CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW

VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1 (SPRING 2005)

HMCS *Sackville* – Canada's Naval Memorial

Some 65 years ago, Canada commenced its magnificent struggle to keep the North Atlantic lifeline open. Winston Churchill and Soviet Marshal Zhukov are two of the many who have pointed out that this battle was crucial to Allied victory in World War II. Arguably, the Battle of the Atlantic was Canada's most important contribution to that victory.

The Canadian Naval Memorial Trust is dedicated to preserving HMCS *Sackville*, a veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic. This corvette is the living symbol of that monumental national achievement and of the roles played by Canada's Navy, Air Force and Merchant Navy. Of the 269 Royal Canadian Navy and allied corvettes, Sackville is the last.

To preserve this memorial the Trust needs your support. You are invited to become a Trustee. A Trustee is a voting member of the Trust, may visit *Sackville* free of charge, is a member of the Mess, and receives the Trust's newsletter, *Action Stations*. If you prefer not to become a Trustee but wish to support the Trust's work, you would be welcome as a Member of the Ship's Company and, as a result, have free access to Sackville. Whichever category you choose, your annual contribution will support the work of the Trust. You will be sent a receipt for income tax purposes.

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The editorial offices of the *Canadian Naval Review* are located at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4H6
Phone: (902) 494-3769
Fax: (902) 494-3825
Email: naval.review@dal.ca
Website: www.naval.review.cfps.dal.ca

The *Canadian Naval Review* is published quarterly by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies (CFPS) at Dalhousie University. It is a professional journal examining a wide range of maritime security issues from a Canadian perspective. In particular it focuses on strategic concepts, policies, historical perspectives, procurement programs and operations of the Canadian Navy, and national security in general. This initiative brings together members of the Canadian defence and academic communities and is a component of the CFPS's Maritime Security Program.

The *Canadian Naval Review* has two primary objectives:

- provide a respected, arm's-length focal point for discussing a broad range of issues relating to navy professional development; and
- provide a forum for naval, academic and public discussion of all aspects of naval and maritime policy.

The material included in the review is presented for the professional and general education of the readers. Articles, commentaries and opinion pieces are invited from the widest possible spectrum for the purpose of informing, stimulating debate and generally challenging readers. The opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Editors, Editorial Board, the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, or the Canadian Navy.

Articles, opinion pieces and letters may be submitted via email or mailed (with an electronic copy) to the address given above, to the attention of the Editor, Dr. Ann Griffiths. Articles are to be in Word or WordPerfect and no longer than 3,000 words, in which citations should be kept to a minimum. Articles must not have been published elsewhere. Authors will be paid a small honorarium for an article which is accepted for publication. Opinion pieces are to be 1,000-1,500 words, and book reviews are to be 500-750 words. Intellectual copyright will remain the property of the author, however, the right to re-publish articles initially published in the *Canadian Naval Review* remains with the Editorial Board.

*HMCS **Athabaskan** in Halifax Harbour at sunrise*
Photo by Corporal Bruno Turcotte, MARLANT Formation Imaging Services

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Cover and internal photographs provided by MARLANT Formation Imaging and Maritime Command Museum, Department of National Defence.

Introducing the *Canadian Naval*

Dr. Frank Harvey
Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University

In May 2010 Canada's navy will become 100 years old, with 100 years of experience. Through a series of wars and crises at home and abroad, the Canadian Navy has evolved into a competent, modern force held in high esteem internationally but, unfortunately, less well known in Canada. This isn't surprising when one considers the geography of our country. With only two fleet bases, at Halifax and Esquimalt, some 4,000 miles apart, and with the majority of the population living at considerable distances from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans – to say nothing of the Arctic – Canadians have little first-hand exposure to their navy.

The *Canadian Naval Review* has been created as an initiative of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies as part of its maritime security studies program to provide a vehicle for discussing issues related to the Canadian Navy and maritime security in general. We are confident the Review will fill a vacuum in the professional literature in Canada by providing a forum for a broad-based public discussion of all aspects of naval and maritime policy.

This first edition of the *Canadian Naval Review* includes a selection of articles and commentaries covering some of the many naval and maritime security issues that we believe require public debate and discussion. For instance, the editorial lays down a clear marker that the Review intends to be part of the process by which the navy adapts to changing regional and global circumstances, evolves and remains relevant. In this context, the navy has an obligation to provide a rationale to the Canadian government and public for its continued existence. The Review is intended to make a valuable contribution to these debates.

In this issue, you will also find a thought-provoking essay questioning the emerging trends in Canadian naval policy and arguing that forsaking proven capability is not in the country's best interests. This is intended to be the first salvo in a public discussion on naval policy that will become a hallmark of the *Canadian Naval Review*. As a catalyst for such an open discussion on policy, a number of prominent navalists were invited to write critiques and/or comments on that essay as our first offering of the "Making Waves" section. Other authors have contributed their own commentaries for the section. Our intention is to run this section in every edition, and our hope is that readers will feel free (perhaps obligated) to join the debate.

We have assembled an experienced team to edit and publish this new journal and are confident that it will stimulate the interest of the academic and professional naval communities and members of the attentive public. Obviously, we will have to rely heavily on all parts of these communities to provide the articles, commentaries and opinions to make this a lively and stimulating journal – the views of practitioners are as valuable as those of professors.

We sincerely hope that this will become a stimulating, informative and enjoyable journal.

Review



Vice-Admiral Bruce MacLean
Chief of Maritime Staff

Dalhousie University and the Canadian Navy have a longstanding history that for decades has maintained an active relationship by which experience, professional knowledge and scholarly research in maritime security and oceans policy have been shared to the fullest extent possible. The *Canadian Naval Review* is a further extension of this bond between Dalhousie and the navy.

The broad aim of the *Canadian Naval Review* will be to provide a forum for naval, academic and public discussion of all aspects of naval and maritime policy. As my colleague Dr. Frank Harvey has noted, the journal will go a long way in filling the literature void on issues pertaining to maritime security and defence. The *Canadian Naval Review* will directly contribute to increasing awareness and support for the navy's role in the maritime dimensions. Furthermore, a publication of this nature will provide an effective public education program and will continue to explain to Canadians what the maritime dimension of their country means to them.

That being said, the success and interest generated in the *Canadian Naval Review* will depend greatly upon the written material it receives. Dalhousie University has put together an impressive team to edit and manage the journal but it will require stimulating articles, commentaries and opinions from those "inspiring minds" who serve in the maritime security and defence domain and the greater academic community.

I strongly believe that the *Canadian Naval Review* is important to the navy in many ways and must have our support in terms of written contributions. I encourage all serving and retired members of the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Forces as a whole to write freely and to wade into the debate. I encourage all of our members to write as individuals, challenge the ideas and promote an active and well-informed debate on maritime security and defence issues. Only with the continued input of our serving and retired members will the *Canadian Naval Review* promote the growth of knowledge and informed opinion.

Editorial: The Canadian Meaning of the Battle of the Atlantic

It is not a coincidence that the *Canadian Naval Review* is being launched on the ninety-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Canadian Navy, which also happens to be the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of the Atlantic. Both are important dates in Canadian naval history marking, respectively, the navy's birth and its transition to maturity. In the same way that the British use the Battle of Trafalgar to symbolize their naval tradition, the Canadian practice is to use the Battle of the Atlantic.

In the same way that the British use the Battle of Trafalgar to symbolize their naval tradition, the Canadian practice is to use the Battle of the Atlantic.

Despite tendencies towards anti-historicalism, in the belief that history now has little to teach us, history and its celebration through tradition continues to play an important role in our lives. A frequently and oft misquoted adage holds that those who fail to heed the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them. Ironically, history tells us over and over again that this is true. Perversely, the military is invariably being scolded for always planning to fight the last war!

These are not necessarily contradictory thoughts. However, they do lead to an important question, "How does a military service learn?" Obviously, experience has to count for something because that is a fundamental part of the overall maturing process. At the same time, there has to be recognition of change, especially in technology. Military attention to the lessons of past wars and operations is, in fact, as old as history. Some will argue that military concern for historical analysis began with Clausewitz; others will go much further back in time and cite Thucydides' analysis of the Peloponnesian War. In reality, the origins are less important than the fact that the process of learning from collective military experience has become common practice in mature military systems.

Military attention to the lessons of past wars and operations is, in fact, as old as history.

The end of the nineteenth century saw the birth of formal naval academic learning. Before then instruction had been largely practical with more emphasis on procedures than analysis of facts. In almost no time at all, the naval profession emerged under the watchful eyes and adept pens of men such as Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Castex and Wegener. Soon, the concepts of naval strategy became as well entrenched as those of land warfare explained by Clausewitz and Jomini. Later, the concepts became one under an approach that recognized the need, politically in particular, to blend army and naval capabilities within the mantle of imperialism and power projection that we now know as "joint" operations.

The development of what some called "naval art" and others called strategy was not restricted to the imperial navies though. Those navies which were maintained purely for the defence of the homeland also studied naval history, especially the evolution of other navies. But it was not a static process, changes in technology, concepts and even society had to be brought into analyses. Put simply, navies around the world came to realize that their future depended on their understanding of past campaigns and in being able to apply the implications of emerging and new technologies to those lessons learned.

The Royal Canadian Navy was formed in 1910 in the image of the Royal Navy. Much to the surprise of British politicians and admirals, however, the Canadians refused to be drawn into the Imperial naval fold preferring to remain independent and focussed on national security. Nevertheless, several generations of Canadian naval officers were educated in Britain and instilled with the lessons of Royal Navy battles as analysed by masters such as Corbett and Richmond.

It was only in the closing years of the Battle of the Atlantic that Canadian naval operations began to take on a more Canadian appearance.

The Canadian naval experience until the Cold War was essentially British. Even the RCN's involvement in the Second World War was largely within British formations and under British command. It was only in the closing years of the Battle of the Atlantic that Canadian naval operations began to take on a more Canadian appearance. For this reason, the Battle of the Atlantic is rightly the symbolic turning point at which the navy started to become truly Canadian.

Thus, although the British tradition would remain alive until the 1960s, the Canadian Navy began its transformation into a national navy in the aftermath of the Second World War. Yet, curiously, the navy never developed its own academic structure. A few naval historians taught at the Royal Military College and other universities and a handful worked for the Department of National Defence at various times, but for the most part they taught British naval history. The two attempts to form a uniquely Canadian naval college, The Royal Naval College of Canada and HMCS *Royal Roads*, were short-lived.

Although the Canadian naval tradition in the immediate post-war years may not have been rich enough to support academic specialization, it quickly grew. Today, 95 years after the founding of the RCN and 60 years after the Battle of the Atlantic, with the experience of the Cold War and the complex period that has followed, the Canadian naval experience is much richer. But the academic interest in that block of history is still limited other than analysis of naval procurement programs, major policy decisions, and a few select incidents as case studies. This is a shame and denies Canadians and others the opportunity of understanding their navy and its place in the national fabric. Apart from recent initiatives to study the decade of Canadian naval operations in the Middle East, this lack of attention has not provided enough opportunities to analyse naval operations and develop lessons learned – a fundamental part of the process by which navies learn and continue to mature.

It is into this moment of opportunity that the *Canadian Naval Review* has been launched. It is our intention to seize the moment and actively promote scholarship in Canadian naval matters. In this, we have three clear objectives:

- enhance the existing but small academic program that studies the policies and activities of the Canadian Navy,
- provide a much-needed focal point, maintained at arm's length from government, for discussing a broad range of issues concerning naval professional development; and
- provide a public forum for discussing all aspects of naval and maritime security policy and/or strategy.

It is our intention to seize the moment and actively promote scholarship in Canadian naval matters.

As Richard Gimblett rightly said during a conference on lessons learned, "if the Navy is to continue to be deserving of notice by Canadians, it will depend greatly upon an open and frank discussion of the highs and lows of *Operation Apollo*, and then collectively hoisting in and applying the lessons learned." We believe that it is urgent to extrapolate from Gimblett's view in one key aspect: the basis of analysis must be the entire Canadian naval experience – the good and the bad. The *Canadian Naval Review* cannot do it all, but at least we hope to be the catalyst that sees the naval learning process evolve into the healthy discipline it needs to become if the navy is to be accepted from coast to coast. In this, we need to continue to support Battle of Atlantic commemorative events as a strong symbol of Canadian naval tradition.

Peter T. Haydon

The Many Origins of the RCN

Richard H. Gimblett

Each issue of the *Canadian Naval Review* will feature an article on some facet of the history of our navy that has enduring relevance to contemporary issues. This is neither to deny the pleasure just for the sake of it in discovering the esoteric tidbits of years gone by, nor to provide ammunition to detractors who argue that our service seems condemned more than others to repeat the mistakes of the past. Rather, it is to give life to the simple truth that how our predecessors reacted to the circumstances of their times can inform our understanding of the present, even if the circumstances are never exactly the same. If in the process the authors featured in this space might seem occasionally to engage in de-bunking the past, they do so in order that decision-makers grappling with issues of today are informed by the most complete understanding of the historical precedent – and are not constructing our naval forces or committing them to operations on the basis of myth.

With this inaugural issue appearing on the 95th anniversary of the official birth of the Royal Canadian Navy, it is perhaps appropriate that the series open by tackling one of our more enduring myths: that the RCN was born on impulse as an imperial institution in the aftermath of the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909. Besides the obvious quibble that the designation "royal" was not bestowed until June 1911, a year after passage of the *Naval Service Act*, there is the more fundamental problem that by 1909 there already existed fairly broad and non-partisan agreement on the subject of a dominion naval service, and it wasn't even supposed to be a "navy."

The consensus on naval thinking in Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed within an atmosphere of general acceptance that the Royal Navy, as undisputed Mistress of the Seas, would tend to the maritime defence of Canada. Still, within that construct emerging notions of "dominion autonomy" (a phrase loaded with much the same weight that "national sovereignty" carries today) implied that, if Canada was ever to emerge from the constraints of colonial status, it must assume a greater responsibility for the conduct of its own affairs. As such, Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald – and after him Sir Wilfrid Laurier – embraced the essentially isolationist National Policy of tariff protection and western expansion as the vehicle for internal development. The Canadian view of the wider world was similarly narrow, but the conduct of external affairs was complicated by the fact that Canada shared the northern half of the continent with the United States, and many of their unresolved issues were matters of maritime jurisdiction (generally the fisheries) over which the Royal Navy had no interest in coming into potential conflict with the US Navy.

The consensus on naval thinking in Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed within an atmosphere of general acceptance that the Royal Navy, as undisputed Mistress of the Seas, would tend to the maritime defence of Canada.

This led to the establishment of the Fisheries Protection Service (FPS) in 1885 along quasi-military lines, in imitation of the similar arm of the Royal Navy in home waters. It was perhaps inevitable that the officers of the Canadian Militia would see the FPS as the obvious solution to their own strategic problem of securing the Great Lakes in the event of conflict with the United States, while adhering in peacetime to the naval limitations of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817.

The notion of constituting the Fishery Protection Service as a naval militia specifically to check the advance of American expansionism in its various forms became a constant refrain of Canadian military planning.

*HMS **Charybdis**, a protected cruiser built 1893, in Halifax in the early 1900s, flying the broad pennant of the commodore in charge of the NA&WI sub-squadron assigned to the Newfoundland fisheries*

The most notorious of the early attempts to establish a Canadian naval service was the acquisition in 1881 of the obsolete steam-assisted corvette *Charybdis* as a training hulk, which came to naught not only because of the succession of misadventures surrounding its brief stay in Canada but more so because it was based in Saint John, New Brunswick, and the Russian cruiser scare it was to address had no solid basis in Canadian defence realities. Instead, the notion of constituting the FPS as a naval militia specifically to check the advance of American expansionism in its various forms became a constant refrain of Canadian military planning. Indeed, it came close to being realized on at least three occasions, only to be dashed each time by more pressing demands on a perennially tight military budget: in 1885 by the onset of the Riel Rebellion; in 1899 by the Boer War; and in 1905 by the assumption of responsibility for the garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt.

Each of those occasions, nonetheless, marked progress towards the realization of what was entering the military and political language of the day generically as "the Canadian naval service." The Defence Commission of 1884-85 (sometimes referred to as the Melgund Commission after its senior member, Viscount Melgund, who would return to Canada later as Governor-General the Earl of Minto, 1898-1904) was quick to recognize that "a force for patrolling the fisheries could readily be made more capable of more general naval duties."[1] Within a few years, a more detailed proposition took as its premise the somewhat heretical (yet prescient) notion that Canada required its own naval forces because of the strong likelihood that in the event of a general European war the Admiralty would be forced to recall the North America and West Indies (NA&WI) Squadron from Canadian waters to the defence of Britain. A crucial element of the Leach Commission of 1898 was the recommendation to form a naval militia, an idea that attracted the attention of the NA&WI squadron commander, Admiral Sir John Fisher, converting him to a concept of colonial divisions of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) that would infuse his thinking later as First Sea Lord.

The backlash in Quebec over the despatch of the Canadian contingents to the Boer War led Prime Minister Laurier to fear that implementing the naval militia plan would be misconstrued as a further imperial measure. Having thought through the concept, however, he was sufficiently confident to make the first clear statement of Canadian naval policy at the Colonial Conference of 1902, in declaring that the Canadian government was prepared to consider the naval side of defence as well as the military. Immediately upon returning to Canada from London, he installed a prominent French-Canadian politician (Raymond Préfontaine, who as Mayor of Montreal had supported Laurier on the contingent issue) as Minister of Marine and Fisheries to overhaul the department. Préfontaine and Militia Minister Sir Frederick Borden soon were peppering their speeches with references to the necessity of "forming the nucleus of a Navy in this country."[2]

Premier Brian Bond of Newfoundland, meanwhile, embraced setting up a local division of the RNR as an opportunity to make a tangible contribution to imperial defence, stressing the strategic importance of the colony astride the North Atlantic cable and grain trade routes to Britain. His bid to establish St John's as a defended cruiser base failed, but in December 1902 a contingent of 50 reservists embarked in HMS *Charybdis* (not the old hulk, but its next-of-name, a modern second-class protected cruiser of the NA&WI Squadron, built in 1893) for a six-month training cruise. Within days of their departure, the ship was ordered to join the rest of the squadron off Venezuela to press for the repayment of outstanding debts, and the Newfoundlanders acquitted themselves well in the bombardment and storming of several coastal forts. The cruise was noteworthy also in that it was under the supervision of Gunnery Lieutenant Walter Hose, who would transfer to the RCN in 1911, eventually rising to command it as Director and then Chief of the Naval Staff from 1920-34.

The most enduring of the Canadian initiatives came in the wake of the Alaska Boundary Award of 1903, which

went to the Americans on the basis of their stronger claim of occupancy. Laurier turned to the Department of Marine and Fisheries to shoulder the responsibility of buttressing Canadian claims in other areas, most visibly through the acquisition of a pair of "screw ram-bowed cruisers" that dramatically expanded the capability of the FPS. The Canadian Government Ship (CGS) *Vigilant* has been described as "the first warship to be built in Canada"[3] and the CGS *Canada* (built by Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness, Scotland) very quickly came to be described by Liberals and Conservatives alike as "the flagship of the Canadian Navy."[4] A *Naval Militia Act* was drafted for presentation to Parliament in 1904 as part of a package of general militia reform, and in January 1905 *Canada* departed Halifax for a three-month Caribbean cruise to exercise with the NA&WI Squadron.

*CGS **Canada** as accepted from Vickers in June 1904, before fitting with 3-pounder quick-firing guns*

Early in 1906, Prime Minister Laurier approved the acquisition also of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, a significant move, since the "ownership of bases suggests the advisability of owning warships as well."

The ambitious decision to replace British troops in garrisoning the Halifax and Esquimalt fortifications led the *Canadian Militia Gazette* to opine with genuine remorse that "unfortunately we cannot have everything, and that the assumption of these obligations will undoubtedly postpone the day when we may expect substantial Government assistance towards a navy."[5] But this time the plan refused to die. Early in 1906, Laurier approved the acquisition also of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, a significant move, since the "ownership of bases suggests the advisability of owning warships as well."[6] And in May 1908, he lured a senior Canadian in Royal Navy service, Rear-Admiral Charles Kingsmill, to return to Canada for the express purpose of transforming the Fisheries Protection Service into a Canadian Naval Militia.

Early in February 1909, in response to a Conservative Party notice of motion to debate "the defences of our sea coasts," Kingsmill drafted a "Memorandum on Coast Defence" advocating the gradual acquisition of "scouts" (light cruisers) and torpedo-boat destroyers, from which "the men trained in the first year would be available to man a destroyer or a Scout next year, and so on until we had sufficient officers and men well trained" to maintain the essential Canadian character of the fleet.[7]

Admittedly tentative steps, cumulatively these measures served to define a nascent Canadian naval policy that enjoyed support from both sides of the House. When the Dreadnought Crisis erupted in mid-March 1909, before the Conservative motion could be debated, the frantic claim that Germany might outstrip Britain in the construction of dreadnought battleships had little impact in Canada, other than drawing attention to the fact that naval defence was to be a topic of discussion in the House of Commons.

The first naval "debate" of 29 March 1909 was anything but. To Prime Minister Laurier's insistence that "we are not to be stampeded from what has been the settled policy and deliberate course which we have laid down, by any hasty, feverish action, however spectacular such action may be," Opposition Leader Robert Borden allowed "I am thoroughly aware that the late Raymond Préfontaine thoroughly intended to establish a Canadian naval militia or naval force of some kind." Together they crafted a final resolution calling the House to "approve of any necessary expenditure to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in cooperation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy, along the lines suggested at the last Imperial Conference [in 1907]."[8] Of the other speakers, no one advocated an im-



*HMS **Shearwater** (alongside) dressed overall to greet the arrival of HMCS **Rainbow** in Esquimalt, 7 November 1910*

mediate contribution of money or dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy, and the clear majority favoured a Canadian force. The motion passed unanimously, supported by imperialist as well as nationalist, English-Canadian and French-Canadian, regardless of party, a clear indication of Parliament's sense that any self-respecting country should not be a burden on another for its defence.

There was no talk yet of a "tin-pot navy" – that would come later, and only from a sense of frustration that Canada was capable of undertaking so much more.

There was no talk yet of a "tin-pot navy" – that would come later, and only from a sense of frustration that Canada was capable of undertaking so much more. Interestingly, the biggest vote of confidence came from First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher. When the Canadian Ministers of Marine and Fisheries and of Militia and Defence went to London along with their Australian counterparts in the summer of 1909 to negotiate the inclusion of the proposed naval militia into the existing imperial defence structures, ad hoc as those were, they were presented instead with the proposal to each establish a proper "dominion fleet unit." A clearly offensive force of a dreadnought battle cruiser supported by three armoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines, this was a radical new strategic concept, well beyond anything discussed at the 1907 conference.[9]

Fisher had been frustrated by the inability to follow through on the second part of his fleet re-distribution scheme, that being the replacement of obsolete battleships withdrawn from distant stations with modern armoured cruisers. Along with Australia, he feared Imperial Japan might not be friendly in 1911 when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due for renewal. Always a strong advocate of colonial naval forces (contrary to popular belief), Fisher felt it was entirely within the capacity of the increasingly autonomous self-governing dominions to shoulder greater regional responsibilities: "It means *eventually* Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape (that is South Africa), and India *running a complete Navy*. We manage the job in Europe. They'll manage it against the Yankees, Japs, and Chinese, as occasion requires it out there."[10]

Fisher's concern was for the Pacific Basin, and he wanted Canada's fleet unit to be based in Esquimalt, British Columbia. The majority of Canada's maritime concerns, however, were on the Atlantic, precisely where the RN was still supreme. To the First Sea Lord's dismay, British politicians agreed to the Canadian compromise that the battle cruiser was superfluous, and the rest of the "unit"

would be split between each coast, with the bulk based in Halifax. Pending their construction and delivery, a training cruiser would be accepted on each coast. Following further negotiations, and the proclamation of the *Naval Service Act* on 4 May 1910, these materialized as His Majesty's Canadian Ships *Niobe* (arrived in Halifax 21 October 1910) and *Rainbow* (arrived Esquimalt 7 November 1910).

After many false starts, the Canadian Navy finally was born.

After many false starts, the Canadian Navy finally was born. But soon it was caught in the paradox of Canadian sea power: that the defence tasks in home waters were too few to offer full peacetime employment, while the expanse of those waters required substantial vessels with long range to adequately patrol them. Additionally, being somewhat larger than the types originally proposed by Kingsmill, they had to be crewed initially almost entirely by British officers and ratings. The "Canadian-ness" of the fleet was hard to perceive.

Detecting a chance to split the Liberal electoral hold on Quebec, Robert Borden found it politically expedient to go back on his original support, and instead to let his French wing characterize the fleet as an imperial institution. In English Canada he styled it as an inadequate contribution to the defence of the empire. Contrary positions, but in combination with the Reciprocity issue, they were enough to allow the Conservative Party to form the government and send the Liberal Party into Opposition.

The great irony is that once in power himself, Borden could offer no viable alternative. With Fisher gone from the Admiralty after late 1910, the Dominion navies had no visionary advocate in London. The new First Lord, Winston Churchill, at first favoured colonial cash contributions to the Royal Navy, but when his newly formed War Staff set to the problem, their advice for a Canadian fleet closely resembling Kingsmill's combination of cruisers and destroyers arrived in May 1914 on the eve of the long-feared war in Europe, too late to be put into effect.

In the Great War, *Rainbow* and *Niobe* (with some Newfoundland reservists embarked) would perform yeoman service in the blockade against German raiders off their respective coasts. With the British squadrons recalled



*HMCS **Niobe** c. 1911*

home as anticipated, however, the Canadian forces had to be fleshed out by commissioning the fisheries cruisers of the FPS. It took some 30 years since first proposed in the mid-1880s, but the Canadian naval service finally came into its own.

*Dr Richard Gimblett is a former naval officer and Research Fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. His latest book is on **Operation Apollo**, and this article is derived from his work on the official history of the RCN.*

Notes

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2. J. Castell Hopkins, *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, 1902 (Toronto, 1902), p. 145.
3. T.E. Appleton, *Usque Ad Mare: A History of the Canadian Coast Guard and Marine Services* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 80.
4. House of Commons Debates, various, 1905-08; *Annual Report[s] of the Department of Marine & Fisheries, 1904-1908* (House of Commons, Sessional Paper no 21, 1905-1909).
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7. Brodeur Papers (reel H-1017), vol 2, file 17, Kingsmill to Brodeur, 1 February 1909.
8. House of Commons Debates, 29 March 1909 (cols. 3484-3565).
9. See Nicholas Lambert, *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1999) for a re-interpretation of the Fisher era, different from the standard view given in A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919. Volume I: The Road to War, 1904-1914* (Oxford University Press, 1961).
10. Fisher to Viscount Esher, 13 September 1909, quoted in A.J. Marder, *Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, Vol II: Years of Power, 1904-1914* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), p. 264. Emphasis in original.

Canada's Navy: A Good, Workable Little Fleet?

Peter T. Haydon

The concept of a "good, workable little fleet" was introduced in October 1945 by the Minister of Defence, Douglas Abbott, as a description of the Canadian Navy in announcing the establishment of the post-war fleet. But he never explained his concept of either "good" or "workable" in naval terms. Critics were quick to point out though that the new fleet concept lacked strategic rationale and its structure seemed rather arbitrary. It was a compromise from that proposed by the Naval Staff, with two aircraft carriers, two cruisers and 12 destroyers, the new fleet was strategically significant but lacked a clear function at the time. As we know, the concept was short-lived because the government refused to provide the necessary funding to make it a reality. Has anything changed since? I don't think so. The purpose, size and funding of the Canadian Navy has been a political football ever since.

Half a century ago, it took a combination of the February 1948 Soviet-engineered coup in Czechoslovakia, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear detonation, and the Korean War to make the government open up the public purse and embark on a naval modernization program. The strategic rationale was clear: the Soviets had to be deterred from expanding their grasp on Europe and other parts of the world. Should deterrence fail, Europe would have to be liberated once more. The role of the Canadian Navy, as in the Second World War, would be to fight the U-boats. The only difference was that in the next war the Russians would be driving them.

Despite the constant urging of the NATO planning staffs for Canada to increase its naval and maritime air commitment, Canadian politicians were seldom, if ever, willing to meet requests for more naval capability.

With adjustments for the advances of technology, that strategy formed the rationale for the Canadian Navy throughout the Cold War. The key variable was always the amount of money the government was willing to spend for shipbuilding, operations and people. Despite the constant urging of the NATO planning staffs for Canada to increase its naval and maritime air commitment, Canadian politicians were seldom, if ever, willing to meet requests for more naval capability. As a result, there was a systematic erosion of the fleet from a high of some 65 warships and over 100 maritime aircraft in

The empty Newfoundland coastline

the late 1950s to a meagre 16 destroyers and frigates, 3 operational support ships, 3 submarines, some 28 helicopters, and 21 maritime patrol aircraft by the time the Cold War ended in 1989.

The decline started in the 1960s when Paul Hellyer rejected NATO force requirements and refused to replace the Second World War frigates that had been modernized as Cold War convoy escorts. The fleet stabilized at 24 destroyers during the Trudeau era, but quickly shrank again in the late 1980s when eight destroyers were traded off for nuclear submarines that never appeared. Now, it seems that four more destroyers are to be cut from the inventory.

Fleet size is still a politically-determined variable, having more to do with money than strategy or even utility.

Today, there is no doubt that Canada's naval fleet is undeniably "little" again. Fleet size is still a politically-determined variable, having more to do with money than strategy or even utility. This leads to a parallel concern over what constitutes "good" and "workable" in the government's eyes today.

A correlation exists between numbers and effectiveness. The argument is often made that advances in capability offset the decline in numbers. There is some truth in that, but pushing the argument further creates problems because if taken any lower, the numbers are insufficient to sustain an effective naval capability. One ship cannot be in two places at once. This was recognized in the 1994 Defence White Paper when the government established a policy that would maintain enough ships and aircraft to provide a useful commitment to international security while also providing for the security of home waters. The problem was that the government never provided the money to make this a reality. The concept of a "good, workable little fleet" quickly died. Once again, quality was being held as a substitute for quantity and thus flexibility. Taken to the ludicrous extreme, we might eventually see fleet capabilities being rolled into two ships – one on each coast.

"Good" and "workable" need to be tied to the actual work that needs to be done at sea. This leads to the central question: "What does the government want the navy to be able to do?" Some would phrase this question differently and ask, "What is the national naval strategy?"

An expression of naval strategy was included in the 1994 Defence White Paper, but that has clearly fallen by the wayside because recent announcements of defence policy change fleet priorities. Instead of the focus being on the naval task group concept which has served the county so well for the last 15 or so years, the emphasis now seems to be on joint support operations under a raison d'être that puts more store in helping failed states than on continuing to be a useful member of multinational

coalitions addressing the full spectrum of global security problems.

Since the 1994 defence policy statement the navy has developed a strategy and companion doctrine to implement that broad strategic objective. The most recent of the navy's public rationalizations, *Leadmark*, was broad in context and well-grounded in sensible naval theory. Yet, ironically, it has not been widely read. Far too many decision-makers seem uncertain of the basic rationale for maintaining a Canadian Navy. Too many public statements are made that reflect an incomplete understanding of naval matters and of the value of having a navy to call upon in times of crisis.

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It would seem, now, that without a new defence policy rationalization, the navy has changed from "multi-purpose, combat-capable" to some niche role that has more to do with providing sea lift for peacekeeping forces than being a useful instrument of security at home and abroad. It might seem, therefore, that the navy is about to become "a politically acceptable, marginally useful tiny fleet." Surely, this slide into virtual irrelevance is not in the country's best interests.

Perhaps the time has come to return to first principles and ask why Canada still needs a navy.

Perhaps the time has come to return to first principles and ask why Canada still needs a navy. For too long, the navy has been taken for granted as a first response to crisis based on a philosophy that it is politically acceptable to deploy a warship or a group of ships because it incurs little political risk, brings degree of international leverage, and is unlikely to incur casualties. The world has changed, and as we all discovered after September 2001, things need to be done a little differently. A few more risks must be accepted in the interests of security.

So, what do we want the navy to do today?

At any time and under almost any set of circumstances, the political requirement for naval capabilities is that they be a contingency against challenges to national security at sea. This has two distinct aspects: domestic and international. The problem has always been one of determining the balance between resources for the "home game" and those for the "away game." Throughout the Cold War the Canadian Navy, with its integral maritime air capability, had dual tasking – home and away. In that period, when the threat to security at sea was provided almost entirely by the Soviet Navy and its nuclear-armed submarines, virtually identical capabilities were needed for both home and distant waters. In the post-Cold War world, especially in the wake of the events of September 2001, a new emphasis is being placed on domestic security at sea, and so the previous "one fleet, two functions" approach is being questioned.

So how does one begin to determine the right fleet balance (and perhaps therefore the capability mix) between domestic and international requirements?

The "Home Game"

Domestically, we need to deal with the maritime aspect of the basic security paradox: complete security is a virtual prison from which everybody else is excluded. This is a completely impractical approach to maritime security because Canada's economy depends on the free use of the oceans. Instead, we need to adopt a responsive approach that is selective in choosing situations to which government intervention is warranted. The essence of this lies in being able to recognize what is potentially dangerous. Traditional concepts of maritime security require that a maritime state must:

- know who is using its waters and for what purpose;
- maintain an unequivocal government presence in those waters; and
- be able to respond quickly to threatening and potentially threatening situations.

All this requires a comprehensive surveillance, information-gathering and management system, a high-level decision-making process, and the vessels and aircraft to maintain the government presence and respond to incidents.

HMCS ***Brandon*** *off Baffin Island*

How serious are the threats? The United States takes the threat by sea very seriously; Washington regards US territorial and adjacent waters as borders and requires that all persons and goods arriving by sea be subject to the same scrutiny as those arriving by land or air. Because of the economic integration of Canada and the United States, and the fact that Canadian ports are major transshipment ports for goods destined for the United States, Washington expects us to take maritime security as seriously as it does.

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Port control is one thing (criminals and terrorists will be less likely to use the major ports if they know that security is efficient), but it is not everything. If the ports are secure the terrorists and criminals will instead seek out remote parts of the coastline and land their contraband and people there. Because of geography, this is more of a Canadian than an American problem, except for the Alaska coast. Hence, the first requirements for Canadian maritime security are to maintain watch over the remote waters and shorelines of our huge country and meet American expectations in the process. If we don't, they will do it for us. That is the reality of American security.

If we don't meet US security expectations, they will do it for us. That is the reality of American security.

Although much of this "watch" can be kept electronically, intervention and the resolution of ambiguities can only be accomplished by people either on shore or at sea. And this is why maintaining a government presence at sea is so very important. The mere act of maintaining that presence serves as a deterrent against the criminal or terrorist. Being alert and present in our waters makes it much more difficult for those who would do us harm or break the law.

Do we need to have ships on patrol everywhere all the time? No, that would be unrealistically expensive in view of the known threat. The key point about threat assessment is that it is the "unknown" that demands our attention because we do not know how to respond.

The "known" threats can be dealt with. Once identified as needing action, a threatening situation demands quick and effective action.

Having a ship on patrol readily available to respond to situations also makes sense from a safety and environmental monitoring perspective. Presence and response are companion concepts. Simply, it is good stewardship.

Clearly, any new naval policy needs to include provision for one or two credible warships on patrol at all times. Northern and Arctic waters present a problem because there are not enough ships with the necessary capabilities to operate safely in those waters. If we find it difficult to operate in these waters in winter, it is unlikely that other ships will be there either. Fortunately, this narrows

the windows for using the northern waters, and these are the periods when patrol activity should be intensified. This eases the surveillance requirement somewhat. The other factor is that the sheer size of those waters is so great that some of the patrolling must be done by aircraft, and because the activity rate is low most of the year random over-flights on a fairly frequent basis should be adequate.

The irony of all this is that the navy and its maritime air forces used to do it. Budget cuts and reductions in fleet strength have systematically taken away the ability to conduct northern patrols by air and maintain a greater physical presence in Canadian waters. There was a time when Canadian warships were frequent visitors to outports on both coasts. Having these ships readily available to respond to situations and providing an unequivocal government presence in those waters made sense then, and makes sense now.

The "Away Game"

Internationally, Canada already has a very effective rapid response capability in its navy. Over the past 15 years the country has been well served by a succession of national naval task groups deployed to many parts of the world. Those forces, more than any other arm of the military, provide the government with the flexibility to make a variety of responses to international crises and developing situations. The navy has always been the vanguard force in Canada's response to foreign crises, and there is no sound strategic reason to change that.

Over the past 15 years the country has been well served by a succession of national naval task groups deployed to many parts of the world.

Maintaining a Canadian presence in the former NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (now the NATO Rapid Reaction Force) made sense, as does the more recent practise to deploy a frigate with a US Navy carrier battle group. Both tasks serve as a signal of Canada's commitment to world peace and also act as political leverage for the international security process. Those deployments also provide excellent training opportunities and promote interoperability among coalition fleets. The bottom line is that without such commitments, Canada would be sidelined in the international security process.

Successive Canadian governments have used the navy widely to show concern over developing situations, as in Haiti in 1964, 1988 and 1993-94; as the first response to a crisis as at the onset of the Korean War and the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War; and as a clear signal of a longer-term commitment to international stability in the 2001-03 war on terrorism (*Operation Apollo*). They have also used the navy as an instrument of diplomacy in a host of situations in the Caribbean, the southern Atlantic and throughout the Pacific, while also relying on those same ships, submarines and aircraft to provide a major contribution to international security within NATO and, after 1990, in international coalitions in such places as Somalia, the Adriatic and the Persian Gulf. From this, it would seem that the Canadian government understands that versatile naval forces, rather than specialized forces, continue to be a sound investment in national security, no matter what happens in the future. If this is so, why is there no comprehensive policy to maintain those capabilities into the future?

That the government now seems unwilling to fund the new ships necessary to uphold that policy seems to indicate that a change has taken place in Canadian foreign policy that now no longer requires naval task groups to be the country's first response to crisis. In the meantime, that unspoken policy is being implemented by default – default by not providing for the adequate upkeep of proven, useful naval capabilities.

One has to ask, "Is this deliberate, or is it mismanagement?"

If it is indeed deliberate "structural disarmament" – to borrow a phrase – then it is no better than implementing new policy without having the courage to explain publicly the rationale behind the lack of commitment. If the government only sees a requirement for a token naval capability it should have the courage to say so. If it is merely mismanagement, then somebody should be brought to task for failing to maintain the country's proven security system. Truth be known, it is probably a little of each because the country's security and defence structures have been given lower priorities than social programs. Such is the nature of politics. In this, things haven't really changed in the last 60 years. When sufficiently frightened, politicians are quick to invest in defence, but when the risks of attack or even instability lie far away, security gets far less attention, while vote-catching issues take priority.

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The problem today is that events unfurl rather more quickly than in the past. This is largely a function of the unstable world that replaced the relative stability of the Cold War and the new global interdependence, especially in trade, that has emerged. No country can be an island unto itself any more; our concerns are for stability on a much wider scale.

When a crisis arises, experience and common sense tell us that by taking early and decisive action the effects can be contained more easily. Such action invariably requires the deployment of some form of military capability, either to restore order or to alleviate suffering. But herein lies the problem. Those military capabilities have to exist and be trained to do those things. Contrary to what now seems to be a popular misconception, military units are not "turn-key" operations. They must be maintained ready for use even when there is no immediate need for them. The "unknown" is that we do not know where or when the next crisis will take place.

The force multiplier

The Batting Order

To close the loop we need to ask whether the government wants to be able to respond to various crises as both a good steward of its own territory and as a good citizen of the world. If it does, then maybe it is time to reconsider what is meant by the phrase, "a good, workable little fleet" and ask ourselves, "What it is that we want the Canadian Navy to be able to do?"

In the present era token fleets only achieve token results.

Obviously, the navy cannot do everything because the costs would be too high. A compromise is needed. As in the past, the inherent flexibility of naval and maritime air forces needs to be exploited so that the overall fleet structure can undertake the maximum possible number of tasks. How big a fleet is that? This is a good question that can be debated for ever, but in the end the budget is the controlling factor. However, two things can be said with absolute safety; whatever size the fleet, it has to be good, and it has to be workable. In the present era token fleets only achieve token results.

Today the navy and its maritime air forces should exist in sufficient strength to carry out four tasks:

1. maintain a credible presence in all Canadian waters;
2. maintain the ability to deploy one destroyer, frigate or submarine with either a US Navy formation or the NATO Rapid Reaction Force;
3. deploy and sustain for a prolonged period a naval task group of ships, aircraft and submarines; and
4. provide support for joint operations.

The "good, workable little fleet" to meet these tasks is a carefully crafted mix of command ships, frigates, submarines, patrol vessels, support ships, helicopters and long-range patrol aircraft. The need to sustain those tasks for lengthy periods of time will determine the actual numbers. The balance between the requirements for the "home game" and the "away game" will be struck only when the decision is taken to actively patrol Canadian waters again.

The Invitation

Ninety-five years ago the Royal Canadian Navy was founded as a national security instrument amidst an intense debate on Imperial defence. Its purpose, some have argued, was to keep the fish in and the Americans out. The fish have largely gone, but the Americans have not! Perhaps the modern Canadian Navy should re-assume the traditional role of keeping the Americans out by becoming a visible symbol of Canada's commitment to effective stewardship of its own waters.

The purpose of the RCN, some have argued, was to keep the fish in and the Americans out. The fish have largely gone, but the Americans have not!

However, this should not be the only role for the Canadian Navy. It still remains the country's first and most effective response to international crises and it still has huge diplomatic value. This has been proven over and over again in the past 15 years. To surrender those capabilities would be very foolish. The problem lies, therefore, in finding the right balance of capabilities so that the navy can play both the "home" and "away" games effectively.

Today, the navy needs even greater flexibility and some new capabilities to allow it to continue to be the first response to crisis both at home and internationally. However, the recent announcements on the "new" defence policy seem to indicate a decline in both capability and flexibility. It seems as if Canada's Navy is about to verge on irrelevance: unable to be effective either at home or away from home. In such a condition it presents no political risk, being neither "good" nor "workable."

It seems as if Canada's Navy is about to verge on irrelevance: unable to be effective either at home or away from home.

As I said earlier, we have had official naval "visions" – the latest being *Leadmark* which is about to be updated – of the navy's appropriate roles. As it transpires, these "vision" documents have been remarkably prescient about the leading role the Canadian Navy has been asked to undertake from the first Gulf War to today's 'war on terror.' Good "vision" alone is not enough. Deeper political commitments are needed. Formal policy endorsement, bolstered by sound and predictable funding commitments, has been noticeably lacking. Perhaps it is true that we Canadians don't often think of ourselves as living in a maritime country and all that this entails. Maybe we should.

HMCS ***Charlottetown***

Canadian Task Group

Peter T. Haydon is the Editor-in-Chief of the ***Canadian Naval Review*** *and a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies.*

The Battle of the Atlantic

The Battle of the Atlantic (September 1939 – May 1945) was the longest campaign of the Second World War and arguably the most important. Canada was a major participant and its efforts were crucial to Allied victory.

Overview

As Marc Milner explained in *The Battle of the Atlantic*, "the Allies won the war in the Atlantic and did it in convincing style. They proved superior on all fronts, from sheer industrial production to intelligence, equipment, operational research, and command and control." But it wasn't easy and it took almost four years to reach the turning point at which Britain ceased to be a fortress under siege and became the assembly area for the liberation of Europe. It took until May 1943 for American, British and Canadian naval and maritime air forces to counter Admiral Dönitz's submarine wolf packs, and it would take another two years to defeat them. The Allied strategy always envisaged a two-phased attack on Germany, but it all hinged on countering the U-boats and then keeping them under control. As the statistics show, winning the Battle of the Atlantic was a team effort. In the end, the dogged determination of Allied sailors and airmen, North American industrial capacity, and the efforts of the many scientists and mathematicians who broke the German codes and invented new weapons made it all possible.

The Canadian Role

When the Second World War began, the RCN consisted of six destroyers and seven smaller ships. This small fleet was operated and supported by 1,990 officers and men, and an equal number in the Naval Reserve. At first, the small fleet could do little more than patrol the coast. A modest naval expansion in 1940 saw new ships ordered, but the rush to put those ships to sea made heavy demands on training. The fall of Europe in 1940 saw the RCN more deeply committed to the convoys to Britain.



When the Germans began using U-boat wolf packs to attack convoys in the mid-Atlantic Canada undertook the difficult task of providing convoy escort between Newfoundland and Britain. Small ships designed for coastal waters, with some crews unqualified even for that duty, had to face determined enemy attacks under terrible weather conditions. The men and ships were being pushed beyond their limits. The success rate against the U-boats was not encouraging.

Early in 1943, Britain withdrew the battered Canadian mid-ocean escort groups to allow the better-equipped Royal Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) groups to deal with the wolf packs. This succeeded and the submarines themselves were withdrawn from the mid-Atlantic. Although this was a turning point in the war, Germany still had over 200 U-boats available, and with new equipment and tactics they continued to attack Allied shipping.

With the major Allied push to build up supplies in Britain for the invasion of Normandy, the RCN played a major role in escorting convoys to Britain. It also made a major contribution to the actual invasion. Although the U-boats had little success against the invasion fleet they continued to attack shipping in British and Canadian coastal waters. Thus, the Canadian fleet was continuously and heavily engaged in Canadian and Newfoundland home waters, as well as in protecting the strategically-important transatlantic convoys. This was an essential military contribution to the Allied cause.

(Source: Roger Sarty, "The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945", War Museum of Canada Dispatches)
Photos, clockwise from upper left: a depth charge attack; convoy leaving Halifax in February 1941; U-889 on surrendering to the RCN; a Canadian sailor; anti-aircraft gun; HMCS ***Fredericton***

The Statistics

The numbers from both side of the Battle of the Atlantic remain controversial and, in some ways incomplete. Despite the controversial nature of the numbers, some general statistics are useful because they illustrate the intensity of the Battle. Over the course of the war, about 630 U-boats were lost at sea to Allied action, of these 42% were sunk by ships, 40% by aircraft and 6% by combined action. The Allies managed to capture three. Another 120 were lost through bombing or from mines. 215 U-boats were scuttled at the end of the war and 153 were surrendered. Germany built over 1,000 U-boats during the war and lost 764 through Allied action. In contrast, the Allies lost some 2,750 merchant ships and around 40,000 seamen. In winning the battle, the Allies lost about 175 warships of all types. The RCN lost 24 warships during the war – 14 were sunk by U-boats – and about 2,000 members of the RCN died, almost all of them in the Battle of the Atlantic. Against this, the RCN sank or shared in the destruction of 31 U-boats and escorted some 25,000 merchant ships. By the end of the war, the RCN had expanded to include some 270 ships and nearly 100,000 men and women, and had made a significant contribution to the Allied war effort.



The U-Boats

Germany started the war with only 45 operational U-boats. Another 9 were being built. Of the operational U-boats, 29 were the longer-range types VII and IX, the others were smaller coastal submarines used in the North and Baltic Seas. Until the final hunt and destruction of the *Bismarck* in May 1941, surface raiders actually posed the greater threat, but they rarely engaged Canadian forces. Admiral Dönitz's strategy was to disrupt Allied shipping and prevent the Americans from crossing the Atlantic. This was easier said than done, for although the Allied navies had neglected ASW during the inter-war period, they quickly gained proficiency. At first the U-boats operated independently against the convoys, switching in 1941 to the wolf packs with greater success. Concerted Allied efforts, helped by new equipment and tactics as well as gaining the tactical advantage from breaking German signal codes, eventually turned the tide. Increasing numbers of long-range U-boats allowed the war against shipping to be waged in North American waters with considerable freedom until the Americans eventually started effective hunter-killer ASW operations. But the U-boats still roamed Canadian and Newfoundland waters through much of 1942, destroying over 70 vessels, including 21 in the Gulf of St Lawrence. The focal point of U-boat operations remained the Atlantic, especially when the Allies started to build up forces in Britain. By mid-1943, Allied technology, perseverance and industrial might began to prevail and shipping losses declined. The Allies were building merchant ships faster than the Germans could sink them and at the same time Allied sea-air cooperation began taking a heavy toll on the U-boats. German industry could not keep pace with the losses. In the end, the U-boats lost the industrial battle and thus the Battle of the Atlantic.

(Sources: Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Naval War and http://www.u-boat.net)

Starting Over: The Canadian Navy and Expeditionary Warfare

Commander Kenneth P. Hansen

The Netherlands Navy's new Air Defence and Command Frigate ***De Zeven Provincien***
Photo credit Jane's Information Group

Daily revelations in the news seem to indicate that the impending Defence Review will result in the creation of a joint expeditionary capability. Such a fundamental shift in rationale could provoke changes in the force structure of the Canadian Navy.

Current Canadian naval capabilities were designed to satisfy the demands of a very different set of defence requirements from those that exist today.

Current Canadian naval capabilities were designed to satisfy the demands of a very different set of defence requirements from those that exist today. To do a proper job of assessing Canadian maritime defence requirements in the new geo-strategic security environment, it is necessary to start over; to go back to first principles and see what capabilities a top-down assessment produces. Fortunately, naval theory is sufficiently well developed to give an indication of the demands that the new policy will make on Canadian naval force structure and Canadian naval history has been adequately documented to indicate what requirements dictated the current fleet. A simple comparison of the new theoretical construct with the current force structure will indicate whether the navy is 'on track' or 'standing into danger.'

Ken Booth's classic triangle shows the three main functional areas of naval activity. The demands of the Cold War, combined with fleet-wide obsolescence, resulted in the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) program and Tribal Update and Modernization Program (TRUMP). The driving force behind both programs was Canadian participation in the US Maritime Strategy, adopted by NATO, which prescribed offensive naval operations inside the high threat environment bounded by the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. Gap. To mitigate costs and enhance performance, several difficult choices were made. Specialization in the escort task, a historical legacy from the RCN, along with improved abilities in screening and patrolling, was chosen as the basis for planning. As long as the geo-political environment was stable, the planning assumptions remained valid and the tradeoffs did not present an insurmountable problem. As we know so well, those days are over.

The TRUMP and CPF programs produced ships that function very well in one or two specialized segments

Figure 1. The Functions of the Navy



Diplomatic Role

i) Preventative Deployments
ii) Coercion
iii) Maritime Interception
iv) Peace Support
v) Non-Combatant Evacuations
vi) Civil-Military Cooperation
vii) Symbolic Use
viii) Presence
ix) Humanitarian Assistance
x) Confidence Building
xi) Track Two Diplomacy

Constabulary Role

i) Sovereignty Patrols
ii) Aid of the Civil Power
iii) Support to OGDs
iv) Search & Rescue
v) Disaster Relief
vi) Oceans Management

Military Role

i) Command of the Sea
ii) Sea Control
iii) Sea Denial
iv) Battlespace Dominance
v) Fleet in Being
vi) Maritime Power Projection
vii) Maritime Manoeuvre

of Booth's military functional area, but give up essential capabilities that would have enhanced their wider military relevance. Especially noteworthy was an abandoned naval fire support capability, vital for many functions in the military role. As well, seaworthy and blessed with high endurance, the frigates are ideal for open-ocean operations but are too large and expensive to operate efficiently in constabulary tasks. To complicate matters, the *Kingston*-class coastal defence vessels have proven to be too slow, small and simply equipped to act as adequate stand-ins. The same limitations also make the destroyers, frigates and coastal defence vessels impractical for maritime interception operations, the diplomatic equivalent of sovereignty patrols in the constabulary role.

Beyond this, the *Iroquois*-class destroyers and *Halifax*-class frigates, obvious hybrids and built on a tight budget, lack the hosting facilities and sheer naval impressiveness to function well in the diplomatic role. A frigate's commander is too junior in rank to compel much notice from foreign navies – only the deployment of a major warship or group of warships rates high-level recognition.

The move to joint expeditionary operations will emphasize further the size deficiencies of Canadian warships. Traditionally, the role of any navy in power projection and manoeuvre warfare is to provide transportation for its sister services, to protect them en route, and to support them in the theatre of operations with firepower, logistics and administrative services. High endurance, seaworthiness and underway replenishment are critical capabilities for creating reach. Responsiveness and reasonable speed during transit are important to ensure timely arrival. Once in the theatre, the naval force will conduct a myriad of tasks, ranging from simple coordination activities to delivering fire support.

Canadian naval experiences during the Second World War and in Korea showed that the close inshore environment is complex and dangerous.

Canadian naval experiences during the Second World War and in Korea showed that the close inshore environment is complex and dangerous. The disastrous amphibious raid on Dieppe underscored the hazards of relying completely on the armed forces of other states for essential support services in a combined operation. The experience of HMCS *Athabaskan*, commanded by Commander R.P. Welland, illustrated the diversity of tasks associated with expeditionary warfare in the littoral zone. In a single patrol *Athabaskan* coordinated landing with Republic of Korea forces, sent parties of her own sailors ashore, bombarded North Korean positions, illuminated night operations with 'Starshell' (night illumination

ordnance), intercepted junks and other small craft, destroyed a radio station with demolitions, and gave medical treatment to both military and civilian casualties.

In his recent book *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, Milan Vego showed that, far from emphasizing the extreme case of amphibious assault against defended beachheads, traditional naval support roles in expeditionary warfare most commonly involve cover, administrative support and supply operations.[1] These are not departures from history. Rather, they are the usual, but nonetheless essential, roles of naval forces in expeditionary warfare.

Historically, the vessels employed in long-range, expeditionary operations shared a number of common characteristics with vessels used on constabulary patrol and sovereignty protection tasks. High endurance warships existed in a number of different forms, dating back to the Victorian era. Sloops, frigates, cruisers (second-class protected and, later, heavy cruisers) and battle cruisers were all designed and equipped to conduct independent and cooperative operations at long ranges from supporting bases. They were all good sea keepers, had enhanced habitability features, and were extremely well-armed, durable warships. In addition, they carried large numbers of boats of different types and were able to accommodate small parties that were equipped for military operations ashore. Large versions of these ships would routinely conduct underway replenishments with smaller examples of the type.

Domestic patrol vessels, sometimes referred to as cutters or patrol boats, were also high endurance vessels with good sea keeping characteristics and enhanced habitability facilities, including quarters for inspection teams. They also had boats for boarding and landing work. Some later versions were capable of carrying aircraft. In the American context, US Coast Guard cutters were designed for use in naval roles during 'emergency situations.'

The deliberations of the US Navy's General Board in the 1930s paid particular attention to the naval roles of cutters and extensive lists of tasks and supporting employment in all naval roles were enumerated. Among those many naval capabilities considered important was the ability to embark additional armament, including howitzers, for inshore use in support of joint operations. The General Board endorsed a warship of approximately 2,000 tons that emphasized habitability, ruggedness for withstanding the sustained use of high speed in bad weather, and sea kindliness to ensure steadiness as a gun platform. Speed was intentionally traded off by employing simple propulsion systems that saved space and weight for more bunkerage capacity. USCG cutters were built frugally without sacrificing essential characteristics, which were regarded as reliability, sea worthiness and handiness in close quarters. These capabilities have modern-day parallels and should merit consideration in future fleet composition studies.

Modern trends in maritime traffic density, weapon technology and the development of asymmetric threats all indicate that the littoral zone has broadened and now includes several sub-zones, each with unique challenges and dangers.

Modern trends in maritime traffic density, weapon technology and the development of asymmetric threats all indicate that the littoral zone has broadened and now includes several sub-zones, each with unique challenges and dangers. Wayne Hughes, in his seminal work *Fleet Tactics*, argued, "littoral waters will be the arena of modern fleet actions."[2] He is convinced that the coastal environment will create conditions that will impede scouting efforts and provide opportunities for short-range surprise attacks. In his view, all ships and aircraft employed in the littoral zone will be proportionately more at risk than in home waters or on the open ocean.[3] To compensate for these conditions, he advocates for enhanced scouting abilities, improved command and control systems, and increased weapon ranges. By extension, these same environmental problems can be inferred for inshore naval operations against irregular forces and non-state terrorists.

The types of operations undertaken historically by unconventional forces in attacks on naval forces involve stealth and a suicidal willingness to press an attack to point-blank range. Stealth, by use of camouflage or ruse, tends to act as an anti-scouting measure, reducing the effectiveness of scouting units and own-force command and control systems. Hyper-aggressiveness in the attack will reduce the range advantage of superior weaponry. To compensate for these factors, a larger number of smaller platforms, employing a distributed array of sen-

*The Royal Navy's new **River**-class Offshore Patrol Vessels*
Photo credit Jane's Information Group

sors, are required to counteract the 'all the eggs in one basket' vulnerability of major warships. In addition, defensive firepower must be vastly superior to counteract any enemy advantage in quick-reaction, short-range littoral combat.

A fleet structure optimised for joint expeditionary warfare should be based on two principal types of warships. First, a few large warships should be optimised for the long-range delivery of offensive precision-effects firepower and force area defence. They need not be designed for stealth, as they should be the visible symbols of national maritime power and will operate in essentially open-ocean areas, relatively remote from the dangers of the littoral zone. These large power-projection ships should employ manned aircraft and be capable of accommodating a small contingent of troops equipped for landing operations or boardings. They should also be able to conduct 'top-up' replenishments of other ships of their own size or smaller ones.

The second type of warship should be a simpler, smaller, more manoeuvrable vessel. It must be able to provide relatively short-range, direct fire support to land operations. Due to its use in hazardous environs, it should make optimum use of stealth technology and must be equipped with large numbers of rapid-fire, close-range defensive weapons that are capable of quickly generating devastating stopping power in any quadrant around the ship. The small warship must also be able to accommodate a small landing party for special operations ashore or for inspection visits to vessels. Logic dictates that it also be able to operate remotely piloted vehicles, including undersea surveillance and mine-hunting devices.

Both the large and small warship should be amply endowed with a variety of boats, each of which can be armed. These boats must be able to undertake a wide variety of inspection, patrol, picket, landing and administrative support duties. A number of the weapon, sensor and boat capabilities in the small warship can be modular in nature, allowing the ship to be adapted for different roles in both the expeditionary and constabulary functions. In both roles, the small ship must be both seaworthy and sea kindly, possess high endurance, and be able to integrate into a completely networked system of communications and sensors. In combination, these features would also make the smaller warship ideal for constabulary surveillance duties and training tasks in home waters, while the larger ship would be best used for diplomatic 'flag showing' visits that could involve foreign training cruises.

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Canadian 5,000- to 6,000-tonne warships are too large, too poorly armed and too unwieldy to venture close inshore for joint support tasks. Yet, Canadian destroyers and frigates have neither the sensors nor the weapons to function effectively from further offshore. The object in expeditionary warfare is to establish an extended network of sensors and vehicles, both manned and unmanned, to provide surveillance of the littoral zone and ensure responsiveness to any need. For navies, the networked command, communication, intelligence and reconnaissance system is the traditional and most effective method of countering both symmetric and asymmetric threats. It will be necessary to push this network of sensor platforms as far inshore and even over the shoreline to attain the necessary situational awareness to cope with either challenging conventional threats or secretive asymmetric ones.

Naval command and control in the littoral zone is the most demanding task in joint warfare.

Naval command and control in the littoral zone is the most demanding task in joint warfare. Advanced sensors, highly reliable communications, sophisticated information processing systems, and precision weapon systems are needed to assure the safety, coordination and effec-

tiveness of joint operations. These can only be accommodated in a major warship that must not be hazarded by unnecessary inshore excursions. Moreover, the area of naval control must extend all the way to the shoreline and, to exercise this requirement, they must be highly manoeuvrable and, quite frankly, expendable small warships are needed to venture boldly wherever the need arises.

Recent developments in other navies have shown how radical force restructuring is underway to reshape fleets and add new capabilities for expeditionary warfare. Interestingly, these developments also show signs that domestic constabulary capabilities have not been forgotten in the rush to transformational change. The Royal Netherlands Navy will cut the size of its fleet and manpower roughly in half in order to achieve its force-restructuring plan. Four power projection warships of over 6,000 tons, called frigates, will replace former destroyers while a number of new, smaller 3,000-ton warships, also called a frigates, will tackle the inshore expeditionary and domestic constabulary roles. As another example, the Royal Navy's 1,700-ton *River*-class offshore patrol vessels are being modernized with a flight deck capable of receiving small and medium helicopters plus accommodations for Special Forces landing teams, both for use in expeditionary operations. These improvements will also enhance the effectiveness of the *River*-class in their primary constabulary role.

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The Canadian fleet now finds itself in an awkward no-man's-land, composed of warships too small to accommodate the staff, sensors and weapons needed to perform effectively in the outer littoral zone but too large to be risked in the inner littoral zone. If a major Canadian contingent is to be transported for an expeditionary operation, simple geophysical facts will dictate that it most often will travel by sea. To protect it adequately, both while en route and at its destination, and to support it with the necessary services that only naval forces can provide, the force structure of the Canadian Navy will need to be diversified. Vego recommends that a blue-water navy operating in restricted waters should not use surface combatants larger than 2,000 tons.[4]

During testimony by Dr. Richard Gimblett before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence on 21 February 2005, the Chairman revealed that the Committee is interested in seeing constabulary duties assigned to the navy and recommending the acquisition of cutters for that role. The record of proceedings shows that the Chairman felt the Chief of Maritime Staff had a "lack of enthusiasm for the idea" and "expressed his concern." If his hesitancy is related to a perceived lack of credibility of small warships in expeditionary warfare, naval history and warfare theory both show that many tasks in the inner littoral zone can only be undertaken by small warships. Clearly, a move to expeditionary warfare cannot be accompanied by a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to fleet planning.

The safe assumptions of the past are gone and the price being paid for naval specialization is manifesting itself daily. The new joint expeditionary environment will require a very few large warships to ensure that Canadian authority commands and protects the expeditionary force. A relatively large number of small warships, both surface and subsurface, are required to extend the networked array of naval sensors and weapons about the joint force. This force structure will actually serve Canadian national sovereignty requirements better and at less cost than the current fleet of medium-sized warships and undersized patrol craft. It's time to start over with a new fleet plan; one that provides the flexibility and capability needed to meet the daunting challenges of today and the future.

Commander Kenneth P. Hansen is the Military Co-Chair of the Maritime Studies Programme at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

Disclaimer: The views presented in this paper are attributable solely of the author and are not to be construed in any way as declarations of policy by the government of Canada, the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces, the Canadian Forces College, or any member of the Canadian Forces other than the author.

Notes

1. Milan Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 269.
2. Wayne Hughes, *Fleet Tactics* (Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2000), p. 164.
3. See Ibid., p 292.
4. Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, p. 297.

Making Waves

On the Navy's Role
Gary L. Garnett

The first edition of the *Canadian Naval Review* gives rise to many questions concerning the future of the Canadian Navy. The Navy League of Canada was founded in 1895 as a lobby group for the establishment of the Canadian Navy, which finally occurred in 1910. One hundred and 20 years later are we about to debate the demise of the navy as an effective instrument of foreign and defence policy? Of course to have a debate it is assumed that the government of the day will make public its Defence Policy Review (DPR) that has been under study in one form or another since the turn of the millennium over five years ago.

After 9/11 the overwhelming demand for national security has demanded a sea change in thinking for all elements of the Canadian Forces in relation to their unique capability and first priority for the defence of Canada and all Canadians. Whether they understood this change and allocated more resources to the new reality is open to question. However, some three years later when the government published the very first Canadian National Security Policy in April 2004, the navy was provided with some definition of its role in the maritime security of this country. In early 2005, some considerable time after the newly elected Prime Minister in June 2004 promised the unveiling of the new Foreign and Defence Policy Reviews, it would seem that at the last moment there is to be a bold and dramatic change for the fundamental direction of the expeditionary role of the Canadian Forces.

In the realm of domestic security it is clear that the government has assigned the role of "coordination of on-water response" to the Admirals on each coast. Exactly how the similar task is to be coordinated on the St Lawrence and the Great Lakes and in the Arctic is less clear. As an enabler, the Coastal Admirals are to be provided with new Maritime Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) where the six key departments involved in maritime and port security will be present with full-time watch keepers who will be the conduit for bringing proprietary information from their parent departments to enable a full understanding of any situation and the coordination of the response. Many questions related to crisis management and decision making exist, but the MSOCs are up and running and in due course the standard operation procedures will be resolved. The navy was also provided additional funding to increase its on-water presence off the coasts. It is assumed that any defence policy review will further elucidate the role of the navy in the maritime security arena. Issues like the relationship with NORAD and/or Northern Command on the question of overall North American perimeter domain awareness and situational management, increased Arctic presence, additional interdepartmental on-water vessel coordination and management, and some sense of resource allocation to affect the priority of maritime security will hopefully all be dealt with.

Since his appointment, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, has been speaking publicly about the new joint expeditionary role for the Canadian Forces in relation to "Failed or Failing States." A new high readiness task force, notionally called "Task Force Maple Leaf," is to be trained and ready to deploy rapidly as an entity in response to government tasking. Although not clear, the role of the navy in this task force will most likely be to provide some sort of transport for much of the land and possibly some of the air elements of the task force. This will be effected by the new Joint Support Ship (JSS) or by a more expensive and more capable amphibious ship. The latter, if acquired, will not satisfy the requirement for replacements for the fleet support ships (AORs) which JSS will do.

As the task force will deploy by sea it is clear, to those of us with a maritime background, that it will also require escorts with an embarked air capability to provide for its defence and ability to exercise its rights at sea. The formation will require command and control and replenishment. The command and control may be provided by some sort of Joint Command structure including its requisite component commanders or it might be by more traditional naval structure. This appears to me to be carrying the traditional Canadian Task Group to a new level to embrace all three environments (and possibly Special Forces) of the Canadian Forces into an integrated and joint maritime force structure that has notionally been called "Task Force Maple Leaf" in the media.

The other important roles of the navy will no doubt receive clarification in the DPR. The single frigate or destroyer deployments are in reality a tool for coalition interoperability and professional high-readiness training and, I would suggest, will receive support on that basis alone. It would be my expectation that the Canadian Task Group will need to be maintained in one form or another to provide the maritime component of "Task Force Maple Leaf."

The Navy League of Canada heartily welcomes the birth of the *Canadian Naval Review* and wishes to compliment the editorial team. Let the debate begin!

Frigates alongside in the Halifax Dockyard

Don't Forget the Asia-Pacific Aspect

J.A. Boutilier

Peter Haydon's article is, indeed, a splendid "shot across the bow" – one desperately needed at a time when dismay about the future of the Canadian Navy has begun to manifest itself in some quarters. His analysis highlights a number of dualities and the tensions inherent in them. Two examples will suffice: the tension between utilization and ignorance; and the tension between home and away games.

Successive Canadian governments have been quick to call upon the navy to respond to domestic and international crises. And it can be argued compellingly that no other service is as capable as the navy at responding in a prompt and effective manner. Thus, while politicians seem to realize at an unconscious level how versatile the navy is as an instrument of statecraft, they have relatively little understanding of the true nature of sea power. This fact has given rise to a good deal of hand-wringing among navalists over the years. How, they query, can we ever educate governments about the mobile and nuanced nature of naval might? This is a perennial problem, made that much more piquant by endless political declarations about Canada as a "three ocean" country.

The question of the 'home' and 'away' games has garnered a good deal of attention lately. Those games existed during the Cold War, as Haydon has pointed out, but there was not a great deal of difference between hunting Russian submarines in the approaches to Halifax Harbour and hunting them in Arctic seas. Now, however, the demands of domestic defence are, arguably, quite different from those of expeditionary deployments. That said, we may be dealing with a false dichotomy here. It is not a question of either/or but of both; particularly at a time when we can no longer afford the luxury of arguing, naively, that our national interests end at the water's edge. What we do abroad may very well ensure our security at home. Even if it does not, what we do abroad provides us with critical international currency that translates into security credits in the long term.

So far, so good, but I would challenge Haydon on two points. Yes, the budget does determine what the navy has and does, but the budget, self-evidently, is only an expression of political will. History reveals that Canada is capable of spending much more on defence than it does while continuing to function smoothly. Furthermore, there is a growing body of opinion that Canada is in a muddle. That having voluntarily marginalized itself over the past 30 years, the country has lost its way. These same proponents would point to Ottawa's failure to appreciate that effective military power confers political leverage in an array of non-military realms, particularly with the United States. Thus, more than ever, vision, realism and political will are at a premium.

My other concern is that Haydon's editorial refers only once, *en passant*, to the Pacific Ocean. In his defence, one could say that he has pitched his analysis at a different level; that specific theatres of operations are secondary to the larger question of how a state determines the size and employment of its navy. Nonetheless, we cannot afford to overlook the Pacific.

As we speak, the world's centre of economic and geostrategic gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. After more than five centuries, Europe no longer sets the global agenda. Instead, we must look to the Indo-Pacific region as the source of trend-setting events. This is a transition of truly historic proportions. China is central to this phenomenon. A country with a Gross Domestic Product the size of California is already able to bend world commodity markets out of shape.

But what does all this mean from a naval perspective? To begin with, this is a profoundly maritime age. Globalization has generated massive amounts of maritime traffic, no more so than in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Furthermore, throughout the region national centres of gravity are moving from the land to the sea, a migration that is reflected in the unprecedented growth in and operational tempo of regional navies. Those accustomed to the Atlantic fail, all too frequently, to appreciate how vast, geographically complex, politically contentious, and increasingly dangerous (as a consequence of piracy and maritime terrorism) the Pacific Ocean really is. The Atlantic, by way of comparison is small, empty and not contentious. But the Atlantic has NATO and the Pacific does not. This institutional deficit results in conceptual confusion and encourages policy makers to disregard the military opportunities afforded by Asia.

The Pacific is the quintessential ocean and if Canada is to engage the countries of the region there is no more flexible instrument for doing so than the navy. And, indeed, the navy has already been deeply engaged in Asia – for example, peacekeeping in East Timor, maritime operations with US carrier battle groups in the Arabian Sea, and naval diplomacy throughout Asia over the past 15 years. Nevertheless, Canada still seems uncertain where it wants to go in the Indo-Pacific region. There is an unspoken assumption that naval diplomacy is all well and good but shows few rewards. That view, however, is short-sighted and fails to take into account the power of symbolism in Asian societies, the need to build relationships, consistently and persistently (as early steps toward multilateral naval activities), and the fact that militaries are much more influential in Asia than in Canada.

And so we need new paradigms. Asia is no longer an option for Canada, it is the new imperative. Our good little workable fleet will need to grow in size and capability if Canada is ever to advance its interests there through a carefully orchestrated application of diplomacy, trade and naval power.

The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author, and do not reflect the official policy of Canada's Department of National Defence.

A Modest Proposal

John Orr

For most Canadians, there is a tendency to think of the Battle of the Atlantic in terms of a salt-caked corvette climbing wearily to the crest of yet another wave as a convoy in the background sails relentlessly onward. And yet, in reality, it is much more.

In his editorial, Peter Haydon reminds us that the Battle of the Atlantic was a seminal event in the development of the Royal Canadian Navy. I would go further and maintain that the Battle of the Atlantic has had an influence on Canada matched only by that of the Battle of Vimy Ridge. Consider the following. First, apart from the shelling of Estevan Point by a Japanese submarine, the Battle of the Atlantic was the only Second World War campaign

that directly touched Canada's shores, particularly during the U-boat campaign in the Gulf of St Lawrence in the summer of 1942.

Second, the direct military and para-military manpower bill to counter the U-boat threat was substantial. Not only did this include the expansion of the RCN beyond the most ambitious plans of the Naval Staff (and the Prime Minister of the day), it also included a similar and often overlooked effort on the part of the Canadian Merchant Navy. Additionally, the Royal Canadian Air Force made a remarkable effort to man, equip, train and command maritime air forces both in Canada and overseas. Finally, the coastal artillery establishment of the Canadian Army was expanded greatly, especially on the East Coast.

Third, on the industrial front, because of the battle the Canadian shipbuilding industry launched a major effort to meet Allied naval and merchant requirements. Furthermore, Canada's emerging defence-scientific community received an immense boost as it attempted to grapple with the problems associated with anti-submarine warfare, albeit with mixed results.

Fourth, at the political-military level, the Battle of the Atlantic was the only campaign in which a Canadian officer assumed an operational-level command.

And, finally, Canada's involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic led to efforts being taken to provide for the direct defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, then under British administration. This set in train a series of political events that eventually resulted in the entry of Newfoundland and Labrador into Canadian Confederation in 1949.

Through the efforts of modern naval historians such as Alex Douglas, Marc Milner and Roger Sarty, to name only a few, the story of the Battle of the Atlantic is being told to Canadian audiences in Canadian voices. This is admirable but it is not enough.

To get the message out to a larger audience, it is proposed that a Battle of the Atlantic Centre be established to tell the story, not only in terms of the contribution of the Canadian Navy but in all its various aspects. Clearly, many details need to be worked out but it is long past time to "Make it so!" and acknowledge the significance of the Battle of the Atlantic to Canada and Canadians.

Building the New Warships

Peter W. Cairns

While it is encouraging that new warships are actually being discussed in government and in journals such as the *Canadian Naval Review*, talk alone will not solve the problem of how to physically replace Canada's aging warships and Coast Guard vessels.

Some argue that it is not necessary to build our warships in Canada, proposing instead to build them far more cheaply offshore, perhaps in Asia. From just the cost perspective this might make sense, but what is the real cost to the Canadian economy? As I have argued before, building offshore represents a security concern that we cannot afford to take. Do we really wish to put the supply of the tools required for our maritime defence in the hands of a foreign country such as China? I believe that would be foolhardy. I agree that we have done this with our air defence but with countries that are our NATO partners. Those countries that provide our aircraft cannot build our ships any better or cheaper than we do ourselves. So why should we let them?

There are also those who believe we should build the hulls offshore and then outfit them in Canada. Again, I do not consider this a reasonable solution. A decision along this line would relegate Canada's shipyards to repair and refit only. The ability to both build and repair is required for a small viable shipbuilding industry to survive in Canada. It is the building of new and exciting vessels that attracts bright young people to the industry. Without a building component the repair component is unlikely to survive.

It seems to me that it is strategically shortsighted to operate any government fleet in Canada without some sort of a shipbuilding industry. So what are the options?

It may be realistic to start up a shipyard again given a good government contract provided there is some continuity to the process. This to me, means some sort of a regular building program that is core to that shipyard's existence. Given that core competency it can then leverage its skill sets into other market opportunities.

I believe it is consistent with modern shipbuilding techniques to build modules anywhere and outfit them in Canadian shipyards. A case in point are the two floating production, storage and offshore loading platforms (FPSOs) outfitted in Bull Arm, Newfoundland, for the offshore oil and gas industry. In these cases the hulls and machinery were built in South Korea, the turrets in the Middle East, and the topside modules in Canada and other parts of Europe.

Having said that it is feasible, I do not believe that it is good for the Canadian shipbuilding industry. As I said before, one of our most significant problems is to attract bright, young engineers and technicians to the industry. The industry believes that it cannot do that by repair and outfitting alone, particularly as a significant amount of outfitting tends to be done by the original equipment manufacturers.

More importantly, it seems to me, we should be bringing the resources of Canada's shipyards to major projects not in competition but in accordance with a strategic plan that is designed to maintain and build on their expertise by constructing various types of modules across the country. As an example, the United States has made the decision to keep two submarine building yards alive but they are only producing one submarine at a time. To keep them both going they have devised a plan whereby one yard becomes expert in building certain submarine modules such as the bows, control rooms etc., while the other yard does the same with the other sections. One yard is designated prime and the modules are put together in the prime's yard. When that submarine is completed and when the next one begun, the other yard is then designated as prime so that they keep their expertise up in project management also.

Although our government is paranoid about competition, it could bite the bullet and designate centres of excellence to build Canada's naval and Coast Guard ships. Given that we only have a few yards now that can do any major naval shipbuilding work, it may be time to reconsider this option. I have said it before and I will say it again, it is strategically shortsighted to operate any government fleet in Canada without some sort of a national shipbuilding industry.

HMS Albion and the British Amphibious Task Group

Douglas S. Thomas

HMS *Albion*, a modern amphibious vessel visited Halifax for the first time in January 2005, as part of a six-week deployment to Eastern Canada. This port visit was part of a series of first-of-class cold weather trials, and I was fortunate to be given a tour of this extraordinary new vessel. I am happy to say that the Canadian North Atlantic winter provided excellent support services for *Albion*'s trial – delivering several blizzards, an impressive wind-chill, and a great deal of snow and ice. I hope our efforts were appreciated!

Albion (and her sister-ship HMS *Bulwark*, to be commissioned in June) represents a powerful contribution to the Royal Navy's Amphibious Task Force. Other vessels comprising this force include the Landing Platform, Helicopter (LPH) HMS *Ocean*, the new civilian-manned Landing Ships, Dock (LSDs) of the *Largs Bay*-class, and one or more of the *Invincible*-class configured as Commando Carriers. There are also several members of the *Sir Lancelot*-class Landing Ship, Logistic (LSL) still in service until all of the *Largs Bay*-class ships are completed.

The two new LPDs were built for a total of £750 million, including 10 Landing Craft, Utility (LCU) capable of carrying a 70-tonne Main Battle Tank, and Landing Craft, Vehicles and Personnel (LCVP) able to transport troops, small vehicles and materiel at 24 knots, self-defence weapons, and modern command and control capabilities. They are the first large electrically propelled ships in the Royal Navy. Their wood-lined stern docks provide a safe harbour for landing craft, including American LCAC air cushion vessels, permitting loading and off-loading operations in Sea State 2. The complement is 325, with a military lift of 305 troops or a short-term overload of 710 troops. These ships can also embark 67 support vehicles, 4 LCU Mk 10 or 2 LCAC in the dock, and 4 LCVP Mk 5 deployed from davits. There are two landing spots for medium- or heavy-lift helicopters.

The *Albion*-class LPD has been mentioned recently in the media as a good design for the Canadian Forces: a vessel that could deploy with, and support, a landing force of troops and their equipment. Indeed, such a vessel would

provide a very useful capability in a broad range of combat, peace support, and disaster relief and humanitarian assistance roles. One shortfall in the design from a Canadian perspective is the lack of a covered hangar, essential for operations in northern waters. Apparently the original design did include a helicopter hangar and more internal sealift capacity, but it was pared down to meet budgetary constraints. Substantial command and control facilities are included within a large combined operation room. The configuration is similar to the previous *Fearless*-class amphibious ships, with a well dock and stern gate but there is also side ramp access to expedite loading/unloading where port facilities permit.

HMS *Albion* is an impressive ship. If Canada was to procure similar vessels they would certainly be welcome additions to any sea-borne coalition operation. However, if we are looking at amphibious vessels, perhaps we should broaden our search and consider other possibilities.

HMS ***Albion***

It seems likely that the Canadian program to build three Joint Support Ships (JSS), designed to replace the fleet replenishment vessels (AORs) *Provider*, *Protecteur* and *Preserver* and also provide a considerable sealift capability, will proceed and that specialist amphibious vessels may be acquired in addition to JSS. If amphibious vessels should replace the JSS program, then it would be necessary also to procure tankers for fleet replenishment and support.

It is interesting to note that the Royal Australian Navy has been down a similar lengthy road in staffing a combined Amphibious and Fleet Support Ship, and has decided instead to procure tankers for replenishment and two specialist LHDs for amphibious operations. These are "flat-top" ships of about 25,000 tonnes, with large internal volume for vehicles of all types, considerable troop accommodation and support facilities, able to operate a broad spectrum of helicopters, and equipped with a well dock as in the LPD. The selection of vessel is apparently between Spanish or French designs, both currently under construction for those navies.

These vessels, being built for two of our NATO allies, are incredibly flexible in capability and similar vessels for Canada make a lot of sense. I will throw out a revolutionary idea: why not "piggyback" on the Australian program, and achieve some economies of scale and interoperability rather than, once again, attempt to re-invent the wheel?

The Convoy Bell

In this, the Year of the Veteran, the Trustees of HMCS *Sackville* in Halifax will join other members of the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust on a trip to Londonderry, Northern Ireland, in early May to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic. Forty trustees from the HMCS *Sackville Trust* will present the City of Londonderry with an antique ship's bell engraved with the dates of the convoys in which hundreds of ships landed in Ireland after leaving Halifax and St. John's, Newfoundland. The Nova Scotia government is also providing a commemorative crystal bowl to be presented along with the bell. In the photo, one of the Trustees, Wendell Brown, examines the antique bell aboard *Sackville*. The corvette is the last of its kind and is owned by the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust.

Let's be Realistic about the Budget

Sharon Hobson

Does General Rick Hillier really believe the government's budget promises, or is he simply trying to boost the morale of his troops? A look at previous defence budgets and political promises should surely warn him against believing that this government is going to add $12.8 billion to the country's $13.5 billion defence budget over the next 5 years.

First of all, no one really expects this government still to be around in two or three years, so it won't have to honour its promises. By then it will have called an election and have been re-elected – I have little doubt about this because this is Canada and we Canadians have an unquestioning Liberal bent, plus the Conservative Party is hardly making a positive impression on the electorate these days. After the election the government can say, as governments always do when they want to renege on their promises, "priorities have changed."

Second, does anyone really think the government will increase defence spending by 19% in 2008-09? Because that's what the Liberal plan calls for. Finance Minister Ralph Goodale's year-by-year budget figures show that in 2008-09 the government intends to add $2.908 billion to the previous year's defence budget of $15.058 billion. Who believes that? This year the increase is less than 4%. For 2006-07 and 2007-08, the increase will be 7%. The same for 2009-10. Now an increase of 7% already stretches our credulity, given that for the previous 5 years, the increase averaged 4.1%. But 19%? Even the optimists amongst us surely aren't buying that.

Third, even the promised increases aren't what they seem. The $500 million promised for this year shrinks to $322 million once the government takes back $178 million as part of its multi-year plan to fund "higher priorities." Next year, DND will have to give back even more money, so that the $600 million promise becomes $328 million in actuality. And so it goes. The government has always viewed DND as a handy source of funds to be assigned to other, non-military, priorities as needs arise. There's nothing to suggest that this will change in the future.

Fourth, General Hillier has said he considers the $12.8 billion a solid commitment from the government but he might want to review the government's other commitments. They haven't panned out too well.

For example, Prime Minister Martin's commitment to ballistic missile defence was pretty clear in April 2003 when he said, "I do not want people sending missiles over Canadian airspace without Canada being at the table and being part of the decision-making process." Later in 2003 he said "I am not in favour of a war in space, but I am in favour of a land-based anti-missile system." But come February 2005, Mr. Martin does an about-face and announces, "Canada will not take part in the proposed ballistic missile defence system." Amazing what a difference two years (not even five) make.

Similarly a commitment in last year's budget to fast track the procurement of a new fixed wing search-and-rescue aircraft has somehow been stalled in the financial shuffle. Finance Minister Ralph Goodale said, "Under Defence's current plan, deliveries of the new [fixed wing SAR aircraft] will begin much later in the decade. This budget sets aside non-budgetary resources to allow the Department of National Defence to move this acquisition forward in time without displacing other planned capital investments. By doing so, the Government will accelerate the process so that deliveries of the replacement SAR planes to Canada's military can begin within 12 to 18 months." That was 23 March 2004. Here we are, more than one year later, and there hasn't even been a call for bids. The air force is now hoping to have the aircraft operational by 2010.

And remember the plan in 2000 to fast track the Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability and have the first ship in the water in 2005? Well here we are in 2005, and practically the only movement in that project has been a name change – to Joint Support Ship.

And we can't forget the granddaddy of all stalled programs, the Maritime Helicopter Project. The previous government committed to speeding that up on a regular

basis, but somehow managed to drag it out for 12 years before awarding a contract.

Addressing this year's Conference of Defence Associations annual meeting, General Hillier talked about the government's budget promises. He said,

> I think there's a bit of a challenge here. Could we possibly have difficulty coming to the understanding things may have changed? Are we actually fighting what we heard a week ago, and are we just unwilling, first of all, to accept what was committed to by our government? And as I do my own analysis looking forward, no matter what government is in office I believe we have a commitment from them, on behalf of the people of Canada with their men and women in uniform, that that is the start of a reinvestment in the Canadian Forces and to allow us to turn a corner and become the Canadian Forces that Canadians need and want. Do you think that we possibly could accept that that could be the [inaudible] in our country? Because I do hear, obviously a lot of people who are suspicious, a lot of people who have some paranoia, all understandable perhaps, but a lot of people who simply refuse to accept that maybe what you have been doing, what others have been doing, has actually had some effect. And if I then, had a job that I would ask you to do in the future, it would be to ensure that that commitment is met and that the reinvestment which has been announced for over this next five years will continue, and in fact will be seen, looking backwards, as the place where we started turning the corner. I look at this as an accord from the government of Canada on behalf of the people of Canada with their men and women in uniform.

Well, General Hillier, I understand your need to believe the government really means what it says this time, and in your world perhaps people are honour-bound by their words. But these are politicians.

Sharon Hobson is an Ottawa-based Canadian defence analyst and Canadian correspondent for ***Jane's Defence Weekly****.*

Book Reviews

"Sink All the Shipping There" – The Wartime Loss of Canada's Merchant Ships and Fishing Schooners, by Fraser M. McKee, St. Catherines, Ontario, Vanwell Publishing, 2004, 336 pages, photos, appendices, bibliography, $39.95

Reviewed by Doug Thomas

This well-researched book by Fraser McKee provides the reader with 60 accounts of World War II Canadian-registered merchant and fishing vessel losses, many compiled from primary sources such as interviews with survivors. As most of the sinkings were the result of U-boat attacks, McKee has also included information about the attacking submarines and their eventual fate.

Stories of the losses are grouped into chapters according to owners or other common elements, so chapters have names like "Canadian Steamship Lines Loses Five Little Lakers" and "The Bullying U-boats Sink Seven Fishing Vessels." Many of the vessels described had been employed in transporting products such as wood pulp, ore and other bulk cargos on the Great Lakes and along the coast prior to the war, and continued this employment in UK waters in order to release larger vessels to trans-oceanic re-supply shipping. Each account includes a list of crew lost plus summary tables giving details of ownership, convoy group and means of destruction. Photographs of many of the ships, their crews and survivors, and details of the two principal types of U-boats are included.

A lengthy introductory chapter describes Canadian shipping of that time and how merchant ships operated during the war. The chapter discusses, for example, personnel issues (what happened to the survivors of a lost vessel if they decided not to sign on to another ship?), characteristics of wartime merchant ships – i.e., "defensively equipped merchant ships" – and their control and management. There is also a very interesting discussion of how convoys were structured and escorted. Did you know that merchant vessels with speeds over 13 knots were not required to join convoys because their speed was considered to be an adequate safeguard against U-boat torpedoes?

There are amazing and unique stories in this book. Thus, we read about, for example, the adventures of the Kings-

ton, Ontario-built *Canadian Beaver*, re-named *Shinai* and registered in Vancouver, then captured by Japanese forces in Sarawak as they over-ran Southeast Asia after Pearl Harbor and subsequently used as a Japanese freighter for nearly three years before being sunk by US bombers. We also read a compelling account of the ex-German *Weser*, captured by HMCS *Prince Robert* early in the war and refitted for service in the Canadian government Merchant Marine.

But this is not just an account of the fate of Merchant Marine vessels. As the title indicates, it also discusses the fate of fishing schooners. Many Canadian and Newfoundland fishing vessels were lost to U-boats. These vessels were usually sunk by gunfire after being abandoned by their small crews – a long row to shore normally ensued. These vessels were considered legitimate targets, as their cargoes supported the Allied war effort.

Fraser McKee has written prolifically about the Canadian Navy in numerous articles, as editor of the Naval Officers Association of Canada newsletter "Starshell" for many years, and in four books. McKee notes that the material included in "*Sink All the Shipping There*" was a result of research conducted for a previous book, *The Canadian Naval Chronicle*. He had insufficient room to fully tell the stories of the merchant navy in that book, so this follow-on reference was required. The maritime historical world is the richer for this decision.

His Memory Can Survive, by Ray W. Culley, published by Blitzprint, 2003. Copies are held in HMCS *Sackville* library.

Reviewed by Vice-Admiral Duncan "Dusty" Miller CMM MSC CD (Ret'd)

What a great little book. It tells the tales of a very young sailor who joined the Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve in early 1943. The sailor is the author, Ray Culley, born 27 June 1925 in Calgary, Alberta. He provides a factual series of short vignettes (32 to be exact), which are simple and personal from a time when boys became men all too quickly. His first story is hilarious. He tells how he and his friend realize that wearing a uniform guaranteed a Sadie Hawkins invitation to the Western Canada High School's dance. So off they go after school to the Recruitment Centre and join up. It works – they get invited to the dance – but they are shipped off that week and never get to the dance! But so it was during that time when serving was really subject to the exigencies of the service. Here is a poignant account as seen through the eyes of a 17 year old's first encounter with the military, the navy and the war.

Every person in the navy can give you a story for a story but few write them down. Mr. Culley has written them down and each one of them will invoke a sense of being there with him. If you were in the navy, you will have experienced a similar incident, guaranteed! The names of each chapter give you a clue as to the content. Chapters include Life in the Wavy Navy Begins, First Trip Out on the Big Pond, My First Big Mistake, The Newfie-Derry Run, How Not to Get an Irish Lass, Corvette Cuisine, Shore Leave in Paradise, We Decide Who the Real Enemy Is, and Coming Home. Each story has a fresh and comic wink-of-the-eye in it. You will be hard pressed to put the book down once you have started into it. Anyone who served in Her Majesty's Canadian Ship *Summerside*, past or present, will get a great kick out of this book as the author recounts his life aboard.

There is an ironic sadness in his story as he finds out his brother dies at home from a freak accident. Ray Culley fights the enemy and comes out of it alive while his brother dies at home. He dedicates the book to his brother, a fellow with a fearless nature and a love for challenges.

Ray Culley is still with us and will attend the services in Londonderry, Northern Ireland commemorating the end of the Battle of the Atlantic. "Derry" was the key stop for wartime Corvettes and holds a special place in the hearts of all those sailors who spent time there. In gratitude the people of Londonderry and their Royal Naval Association have invited Canadian servicemen and women from World War Two and members of the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust who look after the only surviving Corvette, HMCS *Sackville*, to attend their Commemoration Services in Northern Ireland on the anniversary in May 2005. The Trust has commissioned a "North Atlantic Convoy Bell" as a tribute to the veterans who fought in the Battle of the Atlantic – sailors, airmen and soldiers all took part in the longest running battle of the Second World War. What a fitting tribute.

Read Ray Culley's book and you will better understand the human side of courage, fun, sadness and triumph during a time of great sacrifice. Good on ya Ray Culley and all who served with you – as they say in the navy BRAVO ZULU, WELL DONE. This is a book well worth the read!

To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World, by Arthur Herman, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, 2004, 642 pages, photos, charts, $36.95

Reviewed by Doug Thomas

Arthur Herman has written a number of popular and highly readable histories – the last was *How the Scots Invented the Modern World*. *To Rule the Waves* describes the role played by Britain's seafarers and the Royal Navy in world history during the past 500 years. His thesis is that the Royal Navy forged a nation, then an empire and then the world as we know it today.

As an admirer of the Royal Navy and its history, I found this book very interesting. Some of the claims made by the author are very sweeping in their scope. The sea-borne explorations, scientific discovery and empire building of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries are in many ways analogous to the military struggles and ventures into space of the twentieth century. Other reviews of this book have questioned the author's statements – for example his supposition that the British Navy played a pivotal role in ending slavery – as being too general and explained by other means, but my view is that the reader should let Herman build his case. This I believe he does, in a highly readable and factual book that reads like a novel.

Certainly Herman dispels some legends. Thus, for example, Elizabethan heroes and explorers such as Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh were frequently motivated more by greed than patriotism. But scurvy, shipwrecks and the Spanish Inquisition were among the principal concerns of their day, and certainly made the profit motive more understandable. These early English mariners risked their lives in tiny ships: Sir Humphrey Gilbert was lost in a north Atlantic storm off Newfoundland in the 10-tonne vessel *Squirrel*. Can you imagine crossing the wintry north Atlantic in a vessel smaller than the Cape Island fishing boats that we see tucked into East Coast ports?

Most of the world's naval and merchant marine officers wear a uniform based on that of the Royal Navy. The author traces this trend to an event during the epic world cruise of Commodore George Anson. In 1742, while in Macao, China, it was necessary to impress a high-ranking mandarin visiting the flagship. Anson had the least-ill of his scurvy-ridden ship's company don the uniforms of his dead marines, and this was such a success that in a few years a dark blue and gold-trimmed uniform became the everyday dress of British naval officers.

Among other events, the book traces the pivotal role of the Royal Navy in defeating Napoleon's objective of world domination, its position as the leading naval power up to the end of World War I, and the diminution of fiscal support that (the author states) led to the end of *pax britannica* in the 1930s and the subsequent rise of tyrannical powers. The reduction in financial support also meant that the navy was not ready for World War II and took quite a battering over the next six years – more than 1,525 warships and 50,000 sailors were lost! A major problem throughout the war was the inadequacy of sea-based air power, largely due to a bureaucratic decision in 1921 that the Royal Air Force would control the navy's planes and pilots.

Herman traces the gradual demise of the RN in the post-war years, as the fixed-wing aircraft carrier fleet was paid-off, and the remaining small carriers were employed in anti-submarine warfare and amphibious roles. In the early 1980s, the British government decided to sell the new small carrier *Invincible* to Australia. This, and other ham-fisted political decisions, made the situation clear to the military junta ruling Argentina and in part led to the decision to invade the Falkland Islands. The Argentineans were very nearly proved right; certainly a little more patience by them would have been well rewarded as many of the principal vessels comprising the British task force would have been unavailable just a few months later. Nevertheless, the British naval force and embarked marines and soldiers were just sufficient to wrest control of the islands from the invaders in 1982, at considerable cost in ships and lives.

In short, *To Rule the Waves* is an interesting and easy read, a popular history that some anti-navalists may well scorn but which I believe is worthy of an interested reader's attention.

A Long and Eventful Journey to Halifax

David Whitehead

Sixty-two years ago, in the last weeks of September 1943, a westbound convoy assembled in the Western Approaches of the United Kingdom. This convoy was to be the last convoy attacked by the notoriously successful U-boat 'wolf pack,' the brainchild of Germany's Naval Commander, Admiral Karl Donitz. The convoy, ONS 18, was protected by 10 escort vessels, destroyers, frigates and corvettes of the Royal Navy and the RCN. One of this escort group was my ship, a destroyer, HMS *Escapade*. I had joined *Escapade*, my first ship, after her refit in Glasgow. I was a telegraphist, but my two fellow operators and I had been specially trained in HF/DF, which located U-boats by radio direction finding, a very successful weapon in the anti-U-boat armoury. This convoy was to be my first taste of action, not as a hero but as a rather scared 19-year old volunteer.

The convoy, and its shepherding escort, zigzagged westward for four or five uneventful days while the young 'rookies' got over their inevitable seasickness. We novices were looking forward to our promised landfall in Halifax, having been told by the regular sailors that we could expect a warm welcome in Nova Scotia, plus abundant good food and chocolate, things rationed and some non-existent in the UK at this time. We were, however, never to make harbour in Halifax, for on the night of 19 September, a U-boat wolf pack, comprising 10 or more submarines attacked the convoy using acoustic torpedoes (T5), which homed in on the noise of ships' propellers and were fired indiscriminately.

The U-boats sank many of the merchant ships and later several of the escort vessels. During the ensuing battle, *Escapade*, which had detected a U-boat, attacked for four hours, using depth charges and several salvos from the Hedgehog, a 24 bomb forward-firing weapon. Finally, attempting to ram the now surfaced submarine and at the same time fire another Hedgehog salvo, disaster struck. The Hedgehog misfired and the whole salvo of 24 high-explosive missiles exploded on the forecastle. The bows of our ship were ripped apart and the wheel-house and bridge superstructure were totally put out of action. The radio and HF/DF aerials were also destroyed.

Escapade veered away from the convoy and drifted far behind the other escorts. Fortunately, when the accident occurred the ship was at action stations and all watertight doors were shut, so there was flooding but only in the forward areas. When daylight broke we were many miles behind the convoy which was still under attack. We managed to get the badly damaged *Escapade* underway and then, completely alone, made the perilous journey back to our base on the Clyde. Twenty of the crew were injured, and during our solitary trip home, we buried at sea 24 of our ship's company.

Convoy ONS 18 continued westward, and for a further three days was constantly under attack and many more merchant ships were lost. To support the beleaguered escorts, the RCN 9th Support Group left its home port and joined in the battle. Sadly one of the group's destroyers, the HMCS *St Croix*, was sunk, some of her survivors being picked up by HMS *Itchen* and the corvette HMS *Polyanthus*. Both these warships were later torpedoed. There were only three men from the *Itchen* who survived, one previously picked up from the *St Croix*, tragically, her sole survivor.

Now, 62 years later, I am 80 plus, and on 24 April I am completing the aborted trip to Halifax, to attend the Battle of the Atlantic sixtieth anniversary commemorations, accompanied by my wife, Margaret. This trip is part of a scheme to allow veterans of WW II to return to theatres of war and places where they served, or in my case bases they were bound for; I chose Halifax. The scheme is called "Heroes Return" and grants to defray some of the costs are funded by the British Lottery Commission.

After attending the Battle of the Atlantic commemorative events in Halifax, organised by Lt. Pat Jessup, I have been asked, upon my return to the UK, to visit local schools to talk to children about WW II and my part in it, and in particular, the Battle of the Atlantic.

One amazing coincidence concerning our visit to Halifax is that, during the week of events, we are to put to sea to lay wreaths, from the deck of the WW II corvette HMCS *Sackville* which the Halifax Naval Authorities have lovingly preserved in sea-going fashion. This corvette was actually part of the fleet of Canadian Navy ships that came to the rescue of the convoy, which included my ship HMS *Escapade*, 62 years ago.

Thus, a life-time later, as a guest of the RCN, I am making the pilgrimage to Halifax to complete the aborted journey I was making in the ill-fated convoy ONS 18.

Canadian Naval Centennial

Captain (Navy) John Pickford

The aim of the Canadian Naval Centennial (CNC) Project is to plan, coordinate and provide oversight to a variety of events, functions and celebrations that showcase the Canadian Navy, and that help to build and strengthen in Canadians an appreciation for the navy and its contributions to Canada during a century of service from 1910 to 2010. It will promote the navy of today, the requirement for the next navy and the navy after next through the achievements of the past and the present, and endorsing the role a navy plays in a maritime country like Canada.

In March 2004 a project charter was issued on the authority of the then Chief of Maritime Staff, Vice-Admiral R.D. Buck. The purpose of the charter is to provide strategic governance for the planning, evaluation, scheduling and execution of all activities related to the commemoration. In February 2005 an initial project team was formed with the author as the project manager. Over the next couple of years the team will be augmented by up to four Public Affairs and Financial officers.

The coordinating organization chaired by the author is the Canadian Naval Centennial Working Group (CNCWG). It comprises representatives from the three navy formations – the NOAC, Navy League, Canadian Force Personnel Support Agency – and other government departments including Heritage Canada, Veterans Affairs Canada and the Canadian War Museum. The aim of the CNCWG, as the coordinating body for the CNC, is to engage all areas of the maritime community seeking ideas for centennial events, and provide advice and support in their planning and execution. A large part of the role of the CNCWG will be to establish strategic partnerships with key organizations to maximize private and corporate support of centennial activities.

The centennial will be officially marked from summer 2009 until winter 2010. Planning has commenced already. In December 2003 a very successful initial meeting was held with Canada Post to discuss centennial stamps. The presentation included the design of three new collections (themes), ships of the navy were featured prominently in one set, another highlighted the men and women of the navy, and the third featured four senior officers who have had a profound impact on the Naval Service of Canada. Along similar lines, procurement of commemorative coins and other Royal Canadian Mint products is an assignment for the team. Another activity, this one being pursued by the Navy League on behalf of the CNCWG, is the sponsorship of a centennial logo design contest as well as developing the particulars of an essay contest. Also, preliminary discussions are underway with the Canadian War Museum to display exhibits and artwork. Much activity will be centred on the 24 Naval Reserve Divisions, which remain today the most visible manifestation of naval presence across the country. There are several events being planned including: exercising (or obtaining) Freedom of the City, open houses, interactive displays and performances of the Naval Reserve Band.

Another interesting activity that supports the centennial is "Canada's Navy Then: Canada's Navy Now," also known as the Colonial Sailor Program. This program is designed to raise public awareness in communities of the maritime aspects of the colonial period through the re-enactment of historical events with actors in period costume and using period boats. For example, events for 2005 include "Une Après-midi avec la Marine Royale, 1758" in Ile aux Noix, Montreal, in June, and in July "The Colonial Sailor of 1812" in Niagara-on-the-Lake. Future events will include a "Salute to HAIDA," and a Kingston to Quebec City voyage in period boats and whalers – a cooperative effort with the Navy League and Sea Cadets to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the founding of Quebec City.

These are only a few of the activities that will occur during centennial celebrations. With the stand up of the project team, the appropriate guidelines and directions will be put in place that articulate the methodology for the administration, coordination and execution of events and activities that stakeholders (and other interested parties) can submit for inclusion into the centennial program.

There is much to do in the next few years. Fleet assemblies, Canadian port visits, parades, dinners and other commemoration activities, large and small, with a national or regional reach will all be considered. I encourage and look forward to the involvement of the broader Canadian naval family in marking this historic milestone in a most memorable manner. I may be reached at the following email address: pickford.kj@forces.gc.ca.

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