# CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1 (SPRING 2006)

**Piracy vs. Terrorism: Same Problem, Same Solution?**

**Prelude to the Storm: The MH Community Gears up for the Cyclone**

**The Fleet We Never Had**

**Showing the Flag Across the North**

**Reflections on NATO and Naval Forces**

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*The Barbary Pirates*

*Copy of an old painting from the Internet*

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*Refuelling at sea during a NATO exercise.* *Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic, 2005*

# Contents

# *Editorial:*
# NATO Transformation: Good for NATO, Good for Canada?


Photo: MCpl Charles Barber, Staff Photographer SNMG1 (NATO)

*HMCS **Athabaskan**, flagship of Commodore Denis Rouleau, Canadian Navy, Commander of Standing NATO Maritime Group One, with FGS **Mecklenburg-Vorpommern** in background.*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded in 1949 on the premise that an attack on one was an attack on all. This provided the basis for a permanent military and political coalition, which has also provided many additional benefits to members.

During the Cold War there was a deliberate policy of insulated protectionism whereby troops were amassed on NATO's own territories, hunkered down to defend against any attack. Canada stationed 8,000 troops in Germany during this period. Venturing outside the so-called "NATO area" (essentially the territories of the various member-states) during the Cold War was considered foolhardy and aggressive. This has changed, as the current NATO-led mission in Afghanistan attests. In accepting a greater role in global security, NATO has indeed evolved into a global organisation.

The most significant paradigm shift in security policy, which actually led to the transformation of NATO, occurred within 24 hours of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. For the first time in 50 years the North Atlantic Council, NATO's political decision-making body, declared that those attacks breached Article 5 of the NATO Agreement. War was thus declared by NATO against the attackers, wherever they came from, whoever they were.

NATO offered assistance to the United States in the wake of the attacks. This assistance included NATO air early warning surveillance and control aircraft for flights over North America. Over 4,500 hours were flown on surveillance missions and included cover flights for Air Force One, the President's plane. NATO participants watched, coordinated surveillance, and were ready to vector in


Photo: MARCOM Museum

*The Standing Naval Force Atlantic in Canadian waters in 1986.*

military jets against any untoward hostile air event. Who knew how many more attacks were planned? There was a real air threat to North America not seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

> *The most significant paradigm shift in security policy, which actually led to the transformation of NATO, occurred within 24 hours of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington.*

At the start of the new millennium, the United States had become lukewarm about NATO and was contemplating withdrawing from NATO's North American military and operational headquarters housing the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Indeed, Washington removed the US Commander from the headquarters in 2002. Several events changed the American perspective. First, it was this headquarters which arranged the presence and acted as the strategic command for the NATO surveillance aircraft under the operational command of the Canada/US North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in the wake of 9/11.

Also, several years earlier, in the fall of 2000 the SACLANT headquarters had run NATO's largest and most complex peace support exercise, with over 30,000 troops involved. These two events made the United States recognise that the NATO headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, had a powerful capability and was in a position to help transform NATO itself.

After 9/11, the headquarters quickly (in less than 2 months) produced a NATO policy on combatting terrorism which suggested that NATO forces needed to venture outside their own territories and take the war to the enemy's backyard. The headquarters recommended sending the NATO Standing Naval Force through the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean seaward of Afghanistan in order to combat terrorist operations from the sea. It was a year before the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council authorized such a mission, but the point is that they *did* authorize it, and a new global NATO security force was born.

After much consultation the United States was dissuaded from abandoning the North American NATO Command. The headquarters in Norfolk would spearhead the transformation of NATO from a Cold War posture and mentality to one reflecting the reality of a global asymmetric threat. This was becoming even more important as NATO prepared to accept six more states with varying levels of military capability. This would bring membership to 26 states. Russia too was

becoming a more prominent player wanting to become more involved in global security. A NATO-Russia Council was set up to parallel activities of the Military Council. The world had changed and NATO had to address the new realities.

SACLANT would no longer be a geographically constrained organisation. It had to have a global perspective. It had to be made up of equal representation from all services and evolve to a joint headquarters from its primarily naval make up. And it had to have a new name. The staff was given a year to define the new role and tasks. With no US Commander at its helm, the British Deputy and the Canadian Chief of Staff led the plan. They came up with the title "Supreme Allied Command Transformation." The new organization was officially stood up in June 2003 and a US Commander was returned to the helm.

*Even planning was a multinational activity. Here, then-Commodore, Lynn Mason, Canadian Navy, Commander of SNFL in 1987 confers with his NATO staff and the Commanding Officers of the SNFL ships.*

Allied Command Transformation would look after some very important issues and aspects of NATO. It would be home to the forward thinkers, the researchers, the scientists, the tacticians, the developers, the inventors, the teachers, the trainers, and the policy-makers. (The best Canadian analogy to this redesign would be the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre.) The missions of the new NATO Headquarters were: developing strategic concepts, policy and interoperability; defence planning; joint experimentation, exercises and assessment; joint education and training; and future capabilities, research and technology. These would be accomplished for all of NATO in order to allow the only other NATO strategic command, Allied Command Operations, to concentrate on operations.

Some time ago Canada discovered that placing all operations under one command is unwieldy. Will NATO make this discovery as well? There have already been disputes about operational capability. During negotiations some NATO states preferred to maintain North American Headquarter with an operational capability by making it the NATO Expeditionary Command. The United States overruled such an option in favour of the Transformation Command. In effect the European states and Canada desired a 'domestic' NATO Strategic Command, which the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had become, to look after NATO operations within the geographic areas of the member-states. In the new organisation the Supreme Allied Command Operations would also look after expeditionary and all other operations for NATO. The question is whether this will become unwieldy as has been Canada's experience.

Canada's military has just undergone a reorganisation of its command structure creating four operational commands. This was done because it had become apparent that one commander, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, was unable to give full attention to the increasing number of varied operations. There have been some 31 overseas missions including response to such things as floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, snowstorms and earthquakes as well as participating in peace support operations and missions like the Canadian contribution to Afghanistan. The new Canadian organisation indeed reflects these realities. As NATO goes global and takes on more out-of-area operations there may well be a case to re-evaluate its new organisation along the line that Canada's forces have taken.

As this issue of the *Canadian Naval Review* goes to press,


Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

*HMCS* ***Fredericton*** *(inboard), FGS* ***Schleswig-Holstein*** *(centre) and ITS* ***Espero****.*

Canada will be in command of two NATO multinational forces – the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan and the Standing NATO Maritime Operations Group One. These are perfect roles for Canada to demonstrate its resolve and capability, but these opportunities arise infrequently.

*If Canada wants to* ***regain*** *its international influence, let alone* ***maintain*** *its major commitments such as Afghanistan, then a more permanent and larger contribution to NATO and global security generally must be made.*

A larger full-time personnel contribution to NATO is required. Canada presently provides less than 200 personnel to NATO on a full-time basis. Even if one could argue for a bare minimum contribution of one per cent of Canadian forces, this would triple the number. Canada has lost influence in the halls of NATO because of the lack of a regular contribution, a loss of higher level positions because of this, and intermittent major troop contributions, to name just a few reasons. There has been no Canadian in a position of higher command in the Operational NATO Command Headquarters since the stand-up of Allied Command Transformation. This has consequences when Canada does send a major contribution – such as both the Canadian-led Standing NATO Maritime Force and the Afghanistan mission – because Canadian leaders report to an operational headquarters which has no Canadian in the chain of command authority.

As you read this issue which features articles concerning NATO during various time-frames, keep in mind the paradigm shifts in the world and the requirement for NATO to shift with them. Remember the history and rationale for NATO's formation in the first place. Look at the geographic versus the more global approach we see being taken by NATO today. Reflect on the command structure best suited to handle domestic and expeditionary missions. Look at the rationale for joint versus single service commands and organisations.

Look also at the enormous value Canada has received from the world's most powerful permanent coalition. Look at Canada's contribution to NATO forces, the present NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, and Command of the Standing NATO Maritime Group One. To command such multinational operations a command and control capability along with the requisite task group staff is required. The navy's maritime command and control capability will disappear with the eventual retirement of Canada's four *Tribal*-class destroyers; one, HMCS *Huron*, has been paid off already. The class was built in the early 1970s and now approaches 40 years of service – a good 10 years past the best-before-date for warships! It takes at least 10 years to obtain new ship projects from the government. Icebreakers just won't do for this specific capability requirement and Canada will have to forgo its internationally recognised leadership role unless an off-the-shelf purchase can speed up the process or the capability can be incorporated in the present fleet, the future support ships, or the peace support (amphibious) ships which the government would like to transport the army.

If Canada wants to *regain* its international influence, let alone *maintain* its major commitments such as Afghanistan, then a more permanent and larger contribution to NATO and global security generally must be made.

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Duncan Miller
Former Chief of Staff, SACLANT

# Piracy vs. Terrorism: Same Problem, Same Solution?

**Heinz Gohlish**

Maritime law is quite clear about the difference between piracy at sea and terrorism at sea. There is an agreed demarcation which puts such criminal acts into specific categories. However, until recently, the only persons with a real interest in this distinction would have been maritime lawyers and marine insurance underwriters.

Terrorism comes under the heading of "acts of war." This can be perpetrated by groups of people or individuals and *need not* emanate from a political motive, but the terrorist act must involve the use of explosives or weapons of war. Piracy is classified as a "marine peril." Generally, a piratical act emanates from a person(s) who owes no allegiance to a recognized flag and who acts solely for his personal gain. Further, piracy should originate from the shore. Persons who roam the seas looking for targets are defined as "rovers" but are considered in the same category as pirates.

In practical terms, marine insurance underwriters treat terrorist risks within war clauses while piracy risks are covered within standard marine hull clauses. This means that different criteria are applied in paying compensation for losses resulting from acts of piracy or terrorism. These arcane distinctions may be of little immediate interest to seafarers and, indeed until recently, most seamen gave this little thought. All that has changed over the last two decades. Terrorism is now a fact with which we all live and seamen are very much in the front lines of possible terrorist attacks. Ships have been attacked directly with weapons of war and destructive explosives. However, unlike terrorism, piracy has to some degree always been with us. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as follows:

> An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.[1]

This is a simpler definition than that under Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) and makes it distinct from terrorism.[2] But that distinction can easily be blurred as piracy is defined mainly by *objective* and terrorism is defined more by *method*. This has become even more problematic in recent years as pirates have gained greater access to automatic weapons, explosives and faster boats. In addition, piracy can be isolated to a few well-defined regions. Nine locations worldwide account for two-thirds of all reported incidents – Gulf of Aden/Red Sea, Indonesia, Malacca Straits, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Somalia and Nigeria.

The number of reported piracy attacks has fluctuated in recent years, as indicated in the table below.

***Regional Distribution of Reported Piracy Attacks (2002-2005)***

| Region | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Americas | 65 | 72 | 45 | 25 |
| Indian Sub-Continent | 52 | 87* | 32* | 36* |
| Africa/Red Sea | 78 | 93 | 72** | 80** |
| SE Asia/Far East | 170 | 189 | 173*** | 122*** |
| Rest of World | 5 | 4 | 6 | 13 |
| **Total** | **370** | **445** | **329** | **276** |

* Of which 58 (2003), 17 (2004) and 21 (2005) were off Bangladesh.
** Of which 28 and 16 were off Nigeria.
*** Of which 138 and 101 were in the Malacca Strait-Singapore Strait-Indonesia area.

*Photo: Internet image*

*The **Seabourn Spirit**, the target of terrorists off the Horn of Africa in 2004.*

The notable reduction in incidents off Bangladesh is attributed mainly to increased naval patrols. This indicates that the impact of piracy can be reduced by preventative actions. Yet in 2005 new areas of concern have emerged, particularly off Iraq, Tanzania and Vietnam. The situation off Somalia continues to deteriorate, rising from two attacks in 2004 to 35 in 2005.

Generally, the dangers of terrorism and piracy can be mitigated by sound intelligence, effective counter-measures and heightened threat awareness. Considerable political and military resources are being applied to the problem of terrorism both ashore and at sea and it is fair to say that much effort is being made in the attempt to contain the problem. However, piracy is not always being attacked by littoral states with the same zeal.

*That piracy still exists in the 21st century is in itself astounding and a measure of a shortfall in international law enforcement.*

Yet, from a seaman's perspective, piracy presents the greater danger. That this phenomenon still exists in the 21st century is in itself astounding and a measure of a shortfall in international law enforcement. Yet it does exist and seamen are still threatened, injured and killed on a depressingly regular basis – there were 30 fatalities in 2004 directly related to piracy. Yet the same political will that exists to fight terrorism is not always evident in the fight against piracy. It is almost as though the authorities treat piracy as a sub-set of terrorism in the hope that it can be handled in the same way. That can be a mistake.

A fundamental practical difference is that terrorism is a worldwide threat while piracy is concentrated in a few highly active regions. The three most dangerous regions are the seas off Nigeria, off East Africa and among the islands of Southeast Asia. The following incidents are illustrative of contemporary pirate activity:

- In February 2004 four pirates in a speedboat with automatic weapons intercepted a Liberian-flagged barge carrier off Nigeria. They demanded cash for safe passage. Having received the money, they wanted more and fired on the moving barge.
- In June 2005 the UN relief ship *Semlow* with 850 tonnes of World Food Program rice for Somali tsunami survivors was hijacked off Mogadishu for a $500,000 ransom. The target was typical – an old ship, slow, smallish, with a mixed crew and a flag of convenience (FOC) registry.
- In August 2005 an explosion onboard the Filipino ferry *Dona Ramona* injured 30 people. It was at first thought to be the work of terrorist due to a similar explosion on board *Superferry 14* in February 2004 which killed 116 people. However, this was later re-assessed by Filipino police as the work of pirates with an objective of extortion or even retribution against the owners.


Credit: Internet image

*Sir Francis Drake: National hero or pirate?*

In the Somali hijacking, the crew was released after 100 days. The real tragedy of this incident may be that if it were not for the UN aid cargo, it may never have been reported. The ship and crew could simply have disappeared if the owners had refused to pay the ransom. In July 2005 the IMB issued a warning for all passing ships to stay at least 50 miles off the coast of Somalia. This in effect admitted to a lawless no-go area close to important shipping lanes.

One month later an Italian ship, *Jolly Marrone*, was attacked with a bazooka 105 miles off the same coast. Such an attack itself blurs the distinction between piracy and terrorism. It was a piratical act using terrorist methods. Italy immediately allocated a *Soldati*-class patrol ship to the area to act as a deterrent and as an escort for Italian-flagged ships. However, this is a level of support not available to an FOC ship and thereby creates even greater dangers for seamen employed in open registry ships.


Credit: Internet image

*The USS* ***Cole****, the first victim of modern terrorism at sea.*

In November 2005, the US Maritime Administration (MarAd) advised all vessels to keep 200 nm clear of Somalia. If there remained any doubt as to the seriousness of pirate activity off Somalia, this was dispelled within days of the MarAd announcement when the Bahama-flagged passenger ship *Seabourn Spirit* was attacked inside the 200 nm zone, on her way to Mombasa with 302 passengers. The attackers used automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades against a fast ship of almost 10,000 GT which fortunately out-ran the pirates after sustaining minor damage. The same week and in the same area, a Thai cargo ship *Laemthong Glory* was hijacked and the crew of 24 taken hostage. The United States has since deployed a guided missile destroyer as part of a multinational task force patrolling the western Indian Ocean. In January 2006, USS *Winston S Churchill* took possession of a suspected pirate vessel (itself a hijacked ship) with the direct support of IMB intelligence. In March 2006 a Dutch-led coalition task force, including US destroyers, captured a pirate-controlled fishing vessel, again off Somalia. It appears that military counter-measures can be made to work.

The situation in Southeast Asia is even worse. Indonesian waters remain the most pirate-infested area in the world with 79 reported incidents in 2005, more than a quarter of all attacks worldwide. The dubious distinction of second most pirate-infested region now goes to Somalia with 35 attacks. These are almost certainly understated. The Malacca Strait region offers particular difficulties for anti-piracy measures in that this region includes three contiguous jurisdictions: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Getting these states to *admit* to the problem was already a difficult task.

The Southeast Asia area has two additional problems which militate against a coordinated response to combat piracy. First, many of the international ship crews come from this region and thus there is a certain national self-interest at work. And, second, this region is also the home of several radical nationalist movements such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia who exploit the confusion between piratical or terrorist acts. The problem remains that, while the objectives of pirates and terrorists may be entirely different, their methods are increasingly similar and littoral states seem to have difficulties in applying a measured response commensurate with the threat.

However, in July 2005 some combined naval patrols finally emerged in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Crucially, it is intended that patrol vessels in hot pursuit will be able to chase suspected pirates into each other's territorial sea. Since August 2005 the three littoral states have also cooperated with an "eye in the sky" aerial surveillance program. Whether these measures will be effective or not depends on the degree to which such resources are applied. The sea area is huge and the islands number in the thousands. Almost certainly the impact will be minimal unless the patrols and surveillances are extensive and continuous.

Despite the encouraging progress that has been made, there are a number of issues that remain to be resolved. How, for example, will a Singapore patrol boat react when it finds that it is not chasing pirates into Indonesian waters but operatives of GAM? Indeed, depending on who is opposing them, the criminals could change allegiance and motive during the course of the surveillance. And how will marine underwriters deal with compensation for losses under these circumstances?

In fact, hull underwriters in London, through the Joint War Committee (JWC), have decided not to bother with such technicalities and have declared the entire Malacca Strait a War Risk Exclusion Zone (EZ), even if the principal threat is piracy, not war. In assessing the risk, the JWC consulted the Aegis Threat Assessment System (ATAS), produced by a private and independent security company, Aegis Defence Services of London. An EZ rating gives the insurers the discretion to increase premiums and impose additional conditions, both for ships and cargo transiting the strait. The Malacca Strait EZ includes one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and affects about 50,000 ships annually, incorporating a quarter of the world's trade and half of the world's oil cargo. Ship owners and all Asian states are understandably unhappy with marine underwriters but to date all attempts to negotiate have failed. The issue is now not only safety, it is also economic. It also clearly throws into focus the question

of whether the affected states of Southeast Asia are doing enough to counter piracy.

Terrorism is a long-term problem which is unlikely to disappear soon. It is also worldwide in scope. But piracy is a smaller, more localised event with a far more limited objective and no real complicating political agenda. To lump piracy in with terrorism will create additional problems for both counter-activities. Including anti-piracy measures within anti-terrorist policies will muddy the waters of an anti-terrorist strategy. Conversely, treating pirates as terrorists will, at best, slow the fight against piracy and, at worst, drive the pirates into the terrorist camp. Pirates and terrorists helping each other in matters such as intelligence sharing and resource diversion would be a huge step backwards for the maritime community.

There is therefore a need for a simple demarcation, consistent with the accepted definitions of piracy and terrorism. Pirates and terrorists are not natural allies – one shuns publicity, the other needs it. Since piracy is the smaller problem in terms of resources and global effect, and since the objective of eradicating piracy worldwide is actually attainable in the short term, it would make sense to separate pirate activities from within the wider and more complex realm of terrorist activities.

On that basis, piracy needs to be defined in practical terms and in such a way as to distinguish it from terrorism. The IMB definition quoted above is a good beginning. To further clarify this distinction, it may be helpful to see pirates as fitting into three categories with different objectives: those who live near the sea or make their living from the sea but are sufficiently poor to risk criminal activities in order to supplement their income; those who are part of organised crime, both willing and unwilling, and respond to orders from a crime boss or syndicate; and those who have, at least in part, a political objective or use political discontent as an excuse for criminal activities.

Each category requires a differently applied anti-piracy measure. These measures come under the general headings of social, constabulary (police) and military respectively, and relate to a particular type of pirate activity. Let us start with the third type first – those who use piracy to further a political objective or use political discontent as an excuse for criminal activity. It would be difficult and unfruitful to attempt to distinguish the political malcontent from the hardcore terrorist. No attempt should be made to do so and this group of pirates should be dealt with as terrorists. The distinguishing feature is the preference for maximum damage in addition to economic gain. The third example of the three outlined above (*Dona Ramona*) illustrates this category of piracy.

The second example of pirate activity – the professional criminal who happens to undertake his activities at sea – requires constabulary counter-measures. To be effective, the measures undertaken by the authorities require, like their land counterparts, good policing as well as an effective coast guard. This means aggressive search and prevent patrols rather than just reacting to attacks. The example of Bangladesh is encouraging. The police also need to work at both local and international levels. Where the local police are ineffective or over-stretched, the state should not hesitate to bring in international resources to assist. There are situations where foreign police forces are not always acceptable, but certain non-political police forces backed by intelligence from the IMB or private agencies, could lend effective expertise in support of the local police. New technological innovations now available, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), acoustic counter-measures and Secure-Ship measures (best described to naval personnel as a civilian version of degaussing) will also assist. The second example given above (*Semlow*) would illustrate piracy that could be addressed by this approach.

Finally let us discuss the first type, the social and poverty aspects. Anti-piracy measures specifically need to address the activities of the economic opportunist as illustrated in the Nigerian example above. The most effective counter-measures for this type of piracy are fundamental social changes to make such crime uneconomic and too risky for the perpetrator. In Southeast Asia, one can hope this approach will work in the medium term as economic growth and productive employment filter downward to absorb a greater proportion of the previously poor. Those who continue as pirates, either by choice or by compulsion, will then fall into the second category.

However, in Africa this approach can reasonably be considered only on a long-term basis. In the meantime, the most viable interim solution in Africa seems to be area containment. That responsibility would largely fall on the Italian, French, British and American naval forces as seems to be the case at present. Perhaps a UN command structure may be workable. The IMO has called for exactly that. This should ensure that seamen going about their lawful business receive the same protection on the high seas as their transport counterparts do on land. If necessary, ships visiting ports near pirate hotspots should be routed through protected traffic lanes. This protection will be expensive but effective.

## *Conclusions*

London's Joint War Committee was probably wrong in treating the piracy threat with the same inflexible underwriting policy as terrorism. But it was certainly right to highlight the issue, and its uncompromising action with regard to insurance rates and conditions has forced the effected states to review their existing commitments to the eradication of all piracy activities. The most effected states appear to have finally recognized that with the due application of intelligence and enforcement the fight against piracy is winnable now.

*There are benefits to treating pirates separately from terrorists by means of a committed application of economic, constabulary and military forces.*

The benefits of treating pirates separately from terrorists by means of a committed application of economic, constabulary and military forces are twofold. First, measures aimed specifically against terrorism itself will be better focused and resources more effectively applied. Second, defeating piracy will be an immediate tangible result which will be visible to the maritime community. Success in anti-piracy measures will create a more cooperative and diligent seaman in the fight against terrorism.

**Notes**

1. International Maritime Bureau, *Annual Report*, 1 January-31 December 2005, London, 31 January 2006. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce. It is a not-for-profit body aimed at containing commercial crime, among which is maritime piracy. Since 1992 it has run the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur which provides the most comprehensive information on piracy world wide. The services of the PRC are available to all ships free of charge. For more information on this subject see ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,"
2. The UN definition (Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS) reads as follows: "Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
   (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
   (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
   (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
   (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
   (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

*Heinz Gohlish is a former naval officer working as an independent marine consultant in the UK.*

*In 2004, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic visited Boston and as shown here tied-up close to the historic ship USS* ***Constitution****. It was this ship that was sent to Tripoli in 1803 to conduct operations against the Barbary Pirates. These included the re-capture of the USS* ***Philadelphia*** *taken by the pirates earlier. These frigates were the workhorses of the young US Navy in much the same that the Canadian* ***City****-class frigates are the workhorses of our modern fleet.*


*Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic*

# Prelude to the Storm: The MH Community Gears up for the Cyclone

**Major Jeff Tasseron**

Credit: Musees Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique,

*"Landscape with the Fall of Icarus" by Pieter Brueghel, 1558.*

> *. . . even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course*
> *Anyhow in a corner, some untidy spot*
> *Where the dogs go on with their doggy life and the torturer's horse*
> *Scratches its innocent behind on a tree.*
> (W.H. Auden, "Musée des Beaux Arts")[1]

In the richly metaphorical painting "Landscape with the Fall of Icarus," sixteenth century artist Pieter Brueghel depicts the disastrous end of Icarus' flight training as a freakish sideshow to the infinitely more prevalent business of ordinary life on land and at sea. Icarus himself appears only as two flailing legs disappearing into the water, almost unnoticed in the lower right corner of the painting. Around him, daily events unfold – the peasants plough and tend their flocks, and a ship sails grandly by, its sailors perhaps entertained but entirely unmoved at the sight. For the poet W.H Auden, who comments on the scene in his companion work "Musée des Beaux Arts," the painting represents a sobering reminder of how the mundane reality of daily life tends to overpower even the most significant events. Surely it is one of the great oddities of the human condition that life plods onwards, even as miracles and tragedies unfold around us.

Although it might be tempting to interpret the painting as a broad allegory for the Canadian Forces (with the labouring army and the proud navy tending to their respective businesses while the air force splashes about untidily in unfamiliar waters), it is the deeper message of near disinterest in the face of something distinctly unusual that appears most apt to the situation now facing the Maritime Helicopter (MH) community.

For though we are perched on the precipice of the introduction of the CH-148 Cyclone, a platform which heralds a sea change in capability, complexity and flexibility (the likes of which has not been seen since the introduction of the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) or the CP-140 Aurora), there seems to be little or no meaningful debate among the primary stakeholders over how this minor miracle might best be accomplished, or even if it can be accomplished in the manner originally envisaged.[2] At the risk of unfairly comparing the MH community with poor, doomed Icarus, thus far it seems as though the introduction of the Cyclone is happening just as the painting suggests – a bit of flailing, cries of surprise from a few onlookers, but yielding only a minor splash whose ripples are expected to fade swiftly against the larger landscape of the air force.

Now, however, 18 months after a contract was awarded, and only 30 months until Sikorsky is supposed to deliver the first airframe in November of 2008, evidence is mounting that the introduction of the Cyclone will not be accompanied by a mere ripple, but will instead be a tumultuous affair. In this regard, it is my belief that the introduction of this airframe may in fact have a dramatic and largely unanticipated impact, not only upon those immediately involved, but also on those organizations who until this point seemed content to proceed as though it were business as usual, to "go on with their doggy life" in the words of the poet.

A few key themes permeate the growing body of evidence that the MH program represents both great peril and great opportunity for many constituent parts of the CF beyond the MH community itself. Operationally, the Cyclone clearly has enormous implications for the future, opening the door on new, even revolutionary joint-warfare options, while challenging the traditional anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-centric MH capability model.[3] Organizationally, the need to bring new skill sets into the community is colliding with transitional pressures in the closing years of CH-124 Sea King operations, as the legacy MH force generation approach grapples with declining aircrew throughput and ambiguity surrounding the ultimate technical sustainment posture for the new aircraft. Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, it seems increasingly likely that the inherently broad capability mix of the platform will require force employers at the operational and strategic level to confront difficult philosophical questions, even to the extent of asking whether the concept of a discrete, unitary air force has meaning in a 3-D-oriented, joint-focused military.

### *Operational Ambiguity*

A quick review of the performance specifications of the basic vehicle gives little indication that this platform will offer a powerful and diverse range of new capability to force employers. Compared to the Sea King, the Cyclone is a little faster, provides a slightly better radius of action, and has a ramp for easier unloading – nothing much revolutionary. While its payload represents a significant improvement to the status quo capability, it is by no means exceptional when measured against more recent competitors, particularly those optimized for logistic roles. Similarly, with respect to the emerging Cyclone support footprint, there is little indication that something unusual or exciting is underway, beyond the new training centre taking shape at 12 Wing Shearwater and the sudden appearance of a few much-needed stretches of fresh asphalt on base roads.

*While the prospect of an all-singing, all-dancing armed flying minivan is superficially appealing, it also presents its share of challenges.*

With a closer look, however, a very different story emerges. Combining a highly integrated sensor suite, spanning multiple wavelengths across acoustic, visual, radio and radar spectra, and with significant tactical data interpretation aids and sound human factors design, the Cyclone will be Canada's first true "net-centric"-optimized weapon system.[4] Coupled with a plug-and-play architecture that will permit relatively swift reconfiguration, the ability to mount a surprisingly capable mix of offensive and defensive hardware, and with enormous over-land as well as over-water capability, the CH-148 is poised to become the air force's premiere joint warfare asset.

While the prospect of an all-singing, all-dancing armed flying minivan is superficially appealing, it also presents its share of challenges. For example, the emerging Standing Contingency Task Force (SCTF) concept of operations postulates an early injection of CH-148 airframes into an over-land utility role. This would mean that just as the slowly declining operational skill sets of the CH-124 community are approaching their lowest pre-transition ebb, the draw upon airframes for the important but distinctly low-tech role of transport will be at its most intense. Leaving aside the wisdom of using an enormously expensive, capable and scarce Cyclone to transport troops in what was formerly the domain of more basic airframes, there are many unanswered questions regarding the degree to which we are prepared to sacrifice longstanding tactical capabilities for early "return on investment" in the form of a deployable field asset.

Along with this comes a logistic footprint of unprecedented dimension – not primarily because of the demands of the new aircraft, but more due to the pressing need for a broad rejuvenation of 12 Wing's generally decrepit infrastructure. With hundreds of millions of dollars now being committed to the Wing proper, the future flexibility of the site is being enhanced to the point that it will likely exceed the basic capability required for direct support to deployed shipboard flight operations. This in turn opens the door for new and more ambitious opportunities to leverage the virtually unique conjunction of air, rail and sea access offered within the 12 Wing footprint.

But even this highly positive development comes with a stiff cost. There is no standard blueprint for how to build MH support infrastructure. Good decisions require military-specific subject matter expertise, sustained involvement by a stable set of personnel, and a range of skills and aptitudes not normally resident within the community. These are valuable and increasingly scarce commodities in an organization that has made a virtue out of the necessity of an extremely lean personnel structure.

The key to overcoming such challenges is to ensure that


Photo: Sikorsky Aircraft

*Artist's Impression of the Canadian CH-148. This aircraft will continue the long operational relationship between the navy and helicopters.*

senior decision-makers understand that in the current personnel-limited environment, building capability is fundamentally a zero-sum proposition, at least in the medium term. Years ago, when the MH community entered into an experiment to create a passive ASW capability,[5] it did so without a clear understanding of the degree to which the demand for qualified personnel in one capability domain would limit or preclude their use in another. In hindsight, it is now easy to see the extent to which the community was required to sub-optimize its core active ASW capability (not only in terms of airframes, but in terms of qualified people) to support the "new" aircraft. Given that multi-skilled, highly experienced personnel are a force multiplier, and that real-world operations will almost always trump training (or transitional activity?), without some significant reprioritization of MH and perhaps wider air force personnel resources, SCTF's current direction seems destined to bring the community full circle, to the point that it must again make the wrenching choice between real competence in a single area, or limited capability across many.

Unfortunately, discussions on the SCTF both within and outside the MH community have to date tended to gloss over this problem, most obviously because it has direct implications for the "central dogma" of the MH concept of operations – active anti-submarine warfare, prosecuted from ships and ashore, in support of transiting forces. As mentioned previously, the simple truth is that the present MH community is only notionally ASW-centric. In fact, some might argue that the early 1990s were the zenith of shipboard rotary-wing ASW operations, and it has been downhill since then. Instead, the skills required to perform credible ASW have come to be regarded more as a proxy for broad maritime warfare competence – the theory being that if we can build and maintain crews with even limited capability in this extremely challenging area of warfare, there is a good likelihood that they can perform adequately in other areas. This has been an extremely successful risk-reduction strategy, but it is inherently platform-dependent, and cannot survive the introduction of the Cyclone.

Put bluntly, it is my considered belief that a fundamentally new warfare orientation will be required – likely one in which ASW capabilities survive (perhaps even in a highly robust form) but where they are no longer the "marquee role" of either the new platform or the MH community. This is not a dry, doctrinal problem. At the current time, the MH community is tenuously holding on to a credible capability in general maritime warfare. If personnel shortfalls or similar circumstances force the community into an "operational pause" prior to the introduction of the MHP – in effect, a gap in operational capability between the end of the Sea King and the Cyclone IOC, rather than the currently projected overlapping transition – vital skill sets will be lost, and will have to be learned again by less experienced aircrew on a completely different and immature platform. The technical and military risks presented by this scenario, while not insurmountable, are dauntingly real.

### *Overcoming Organizational Stasis*

Beyond the immediate operational implications, new organizational challenges are also becoming apparent. For example, in the joint world of tomorrow, what does it mean to be an MH aviator or technician, if your primary job is as likely to be ashore as at sea? The Tactical Aviation community could pose a similar question, as

Photo: MCpl Charles Barber, Staff Photographer SNMG1 (NATO)

*Proven capability. An essential force multiplier. A Sea King helicopter on board HMCS **Athabaskan** in Malaga during the deployment with the Standing NATO Maritime Group One, 2006.*

the joint support ship (JSS) and "son-of-big-honking ship" projects get underway, and a more expeditionary deployment model gains credibility. The navy at large is implicated as well; if the Cyclone becomes one of the cornerstones of a robust amphibious warfare capability, how are the costs of this to be reconciled with the desire to maintain core anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW) roles? The future of entire units is at stake here, as are scarce command billets, longstanding command and control relationships, opportunities for professional development, established career paths, and individual stability. Even simple questions are fraught with complexity and long-term implications. For instance, to build early-in forces does it make more sense to teach land-centric pilots to fly large helicopters from small decks, or would it be better to simply convert existing MH aircrew into land warriors?[6] A superficial response is always possible, but if we take the time to really analyse the parameters of the problem, it soon becomes evident that we are working in a non-linear realm, where seemingly minor decisions can yield surprising or even counterproductive results.

There are no obvious solutions, but what seems certain is that with increasing numbers of rotary-wing cockpits, the current stovepipe structure of the air force (seven distinct and separate societies) seems increasingly out of date, even unsustainable. Contemplating some sort of conjoined Tactical and Maritime rotary-wing aviation community leads inevitably to more fundamental questions regarding the current structure of air operational roles. Lacking precise information about the nature of Canada's future expeditionary warfare posture, set-piece planning exercises such as MOSART (Military Occupational Structure Analysis, Redesign and Tailoring, an analysis project intended to examine and propose changes to the current CF occupational structure) might be forgiven for being unable to agree upon the need to revisit some of our most cherished employment models.[7] Within the air force, however, there must be at least a dawning realization that we have reached the absolute limits of incrementalism. As Gary Hamel points out in a 1996 *Harvard Business Review* article, "*We Try Harder* may be a great advertising slogan, but it's depressingly futile as a strategy."[8]

In addition to difficult questions of how best to train and supply aircrew, technical sustainment plans for the Cyclone raise other thorny issues. Recall that this is a community that has trained generations of technicians who are highly proficient in near steam-age avionic and airframe technologies. Repairing and maintaining the Sea King, particularly under operational conditions, has required significant apprentice and journeyman training, over periods of months and even years, to create qualified, capable personnel.

Yet in a matter of months the community will be catapulted into the twenty-first century; PDAs and wireless ordering will replace volumes of diagrams and exhaustive maintenance procedures. There will still be a need for a strong wrench hand and a nose for trouble in the rigging, but additional skills and knowledge will be needed to deal with novel structural materials, sensitive electronic equipment, and on-aircraft networks, all in the face of a still-emerging contractor support model. With delivery time-lines so tight, the final format of how the aircraft will be supported will not be known in sufficient time to allow measured input into the existing military personnel management structures. Worse, with the operational cycle running more quickly by orders of magnitude than our sluggish Cold War training structure, we now find ourselves inside an unfortunate reaction loop; forced into a "come-as you are" technical support strategy not by design, regrettably, but by circumstance. Suffice it to say, expect upheaval.

## *A Siege Philosophy?*

Increasingly, the question that confronts the MH community is not whether the wax in our wings will melt, but what will be left intact after the ripples of our impact with the water subside. Should we shout as we fall, hoping to attract the attention of people on shore or at sea? Do we pursue a strategic alliance with the Tactical

Aviation community, or cleave to core ASW and naval support roles? Does it make sense to sacrifice the continuity of in-community professional development for early stability of personnel in key project jobs? Should we maintain operational capability with the Sea King, at the risk of missing targets for the Cyclone?

Ultimately, it is neither operational nor organizational challenges that have the capacity to seriously endanger the maritime helicopter program (MHP) – people rise to the occasion, natural leaders emerge, events conspire to focus attention on the problem at hand, and somehow everything comes together. In the current fiscal, political and public environment, however, it is the philosophical shortfalls and schisms that are truly dangerous. Questions surrounding the ultimate employment model for the community are debated behind closed doors (if at all) without broad representation from the appropriate constituencies, at the right level. Vast blocks of strategy are being crafted and put in place by laughably small and under-resourced groups, or even by individuals. And at the frontlines, there is no sense of sustained, senior engagement at the operational or strategic level.

*. . . we must first and foremost recall that we are not innocent bystanders, herding our sheep or leaning on the rail of the ship, eyeing the swirl in the water where a pair of legs once kicked for a moment before disappearing.*

Put bluntly, the MHP is a $5.0 billion procurement item, nearing the home stretch, yet the transition process seems to be characterized by more of the same, desultory football that has defined so much of the Sea King's operational life, suspended as it is between the air force and the navy. The only difference now is that there is a third team on the field, dressed in green, and perhaps with a significantly different take on the rules of the game.

Certainly, these are difficult and controversial subjects, particularly given the precarious and highly developmental state of the ongoing CF transformation. But it is only by formulating and rationally considering such questions that we as a community will be able to build our metaphorical emergency checklist – that series of critical actions that we must be able to perform (and those things we absolutely should not do, as well) if we

Photo: Sikorsky Aircraft

*The new CH-148 will look like this as it lands.*

are to have any hope of surviving the inevitable impact with the water. To return, therefore, to "The Fall of Icarus," we must first and foremost recall that we are not innocent bystanders, herding our sheep or leaning on the rail of the beautiful ship, eyeing the swirl in the water where a pair of legs once kicked for a moment before disappearing. As much as we might prefer to ignore it, $5.0 billion makes a big splash, and if the entry is not right it could swamp the ship, and risk flooding the humble farmer's carefully tended crop as well.

**Notes**

1. W.H. Auden, "Musée des Beaux Arts," from *Collected Poems by W.H. Auden*, edited by Edward Mendelson. Executors of the Estate of W.H. Auden, 1976.
2. Though it may overly dignify the Statement of Requirements and/or the Concept of Operations to call them plans, they were at least a reasonable starting point for debate.
3. It must be noted that the ASW-centric model under which the MH community continues to operate is no longer ASW-centric in the sense of actual war-fighting capability – serious anti-submarine expertise has long been moribund in MH. Rather, the community remains ASW-centric in terms of its capability orientation.
4. In fairness, the Aurora Incremental Modernization Plan (AIMP) aims to offer similar capabilities, albeit in a legacy platform.
5. Known as "HELTAS" – Helicopter Towed Array Support. This project saw a portion of the CH-124 fleet fitted with advanced acoustic processors, MAD, and a digital tactical computer. Intended as a developmental exercise in advance of the NSA, HELTAS subsequently morphed into a quasi-operational platform.
6. This is already an ongoing experiment, given the increasing (and intentional) insertion of experienced MH aircrew into joint positions at the JOG, JSG, overseas in Afghanistan, and at Foxhole U.
7. A proposal by the author to consider the feasibility of a cross-community, rotary-wing-centric approach to building the next generation of aircrew was soundly rebuffed at a recent MOSART option analysis session. Ironically, this rejection may yet hasten the advance of what increasingly seems to be a fait accompli.
8. Gary Hamel, "Strategy as Revolution," *Harvard Business Review*, July-August 1996, p. 69.

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# The Fleet We Never Had

**Commander M.D. Tunnicliffe**

## *Introduction*

The origins of a navy are often rooted in conflict and the Canadian Navy is no exception. However, the battles that surrounded the birth of our navy were political ones, the inevitable outcome of the messy business of developing policy. The naval requirements process ultimately involves shaping government policy into equipment and, whatever the provenance of the ships that states buy, the resultant fleet is a unique reflection of governmental direction – a policy recorded in steel as it were. Interpreting the composition of a fleet as a record of policy therefore requires an understanding of its format and language.

The discussion of the birth of the Canadian Navy sometimes ignores the nuances inherent in the advice provided by the British Admiralty to Canada, frequently confounded by anachronistic language. Canadian understanding of the recommendations made by the Admiralty at the Imperial Conference of 1909 for an independent Canadian fleet was shaped by the contemporary appreciation of naval terminology. The recommendations were, of course, coloured by the Admiralty's own agenda resulting in a collision of policies and interests. The product was a compromise represented in the hulls of two new fleets proposed for Canada at the conference – a training fleet and an operational one. The country quickly acquired the training fleet but the operational force was the fleet we never had.

## *The Imperial Conference of 1909*

The background to the convocation of the Imperial Conference held in July and August of 1909 in London has already been outlined in the *Canadian Naval Review*.[1] Canada and Australia had both determined on a policy of national fleet building while New Zealand, placing its defence in the hands of the Royal Navy (RN), offered money towards the cost of a battleship. The British government, with a somewhat overplayed naval "crisis" to manage, was looking for ways to mitigate the costs of the expensive building program it had engendered. The Admiralty had for years been attempting to get the colonies to contribute to a unified Imperial navy, but recognizing that in Canada and Australia this would be a losing proposition, sought a compromise that would satisfy the demand of the senior dominions for their own navies while maximizing Admiralty control.

In preparation for the naval discussions, the Admiralty had drawn up a memorandum intended to form the basis of discussions with the dominion representatives. The provisions of this memorandum, which shaped the subsequent discussions, included:

*Photo: Archives Canada No. C-017906*

*HMCS* ***Niobe*** *in Halifax. This photo shows the ship in "Victorian" livery – a paint scheme dropped by the Royal Navy in 1902/03.*

- dominion navies must be able to "contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence";
- any dominion wishing to create its own navy should form a "distinct Fleet Unit," and the smallest unit is one which, "while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war";
- a dismissal of local defence forces constructed of torpedo craft and submarines, which could not take a "proper place in the organization of an Imperial navy distributed strategically over the whole area of British interests";
- a specification of the Fleet Unit which "in the opinion of the Admiralty [should] consist at least of the following:
  - 1 armoured cruiser (new "*Indomitable*" class, which is of the "*Dreadnought*" type),
  - 3 unarmoured cruisers ("*Bristol*" class),
  - 6 destroyers
  - 3 submarines
- a recognition that the armoured cruiser, as the essential part of the fleet unit should be the first unit acquired; and



*HMCS **Rainbow** in Prince Rupert Harbour, circa 1914.* *Photo: (Photographer unknown)/Library and Archives Canada No. PA-157606*

- standards for crewing, pay, support, and discipline in fleets should permit its interoperability with RN forces under Admiralty control.[2]

This was a reversal of the Admiralty's earlier position (taken at the 1907 conference), which had indicated no objection to the "colonies" acquiring smaller vessels such as torpedo boats and submarines for local defence. The Admiralty was now recommending that the new dominion navies adopt the latest technology – starting with the biggest and most complex unit. Of course the operation of a major unit like an *Indomitable*-class armoured cruiser would be a stretch for the capabilities of a neophyte navy and the skills and facilities necessary to support it a commensurate challenge. The proposed "Fleet Unit" would therefore force the new national navies back to the Admiralty for assistance, giving the latter both the control and the financial backing it had always sought.

*Discussions with the Canadians resulted in a quite different proposal.*

The Admiralty proposed that the Fleet Units provided by Canada, Australia and New Zealand be stationed in the Pacific as the principal Imperial force there replacing RN units that had been pulled back to home waters. As this proposal was of little interest to Canada (whose maritime interests were largely focused on the Atlantic seaboard) this "one size fits all" proposal was considerably modified to meet individual interests during the subsequent discussions. New Zealand's offer of a battleship was converted to funding an *Indomitable*-class armoured cruiser as the centre of an RN Fleet Unit on the China station, while Australia agreed to build a complete Australian Fleet Unit comprised of an *Indomitable*-class armoured cruiser, three unarmoured *Bristol*-class cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines.[3]

Discussions with the Canadians resulted in a quite different proposal. The Canadians indicated that while they were interested in Admiralty advice, they were not prepared to construct a complete Fleet Unit. Canada, however, was willing to consider two options based on annual maintenance cost options of £600,000 and £400,000. In the first proposal (the one ultimately selected by Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier), the Canadian fleet would comprise one *Boadicea* and four improved *Bristol*-class cruisers, with six improved *River*-class destroyers all disposed on the Atlantic coast except for two Esquimalt-based *Bristols*. In the second option, only three *Bristols* and four destroyers would be built, with all the destroyers and one of the *Bristols* based in the Atlantic coast and two *Bristols* in the Pacific. Discussions also provided for the loan from the Admiralty of two *Apollo*-class cruisers to commence training the crews.

### *The Proposed Fleet*

At the centre of both the Canadian and Australian fleets was the cruiser, a type of ship that by 1909 had undergone a revolution in concept, design and roles. Its function was derived from the frigate of the sailing ship navy, but the revolution in technology that characterized the latter half of the nineteenth century had made the frigate obsolete. As a 'cruising ship,' the frigate was designed to control the sea lines of communication assuring the British Empire free use of the ocean for logistics, military transport and commerce. The battle fleet, which partly existed to prevent interference with this cruising fleet of frigates, also required a scouting capability, a communications link, and a screen against enemy scouts. Thus, ships with the endurance, speed and manoeuvrability appropriate to the control function were highly useful for fleet support as well.[4]

With the development of ironclad steam-propelled warships the term frigate became meaningless, and by 1880 ships were designated according to their operational role. The fundamental cruiser requirements were speed, good operational range, but with limited armour protection and a modest combat capability. The specific allocation of displacement to speed, armour and firepower in a cruiser design depended on the particular role it

was intended to play: the commerce destroyer with high speed and relatively light armament; or the more heavily armed and armoured ships intended to counter them.

During the 1870s the RN experimented with a vertical armour belt but found the protection it offered inadequate for the cost in weight of the wrought iron armour of the day. Consequently, the RN settled on the concept of placing a domed armoured deck (1½" to 4" thick) over the engines and magazines at the waterline. Along with underwater compartmentalization, backed by coalbunkers, it provided a damage limitation system intended to keep the ship afloat and moving under fire from the guns of an opposing cruiser. Cruisers so armoured were called "protected," categorized as first, second or third class (determined largely by displacement), designed as required for long-range commerce protection, blockade, or local station patrol duties.

*Photo: Department of National Defence and Archives Canada, No. PA-133876*

*HMCS **Niobe** at Cornwallis (probably in August 1914). She commenced training cruises in April 1911 around Nova Scotia but ran aground off Cape Sable on 30 July that year.*

As metallurgy advanced, thinner but stronger plate was developed making it practicable to replace the protected deck with a vertical armour belt capable of stopping typical cruiser shells from piercing the hull. In 1890 the French launched a 6,500-ton cruiser that combined speed, endurance and advanced guns with an extensive vertical armour belt. The RN initially reacted to this challenge by constructing larger protected cruiser designs, the last being the eight-ship 11,000-ton *Diadem*-class (including HMS *Niobe*, launched in 1898). However, as potential opponents continued to build cruisers with armoured sides, the RN followed suit in 1901 with the 12,000-ton *Cressy*-class which, because of their vertical belt of 6" steel, were classified as "armoured" cruisers. With this extra protection, many in the Admiralty felt that such



*Photo: Jack R. Wrathall/ Library and Archives Canada, No. PA-095648*

*HMCS **Rainbow** responding to a false report of German cruiser activity. Still fitted for her training role, she had no functional warstock ammunition on board.*

armoured cruisers would be also capable of operating with battleships in a general fleet action in addition to performing traditional cruiser roles. Indeed, one of the first operational roles of HMS *Niobe* after she was commissioned in the RN in 1899 was in a fleet exercise to determine "the most advantageous method of employing a considerable body of cruisers in conjunction with the main battle fleet" presumably in anticipation of the first armoured cruisers joining the fleet the next year.[5] (Today we might call this Concept Development and Experimentation). The armoured cruiser evolved through six more classes until, in 1908, it reached its ultimate expression in a vessel with the same displacement and armament as a *Dreadnought* battleship.

The first of these large armoured cruisers, HMS *Invincible*, had a displacement of over 17,000 tons, a speed of 25 knots, and an armament of eight 12" guns. These cruisers, armed like battleships, but with much less armour protection, immediately sparked controversy over their role – the temptation to place them in the line of battle was now obvious. The confusion as to their role eventually carried over into their nomenclature, but it was not until 1912 that the term "battle cruiser" would be used officially for the *Dreadnought*-type armoured cruiser. This was the ship (in the *Indomitable*-class version) that was proposed to the dominion navies in 1909 as the "large armoured cruiser" centrepiece for their new fleets.

The requirement for the traditional cruiser functions remained and this called for a large number of ships to protect the extensive merchant fleet spread over the vast reaches of the British Empire. By 1894, numerous small second-class protected cruisers were being built including the 3,600 ton *Apollo*-class (which included HMS *Rainbow*). The design of second- and third-class cruisers evolved through the 1890s with an increasing focus on the secondary function of scouting in support of the main battle fleet. By 1909 this operating concept was being executed in the 3,300 ton, 26 knot *Boadicea*-class third-class protected cruiser design later designated as a "*Scout*" type.




*HMCS* ***Niobe*** *– Fo'c'sle, looking aft.*


*Sailors from HMCS* ***Niobe*** *(date unknown).*

With the introduction of the torpedo boat as a challenge to the battle fleet and the consequent development of the destroyer (a type represented in the proposal to the dominions as the 700-ton, 26 knot improved *River*-class) as a counter, a new role emerged for the small cruiser. While the torpedo boat had proven to be a disappointment in fleet exercises, the larger torpedo-boat destroyer was found to be sufficiently seaworthy to act as a torpedo carrier screening the main battle fleet. However, a larger vessel, able to keep up with the destroyers, was necessary to provide the command function necessary to coordinate their attacks – a role for which the *Scout*-type cruisers were ideally suited. It was for this purpose, therefore, that a single *Boadicea*-class unit was recommended for Canada.

In reaction to the challenge presented by new foreign cruiser designs with a commerce destruction role, the RN still needed a medium-sized ship for patrol and commerce protection duties. The result was the 4,600-ton "*Bristol*" second-class protected cruiser. This design was rapidly followed with upgraded versions collectively known as "*Town*-class cruisers" and a slightly larger "improved *Bristol*" design was proposed at the 1909 Conference for the Canadian and Australian Navies.

In 1913 the Admiralty revised the cruiser classification system, re-designating types as battle-cruisers, cruisers (which included the former armoured cruisers and first-class protected cruisers) or light cruisers, this latter grouping including the *Towns*, *Scouts* and former second- and third-class cruisers. However, as this nomenclature was not in place at the time of the birth of the Canadian Navy, Laurier's proposed fleet therefore was described as comprising four second-class cruisers of the improved *Bristol*-class, and a flotilla of six destroyers of the improved *River*-type led by a *Boadicea* third-class cruiser. In the interim, two old *Apollo* second-class cruisers would be loaned to train the men of the new navy.

## *A Concept of Operations*

There were two fleets involved in the birth of the Canadian Navy, an operational fleet and a training one, but only the latter ever saw the light of day. The proposed operational fleet represented a reasonable capability for meeting Canada's maritime security needs and provided a good springboard for the initiation of a new navy. That navy had at least three roles to fulfill: a wartime mission controlled by the Admiralty; domestic operations under national direction; and a political, nation-building function. In the latter role the fleet had to become a unifying force for Canada, satisfying most of the divergent views on the purpose of a national navy without creating acrimony between French and English Canadians. In other words, the new fleet had to support the British Empire by taking up the local maritime defence burden without becoming a device for getting the country involved in overseas Imperial adventures.

The *Naval Service Act* of 1910 established a Department of Naval Service with five branches – naval, fishery protection, tidal and hydrographic surveys, and wireless telegraphy – and it was clear that naval ships acquired by Canada would be expected to be available for all of the domestic purposes of the department, particularly fisheries protection. Certainly, the initial selection of an *Apollo*-class cruiser was a reasonable choice for the training fleet, being handy enough to operate in inland waters while sufficiently robust to withstand heavy weather offshore, and therefore useful also in the fisheries protection role.

Before the arrangements to acquire the training ships were completed, however, the Canadian government decided to purchase the first-class protected cruiser *Niobe* in lieu of one of the proposed *Apollo*s. This change, from a 3,600-ton ship to an 11,000-ton vessel is a significant one which is poorly discussed in the literature. The explanation often given, that *Niobe* would substitute for the *Boadicea*-class unit[6] is, from an operational perspective, nonsense – *Niobe* was too big and lacking in ma-

noeuvrability to fulfill the *Boadicea*-class ship's role as a destroyer flotilla leader. The reason for the decision to drop the *Boadicea* from the fleet, made before the *Naval Service Act* was passed, is unclear but such a one-off type would have added considerable complexity to the sustainment effort needed for the little fleet.

*Niobe*'s main role was to support the training requirements of the new navy but, given the limited shore accommodation in Halifax for recruits, she was also intended to act as an accommodation ship.[7] Certainly, as a training ship, *Niobe* was a debatable choice. Confined to Canada's three-mile territorial waters by a jurisdictional dispute with the RN, she was restricted to cruising in coastal waters and after two months of operation, she ran aground in July 1911, suffering severe damage that rendered her non-operational until 1914. Conversely, *Rainbow* proved quite successful as both a training ship and a fisheries protection cruiser operating off Vancouver Island in support of local fisheries protection forces.

The proposed operational fleet was a reasonable compromise between Admiralty operational interests and Canadian political interests. The six destroyers with the *Boadicea* flotilla leader would have been constituted as a strike force threatening raiders operating against commerce in the Gulf of St Lawrence and the approaches to Halifax, although there is some debate about how effective this would have been.[8] The *Bristols* (in the *Chatham*-class variant actually constructed for Australia) were well suited for surveillance and patrol missions and were more than a match for most commercial raiders potentially operating in the Canadian offshore area.

It is interesting to speculate how such a Canadian fleet would have been employed. Again the experience of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) provides a useful guide. As Laurier rightly suspected, a battle cruiser would have been of little use to Canada. HMS *New Zealand*, the battle cruiser paid for by that country, did not stay in the Pacific but, after a series of promotional cruises around the Empire, she was sent off to defend the British Isles. Shortly after the outbreak of war HMAS *Australia*, the *Indomitable*-class battle cruiser constructed as the flagship of the RAN, followed her to be joined by most of the rest of the Australian fleet once the situation in the Pacific had been resolved. The cruisers *Sydney* and *Melbourne* joined the British home fleet in 1916, and by 1917, the Australian destroyers were operating as a flotilla in the Mediterranean. In all likelihood a modern Canadian fleet would have been similarly deployed "in its component parts . . . over the whole area of British interests."[9]

Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

*HMCS* ***Niobe*** *soccer team (date unknown).*

A navy is an instrument of national policy and Laurier's policy was nation-building. He recognized that nationhood for a country with Canada's extensive maritime interests could not include dependence on another country for the security of those interests. In satisfying the divergent interpretations of those interests in a country of two founding peoples he needed a navy substantive enough to be relevant to national security, useful in both domestic and local wartime roles, while still being of practical assistance to the Empire. On the other hand, to his mind, the navy must not provide any obvious mechanism for getting the country involved in Imperial entanglements. There could be no Canadian plans for "armored cruisers [which] may be classified as battleships"[10] – and thus an instrument of Admiralty, not Canadian, policy.

In the event, the planned fleet never saw the light of day. And even if it had, it would likely have been deployed to British waters by 1917. When shipping came under attack in Canadian waters in 1918, Laurier's navy might still have been the fleet we never had.

**Notes**

1. Richard Gimblett, "The Many Origins of the RCN," *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp 6-10. The evolution of Canadian naval policy is described in detail in Richard Gimblett, "Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909," *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1994), pp 35-53.
2. Summations and quotations are taken from the "Admiralty Memorandum" dated 20 June as included in the summary of the conference presented in: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Conference with Representatives of the self-Governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire, 1909* (J. Kemp, Printer for the State of Victoria, 17 November 1909), pp 22-24.
3. *Ibid*, p. 28. Elsewhere in the report of the proceedings, the *Bristols* are referred to as "second class cruisers." The *Indomitables* were referred to as armoured cruisers.
4. J.S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Uckfield, E. Sussex, The Naval & Military Press Ltd, a reprint of the 1918 ed), pp 103-105.
5. NHS, "Brief History of HMCS *Niobe*," 21 October 1961.
6. T.A. Brassey (ed.), *Brassey's Naval Annual*, 1910 (Portsmouth, J Griffin & Co, 1910), p. 166 provides this contemporary explanation, which has been picked up in Canadian accounts of the decision. Where Brassey's got this interpretation from is unknown.
7. RAdm Kingsmill, (Sessional Paper No 39, *Report of the Department of the Naval Service for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1911* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1911), p. 16) stated that Niobe was substituted for the second Apollo-class trainingship to provide accommodation.
8. See Ken Hansen, "Kingsmill's Cruisers," *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (January 2003), pp 37-52.
9. Admiralty memorandum in Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Conference with Representatives of the self-Governing Dominions*, p. 23.
10. Brassey (ed.), *Brassey's Naval Annual* 1906, p. 120.

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# Showing the Flag across the North: HMCS *Labrador* and the 1954 Transit of the Northwest Passage

**Michael Whitby**[1]


*Photo: DND/Directorate of History and Heritage*

*HMCS* ***Labrador*** *in ice during her transit of the Northwest Passage from east to west.*

In late September 1954, the Canadian naval icebreaker HMCS *Labrador* passed southward down the Bering Strait between the Diomedes Islands and Cape Prince of Wales towards the Bering Sea and the Pacific. Having entered the Arctic from the Atlantic, she became the first warship, the first large ship, and the first icebreaker to transit the storied Northwest Passage. It was an incredible achievement that brought welcome publicity to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and demonstrated that the service had the capability to work in the North, a region of growing strategic consequence. But although *Labrador*'s transit of the Northwest Passage has long been celebrated, the reason why she was sent on that mission has largely remained unexplained. The answer lies, as it so often does in the Canadian context, in our complex relationship with the United States. It reminds us not only of the tension and anxiety that routinely accompany even the closest cooperation, but also how the navy can play an important role in protecting and projecting national interests.

Although other navies had demonstrated interest in northern operations in the years immediately following the Second World War – in March 1946, for example, the United States Navy (USN) undertook *Operation Frostbite* in which the fleet carrier USS *Midway* tested cold weather capabilities in the Davis Strait – the RCN had been unable to do so, mainly due to the severity of post-war budget cuts. In May 1947 the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence observed that while ships of the Royal Navy, USN, the RCMP and other Canadian government departments had operated in the Canadian North, no ship of the RCN had ever entered northern waters. "In view of the growing importance of the Canadian north," Captain Horatio Nelson Lay noted, "and the possibility that in a future emergency Naval operations may be conducted in these waters, it is essential that the R.C.N. should be familiar with the operating problems and conditions." As a result of these observations – which had a distinctively timeless ring to them – in September 1948 the aircraft carrier HMCS *Magnificent* trained in the ap-

Photo: DND/Directorate of History and Heritage

*HMCS **Labrador** riding up on the ice in the process of breaking it to clear a passage.*

proaches to Hudson Strait while her accompanying destroyers *Nootka* and *Haida* penetrated into Hudson Bay itself. As well, in 1949 the frigate *Swansea* cruised off Greenland and visited Iqualuit on Baffin Island.

While traditional naval operations in northern waters quickly evaporated, oceanographic research and other scientific studies continued on a regular basis and featured increasingly close cooperation between American and Canadian defence scientists. Most particularly, scientists working for the Canadian Defence Research Board, the Pacific Naval Laboratory and the US Navy Electronic Laboratory conducted a series of joint research programs in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas areas of the Western Arctic. Although the Canadian research vessel HMCS *Cedarwood* made a valuable contribution to this effort through 1947 to 1949, American ships carried the brunt of the load. Indeed, from 1949 to 1954, when HMCS *Labrador* became operational, the only major vessels operating in the western Arctic were the USN icebreaker *Burton Island* and the US Coast Guard icebreaker *Northwind*. They usually embarked Canadian scientists and occasionally RCN personnel but it was chiefly an American effort.

The impending arrival of *Labrador* changed the landscape. The lead USN scientist, Dr Waldo Lyon, who visited naval headquarters in Ottawa in late 1953 to discuss the following year's program, which for the first time would include the RCN icebreaker, noted the change. His biographer noted that Lyon "came away from the meeting with a sense that *Labrador* opened new doors for his Canadian partners. "Note interest much increased in Arctic,' he wrote in his journal." Moreover, "there had been a change from the previous Canadian role as junior partner to the United States in arctic research to one of "leadership and acceptance of long term planning and work.'" [2]

Despite the increased confidence stemming from *Labrador's* impending arrival, Canadian naval staff officers were nonetheless concerned that the USN would trump them by using their experience and presence in the western Arctic to transit the Northwest Passage. The Department of External Affairs was also uneasy about sustained American operations in what the government claimed as Canadian territorial waters. These concerns, and the promise of the positive publicity that would come from a successful transit, caused the RCN to push *Labrador* northward, and into the Northwest Passage, earlier than would be considered normal or, perhaps, even prudent.

As one of only two heavy icebreakers in Canadian service – the Coast Guard's *D'Iberville* became operational in 1953 – decisions about *Labrador*'s employment were handled differently than other warships. Although she was to be based at Halifax, due to the various demands on her services from other government departments as well as the RCN's own requirements, it was decided that Flag Officer Atlantic Coast would maintain only administrative control of the ship and that operational control would reside at Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa. The Director of Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO) – Captain Dudley King during the period under consideration – would be the coordinating authority for all matters pertaining to the ship and to facilitate that activity an "Arctic Desk" was established within his organization. As a result of this set-up, the senior naval brass in Ottawa were more directly involved in the ship's program than would have been the norm, which also eased the inclusion of a 'political' dimension into her activities.

Decisions about *Labrador*'s deployment were also complicated by the fact that her completion was lagging some six weeks behind schedule. At a 13 January 1954 meeting chaired by the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy, it was revealed she would not be ready for acceptance until August 1954, too late in the season for Arctic operations if she was also to complete a full work-up program off Halifax. Comprehensive work-ups were seen as particularly important since *Labrador* was an entirely new class of ship.

*Labrador* had important commitments the first season, including re-supply missions to Department of Transport stations at Resolute and Eureka. If completion of the ship was late, obviously plans had to be compressed or foregone entirely if she was to make it to the Arctic at all. The ship's prospective commanding officer proposed a solution. Captain O.C.S. Robertson – dubbed "Long Robbie" because of his six-foot seven-inch frame – was a

skilled seaman who had spent the previous summer with the icebreaker USS *Burton Island*, a near sister to *Labrador*, in the Beaufort Sea. He would be comfortable taking the ship into the North with a two-week work-up or less provided he was given most of the ship's company prior to the shipbuilder's trials. Along with other shortcuts, like not sandblasting the hull, this was deemed tolerable, and *Labrador*'s acceptance was set at 15 July 1954, which would enable her to carry out the re-supply missions and perhaps take on the Northwest Passage.

Photo: DND/Directorate of History and Heritage

*HMCS* ***Labrador*** *fast in the ice with members of the ship's company out on the ice.*

The idea of *Labrador* trying the Northwest Passage arose from concerns about the potential movements of the US icebreakers that had been operating in the western Arctic as part of the Joint Canadian-American Beaufort Sea Expedition. In a December 1953 memo requesting permission to plan a transit by *Labrador*, the Director Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO) noted that "For various reasons, including those of sovereignty, Canada is reluctant to permit ships of other nations to proceed at will through the waters of the Canadian Arctic." He also noted that Captain Robertson had told him that when he had accompanied USS *Burton Island* during the 1953 season as Canada's senior representative, he was under instructions "to permit the eastern passage by US ships only if, in his opinion, the return to the westward would be truly hazardous."[3] Thus, an 'accidental' passage based on safety concerns was all Canada would accept. In February 1954, however, there were informal indications that the United States planned to send its icebreakers through the Northwest Passage that summer.

Matters concerning the law of the sea were in a state of flux at this time, with different states or groups of states claiming and recognizing different territorial limits and archipelagic rights. It is evident from planning memos that elements within the Canadian government were concerned that they had no legal entitlement to block an American transit of the Northwest Passage, which could affect claims of sovereignty.[4] Although this was never stated explicitly the DNPO clearly thought that the appeal of an American transit might dissipate if *Labrador* beat the United States to it. At any rate, it was believed that as a result of the publicity associated with a successful passage by *Labrador*, sovereignty claims over the Arctic might be strengthened, and Canada might be less reluctant to allow US ships to take the Northwest Passage in future, which would relieve a certain amount of tension in the Canada-US relationship.

Apart from strengthening Canada's position, the DNPO also thought the attendant publicity would benefit the navy. In a memo, he said:

> I am convinced that there is a certain amount of kudos to be gained by the Royal Canadian Navy if one of HMC Ships were to be the first Naval ship of any nation, not only to traverse the Northwest Passage but also to circumnavigate the North American continent in one 'season'. It is an opportunity which, like the conquest of Everest, will occur but once!

The VCNS, Rear-Admiral Wallace Creery, shared this enthusiasm for the mission but sought reaction from the scientific and naval technical communities. The research program would have to be cut back in some areas if the ship attempted the passage, but the RCN's Director of Scientific Services and the Dominion Hydrographer were willing to accept that. The Dominion Hydrographer noted that "the psychological value of such an accomplishment in opening up the Arctic would outweigh most other considerations." The Chief of Naval Technical Services (CNTS) cautioned:

> it was a somewhat ambitious programme for the maiden voyage of a new ship with inexperienced personnel and it would obviously be preferable to carry out initial ice-breaking operations of LABRADOR closer to support facilities. That said, "Nothing ventured nothing won."[5]

It was obviously risky to send a new, untried ship into such a hazardous environment, and the consequences of failure, like the fruits of success, could be immense. Imagine the embarrassment if *Labrador* had to be towed to safety by an American icebreaker, particularly if the US ship completed the Northwest Passage in doing so! But the prize was deemed worth that risk and the confidence in the ship ultimately proved justified. Although there were some technical failures during the passage, all were overcome by the ship's engineering department. (As an

indication of what could go wrong, *Labrador*'s steering failed as she negotiated severe rapids on her maiden voyage down the St Lawrence River to Halifax causing great consternation on the bridge.)

Based on these recommendations the operation was approved in principle, at least until 13 August 1954. At that point *Labrador* should have completed her re-supply commitments and would be poised either to withdraw from the Arctic eastward by the way she came or to push through westward to complete the transit of the Northwest Passage. Headquarters decided to leave the final decision to the man on the spot, Robertson, who, depending upon the condition of the ship, crew and ice, would signal his intentions to Ottawa. To avoid the consequences of a failed attempt, headquarters decided to keep news of the transit confidential until it was successfully completed. Indeed, even the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), which requested the ship's program so it could arrange critical ice reconnaissance, was kept in the dark.

The Americans were one group that had to be informed. Not only would *Labrador* be able to conduct valuable oceanographic work with *Burton Island* and *Northwind* in the Viscount Melville Sound-Prince of Wales Strait-Beaufort Sea area if she attempted the passage but, ironically, American authorities would have to be informed that the Canadian icebreaker was going to transit Alaskan waters on her way out of the Arctic. Moreover, it appears from an account of an informal meeting in Washington between *Labrador*'s navigator and a USN hydrographer where the Canadian officer was gathering charts for the operation that the Americans suspected the RCN icebreaker might attempt the Northwest Passage.[6] Certainly, based on that meeting, in May the USN requested details of *Labrador*'s program. The Canadians responded in mid-June, about a month before *Labrador*'s departure, mentioning that the icebreaker would likely attempt the transit.[7] It is not known how American authorities reacted but post-operational accounts of *Burton Island* and *Northwind*'s activities contain no hint that they had intended to attempt a transit that season. When *Labrador* completed the passage successfully that September she had the spotlight to herself.

As the senior naval officers had predicted, the glare of publicity on the heels of the successful passage was bright indeed. Congratulatory signals flowed into naval headquarters and newspapers trumpeted the success. Seventeen reporters scurried onboard *Labrador* the moment

Photo: DND/Directorate of History and Heritage

*HMCS* ***Labrador*** *in the Arctic in August 1954.*

she went alongside in Esquimalt, and Robertson had to endure a four-hour press conference. Popular enthusiasm was unbridled, and after a port visit to Vancouver Robertson complained that the crew had become social magnets, attracting the interest of what today would be dubbed Arctic groupies.[8]

Although important, publicity was secondary to the navy's objective of helping to solidify Canadian interests in the North. Beating the Americans through the Northwest Passage appears to have had no adverse impact on the US-Canadian relations in the region. Indeed relations probably grew stronger as *Labrador*'s capability brought them into closer partnership in subsequent joint operations such as constructing the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line and charting the waters and coastline of the Arctic. But by transiting the Northwest Passage *Labrador* had made a point for Canada. She had made a statement reinforcing sovereignty; perhaps that is all that is required or, indeed, all that can really be done.

**Notes**

1. This article is based on research conducted for the Official History of the RCN, 1945-68. The author has profited from discussion with team members, Dr Isabel Campbell, LT(N) Richard Mayne and LT(N) Jason Delaney. Any views stated are the author's.
2. William M. Leary, *Under Ice: Waldo Lyon and the Development of the Arctic Submarine* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), p. 72.
3. DNPO, "The Northwest Passage-HMCS *LABRADOR*," 18 December 1953. Unless mentioned otherwise all citations are from Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 24 (Acc 83-84/167), Box 3922, 8375-AW 50 Vol 1.
4. For Canadian concerns see Department of External Affairs, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 19 (1953), p. 1047-53 and Vol. 20 (1954), p. 1139.
5. CNTS, "The Northwest Passage-HMCS *LABRADOR*," 22 February 1954.
6. T.A. Irvine, *The Ice Was All Between* (Toronto: Longman, Greens and Co., 1959), pp. 20-21. Irvine was *Labrador*'s hydrography officer.
7. Naval Secretary, "HMCS *LABRADOR*-Programme for 1954," 15 June 1954; CO *Labrador*, "HMCS *LABRADOR*-Programme," 2 June 1954.
8. CO Labrador, Report of Proceedings October 1954, DHH, 81/520 Labrador 8000.

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# Reflections on NATO and Naval Forces

## *Operations in the Adriatic*

Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) G.R. Maddison

This article provides a brief look at the naval operations in the Adriatic based on my year as Commander of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) while deployed in that area. This operation demonstrated that the NATO tradition of cooperation at sea had been extended into yet another theatre and had broadened to include other formations.

In April 1993, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 820, which reinforced a previous embargo against the former Yugoslavia by prohibiting all commercial traffic from entering the territorial sea (12 miles) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Serbia/Montenegro). Stricter control was extended to all oil tankers, regardless of their declared destination within the Adriatic, and to all vessels owned by Serbian/Montenegrin persons or companies. This resolution resulted in a tightening of the cooperation between all naval forces operating in the Adriatic, under various command and control structures.

In June 1993, forces from both NATO's Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL) and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM), plus forces from the Western European Union (WEU), were placed in a common pool with three Task Group Commanders, each responsible for a different task. Two were the tactical commanders at sea in two operations areas, and the third oversaw training activities for ships off station. Commanders rotated between the various areas of responsibility every four to six weeks. Ships generally spent about half their time on station, 35 per cent in port conducting maintenance and providing ships' companies some much needed rest, and 15 per cent at sea conducting further training.

Ideally, the three different task groups ought to have operated as cohesive units – i.e., SNFL ships and assets ought to have remained together in an operation area to facilitate command and control. I knew the capabilities and weaknesses of my ships and their crews. The same can be said for the other two groups of SNFM and the WEU Contingency Force. Unfortunately, there were fears from the strategic and political levels that the WEU force, if operated as a complete unit, would demonstrate a lesser capability than inherent within the other two forces. As a result, the three Task Force Commanders received instructions to break our three forces into a common pool and have each of the three tasks conducted by task groups made up of ships and assets from all three forces. This meant that continuity of command and control was weakened.

An aside to all this is that my staff and I operated from a non-Canadian ship when the Canadian flagship was off station. So we operated for several weeks in ships as disparate as the WEU's Italian aircraft carrier *Garibaldi*, NATO Dutch and British frigates, and the American new threat update cruiser USS *Dale*. Operating from the flagships of different countries had been rare in the past, but in this operation it demonstrated and confirmed NATO's ability to conduct transparent naval operations and execute effective command and control over maritime forces no matter what country's flagship was used. The level of interoperability that has been achieved through the many years of SNFL experience has paid significant dividends.

Photo: MCpl Charles Barber, Staff Photographer SNMG1 (NATO)

*HMCS **Athabaskan** leads the other ships of the Standing NATO Maritime Group One during exercises in March 2006.*

Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

*Necessary cooperation! HMC Ships **Athabaskan** and **St. John's** refuelling from the USNS **John Lenthall** in 2005.*

## *The Operations Areas*

The were two areas of operations – the southern and northern areas. In the south, the Strait of Otranto was where the vast majority of all challenges and boardings occurred. The area is a natural choke point through which all merchant traffic must travel to enter or leave the Adriatic. With a combination of ships, helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft, every merchant vessel was located and identified. (I should note here that the liaison with Italian port authorities all along the coast was both extensive and excellent.) Then, based on a number of factors, such as its destination, type of cargo, registration and intelligence information ascertained about the vessel, a decision was made by the Commander of the Task Group (CTG) as to whether a vessel was allowed to proceed on its way or if further investigation was required. Ships were stationed in different patrol areas, one of which was always the responsibility of a German ship as the German contingent was severely restricted in its rules of engagement – the German forces were not permitted to fire weapons except in self-defence or to conduct boardings. Thus, the Germans were the ones I tasked to develop the initial maritime picture as to the presence of merchant vessels. I normally assigned them the maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters to assist in producing a clear and accurate picture – this was critical to our operation. The boardings then occurred in the other three patrol areas.

Boarding operations had their own unique challenges. For instance, sometimes boardings were conducted in merchant vessels whose entire crews (including the master) were under the influence of alcohol or lived in conditions foreign to the standards that we insist on in our ships – absolute filth, cockroaches and even rats were not uncommon. However, the boarding parties were able to exercise the proper amount of restraint and patience in dealing with dirty conditions and exuberant crews.

Boarding operations were conducted both at night and during the day, often in very difficult weather and sea conditions. Some navies used a rigid inflatable boat with a powerful inboard motor to transfer an entire 16-person boarding team. Other ships used helicopters, which meant that boarding teams arrived on a vessel by sliding down a rope strung from the helicopter hovering over the deck.

In the northern area, the mission could be summed up by the following directive – nothing must get in and nothing must get out of FRY territorial waters. This meant that we had limited space and time to perform a long list of actions necessary to prevent a *potential* violator from becoming an *actual* violator. The distance from the FRY coast to the middle of the Adriatic is only 50 miles. Any hesitation, any delay, any gap in the disposition of units may have resulted in a successful break through our barrier and consequently, require our ships to enter Montenegrin territorial waters in hot pursuit of a violator.

One of the great advantages we had was that our forces had received authority to operate within Croatian and Albanian territorial waters. This permitted a vise-like net to be established completely around Serbian-Montenegrin territorial waters.

Should we have had to enter Serbian-Montenegrin territorial waters, we would have had to be very wary of the following assets:

- mobile coastal missile sites;
- coastal artillery guns;
- missile-fitted frigates and fast patrol boats;
- conventional submarines;
- various types of aircraft; and
- an extended mining capability.

During this operation, not *one* violator entered FRY territorial waters. There were a number of suspicious vessels carrying oil or ammunition that we stopped and boarded in a timely fashion. These vessels were subsequently impounded by Italian Coast Guard authorities or ordered out of the Adriatic with firm direction not to return. This did not stop other vessels from trying to get around us. For example, during a bad storm one night, I had the captain of a 95,000 ton tanker full of oil attempt a ruse by claiming he had an engine failure causing him to drift towards FRY waters. We managed to get a boarding party on board in difficult wind and sea conditions, get control, flash up the engine and force the ship to Italy for further inspection and subsequent impoundment by Italian, then Greek, authorities.

In order to face the multi-directional threat (potential

violators from the sea and coastal defences from the shore), our operational disposition was composed of different but strictly interconnected assets that included a number of surface vessels with a variety of capabilities. Helicopters carried by ships on station played an essential role. They performed extensive surface surveillance and vessel identification missions. The helicopters facilitated some boardings and provided a positive addition to force logistics.

External support services to the operation were provided by a number of other assets including:

- maritime patrol aircraft provided surface surveillance and identification;
- airborne early warning aircraft assisted in providing a continuous air and surface link picture over the Adriatic;
- defence of the force from the air was augmented by a combination of air assets which included both air defence and surface combat air;
- tankers or replenishment ships were added for refueling support; and
- submarines added to the maritime picture in the area.

There was one complication to operations in this area that I should mention and this was the Albanian refugee problem. Many Albanians were leaving their country by boat. The Adriatic Sea can be quite unfriendly in terms of wind and sea and the boats that these people were using were often very small, open and fragile. Some of them made it to Italy but some, unfortunately, did not. We were involved in many search and rescue incidents looking for Albanians lost at sea.

### *Conclusion*

Despite breaking up each of the three forces prior to the onset of operations, overall the operation in the Adriatic was an overwhelming success. The number of both sea-based and shore-based assets at the hands of the three commanders and the robustness of the rules of engagement (with some national exceptions) were crucial to the success of the operation. In Canada's case, the forward thinking of Canadian naval leaders which permitted a significant focus on training and technology related to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) proved to be the key in leading and executing this successful embargo operation. Any commander at sea can exploit the strengths of his forces, weapons and sensor systems and minimize the weaknesses therein but if he cannot have displayed in real time what is actually going on within his theatre of responsibility and cannot communicate effectively with both his forces and his superiors, he will fail.

This operation proved the worth of the C4ISR focus and set today's foundation for producing the navy of the future.

*Vice-Admiral Greg Maddison recently retired from the Canadian Forces having served as the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, and Commander of SNFL in 1993.*

## *Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) 1999-2000*

Rear-Admiral (Ret'd) David Morse

In 1976 I had my first exposure to the famous Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) – or "Sniffle" as it was euphemistically referred to in those days. Before that, four years on the West Coast had me convinced that "out there" we were free from the restrictions of alliance compromises and influence. After all, we were cheek and jowl with the real navy, the US Pacific Fleet, and that's where real tactical development went on and where real standards were being set – or so we thought. Even those Halifax courses hardly seemed relevant; West Coast Fleet Tactical Procedures were foreign to most of our instructors and surely half of material really didn't apply to us!

Even after my six-month NATO deployment to Northern Europe in 1976 the influence of NATO and the Standing Naval Force (SNFL) really didn't hit home until 1984 during a Pacific Rim (RIMPAC) naval exercise when the Commander of the Second Canadian Destroy-

Photo: MARCOM Museum

*HMCS **Algonquin** and a Royal Navy frigate of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic refuelling at sea from HMCS **Protecteur** in 1987. Canada often assigned a fleet support ship (AOR) to SNFL as well as a destroyer.*


*The Standing Naval Force Atlantic in 1984, curiously without a Canadian ship in company.*

er Squadron was acting as the surface and sub-surface Commander. This was the first "out of area" deployment for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces and as the Squadron Operations Officer I realized that the barriers of language and lack of common practice demanded an effective series of communications and tactical publications which, when all else failed, could provide the references for the required action. What was the only common denominator? You've guessed it: the NATO Allied Tactical Publication 1, Volumes I and 2, albeit one edition and several changes out of date. And so, in mid-ocean, we were reduced to photocopying the essential NATO standards for use by our Pacific allies.

These standard procedures were forged through long experience by NATO partners, and SNFL played a not insignificant part in proving and improving them. And this was so even if in 1976 SNFL still struggled with fuel- and water-fitting compatibility, managed without secure voice equipment, laboured in the absence of data-link equipment and relied on laboriously handwritten messages.

By the time I returned to SNFL in 1989 as a frigate Captain and then again in 1999 as the Force Commander, a long series of changes (technological, missions, operational tempo, shrunken fleet sizes, the emergence of new NATO navies) all had had a profound effect on what SNFL was and what it was expected to do. But, by and large, SNLF remained a combined but not so joint blue-water force in an era where more *joint* and less *blue* was fast becoming the norm.

Recent Canadian operational experience – international and domestic – has proven this point. The floods in Manitoba and the recovery operation after the crash of Swissair 111 both shaped and conditioned our views of what a fully operational maritime capability comprised. Sailors operating small craft in support of soldiers providing dike security and soldiers providing shore support in the search for survivors spoke eloquently of the need for navies to reach beyond the previous definitions of sea power and to respond wherever and however the country called.

Similarly, the experience of SNFL (under then Commodore Maddison) in the Adriatic in 1994 and repeated Canadian deployments to the Arabian Gulf emphasized new missions in support of strategic embargos and operations ashore. This illustrated that there was more to SNFL than standard deep water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises and port visits. Nor were we alone in this perception: both the British and Portuguese navies had recently deployed in non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) to former colonies; the British and Dutch had deployed to the Middle East; and the standard pattern of Atlantic/Mediterranean NATO ship assignments had been repeatedly disrupted. Along with new areas of operation came new capabilities – the most visible being the introduction of boarding parties and a new emphasis on mine warfare and in the background vastly improved surveillance and operational coordination capabilities.

As I assumed command, I was concerned that these new requirements would not be uniformly reflected in SNFL. Key to this concern was the perception of SNFL by individual states. Of course the perceptions varied; for some it was an essential entrée into NATO operations. Poland, for example, was about to complete an agreement for the transfer of US Navy frigates and was keen to operate in the Baltic and in the broader NATO area. For Poland, exercising with SNFL was an essential part of an overall naval strategy. For many others, SNFL was simply another task or obligation to be met often in the face of competing demands. This helps explain ships that were assigned missing essential pieces of equipment, crews that barely met training and readiness standards, operational limitations incompatible with the mission and ships diverted from SNFL, sometimes while en route, to higher priority national taskings.

### *SNFL 1999/2000*

| | |
|---|---|
| Total Number of Destroyers/Frigates | 29 |
| Underway Replenishment Ships | 4 |
| Submarines | 2 |
| Maximum number of vessels at one time | 14 |
| Minimum number of vessels at one time | 5 |
| Average length of assignment (DD/FF) | 3.3 months |
| Average number of AAW capable ships | 2 |
| Average number of helicopters | 5 |
| At sea/In port ratio | 60/40 |
| Miles steamed (all ships) | >55,000NM |
| Ports visited | 35 |
| Visitors in port | >90,0000 |

The above table shows the challenges of maintaining a force at any level of readiness in the face of other de-

mands. Constant change was the norm – seldom did SNFL leave a port with the same ships that it came with. With changing players (ships and states) and regular staff changes as well, building towards any operational assignment and incorporating new mission expertise was a constant struggle. Also hidden in these statistics was the fixation on sea time as the sole measure of readiness and the difficulty of finding relevant training opportunities across the area. While sea time is valuable, more than half of our time at sea was spent simply transiting. It was an unfortunate reality that for the majority of a ship's company, business in SNFL was business as usual.

It was our view that some alternative techniques, perhaps with the use of modern simulation, could reduce sea time while providing time for greater examination of the issues surrounding new tasks and missions. To this end, we placed as much emphasis on shore training as on sea training – extending time at anchor or alongside to take advantage of shore disaster/humanitarian relief training in the Netherlands, the UK and Puerto Rico. Similarly, we held a series of operational seminars exploring issues such as tactical development and procedures with the Polish Navy, the newly released NATO Guidance for SNFL, Military Committee document MC 171/3, rules of engagement, and general conduct of operations in the specific case of Caribbean counter-drug operations.

Our "bible" MC 171/3 noted that "SNFL provides to NATO a force capable of operating, independently or jointly, to carry out tasks including MOOTW [military operations other than war] or to respond to a small-scale crisis, requiring immediate, time-critical military intervention." It provided examples of such tasks, including:

- non-combatant evacuation operations;
- maritime interdiction operations;
- support to land, air and special forces operations;
- peace support operations including humanitarian aid operations; and
- surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

So what did we accomplish in our year (1999-2000) and after 55,000 nm and 35 ports? In my annual report to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) (my boss), I provided a scorecard which summarized what contribution SNFL had made during my year in command. Those comments are useful today because they explain what an effective multinational team the formation had become. My comments were based on the direction provided by MC 171/3 and SACLANT Directive 1-97 which stated that the NATO Military Committee established the roles of SNFL as: "a continuous NATO multinational, versatile, highly mobile and joint capable force based on naval units, which conducts routine presence and surveillance operations, throughout the NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR) but also beyond the AOR. The force is maintained at the highest readiness to demonstrate NATO's cohesion and resolve."

During my tenure, SNFL had been particularly active. It had supported the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for *Operation Allied Force*, operated beyond NATO's AOR in the Caribbean in 1999, and conducted extensive counter-drug operations in the southern Caribbean in 2000. I noted in my report that it was clear that the formation provided NATO with a maritime immediate reaction force which, when needed, could deploy to a crisis area in order to establish alliance presence and demonstrate solidarity, to conduct surveillance, and to contain a crisis. SNFL also provided a core around which the employment of follow-on forces could be based.

Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

*SNFL manoeuvres at sea with a German fleet support ship and a Dutch frigate.*

I also explained that during *Operation Allied Force* both the Italian and Belgian forces joined at short notice without noticeable loss in operational efficiency. This showed that SNFL was capable of operating, independently or jointly, to carry out tasks including military operations other than war or to respond to a small-scale crisis, requiring immediate, time-critical military intervention. Although these operations were new to SNFL, it participated in their development in several ways. Examples of such tasks are:

- non-combatant evacuation operations, especially legal, political and operational issues were examined during operational seminars.
- maritime interdiction operations were prepared for but not executed in *Operation Allied Force*.

- support to land, air and special forces operations was studied while operating in a littoral environment during electronic warfare trials off Norway.
- peace support operations including humanitarian operations were exercised several times, and included participation of civilian volunteers.
- surveillance and reconnaissance operations were undertaken which included routine integration into NATO Air Defence Operations Centres, a consistent contribution to the NATO recognized maritime picture.
- surveillance and reconnaissance operations were conducted which included more than 200 ship-days of counter-drug cooperation with Caribbean states.

I went on to discuss the structure of SNFL as a naval squadron composed primarily of destroyers and frigates which had, during my command year, included 29 ships from 12 states. Ships were primarily drawn from NATO states operating forces in ACLANT but in 1999 also included ships from Italy, and French forces operated with SNFL on three occasions in 1999. It was a condition of assignment that states could withdraw ships for national purposes at any time. In my year, one ship was deployed on a national task and did not join SNFL as planned in January 2000, and a second ship was delayed in the Caribbean due to national tasking.

My report noted that SNFL staff is a combined national and international staff of approximately 22 officers and other ranks. The Command and staff appointments rotate amongst member states as mutually agreed. The state exercising command provided the flagship and the bulk of the staff support. While Canada exercised command, the international staff included officers from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Additional staff support was located in CINCEASTLANT in Northwood, UK. It was particularly valuable to have operational support from a Royal Marine staff officer in the complex area of maritime operations other than war. This also allowed us to develop relationship with core deployable element staff in CINCEEASTLANT

The SNFL employment program for 1999-2000 shows just how active we were and just how diverse were our taskings. It was a balance between at sea and in port/maintenance activities, between eastern and western Atlantic areas, between training as an individual force and participation in NATO maritime and joint exercises in which we spent 60 per cent of our time at sea of which 75 per cent was in the east Atlantic area. SNFL was also very supportive of Partnership for Peace (PfP) training (and embarked representatives of a number of Baltic states) and Mediterranean Dialogue initiatives.

SNFL also played a role in the development of NATO maritime capabilities. In 1999, for instance, the force supported a series of electronic warfare trials. These trials were conducted off Stavanger, Norway, and examined the effectiveness of electronic support measures in a littoral environment, the effectiveness of chaff, laser and infra-red decoys, and the tactical application of self-defence measures.

My report suggested to the Commander that for SNFL to continue to be successful, it must be seen as important enough to demand the allocation of resources. That importance would have to rest on operational relevance – not just on the traditional loyalty to the concept of SNFL. In the 1999-2000 period, SNFL certainly responded on the political and strategic levels not only by deploying Atlantic assets to the Mediterranean in a demonstration of NATO resolve but also in small steps to encourage, develop and build understanding and trust in NATO as it enlarged.

Since 2000, much has changed. The entire operational structure has been simplified and SACLANT is no more. The demands for ships have continued to increase and the gapping of assignments to the new Standing NATO Response Force Maritime Groups (SNMG) is common. The operational schedule is more focused on areas of concern – usually in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. But unchanged is the composition and the tasks of the force. The force is a squadron of eight to 10 destroyers and frigates. In terms of tasks, SNMG1 spends about 60 per cent of its time underway, conducting squadron training exercises, cooperating with non-SNMG1 national forces to make the optimum use of available training and support facilities. In the course of this work, the force participates in major NATO and national exercises and plays a part in the evolution of new NATO naval warfare tactics. Also, the force visits various ports, including those of non-NATO countries, to show itself as a symbol of naval solidarity. Through its various social, sporting and community activities during in-port periods SNMG1 demonstrates the intangible qualities inherent in multinational cooperation. That hasn't changed.

*Rear-Admiral David Morse recently retired from the Canadian Forces. He was Commander of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in 1999-2000.*

## *Ville de Québec and SNFL*

Commander B.A. Mosley

*Ville de Québec* was the last Canadian ship to participate in the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) before the force was renamed Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1). The deployment started in Bermuda in late August 2004, included a transit up the eastern seaboard of continental North America, and lasted through the rest of 2004. We ended our time with SNFL in Reykjavik, Iceland, and returned to Halifax just prior to Christmas. Under the leadership of Commodore Leon Bruin of the Royal Netherlands Navy, SNFL executed several periods of squadron integration training, exercised independently with the SAIPAN Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and then participated in Canada's Combined Readiness Operations (COMREADOPS) with SAIPAN ARG and the Canadian Task Group. As has always been the case, the experience of operating with the Dutch, Germans, Americans and Spanish was professionally rewarding and offered the chance to make new friends.

Although the name has changed, many of the challenges facing the new ready reaction force will remain. As was noted on more than one occasion by NATO flag officers visiting the force, the standards of readiness, consistency of contribution, and platform and crew stability of ships participating in SNFL are all issues that the NATO Maritime Component must address.

*Standards of Readiness*. The standards to which ships were prepared and resourced for SNFL duties by their contributing states vary significantly. There is no common pre-deployment standard of training or readiness with which all ships joining the force must comply. This poses significant challenges for the force Commander, since he is required to integrate the ships into a cohesive grouping without a common baseline level of training and resource preparation for each ship on joining the force. Canada's contribution was much appreciated, as our frigates arrived in SNFL having completed the demands of our Tiered Readiness Program, including a missile shoot and, in *Ville de Québec*'s case, a major multinational exercise prior to joining SNFL. Additionally, *Ville de Québec* arrived with a Sea King helicopter and the full benefit of our national logistics support structure.

*Consistency of Contribution*. SNFL's ability to operate as a cohesive squadron was hampered by the "revolving door" of contributing states. During *Ville de Québec*'s four months with the force, there were two German ships (one AOR and one frigate), the Dutch flagship, and frigates from Spain, Canada and the United States. There was no British contribution and the Spanish were at the time uncertain whether or not they would be able to commit a ship to the force in 2005. The SNFL staff was grateful to know that HMCS *Montreal* was to join the force after the Christmas dispersal period, but was somewhat frustrated with planning operations into 2005 without a firm force structure.

*Stability of Deployment*. The third challenge that SNMG1 should address is closely linked to the consistency of contribution. It involves the stability in ships and their complements during the time a unit remains with the force. This stability is a function of the degree of turnover a ship's company experiences on deployment and the duration of the deployment itself. A measure of stability in the force is required in order to form the group cohesion necessary for a squadron of ships to operate together efficiently. In *Ville de Québec*'s four months with SNFL, the Dutch flagship and the German frigate changed, as did the Commanding Officer of the Spanish frigate. Additionally, the American frigate, crewed largely by naval reservists, experienced a significant turnover of personnel throughout the deployment in concert with the contract status of various members of the crew. This left only the German tanker and the Canadian frigate with crew and platform stability throughout SNFL's four-month deployment to North America.

SNFL served NATO magnificently throughout the Cold War and into the immediate post-Cold War period. Like the rest of NATO, it is now in the process of transforming itself to cope with an environment characterized by a more dispersed world threat than characterized the Cold War. SNMG1, which is now under the command of Canadian Commodore Denis Rouleau, will operate in theatres previously unknown to NATO's deep-water naval forces. At some point soon, it will have to come to terms with the issues of common readiness standards for ships joining the force, consistency of contribution among member states, and stability among those ships deployed to the force.

*Commander Bryan Mosely was the Commanding Officer of HMCS **Ville de Québec** during a NATO deployment and is now a member of the Directing Staff at Canadian Forces College in Toronto.*

# Making Waves

## *Of Hydrofoils and Things*

Pat Barnhouse

In his review of Owen Cote, *The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines* (*CNR* Vol. 1, No. 4) Ed Tummers states "it was the combined effort to develop new ASW platforms that lead to Canada's part in developing its hydrofoil while the United States developed fixed wing hydrofoils and the UK investigated hovercraft." Indeed, in January 1960, there was a meeting at the Naval Research Establishment (NRE) in Dartmouth, NS, to consider research in advanced, high-speed naval vehicles. But just who attended, what was discussed and what conclusions were drawn? As a junior officer in the Hydrofoil Project Office in the mid-1960s, I remember that the outcome of this particular meeting was treated with almost reverence as a binding international agreement that committed the three participating states to specific research areas – Canada to investigation of surface piercing foils, the United States to fully submerged foils and the UK to hovercraft. But how close to the truth was this presumption?

Over the years, a number of authors have waded in with their interpretation of the events. Here is a sampling of those writings.

- Tony German, *The Sea is at our Gates*: "By this time (1959) the dazzling speed of the nuclear submarine was shouting for novel solutions. Britain was working hard on hovercraft. The USN had a hydrofoil using different submerged-foil techniques. NATO urged Canada to press on with her surface-piercing project."[1]
- John Longard, *Knots, Volts and Decibels*: "A meeting of U.S., U.K. and Canadian naval research scientists was held at NRE in January 1960.… The meeting approved the ideas expressed, and stated, 'The proposed 200 ton hydrofoil craft is technically sound in principle and justifies a program leading to the construction of a full scale prototype. Experimentation with a prototype is essential to establish with certainty the capabilities of such a craft.'"[2]
- Thomas Lynch, *The Flying 400*: "In January, 1960 a select group of American, British and Canadian naval experts arrived in Halifax for a tri-partite assessment of hydrofoil research endeavours within NATO…. The US were extensively involved with developing the fully-submerged foil system and the British were partial observers; both parties thought the Canadian experimentation with, and development of, the surface-piercing foil system, would fully complement their own studies."[3]
- Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*: "One more difficult decision was whether to continue development of the hydrofoil or not. The hydrofoil was our segment of a three-country project in cooperation with the United States and United Kingdom. Each country agreed to test a craft of different size and design, on the understanding that its findings would be shared with the other two partners."[4]
- Jeffry Brock, *The Thunder and the Sunshine*: "… the British Navy was showing great interest in the development of hovercraft, and all three navies had been toying with the development of high-speed hydrofoil vessels. It seemed wasteful to me that three countries who were such close allies should be duplicating our efforts in these fields. Accordingly, I managed to arrange for a


HMCS **Bras D'Or foilborne**.

conference in London where we agreed that the United Kingdom would concentrate on the development of suitable hovercraft for the use of all, that the hydrofoil craft should be developed by the United States and Canada.… We also reached solemn agreement for complete exchange of information among the three of us."[5]

- John Boileau, *Fastest in the World*: "In early 1960, Eames [Dr. M. Eames of NRE] pitched his proposed design to naval experts from Canada, Britain and the U.S. who had gathered in Halifax to assess hydrofoil research. Impressed by what they heard, the tripartite group encouraged him and NRE to carry on with their preliminary study."[6]
- William Ellsworth, *Twenty Hydrofoil Years: The US Navy Hydrofoil High Point PCH-1*: "It was agreed that the US and Canadian approaches would be complementary in expanding the data base and providing the opportunity for comparison of two quite different designs."[7]

The true picture can be found in the minutes of the Tripartite Meeting on Hydrofoil Craft and their ASW Applications, held at the Naval Research Establishment (NRE), 18-21 January 1960.[8] The preamble points out that in September 1959, NRE prepared a report entitled "All-Weather 200-Ton Hydrofoil Craft and Their Applications in Anti-Submarine Warfare" and requested the Research Working Panel (RWP) of Sub-Group G (the ASW sub-group of the Technical Cooperation Program, a defence scientific program which at that time involved Canada, the UK and the USA) to sponsor a meeting to discuss the validity of the ideas advanced and their implications. RWP considered the matter and suggested a tripartite meeting at NRE to further consider the proposals contained in the NRE report and to decide whether the proposals were sufficiently well founded to justify pursuing the matter further to the stage of a complete design study of a full-scale prototype craft.

The meeting was attended by a select group of scientific and engineering experts from the three states, none of whom had authority to commit their countries to any cooperative endeavour. They were able, however, to comment knowledgeably on the NRE proposal, offering the following observations and recommendations:

- Taking into consideration the capabilities of all ASW vehicles, hydrofoil craft of about 200 tons should possess a unique combination of performance characteristics which promise a significant improvement in ASW capability. Because of relatively low construction and operating costs, they could be available in sufficient numbers to make good the "small and many" concept.
- The proposed 200-ton hydrofoil craft is technically sound in principle and a program leading to the construction of an anti-submarine hydrofoil craft of about 200 tons should be set up in the near future with design studies and model testing as initial steps. Such a program would complement in a very essential way the US programs underway at the time, and its initiation should not await the completion of these programs.
- Experimentation with a prototype is essential to establish with certainty the capabilities of such craft.
- Detailed operational research studies of the use of such hydrofoil craft should be made concurrently with the recommended prototype program.
- It was agreed that to be viable, an ocean-going hovercraft would have to weigh at least 1,000 tons and thus could not be considered a competitor for a 200-ton hydrofoil.
- A meeting of appropriate personnel from the tripartite countries should be convened at the earliest possible date to formulate in detail a proposed cooperative program. (It should be noted the meeting that could have resulted in an international agreement never took place!)

As can be seen, some of the authors were bang on in their assessment. Longard probably had access to the minutes of the meeting and Boileau, by virtue of his book's recent publication date was able to benefit from Longard's

work. Ellsworth, although not at the meeting, for many years was in a position to be privy to all US hydrofoil activities and related international developments. On the other hand, put in the kindest terms, Admiral Brock was way off base.

**Notes**

1. Tony German, *The Sea is at our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), p. 298.
2. John R. Longard, *Knots, Volts and Decibels: An Informal History of the Naval Research Establishment, 1940-1967* (Dartmouth, NS: DREA 1993), p. 91.
3. Thomas G. Lynch, *The Flying 400: Canada's Hydrofoil Project* (Halifax, NS: Nimbus, 1983), p. 30.
4. Paul T. Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), pp. 128-9.
5. Jeffry T. Brock, *The Thunder and the Sunshine: With Many Voices, Volume 2* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1983), p. 78.
6. John Boileau, *Fastest in the World: The Saga of Canada's Revolutionary Hydrofoils* (Halifax, NS: Formac, 2004), p. 56.
7. DHH, Hal Smith Fonds, 00/14, File 121, paper by William. M. Ellsworth, *Twenty Hydrofoil Years: The US Navy Hydrofoil High Point PCH-1.*
8. DHH, Smith, 00/14, File 132 contains the minutes as published 25 January 1960, no file number.

## *How We Really Got Here*

Ken Hansen

In the Winter 2006 issue of *Canadian Naval Review*, "Artemis" wrote in his Making Waves commentary: "The Bofors 57 mm "peashooter" is a good anti-aircraft weapon, but it is essentially useless as a bombardment gun." Artemis doubted whether the army had advocated for a naval fire support (NFS) capability when the design of the *Halifax*-class was being finalized. I wrote in *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2000) about the demise of the Canadian NFS capability and the reasons why this came to pass. Here are a few thoughts for Artemis and *CNR* readers.

The Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) Project was born during the end of the Cold War. While the *Iroquois*-class destroyers and the *Protecteur*-class replenishment ships arose from the requirement to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the western Atlantic, the frigates came from a different concept altogether. *Sea Plan 2000* and the derivative American *Maritime Strategy* date back to 1978. The new concept of operations outlined in these documents called for offensive forays over the North Cape of Norway and into other equally hazardous environs for operations against the Soviet naval 'bastions' and for strikes against Soviet shore bases. Both the Tribal Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) and the CPF Project were shaped by the necessity for Canadian naval forces to be able operate in extremely high-threat environments far from home waters.

The Ship Replacement Project (SRP) was a four-phased plan intended to modernize the Canadian Navy and make it 'fit to fight' within the new strategic concept of operations. SRP I was announced in 1983 and resulted in six *Halifax*-class ASW frigates. SRP II, which was announced in 1987, resulted in the six virtually identical *Montreal*-class frigates, a distinction that is seldom made any longer. SRP III, which was to have produced six frigates optimized for anti-air warfare (AAW), was cancelled. SPR IV was the TRUMP. The first 12 frigates were intended for outer screen employment and for use as towed-array ships, some of which could have been operating beyond cover from long-range AAW ships. For these new ships, all measures that could be taken to enhance their AAW effectiveness became essential to their survival. Their mission and projected tasks had nothing to do with support to joint operations and their abilities to conduct NFS did not rate very highly in the design process.

The decision to select a 76-mm gun for the modernized *Iroquois*-class destroyers and a 57-mm gun for the new frigates was based on their superior performance as anti-aircraft weapons. The Statements of Requirement for both the TRUMP and the CPF Project listed NFS as a tertiary requirement for the *Iroquois*-class modernization and did not mention it at all for the *Montreal*-class. The army was not consulted when the design specifications for both projects were set, nor was it when NFS was dropped from the *Operational Readiness Requirements Manual* (CFCD 102). Moreover, at the time the army expressed little interest on either count. With the Cold War over, the Canadian Navy found itself without a NFS capability. The increase of joint operations demands that it be reacquired.

It is frequently said, in *Leadmark* among other places, that the patrol frigates were designed for general-purpose operations based on Canadian requirements. In fact, this is not true. Without the *Maritime Strategy* of the early 1980s, I contend that the replacement frigates for the *St. Laurent*-class 'steamers' would have been much smaller and less capable warships, with lower endurance, among other things. Whether they would have or could have been designed with a gun suitable for NFS is the subject for a future interesting debate.

# Plain Talk

**Sharon Hobson**

*We made a number of commitments [in our electoral platform] and we have every intention of meeting them. Increasing the strength of the Canadian Forces to at least 75,000 Regular force personnel is a clear priority. We also intend to increase the Reserve force personnel by 10,000.*

Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor
to the Conference of Defence Associations
23 February 2006

An election promise is not a financial commitment, nor is it a fait accompli. The politicians may promise more soldiers, but funding them and training them requires a commitment that goes beyond the expediencies of an election.

Ever since the cuts of the 1990s, critics have been urging the government to increase the size of the Canadian Forces (CF) which have been stretched beyond their capabilities trying to fulfill all their assigned missions and tasks. The Liberal government finally responded with a 2004 election promise to increase the regular force by 5,000 and the reserves by 3,000. In the 2005 election campaign, the Conservatives upped the ante by promising a further 10,000 regulars and 10,000 reserves.

A 75,000 strong regular force and a 35,000 strong reserve force should be welcome news. While the bulk of the Liberal promise was for the army, the Conservatives included the navy in their plans. According to them, "The Pacific fleet will receive 500 regular force personnel for ship crew requirements. Also, further regular force personnel will be recruited to bring existing establishments at CFB Esquimalt up to full strength." As well, "1,000 regular force personnel will be recruited for the Atlantic fleet, and in the Arctic," and "at least 500 sailors will be committed for operating [the three heavy naval ice breakers] and the docking facility" in the Iqaluit region.

Sounds great (except for the part about the Arctic), but so far there is no word on how, exactly, the government expects the military to accomplish this expansion. All indications are that it will not be easy, it will be expensive, and it will have dramatic implications for all other parts of the defence program.

In a June 2005 paper written for Doug Bland's *Transforming National Defence Administration*, Dr. Chris Ankersen of Carleton University examined the initial 5,000 plus 3,000 promise. He found that for an 8,000 increase, 48,000 people must contact the CF recruiting centres – that's 48,000 over and above the usual 20,000 people per year needed to produce the current annual intake which essentially replaces those lost through normal attrition. At a 6:1 ratio of initial contacts to eventual recruits, the CF will need 168,000 Canadians to express an interest in joining the military to implement both the Liberal and Conservative promises. That's a lot of interest.

*Photo: MCpl Charles Barber, Staff Photographer SNMG1 (NATO)*

*There are some things that need to be done that cannot be automated such as securing the ship alongside!*

Worse, the Department of National Defence *Report on Plans and Priorities, 2003-04* notes that many trades necessary to the CF require high levels of specialization, and thus higher educational standards than they did in the past, which reduces the pool of recruits from which to choose. The ability to recruit skilled and educated individuals is further undermined by Canada's strong economy. Former Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral Bruce MacLean, told *Frontline* magazine in 2005 that "the competition [with industry] for folks in the highly technical trades is really tough, and going to sea is not for everybody, so consequently those numbers are down, in some cases 15-25% under what I need."

Even if the CF does manage to attract those 168,000 Canadians – a feat in itself – Ankersen says the military cannot handle the resulting influx of recruits. He notes that the recruiting intake was increased in 2001-02 and 2002-03. Following this the training system was overwhelmed, and "not enough instructors could be found to conduct the training and waiting times between courses was increased."

A dose of reality was effectively inserted into the force expansion discussions by Vice-Admiral Ron Buck, Vice


Photo: Formation Imaging Atlantic

*People matter! Some of the crew members of HMCS **Montreal** during Exercise Narwhal 2 in the fall of 2004 when the ship was off the Baffin Island coast.*

Chief of the Defence Staff, who, in December 2004 surprised Senators when he told their defence committee that it "would not be possible to grow by 5,000 or 3,000 in the next three years. It will take a period longer than that." He pointed out that ramping up the training capacity "is not just building things, it is also preparing highly trained people to do that training." He suggested that the CF would need about a five year phase-in.

That's the problem with defence – nothing is achieved quickly. When personnel or capabilities are cut, there is no quick way back.

Commodore Roger Westwood, Director General, Maritime Equipment Program Management, told the Senate committee in June 2005 that "my major challenge is the lack of sufficient personnel trained with project management capability in order to deliver the program." After all the cuts in the early 1990s, he said the problem "is getting the people to deliver the product."

There appears to be a common misperception amongst politicians and the public that once the government allocates funds for a defence project, that's the end of it. The deed is done. But of course, nothing could be further from the truth. For example, the government signed a deal for four secondhand submarines in 1998, but they won't become fully operational until 2009. The government *fast-tracked* a project for new support ships in 2000, but the first one still won't be delivered until 2012. The government is now planning a 15,000 person increase in the size of the forces, but it will probably take about 10 years to implement.

So what's the government's plan? How is it going to expand the forces within a relatively short period of time? Defence Minister O'Connor gave some indication of his thinking at the Conference of Defence Associations annual meeting. According to him, "To meet this requirement, we'll expand the existing recruitment and training system, as well as look at alternate ways to increase personnel levels, such as temporarily tasking selected operational units to act as trainers." That sounds good. But what is involved in expanding the recruiting and training systems? What progress has been made on tasking operational units to train soldiers?

A phone call to the Department of National Defence, inquiring about the regular force expansion of 15,000 (5,000 from the Liberals and 10,000 from the Conservatives), brought this response: "That actually was an announcement by our new Minister, that hasn't translated yet to directives to the Canadian Forces. Because it's not our policy yet, we can't answer questions about training and the amount of money [involved]."

A subsequent request that information be provided for just the initial promise of 5,000 regular force personnel – a program that has had a year to get underway – elicited a response that the senior staff were at an off-site meeting to develop a comprehensive plan for the total expansion, including consideration of the costing.

*Ah yes, the cost.... The actual cost of adding 15,000 regulars and 13,000 reserves is daunting.*

Ah yes, the cost. In February 2005 the Liberals gave substance to their 2004 election promise by providing some initial funding for the CF expansion. The federal budget provided $3.06 billion over five years (2005-06 through 2009-10). But that is just the tip of the iceberg. In addition to salaries and training costs, there are costs for medical coverage, pensions, continuing education, infrastructure expansion and equipment.

The actual cost of adding 15,000 regulars and 13,000 reserves is daunting. In fact, a long-term costing model shows that for the first time in history, the personnel costs for the army alone will surpass the amount going into equipment programs of all three services at the height of recapitalization. As one senior officer said, "our personnel costs are blossoming and will start to overtake capital renewal in a couple of years. Decisions are being made to throw people at us which are going to supplant capability investment decisions because there's no money, you're paying it all on people."

The politicians, however, do not want to know about this. They do not want to know the full cost of their defence promises. Talk is cheap; military expansion is not.

*Sharon Hobson is an Ottawa-based defence analyst and Canadian correspondent for **Jane's Defence Weekly**.*

# The Real Canadian Defence Priority is the Task Group

**Peter T. Haydon**

Canadian involvement in Afghanistan makes absolute sense today. The prevailing situation represents a threat to collective security as well as being a humanitarian situation requiring direct action. Contrary to some views, this is not Canada's Vietnam. Far from it! There is a job to be done. It is a complex and often dirty job, but there is widespread agreement in the international community that all our interests are served by bringing law and order to the country. It is a commitment to collective security made freely, not a commitment made under pressure to support the foreign policy objectives of the United States.

Canada has a long and proud tradition of active internationalism, and over the years has seldom faltered in carrying its fair share of the collective security burden. However, commitments to international security operations have been tempered by available capabilities and the national capacity to sustain a meaningful military role. For this reason there are problems with the long-term implications of the Afghan mission. And these need to be brought out into the open to ensure that Canada does not over-commit itself and retains the very useful strategic flexibility it acquired over the last 15 years.

Specifically, it appears that the mix of capabilities maintained to keep a naval task group readily available may be in jeopardy because of funding constraints and lack of appropriate priorities. It would be a national tragedy if a rapid response capability that has served Canada well on many occasions since the end of the Cold War were allowed to wither. It makes no strategic sense to allow military capability to shrink to a quiver with only one arrow. Experience should tell us that the world is unpredictable, and that we can be unpleasantly surprised. This demands that we retain the capability for both flexible and rapid response.

Unless care is taken, the Afghan mission could become a resource sponge that soaks up more than just the capacity and flexibility of the Canadian Army but also of the other services as well. The cost of the mission is already a source of concern, and we have seen non-army resources being drawn off for use in Afghanistan – the Sea King helicopters in particular (and hiving off the Sea Kings to Afghanistan means that they are no longer a key part of the task group synergy). The demands of this operation are such that much new equipment is being acquired to ensure that the mission can be carried out effectively within an acceptable degree of individual safety. This is logical and prudent. Yet, there are concerns that unless enough new money is injected into the defence budget, the Afghan mission can only be continued to the detriment of the rest of the Canadian military.

Photo: DND Combat Camera

*Afghanistan operations: The crew of a NYALA, a vehicle used by the Provincial Reconstruction Team, watches as a Bison approaches.*

This would be a disaster! The Afghan mission makes sense today, but it would be foolish to believe that it will be the only international crisis in which Canada may become involved in the years ahead, or that the military requirement will be the same. For all we know, the next crisis or perhaps even the next phase in the war to counter terrorism, will occur in a completely different part of the world under very different circumstances. Unless Canada wishes to lessen its ability to play a meaningful role in global crisis management, it needs to retain a high degree of strategic flexibility. It makes absolutely no sense to squander capabilities proven over time to be useful under a wide range of criteria in the interests of a short-term objective.

The uncertain future of the naval task group is a good example of this possibility. Since 1990, when the Cold War effectively ended, the Canadian Navy has maintained a series of "multi-purpose, combat-capable" task groups, usually under a tiered readiness system where a task group is always ready to deploy in about 10 days.

This useful strategic capability has been recognized by a succession of governments all of which have made good use of it in responding to international and domestic crises. And for good reason – a naval task group provides flexible response options that other military organizations do not.

For instance, a naval task group provides an effective, self-contained force for national and international operations. It is also a realistic upper limit of commitment that Canada can make to an international operation short of major war. That capability, in itself, has considerable flexibility: it can consist of more than just surface ships. Submarines, aircraft and even shore-based systems can be integrated in a task group with ease depending on the mission. If necessary, an amphibious capability can be added.

One of the advantages of the task group is that it can roll out quickly while a land force or joint task force takes much longer to deploy. Unlike other military formations, the naval task group does not require a large infrastructure to sustain it; it is almost completely self-sufficient. Further, a naval task group can have its mission changed without having to return home for re-equipping. Also, and unlike other formations, a naval task group can be withdrawn as easily as it can be deployed. It is unique in being a means of response that is highly effective but with only minimal political and human risk unless combat is joined.

In recent years, there has been a marked preference for using naval forces in crisis management situations, especially in making the initial response. For example, naval task groups have been used to:

- maintain a military presence to prevent or to deter aggression and lawlessness or merely to report on a deteriorating situation, as the British did off Sierra Leone before the armed intervention of 2000;
- conduct a wide range of law enforcement tasks, which might include such tasks as the counter-narcotics patrols in the Caribbean;
- enforce economic sanctions or a quarantine, as in the Adriatic during the Bosnian crisis – a role the Canadian Navy undertook;
- protect shipping and maritime facilities (including mine countermeasures operations) as in the 1986-88 Tanker War;
- support UN operations on land in many ways, including the use of naval aviation for logistic and tactical support as the Canadian Navy did in Somalia in 1992;
- restore order and stability in a crisis under conditions ranging from environmental destruction to civil war, as the Australian and Canadian forces did in East Timor;
- supervise truces and other such agreements through peacekeeping, verification and monitoring, as in the Gulf of Fonseca operation from June 1990 to March 1992.
- support operations ashore such as during the initial attack on the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan as part of the war on terrorism – this too was a role the Canadian Navy was assigned and performed superbly.

The list of possible mission is far greater, and Canadian naval forces have been involved in many of them. Such versatility is unique to naval forces.


*One version of a naval task group: a proven combination of efficiency and flexibility.*

Another reason for maintaining task group capability is that it often takes that level of commitment to an international operation to be part of the process of managing a crisis and determining the outcome. From another perspective, the task group represents the minimum capability for a complex national task such as evacuation of Canadians from dangerous conditions or for maintaining a prolonged presence in an area of national concern. However, unless the task group as a whole is fully interoperable (i.e., both technically and procedurally) with ships of other states, it is not a particularly useful partner in the operation. The requirement for interoperability is a major factor in setting equipment and training capabilities. Commitment to the national task group is, *de facto*, also a commitment to a level of technology and operational capabilities. This was one of the les-

sons made possible by the development of the standing NATO naval formations and their demanding training schedule.

Canada has regularly commanded multinational naval formations, mainly NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL) and now NATO's Standing Maritime Group (SNMG). A Canadian commanded the Underway Logistics Force with distinction during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Canadians successfully commanded international task forces in the Arabian Sea from 2001 to 2004. Some may ask whether it is useful for Canada to exercise tactical command of multinational naval forces in this way. There is little doubt that being able to do this and actually doing it pays dividends politically and militarily and is a source of great national pride. Not only does it assure a place in the decision-making process, it also provides input to evolving doctrinal and tactical changes, and thus can have an important bearing on Canadian concerns about the proper handling of detainees, for example, as was the case in *Operation Apollo*. However, this cannot be done unless there is a national task group through which future Canadian multinational commanders can gain experience.

There are those who would challenge Canada's need to maintain a naval commitment to the NATO naval forces. Despite the mutterings of a few nay-sayers, NATO remains a useful international organization and the standing naval forces have proven their diplomatic utility as well as their operational value. With Canada's proclivity for active internationalism at the lowest possible cost, integrating a ship into a NATO formation provides a good return on a modest investment. Without the national naval task group structure, individual ships cannot gain the necessary prior training to allow them to be useful members of the coalition force. But for such a commitment to be meaningful, the ship must be useful operationally, there simply isn't room to carry a passenger when serious work has to be done at sea. Thus the ships sent to work with NATO must be able to look after themselves if the going gets rough, and they must be able to add something to the collective operational capability. A token presence doesn't cut it!

Similarly, the political value of integrating a Canadian frigate into a US carrier battle group can be questioned. There are obvious foreign policy implications, but such commitments do not jeopardize Canadian political sovereignty in foreign affairs. On the contrary, they enhance Canadian sovereignty while allowing Canada to play an important role in international security. Moreover, the Americans need other naval forces in their battle groups for many reasons, not least of which is that they act as a

*A naval task group can include a wide range ships, aircraft, and other assets depending on the task to be undertaken.*

counter to perceptions of US unilateralism. While this may be unpopular in some Canadian political circles, Canada's interests are best served by joining with the Americans in international crisis management operations. Without prior operational experience in a national task group a Canadian warship could not be integrated into a US Navy formation.

Integration into US and NATO naval formations strengthens Canadian sovereignty because each mission is a function of choice. Similarly, warship visits to other countries and participation in exercises with the forces of other navies serve to reinforce Canadian sovereignty. Sovereignty is not just territorial, it is about the right to choose the course of action to be taken in a particular situation. Warships operating independently and collectively are symbolic of that right.

Why does the task group concept seem to be under threat? Broadly, the naval replacement and modernization program seems stalled. There is no apparent sense of urgency to move ahead quickly with the new ships to replace the obsolete fleet support ships that provide the task group and the navy as a whole with strategic flexibility. The program to replace the command and control capabilities of the *Iroquois*-class destroyers seems to have fallen off the new defence agenda. Why? These are essential capabilities if the task group concept is to be kept. The 12 *City*-class frigates are reaching their mid-lives and their capabilities should be upgraded to allow them to work as equals with their international counterparts, but nothing seems to be planned.

Simply put, Canada's ability to be a meaningful participant at sea in international security operations is in decline. Unless the slide to obsolescence is halted, Canada will forfeit a capability that has served it well for the last 15 years and thus be denied a measure of flexibility in contributing to global security. But it is not only a loss in terms of Canada's international role – these capabilities are also needed for national security. The size of Canada's ocean domain is such that the capabilities inherent in the naval task group provide the best means of rapid and effective response to crises closer to home.

So, to abandon the proven, naval task group capability would be tantamount to strategic lunacy. Why would any sensible organization willingly give up a capability that has served it well under a wide range of international and domestic situations? Yes, Afghanistan is important, but it is not so important that other proven and necessary capabilities of the Canadian Forces – such as the naval task group – should be allowed to wither.

# Book Reviews

*Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics* by Michael Keane. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 256 pages, hardcover, $34.95 US.

## Reviewed by Doug Thomas

Michael Keane's collection of terms dealing with modern strategy and tactics is impressive and engaging. While other works focus on nuclear strategy or the Cold War, the thrust here is on modern terminology, although Keane also examines the origins of some of the terms we use. Historical examples supplement definitions, and quotations from leading strategic thinkers provide further insights. While the contents are professional and accurate, the author injects humour and colour to make his book enjoyable as well as edifying. It will be a welcome reference for defence strategists and interested armchair warriors.

*Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics* discusses the origin and defines many terms one hears frequently, such as pyrrhic victory, sea basing, sea control, centre of gravity, strategic bombing and dirty bomb. Military thinkers such as Giulio Douhet, Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the theories that have perpetuated their names, can be found within the pages of this dictionary. Modern terms include, for example, TACINTEL, OODA Loop, SIGINT and Network-Centric Warfare. Organizations are described and a few mysteries are solved. For example, the acronym RAND (as in the RAND Corporation) comes simply from R & D. The origins of "hyperpower" – a state that has vastly greater economic, political, or military power than any other state – are explained. Thus, after the demise of the Soviet Union, French Foreign Minister Hubert Verdrine coined a new term, saying "There is one hyperpower and seven powers with world influence – Russia, China, Japan, India, France, Germany and Britain."

There are a few small errors for the serious nit-picker. Thus for example, the book says that there are only 19 rather than 26 NATO countries, even though this book was printed in 2005. To be fair, the other seven countries are listed as having been invited to join. (They formally joined NATO 29 March 2004.)

Nonetheless, I found *Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics* to be well researched and entertaining in its use of examples. It will be of interest to anyone who writes or comments on naval, military or foreign policy matters, and should be a useful addition to defence and university reference libraries.

CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

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**The top three essays will be published in the *Canadian Naval Review* in either the Fall 2006 or Winter 2007 issues. (Other non-prize winning essays may also be considered for publication subject to editorial review.)**

**Essays must address issues – past and present – of relevance to current Canadian maritime security.**

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2. **Essays are to be no longer than 2,500 words. A limited number of graphics are acceptable.**
3. **Essays must contain appropriate citations in any acceptable format.**
4. **There is a limit of one submission per author.**
5. **Authors should put the title only on manuscripts. Names, addresses, phone numbers and email addresses should appear on a separate cover page.**
6. **The decision of the judges is final. The essays will be judged in a two-stage process. First they will be assessed and shortlisted by the *CNR* Editorial Board and then the winning essays will be determined by a panel of three independent judges.**

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