by Major R.D. Bradford, C.D.

Gators of Neptune is a description of the planning for *Operation Neptune* and a consideration of the key issues that arose in the process. The book concludes with a remarkably fair-minded and balanced assessment by the author.

The book starts with the commanders, beginning with the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Forces (ANCXF), Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, RN, followed by his superiors (General Eisenhower, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff), his peers (the commanders in *Operation Overlord*, and the Royal Navy home commands), and, of course, his British and American subordinates in the two Naval Task Forces and their five constituent Assault Forces.

This is followed by a consideration of doctrine derived from experience in all theatres of war since 1940. The history of planning is covered next, including the controversies over early entry into France *versus* Mediterranean forays. The book then proceeds to the specific problems of *Neptune*. The friction between Admiral Ramsay and such strong-willed commanders as the US Navy's Rear-Admiral Alan Kirk and Rear-Admiral John Hall is described, as are the sources of that friction.

The book is at its best in identifying factors, elements, processes and relationships, and related arguments and controversies. Most importantly, the inter-relationship amongst issues is made clearly apparent. For example, the timing of H Hour was a big sticking point. H Hour was related to visibility, visibility was related to offensive support, offensive support was related to obstacle clearance, obstacle clearance was related to tides, tides were related to currents, currents were related to minesweeping, and so on. No single solution could satisfy everybody.

The book then considers the implementation of the plan, both in terms of pre-D Day activities and the actual assault on 6 June 1944. *Gators of Neptune* concludes with the author's assessment.

Christopher D. Yung has provided a very creditable addition to D Day historiography. A senior research analyst at the US Navy's Center for Naval Analyses, Dr. Yung is a specialist in maritime expeditionary and amphibious operations. This background has served him well, but it should be noted that the book is not a highly-detailed, technical document intended only for a specialist audience. Although concerned with a specific aspect (the planning of *Neptune*) and selected elements within it (critical issues, personalities), Dr. Yung seeks a balance between the forest and its trees to satisfy a broader readership.

Dr. Yung does not succumb to the temptation to superimpose modern amphibious doctrine onto the *Neptune* of 60 years ago in order to provide a convenient explanatory framework. To do so would not have been entirely wrong, since modern doctrine is firmly rooted in the WW II experience and has remained remarkably consistent over the decades. However, retroactively applying a modern framework always risks distortion of the actual story, and Dr. Yung wisely eschewed this.

In this vein, a final remark should be made. *Gators of Neptune* is not intended to be a standard general history of *Neptune*, nor the first book a neophyte would read on the subject. Commander Kenneth Edward's *Operation Neptune* (1946) and Vice-Admiral B.B. Schofield's concise *Operation Neptune* (1974) remain useful introductions to the operation, and newcomers to the topic would profit from reading these before tackling *Gators*. However, as long as readers have a general idea of *Operation Overlord* and what happened on D Day, they can read *Gators* to good effect. The reference notes and bibliography are very useful.

This reviewer must, with regret, address the book's defects. Unfortunately, the text resembles a near-final draft characterized by minor errors that the writer, saturated with his own work after many months of writing, is

unlikely to discern. The Naval Institute Press subjected the manuscript to exhaustive review, but apparently this was for substance rather than form. Some editorial work is needed in future editions. For example, the book does not spell out abbreviations the first time they are used, so the reader must consult the list provided at the front of the book every time an acronym is first encountered. As well, a first reference to a person is by surname only, giving the impression the reader has already met that person, and presumably knows his appointment and relevance. Backtracking reveals this is not the case.

Another practice that jars the reader concerns quotations. Dr. Yung will write that a historical personage "told his biographer" something, which then ostensibly follows in quotation marks. However, what follows is not the exact statement of the personage, but an extract from a description of what he said. And finally, there are a few factual errors – e.g., the main armament on the Landing Craft Gun (Large) was a 4.7-inch naval gun, not a 47-mm gun. Since the issue being discussed is gunfire support, this is an unfortunate slip. All these are shortcomings that can be remedied by a good polishing, and they do not undermine the overall value of the book.

Notwithstanding these problems, *Gators of Neptune* is worth the effort to read. Dr. Yung intended it as a tribute to the "Gators" of Normandy in 1944, and it is certainly that. However, he expresses reservations about its value as a learning aid for modern amphibians, since *Overlord* in general and *Neptune* in particular were so unique. This is certainly a valid concern, for there is a reason why the US amphibious campaigns in the Central Pacific became the basis for post-war allied doctrine and not the North Africa, Sicily and Normandy landings. However, in this respect Dr. Yung has short-changed himself, for the constituent elements discussed and the vital inter-relationships that marked them come through clearly and remain relevant. *Gators of Neptune* is therefore a valuable learning aid for the modern naval officer concerned with amphibious warfare in its essentials. 🍷

Brutality on Trial. "Hellfire" Pedersen, "Fighting" Hansen and the Seamen's Act of 1915, by E. Kay Gibon, Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2006, 225 pages, photographs, appendices, glossary, bibliography, index, US \$34.95, hard cover, ISBN 0-8130-2991-0.

Reviewed by Michael Young

In March 1915, US President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the *Seamen's Act*. It was designed specifically to

protect seamen in US-flagged ships from abuse at the hands of their officers and to provide an avenue of redress should such abuse occur. That such legislation was even considered necessary is in itself an interesting commentary on the times. This book examines the first two cases successfully prosecuted under the act. It makes for chilling reading.

The ships involved, *Puako* and *Rolph*, were barquentines owned by Hind, Rolph & Co. of San Francisco. They were among the last of a dying breed of wooden, ocean-going, cargo-carrying sailing ships when the incidents that led to the prosecutions took place between 1918 and 1921. *Puako* was commanded by Adolph Cornelius Pedersen whose nickname was “Hellfire.” The name actually came from his actions when trying to save his burning ship in 1905 rather than from his approach to shipboard discipline. Nonetheless, Pedersen took literally the old dictum that he was Master under God when at sea and ruled his domain with an iron fist that lacked any velvet glove. He had faced accusations of ill-treatment, abuse and violence towards his crews twice before – once in 1915 and again in 1917. Investigations were conducted but no charges were ever laid due to lack of evidence or key witnesses who were unwilling to testify.

On 27 April 1918, *Puako* set out into the Pacific with a cargo of lumber from Vancouver, BC, bound for Capetown, South Africa. When she arrived there almost four months later, two of her crew were dead and most of the rest were in irons charged with mutiny. After a lengthy and comprehensive investigation by the US Consul General and the

South African police, Pedersen was charged, returned to the United States and eventually convicted of five counts of criminally abusing his crew. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on each count.

Frederik “Fighting” Hansen was the First Mate of the *Rolph* on her maiden voyage in the fall of 1919. He also had a history of violent behaviour and had been convicted of the murder of a crewman in 1916. However, he served only 10 months for the crime. In the *Rolph* he continued his brutal ways to the point where, in the first port of call of Melbourne, Australia, the majority of the crew refused to sail with Hansen as the mate and took discharges from the ship. After new crew members had been signed, the ship eventually arrived in a Chilean port in April 1921, where Hansen was removed from the ship, indicted and ultimately convicted on five counts of criminal assault. He was sentenced to five years’ hard labour – a far heavier penalty than he had received for murder.

The book gives a very detailed review, based on extremely thorough research, of the circumstances that led to the charges and indictments of both men. It also speculates on why so many seamen more or less accepted such treatment for so long. Most of the chapters are devoted to the Pedersen case as this was the more complex and required an immense investigative effort. As the author shows, the real importance of these two landmark cases was that such routine brutality became a thing of the past; unacceptable behaviour for the 20th century. This is an interesting contribution to a previously overlooked piece of maritime history and a fascinating story in itself. 🍷



HMCS *Ville de Quebec* passing Georges Island, Halifax.

Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

Announcing the Winners of the 2nd Annual Bruce S. Oland Essay Competition

Photo: Dan Middlemiss



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4. There is a limit of one submission per author.
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